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INTRODUCTION 
History and geography have very often conspired cruelly against 
the Balkans , and Yugoslavia lying at their heart , has felt the 
brunt of several invasions . I llyrians , Celts , Greeks , Romans , 
and many other stronger powers , have in the past , controlled the 
component parts of the present state. 
The Slavs made their appearance in the Balkan Peninsula in 
the s ixth and seventh centuries. Like their predecessors the Celt s ,  
Goths and Huns , the Slavs crossed the Danube , entered the Eastern 
Roman Empire and caused the same devastation as early invaders . 1 
The shattered villas and broken temples of both Greek and 
Roman Civilizations had left dumb witnesses which testified to 
the magnificence of these former cultures .  As the peninsula 
remained desolate , devoid of any substantial culture , the Avars and 
Slavs attacked Constantinople and were defeated by superior forces . 
Contentions over the role of leadership split the united tribes of 
Avars and Slavs . The latter remained . In the ensuing centuries 
they occupied the Balkan Peninsula, from the region north of the 
Danube and the sources of the Sava and Drava Rivers in the Plps , to 
the coastal region of the Aegean and the northern highlands of 
Albania , from the Balkan Mountains to the shores of the Adriatic .2 
1 
George Macadam, "Jugoslavia, the New Great State of the 
Balkans , Comprising the Serbs, Croats and the Slovene s , •  World's 
Work, XXXVII (December, 1918 ) ,  154-155. 
2 
Ibid . , p. 155 . 
2 
The group who settled in the eastern areas acquired Byzantine 
influences , while the western group came under the heavy hand of 
Rome. These pressures became particularly significant after 1054, 
when there developed the famous fissure between the Pope in 
Rome and the Patriarch in Constantinople . The River Drina became 
a major line of demarcation when those Slavs west of it adopted 
Roman Catholicism , and their neighbors east of the river joined 
the Orthodox Church .3 
Nine centuries later, Yugos lavia, one of the youngest states 
in Europe , can avow to a history of freedom lost and freedom 
regained. As a land conquered, divided and redivided , it became 
the famous crossroad where the civilization of the West had met 
and struggled with that of the East. As the historical home of 
several cultures, Yugoslavia has a population of twenty-one million, 
comprised of the major nationalities within the regions of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, Macedonia, Montenegro , Serbia, 
Slovenia and Vojvodina. This includes many minority groups such 
as the Shiptars , Hungarians , Turks , Slovaks , Bulgarians , Czechs , 
Rumanians , Gyps ies and several others who embrace three religious 
faiths , speak three main languages and numerous other d1alects .4 
Highl ighting the turbulent interwar period in Yugoslavia, 
1918-1941,  the purpoee of this the s i s  is to investigate and analyse 
3 
Stephen Clissold, ed. , A Short Histor� of Yugoslavia 
(Cambridge , England: University Pre s s ,  i96 ) , pp. 8-12. 
4 
Robert Paul Jordan, •Yugoslavia: Six Republics in One , •  
National Geographic , CXXXVII , No. 5 (May, 1970), 592-593. I 
3 
the socio-political structure under which the Southern Slav peasant 
existed. Emphasizing the suppressive atmosphere produced by a 
highly centralist-dominated State , it will relate his str�ggle 
and determination to preserve his unique cultural traditions and 
his desire to be separated from the Serbian, hegemonic yoke . 
Secondly, this treatise will review the struggle between the 
forces of centralism and the forces of federalism, interrelated 
with the principal political vexation of Yugoslavia in the two 
decades- the largely unsolved •Croatian Question . •  
Thirdly, the primary and most important organizational 
spokesman for the peasant, the Croat Peasant Party , will be traced 
through its political evolution in the interwar period; its reaction 
and consequent retaliatory tactics employed against the existing 
political structure in Yugoslavia; the measures it undertook to 
enhanae peasant eulture and promote their needs ; and the reasons 
why this party and other affiliated parties failed to offer a 
satisfactory program of revision that was acceptable to the peasantry . 
Fourthly, attention has been placed on reappraising King 
Alexander ' s  efforts to placate and conciliate the three major 
national groups , Croats , Serbs and Slovene s ,  and how, that while 
his dictatorship failed to resolve the fundamental perplexities 
of concurrence , it was only a temporary stage in the Monarch • s  
scheme to reconcile all the Southern Slavs into a unified and 
single State . An attempt has been made to rectify previous 
testimonies by both British and American historians , who have 
underrated the King•s proficiency in administrative reform and his 
appreciation and concern for peasant poverty and the advancement 
4 
of technology in agriculture. 
Fifthly, this paper will discuss the years following King 
Alexander ' s  assassination and the Regency ' s  reconciliatory attitude 
toward the sundry national groups after 1934. Demonstrating how 
the Croat Peasant Party achieved power at the end of the period, 
this thes is will show that the Sporazum ( Agreement ) ,  of 1939 had 
been procrastinated too long, and that it  failed to propitiate the 
Serbs and Croats .  
Finally, it will try to assemble in conclusion, the domestic 
and internal ingredients of Yugoslavia's political dissent and 
impotence in the period between the wars : the little political, 
ideological and sooial cohesion manifested by the ruling clas s ;  
the position and wide dissatisfaction of the peasant masses ; the 
incapacity of the leading parties to meet the economic and political 
challenges in the country ; and the inability of the political 
fraternities , who were concerned with particularistic ambitions 
and the protection or their region's interests, to encounter the 
economic and political challenges of Yugoslavia as a single unify­
ing force . 
In order to understand the e&sent1al patterns and problems 
associated with the Southern Slav peaaanta , it la necessary to 
review the mixed and. variegated formation or the nationalities 
in brief .  Serbia, the largest region, was an independent state 
during the Middle Age s ,  and essentially, the only regten to become 
an independent kingdom in .. th• n·ineteenth centur.y. . ).tlhile the area 
is rich in antiquity, reYealing evidence of human habitation as 
far back as the paleolithic period, the first evidence of a s trong 
5 
dynasty did not come unt i l  the twelfth century during the �eign 
/_ of Steven Nemanja , the founder o"f the .Nemanjic Dynasty. Under 
this family Serbia became a center of unity, good government and 
growing education. 5 
� During the reign of the Nemanjic kings the independent Serbian 
church became wealthy and powerful and promoted cultural activities 
and civilization throughout Serbia.6 At the same time there were 
three major developments in Serbian history. The first was an 
"" attempt by the Nemanjic rulers to create internal stability and 
in this they were greatly assisted by leading church officials 
such as S t .  Sava who was responsible for giving the Serbians a 
national church. Secondly , the age was marked by foreign ex�nsion, 
and finally, it was an epoch of great economic awakening as m�ning 
yie lded rich copper, tin, s ilver and gold deposits, wealth that 
enabled the Serbian rulers to muster a strong mercenary force for 
defense .7 
One of the greatest episodes of Serbian history came during 
v the reign of Stephen Dusan, 1331-13 5 5 ,  who after conquering the 
Bulgarians , was able to be crowned Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks. 
Under him , Serbia became for a time the chief power in the Balkan 
Peninsula. The Serbian King extended his sway over Macedonia, 
8 
Thessal7 , Epirus , Albania, Bosnia and part of Bulgaria. 
_ 
5Ha?'Oli w. v. Temperley, His tory of Serbia ( London: Bel l ,  
1919) , p. 40. 
6 Phyllis Auty, Yugoslavia (London: Thames and Hudson , 1965), 
pp. 2 5-28. 
7c11ssold, op, cit. , pp. 92-95. 
81ynn Thorndike , The History of Medieval Europe ( Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company , 1928), p. 534. 
6 
Shortly after his coronation the King issued the famous Code 
Zakonik, which consolidated the brilliance of Roman Law with 
Serbian folkways. 9 
After his death the peninsula witnessed the break-up of the 
Serbian Empire as disorder and rebellion ran rampant. The final 
collapse followed after the battles of Maritsa, 1371; Kosovo, 1389; 
10 and Smederevo, 1459. The success of the Turks was marked by the 
fact that after 1440, Moslem rule dominated the greater section 
of Serbia. While Serbians remained under the rule of the Muslim 
conquerors, others migrated into the Vojvodina area. The Turkish 
/ regime allowed considerable independence and major compaints, 
which were vocalized against the new government, concerned the 
recruiting methods employed in the janissary divisions. 
By the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire was showing 
great stra1na of decline as they were repulsed from Vienna in 1683. 
By the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699·, Turkey lost Hungary and Croatia­
Slavonia; however, Serbia remained under Turkish control until 
gradual liberation came in the early part of the nineteenth 
century. � In 1804, the Serbians, under George Petrovic, •Kara 
Ge·orge," rose against the Janissary army over the question of 
internal autonomy. In a second rebellion under the auspices of 
v / a former collaborator, Milos Obrenov1c, substantial autonomy was 
gained for the Serbians south of the Danube. 11 
9Malcolm Burr presented an excellent discussion on the Code 
in The Slavonic and East European Review, XXVIII, No. 70 (November, 
1949}, 198-21?. 
181issold, op. cit. , pp. 95-105. 
11Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants Politics and Economic Chan e 
Yugoslavia (Stanford, Ca ifornia: University Press, 
7 
The most prominent feature emanating. out of the conflict for 
Serbian freedom was the development of national sentiment which 
manifested itself in many ways . For instance,  the church played 
an extended role in preserving Serbian national consciousne ss 
during the Turkish dominance. This was especially true where parish 
priests were frequent agitators and leaders in peasant uprisings . 
Until the beginning of the eighteenth century the Serbian 
chureh acted as a substitution for a state. When the church was 
showing symptoms of decay, the roots of national , spiritual awaken­
ing were breaking through the surface . Serbian students championed 
the ideas of the Enlightenment and went off to attend Western 
universities . 
/ 
Men like Kimitrije Obradovic travelled extensively in the 
Wes t ,  returned to Serbia, and contributed to Serbia ' s  literary 
renaissance by spawning interest and work in linguistic studies. 
� / / 
Another pioneer ,  Vuk Karadzic , became inspired by Obradovic's 
talents and developed a deep curiosity for Serbia ' s  past glories 
and traditions . Es sentially a Romantic, he was more concerneQ. 
with keeping Serbia free from Western influences. In an age when 
. / Slavic students were listening to poets li�e Ja� Kollar , one of 
v "'� 
the founders of Panslavism , and Pavel Josef Safarik, a S lovak 
scholar , who called for the awakening of distinctive character 
v / 
in existing S lav nationalities ,  Karadzic collected and studied 
Serbian popular poetry and stories , and even edited a Serbian 
12 °/ v / 
dictionary and grammar. Both Obradov1c and Karadzic were 
12 
H .  G. Schenk, The Mind of the European Romantics (Garden 
City, New York : Doubleday and Company, Inc . ;  1969)-, pp. 16-17. 
opposed by the strongly conservative Serbian Orthodox church 
which had lost a great deal of its own literary prestige to the 
new mcvements. 
After the Treaty or Adrianople in 1829 when Serbia was 
recognized as an autonomous principality, the new territory 
engaged in a number or campaigns to free the Serbs beyond its 
borders. In 1848, the Serbs in southern Hungary rose against 
8 
the Magyars, and again in 18?6, when an anti-Turkish rebellion 
broke out in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Joining with Russia in 18?7, 
Serbta made war on Turkey. By the terms of the Congress of 
Berlin both Serbia and Montenegro aohieved complete independence 
and the area of both territories was considerably augmented. 13 
Serbia's political history in the nineteenth century observed 
the changing of eight rulers between 1815 and 1903. Enervated by 
/ / 
the Karadjordjevic and Obrenovic feuds, intrigues, and scandals, 
Serbia did not embark on a program of national expansion until 
the reign of Peter I. There is an agreement among historians 
that ,just prior to the opening of hostilities in 1914, constitutional 
liberalism and the parliamentary system had progressed further in 
Serbia under the reign of Peter I, than in any other country of 
Eastern or Central Europe. Furthermore, the Serbian state far 
exceeded those developments in some countries or Western Europe 
like Germany and Austria-Hungary. 14 
13 MacAdam, op. cit. , p. 157. 
14Alex N. Dragn1oh, •King Peter I: Culmination of Serbia's 
Struggle for Parliamentary Government,• East European Quarterly, 
LV, No. 2 (June, 1970), 178. 
Croatian history was very much different from that of the 
Serbs. More subject to northern and western influences, because 
of her geographical location, Croatia accepted Roman Catholicism 
and took part in the cultural heritage of the West as reflected 
in Croatian art and architecture. Religious activity reached a 
peak in the twelfth century as attempts were made to eradicate 
the custom of celebrating church liturgy in the vernacular. 
9 
As a self-sustaining kingdom, Croatia did not emerge until 
924 A .D .  when one of the Z'upans of Nin, Tomislav, assumed the 
title of king. The history of Croatia from the twelfth to the 
si�teenth century is largely consolidated under Hungarian history. 
Croatia experienced a great deal of domestic troubles, feudal 
rivalries, the Turkish menace and peasant unrest during this 
span of four hundred years.15 
Stimulations for scholarly pursuits into Slavic antiquity 
were felt as early as the sixteenth century in Croatia. Yuri 
Krizhanich, a Croatian Catholic priest, travelled to Moscow to 
propagate the dominion of foreigners. Calling for the union of 
the Greek and Roman churches, Kr1zhan1ch, can be cited as one of 
the earliest forerunners of Pan-Slavism in the Balkans. 
In the nineteenth oentury nationalistic groups such as the 
proponents of the Illyrian Movement proposed unification of all 
South Slavs living in the lands previously known as Illyria. One 
of its adherents, Bishop Strossmayer, tried to bring about Slav 
15 Clissold, op, cit., pp. 23-24. 
10 
unity and agreement between Catholic and Orthodox Slav s .  Mostly 
concerned with Croat ian autonomy , Bishop Strossmayer was also 
active in promoting Slavic art ,  literature, education and politics. 
Advancing the rediscovery of Croatian culture , he strove to develop 
national consciousness and to gain independence for Croatia.16 
Between 1868 and 1918 , Croatia-S lavonica was under the reign 
of Hungarian supremacy. It was at this time that the Croats 
started to develop a political life . The most popular 
organization was the National Party, which stood for Croatian 
independence associated with Hungary in the person of a joint 
king. Another party, the Magyarons ,  pro-Magyars, claimed that 
Croatia was part of the lands of the crown or st. Stephen. Tpe 
v , 
Party of Croat R ights, founded by Ante StarceTic, 1823-1896, 
demanded unity of all Croat provinces into one kingdom and that 
the Sabor of that kingdom should decide whom i t  would elect as 
�1ng of Croatia. Many of these early parties vehemently fought 
the imposition of Magyar rule over Croatia .17 
Following the terms of the Nagoda, the Croat assembly called 
the S!bor functioned as an advisory board to assist the Hungarian 
repre�entative-governor , the �. S ince the assembly was never 
really represented by the total Croatian population, the principles 
of self-government were not practiced among the Croatian people. 18 
Many Austrian politicians were cognizant of the growing 
16 
Karen Krek •Bishop Strossmayer: Defender of Croatian 
Nationalism• (Southern Illinois University, Ullpublished seminar 
paper ,  1970 ), pp. 27-29 . 
17 z. Kostelsk i ,  The Yu oe avs : of the Yu oslavs 
and their States to the Creation of ugos av1a New York : 
Philosophical Library, 1952), pp. 208-209. 
18Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division, Jugoslavia, Vol I I  
(Norwich, England : Jarrold and Sons Ltd ., 1944) ,  p. 319. 
11 
uneasiness of the Croatian inhabitants and became apprehensive that 
they would destroy the equilibrium of the empire. They accepted 
the program offered by the Tr1al1stic faction, that is, a Croat­
Dalmatian-Bosnian State having equality with Austria and Hungary 
within a triune monarchy.19 The two chief Croatian parties, of 
which more will be said later, were autonomist and non-separatist. 
The Slovenes were fortunate in having lived in the same 
territory through many centuries. As one of the smallest regions, 
Slovenia consisted of a homogeneous national group. The Slovenes 
ha�e occupied their present territory since the sixth century. 
During the Medieval period the mountainous region, which never 
became an independent state, was ruled first by Germans, and in 
the sixteenth century. it became a comparative part of the Habsburg 
domain and rema1ned 1n the Auetrian Empire until 1918. 
The history of the Slovenes has been regarded by some critics 
as the histor7 of their struggle against German violence, of which 
aims varied according to different periods. To political and 
religious domination and to the acquisition of landed property, 
which the feudal system needed, was added later on, the traditional 
pclicy of the German Emperors: the Drang nach Osten with its 
20 aspirations to absorb the Italian lands which lay beyond Slovenia. 
Predominately Roman Catholic, the Slovenes were sporadically 
v 
influenced during the Reformation by men like Pr1moz Trubar, a 
19 
Ludwell Denny, •Pacifist Revolution in Croatia,• Current 
History, XVI! (Nov�mber, 1922 ) ,  256 . 
20 
Ivan Zholger, •concerning the SloYenes,• The Balkan Review, 
I ,  No. 6 (July, 1919 ) ,  445 . 
12 
religious zealot and social reformer , whose ideas inspired 
several dissenter groups . .  As the Counter-Reformation permeated 
through the Habsburg Empire , . heretics were seyerely persecuted in 
Slovenia . Shortly after thie the Catholic Church played the major 
role in moat of the polit ical and social life of the country . 2 1  
Balthasar Hacque t ,  a Freneh philologist ,  botantiet , geologist 
and phys ician , travelled through the regions.or Carinthia and 
Cariola between 1779-1786 and in his Abbildung und Beschreibung 
der s�dweat-und Astli�hen Wenden, Jllyi:er und S laven, round 
Slovenian peaaanta starYing and attached •to their atoney land , •  
�nd oondemned •not their laziness , but the waste ot resources 
entai led in exceas1Te churoh-building. •22 
While rural poyerty waa generally the pictµre of peasant life 
in.the eighteenth oentur1. the S lovenes stood out in retaining 
�heir national character and deyeloped a remarkable l iterary 
t�adition. In art, �he Slovenes produced their own peaaant 
heritage uniquely diapla7ed in their regional coatumea, woodcraft,  
and decorations in home and p&l'ish church . 
In the nineteenth century , SloTenia underwent great agri­
cultural snd industrial change, and through the programs of 
organization established by political fr•t•rnities , such as the 
Catholic Slovene People'• PBl'ty , many Slovenes wen.t into learning 
programs . S lovene nationalism continued to grow and round 
expression in many cultural, economic , and sports organizations . 
21L. s. S tavrianos, The Balkans Since 145.J (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Win•ton , 19.5S5, p. 2J1. 
22phyll1• Auty , •Yugosl&Yia,• Contrasts in Emerging Societies , 
ed. Doreen Warr1nger (Bloomington , Indiana: Indiana University 
Press ,  196 5 ) ,  pp. J49-35J. 
13 
The first evidences among the Slovenes of political 
Yugoslavism became apparent with the rise of nationalism when they 
began to •reel more and more the chains of provincial boundaries , •  
and in • the spring of nations• in 1848 they demanded for the first 
time a "United Slovenia, • while a partition followed , this tendency 
recurred in 1870 ,  1878 , and once again prior to the First World 
War.23 Coinciding with general political tensions , Slovene­
Yugoslav co-operation joined hands in witnessing the deteriorations 
of the Hababurg state . Three Slov� political parties: the All 
Slovene People ' s  Party, better kneJIJl aa the 'Claricala •: the 
National Progressive Party; and the Yugoslav Social Democratic 
Party, all of which were formed in the 1890's determined the 
24 overall nature of Slovene YugoslaTism. 
One of the outstanding aspects of the Movement was loyalty 
to Austria, whil.e. independence for Slovenes , or Habeburg South 
Slavs was not conaidered.25 Among the conspicuous points of the 
SloYene Liberals was that befor� the First World War they con­
st1 tuted a str�nghold of Rusaian-orientated Panalavism. When 
several or the Liberals visited Buaaia they became disillusioned 
26 to the evils of Russian autooraoy. After the asaasaination of 
23Anthony J. Klan�ar , •sloYenia and the Slovenes , •  Journal of 
Central European Affair s ,  V I ,  No . 1 (April. 1946 ), 6. 
24carole Rogel, 'The Sloyenes and Political YugoalaTism on the 
Eve of World War I , •  East European Quarterlz, IV, No. 4 (January , 
1971 ) , 409. 
25 Ibid., p. 409. 
26Hans Kohn, Pan-SlaYism, Its History and Ideology , Rev . 
(New York: Vintage , 19bO), p. 245. 
14 
the Austrian Arohduke , the Slovenian parties cb-opped their reforming 
efforts and zeal to unify the Southern Slavs until after the war. 27 
Macedonia, until recently , one of the poorest regions , has 
been the most fought over of all the regions within Yugoslavia. A 
land of high mountains and cultivated plains , Macedonia ' s  strategic 
importance as an access to the Aegean Sea was early realized by the 
Greeks , Romana and Byzantines consecutively. During the Serbian 
v interlude in the fourteenth century , Stephen Duaan established his 
capital at Skoplje. After his death in 1355, Macedonia was conquered 
by the Turks and many Macedonians were converted to Islam. 
In the nineteenth century the strategic value of Macedonia 
became a contentious subject among the Great Powers . The sentim,nt 
of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, (!PIRO ) ,  and those who 
w�nted the incorporation or all Macedonia into Bulgaria. Macedonia 
was one of the most disputed areas in the Balkans and the peace of 
Europe , during this e,. , rested •on a counterpoise of pressure• in 
this region. By the end or the nineteenth century th1• area had 
been partitioned among the various minorities. The Turkish factions 
wanted to see Macedonia remain in an indigent , ignorant and insurgent 
oondltion so that they could claim and retain i t .28 
After the Balkan Wars, the Treaty of Bucharest partitioned 
Macedonia to �he 8d.Yantage of Serbia and Greece while Bulgaria 
was excluded. After the conflict, Macedonia underwent great 
27 Roge l ,  op. cit . ,  418 .  
28 
Lord Courtney of Penwith, ed . ,  Nationalism and War in the 
Near East ( London : Humphrey Milford , 19l5), pp. 81-86. 
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economic and political transitions . 
The smallest of Yugoslavia ' s  regions. Montenegro, is what Wales 
is to the United Kingdom. Its rugged , mountainous regions lent 
itself to centuries of guerrilla warfare . As one modern Monte­
negrin retorted a year ago : •we have freedom; we have always fought 
for independence. No one has ruled u• for long . •29 Just how true 
these statements are i• revealed in Montenegrin history. Receiving 
its name in the fifteenth century, it is the Venetian translation 
of the native name Crnagora (Taernagora) ,  which means •Black 
Mountain. •  Montenegro obtained its name either from the dark 
forests within its mountain ranges ,  or from the 'Black Prince , •  
/ 
Crnojevio , who founded a dynasty there after the fall of the Serbian 
Empire .JO After the death of King Du�an in 1355, the area to be 
known as Montenegro as an independent pr1no1pal1ty.31 
For centuries it was a loose association or tribal kingdoms 
ruled by a bishop-prince . Patriarohalism marked the whole make-up 
of life in the region.32 In 1516 , the state was transformed into 
a theocracy, ruled by the Bishops or Cetinje . Losing sovereignty 
to the Turks in 1499, the tribes• people resisted until the end of 
the seventeenth century, when it was revived under Biahop Danilo 
Petrovicf.J3 
In the nineteenth century, Montenegro witnessed the reign of 
29 
Jordan, op, cit .,  p.  6 31 
JOA. H .  E .  Taylor, 'The Future of Montenegro • The Balkan 
Review, I I ,  Nos .  2 and 3 (September-October, 1919), 93.  
Jl Clissold, op, cit. , p. 73 . 
32 Tomasevieh, op. oit . , p. 73 . 
33Jara Ribnikar , Yugoslavia-One Long Summer ( New York:  McGraw­
Hill Book Co . ,  1964 ) ,  p.  20.  
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four rulers . Peter I ,  ( 1782-1830 ) ,  furnished Montenegro with its 
first code of laws . Marked by continual struggle against the Turks , 
Peter II, ( 1830-1851),  was known as the •poet• Vlad.ika and the last 
of his line . Danilo I I ,  �851-1860 ) ,  assumed the title or Gospog.ar 
after deciding to break with past traditions and take himself a 
wife . Danilo introduced a new constitution in 1852, and he 
remained a friendly pawn of Austria and stayed at peace with Turkey.  
Assassinated in 1860, he was succeeded b� Nicholas I whose1s reign 
was marked by territorial expansion and peaceful development until 
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars . 34 
Montenegro's chief source of livelihood th�oughout its history 
remained mainly agricultural and the mountainous terrain lent 
itself to the raising of sheep. With the increasing population in 
the nineteenth century and a need for arable land, the system of 
common land , devised to furnish all farmera with ground , was sub­
divided into holdings for individual familie s .  As a result wide­
spread poverty developed and many families emigrated in a continuous 
process from Montenegro .35 A movement for union between Serbia and 
Montenegro waa debated after a stretch of territory called the 
sanjak of Novi Pazar was partitioned between the two . Plans for 
this union were being drawn up despite the objection of Austria 
when war broke out in 1914.36 
34 Clissold, qp. cit . ,  pp. 77-85 . 
3.5 
Tomasevieh, op. cit. , p.  129. 
36 
Clissold, op, oit . ,  p. 86. 
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For a people who have ::always looked toward the sea, Dalmatia, 
represents Yugoslavia ' s  •window on the Adriatic . "  37 Sinoe the time 
when the Roman Emperor Diocletian built hia palace in Split and 
settled there in 305 A.D.  to the Byzantine predominance.up to 535 
A .D . ,  Dalmatia proved to be both an important strategic littoral 
area ror ports and a major emporium for trade along the Adriatic 
Sea. 
After the Byzantine reign both Croatia and Venice jockeyed for 
power over the region. In the twelfth century Hungary grew 
interested in the coastal possibilities of Dalmatia and engaged in 
twenty-one wars with Venice over the valuable coastal eities.
38 
The Venetians acquired all the vital centers by the firat portion 
of �he fifteenth century; however, the new acquisitions fell into 
the hands of the Ottoman Turks after 1537. They , in turn, quickly 
established their feudal system and helped increase the Slav 
character that was superseding the older Latin personality in 
39 
D�lmatia. 
After the liberation of this fringe province in the early 
par� of the eighteenth century, the Treaties of Karlovoi ( 1699 ); 
v and Pozarevac ( 1718 ) ,  respectively recognized Venice ' s  sovereignty 
over much that this Italian state had lost before . Improvising a 
land-tenure system, Venice succeeded in setting up a Military 
37 
Gilbert M .  Grosvenor , •Yugoslavia ' s  Window on the Adriati� , "  
National Geographic, CXXI, No. 2 ( February, 196 2 ) , 219 . 
38 
T .  G .  Jackson, Dalmatia, The Quarnero and !stria (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1890 ) ,  pp. 118-120. 
39 
Clissold, op. cit . ,  p. 48. 
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Frontier in which large tracts of land were assigned to peasant 
leaders who had previously served in the wars against the Ottomans. 
These estates were developed into farms and regulated by a curious 
mandate known as the �Lex Grim.an�� which played an enormous role 
40 in goTerning all sections of agriculture. 
The intellectual life in the larger Dalmatian cities between 
the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries far surpassed the adjacent 
activities manifested in the neighbor.Slavic provinces.within the 
II v J>eninaula.· Korcula..-->StMntk, T.rogir .. and .Zara. flo.uriahed with the 
same·architec�Ul!al. characteriatics and patterna di.aplayed in st. 
Mark ' s Square�_the. Ducal Palazzo and the Grand Canal of Venice. 
/ / 
Marko Marulic, a famous religious human1at, and Ivan Gundulic, a 
dramatist and author, apearheaded Dalmatian scholarship between 
the sixteenth and 1eyenteenth centuries. 
Dalmatian civilization declined in the eighteenth oentury as 
Venice ended her lengthy career as a great power. From.. the 
collapse or this Adriatic power in 1797 to 1805, Dalmatia found 
& new but dialiked ruler- Auatria. Increased acceptance of 
Dalmatia •• fast-changing foreign rule came when the Napoleonic 
defeat of Austria ceded Dalmatia to France after the signing or 
the Treaty of Preasburg in 1805 . The ideas that had developed 
from the Frenoh Revolution , political, cultural and social, were 
exchanged at Dal11&tian gateways into the Balkans and were to have 
a profound significance in the later political innovations of th� 
40 
TomaseT ich , op. cit., p. 116 . 
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South Slavs .41 
Between 1809 and 1813, Dalmatia formed part of the I llyrian 
Provinces . The French occupation was short-lived and by 1814 the 
last of the Napoleonic contingents were evacuated from the coastal 
province . During the French interlude there were considerable efforts 
made to improve the conditions in Dalmatia. Road• were built , 
commerce thrived, agricultural methods were amended to produce 
higher yields, some educational advancements were achieved , the 
establishment of a centralized police s7stem discouraged violations 
of the law and a great deal of religious toleration was afforded 
to the Orthodox sects. 
At the Congre11 of Vie?Ula when the allies were dividing up 
•the Cake of Europe , •  Austria received, as stipulated in the Treaties 
of 1814 and 1815, the provinces of Dalmatia. When the heads of the 
Congress had returned to their respective nations, the distant 
coastal strip, once ruled by an •1ron-willed1 Emperor, was stream­
lined both executively and administratively to meet the conservat1Ye 
tastes of the Viennese bureauorats. 
In 1861, the flowering or national awakening was imminent as 
several societies spoke out for Dalmatian autonomy. While there 
were many Unionists demands for dual oonsolidationa with Croatia, 
Aaetrian official• turned a deaf ear. 
Even though the history of Dalmatia presents a stormy picture, 
nowhere else h&Ye the olashes between East and West in Yugoslavia 
41 
Ibid . ,  p. 116 . 
been more apparent than in Bosnia-Hercegovina. One of the last 
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of the large Medieval South Slav states to lose its independence , 
Bosnia did not attain collective individuality until th� end of the 
twelfth century. A personage in the early history of this centralized, 
inland province was Kulin, who in the eleventh century led the move 
towards national autonomy. 
Bogomili•m was one or the early facets of Bosnia that generated 
a great impact in the religious fields. It aro•e as a protest 
against the secular interests of the clergy, advocating that material 
things were the product of the devil. Leading an existence of rigid 
ascetism, the Bogomil •upporters disbelieved many of the Christian 
�eneta, which made tbem outlaws of the church.42 
Another outstanding ruler, Stephen Tvrtko, •tands out in 
�o�nian legends and literature. In 1J76 , he crowned himself •King 
of the Serbs, and of Bosnia, and the tideland area•. •43 After his 
dea�h discordance followed in the Bo•nian territories and the 
threatening Ottoman Turks became involved in the turbulent political 
life of the province. �/ During the fifteenth century , Stephen Vu�cic , 
was granted the title 9r 'Duke of St Sava• and the title in its. 
" German form is the origin of the name Hercegovina. 
The Bosnian state broke down in 1463, after continual internal 
str"ggle and external preaaurea. One or the salient results of the 
42 
A. S. Peake and B. G. Parsons, An Ou•line of Chrietianity: 
The Storz of Our C1Y111aat1on, Vol. II._(_LO_na_. o_n __ : ___ T�h-e __ W_a_v_e_r_l_e_y __ _ 
Book Co., L�d., n.d.), pp. 24)-245. 
43 Clis•old , op. cit. , pp. 60-61. 
� Ibid., p. 6 2 .  
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Turkish occupation was that many Bosnians were converted to the 
Islamic faith. According to some historians this was understandable 
as the Boanian nobility recognized i n  this a chance for them to 
preserYe some or their former prope�ty and power. For the peasants 
it repreaented a chance to gain freedom.
45 After the conquest the 
Turks introduced the aame system of land tenure as they had in the 
other South Slavic States. 
. The Turkish occupation lasted from 1463 to 1878. When Bosnia 
became an Austrian province, the territories were still indirectly 
under Tut-kish sovereignty until 1908. One momentous oonsequence of 
the nineteenth centl11"1 in Bo•nia was the Ottoman Reforms. This was 
spawned by the 18.lle national awakening fever that had affected her 
neighbors . In order to smother widespread discontent, the Tanzimat 
(reforms), were •tarted with the dissolution of the Janissaries and 
of.the Spahis in 1862. A number of speaial laws were passed between 
186� and 1876, that reorganized and rehabilitated political 
1ns�itut1ons and administrative structures.46 
Many of these edicts were violently challenged by the Bosnian 
M�a�em nobles, whose abuses the reform• aet out to crush. Some of 
/ 
the more influential resulta were that the obligation of the corvee 
was abolished, landlords in most areas were obliged to provide 
housing for their serfs, the army was updated and the oollection of 
the tenth tax was taken away from the former Spah1s. The Safer 
45 
46 
Tomasevich, op. cit., p. 96. 
Ibid., p. 101. 
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Decree or 1859, proclaimed serfs to be tenants, and gave them 
certain degrees or protection for their menial rights. It pacified 
the Moslem nobles by proclaiming almost full property rights for 
landlords and furthered peace and order in a time when the provinces 
were threatened with intervention by the Great Powera.
47 
The occupation of Bosnia Heroegovina in 18?8, by Austria 
fomented a great deal of irradentistic 1entiment among the Southern 
Slavs. Austria, des1P1ng more land to rule oYer and wanting to. 
check any attempts by the Serbian state for natural extension of 
Yugoslav unity, put the regions under a military commander whose 
administration consisted of Germans, Magyars and Polish-Jewish 
officials, who had no real understanding of the basic needs of the 
population. The government was helped by Mohammedan feudalism 
which continued ruling over the Christian serra. The Southern 
Slavs considered the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina as the 
•projected arm of the German imperialism for the frustration of 
Yugoslay unity. • 48 
Some degree of free legislature was allowed by the Habsburg 
dec�ee after both Orthodox and Moslem• asked for a proper 
con�titution in 1910.
49 The greatest degree of enthusiasm followed 
the victories or Serbia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-191). Terrorism 
and the activities of the •alack Hand•, pan-Serb terroriat organ-
47 
48 
Ibid. , pp. 102-106. 
Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution or the Hababurf Monarchy 
(Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Presa, 961}, pp. 
411-413. 
49 Clissold, op. ci t. , p. 71. 
23 
ization , became overtly active. It was this violent group of 
professionals, who were directly responsible for the violent deeds 
committed in Sa.rajevo June 28 , 1914.50 It was ev�dent when the 
storm clouds were gathering in 1914, that the future of all South 
Slav peasants was on the firing line. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE NEW YUGOSLAV STATE, 1919-1921 
The f irat effort at Southern Slav unification dates back to 
the ninth century. Difficulties of communication and other 
obstacles prevented their fusion in the Medieval Age as attested 
in the introductory section. Racial sentiment played an integral 
part in helping these provinces realize their aspirations with one 
another. The Yugoslavs were a larger racial unit than either 
1 the Germans, Hungarians, Poles or Czechoslovaka. Many historians 
have questioned the probability of early union had not the Turks 
raided the realms.2 Fighting against the Turkish absorption, the 
Southern Slavs endured through the nineteenth century, and came 
into contact with the principles that emanated from the French 
Revolution. Sentiments of kinship united them as intercourse 
allowed a closer knowledge of one another.3 
The peasants in almost all of the pre-war regions vegetated 
/ under the feudal regime where great landed estates were the rule 
and the great land-owners were the highest court of appeal for 
4 them on their land. 
1 
'The Importance of the Jugo-Slavs,• Literary Digest, LVIII 
(August 31, 1918), 20. 
2H. Marltch, •Who are the Yugoslavs,• The American Review of 
aev�ews, LVIII (September, 1918}, 324-325. 
3 Ibid., p. 325. 
4aaymond E. Crist, •The Peasant Problem in Yugoslavia,• The 
Scientific Monthly, L (May, 1940), 386-387. 
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Many of these peasants in the Southern Slav lands had died 
fighting each other during the •Great War.• Bearing the brunt of 
the war the peasantry was also affected by a host of new conditions. 
The aut&rchical position of the Zadruga was challenged and weakened 
by increased.contacts with the outside world. The Agrarian Reform, 
aimed at solving the peasant problem, liberated large numbers of 
peasants from economic slavery. In the new Kingdom the surface of 
the land divided: 
amounted to 1,356.253 hcts. (From this number 
775,23) hcta were already divided in the former 
regions Boania and Hercegovina by the Austro­
Hungarian authorities, which was recognized 
as law by the Yugoslav government.) The 
families which took the land numbered 369,156. 
From this number of hec.tares, land was divided 
among 367, 327 families interested in agriculture 
(local farmers and colonists from other regions 
and the barren districts). The number of optants 
who rece1Yed land amounted to 1,829. Public 
institutions numbered 221, with an entire area 
of 96, 439 • •• Enforcing the agrarian reform the 
state has spent tremendous sums of money not 
onl7 on indemnity, but also for the farmers 
who were to be provided with houses, cattle, 
implements, etc. The state has s�ent for that 
purpose over 100,000,000 dinars. ) 
One out of every four peasant families actually benefited 
from this reform and while there were positive outcomes to it, 
several negative features eclipsed the success of the movement. 
It neither solved the problem of the peasant's wish for democracy, 
nor did it answer his goal of adequate living and economic security. 
Agricultural overpopulation, the unstable connection between what 
5 
Presidency of the Ministerial Council, Kin,dom of Yugoslavia: 
1919-1929 (Beograd: Central Press Bureau, 1930 , pp. 32-33. 
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the farmer sold and bought against the price of goods , demand for 
credit and the overburdening and heavy taxation, caused thousands of 
peasants to look outside their farms for a part or their income and 
others to emigrate to more promising countries . The peasant was 
also faced with the compe tition of an expanding population and the 
imports of other nations . His housing conditions were bad, his 
food unsatisfactory and his agricultural methods primitive . Little 
attention was paid to public health as tuberculosi s  became the 
scourge of his people . The advancement or technology was severely 
hampered by poor co111Dunieations in his village . 
To understand the eircumatances of the peasant ' s  dilemma, i t  
is essential t o  review and analys�:•; the poli tical deve lopments 
that . created and governed his new world. The War brought with it 
radical changee , as well aa political, geographical, ethnical ,  religious , 
social and economical deve lopments . While solving many questions 
it created new onea .  One of these questions concerned the Bal�an 
problem . In order to aatisfy the desires of the Entente Balkan 
Alli� s ,  Bulgarian territory was out down to a minimum . 
Another open quer7 remained concerning the solution to the 
national problem of Greece , Rumania and Serbia. When the War �ad 
broken out , there were a number of prominent Southern S lavs who 
were either abroad or h&d made their escape from their oppressors. 
Several of these representatives of Yugoslav opinion met in 
London to form a commission known as the • committee or London . •  
/ 
Some of the better known participants were Ante Trumble ,  Pre sident 
v / of the Croat National Party ;  Ivan Mestrov i c ,  the famous sculptor , 
Franjo Supilo, and H .  H1nkovicf.' The purpose of this group, 
cons isting of s ixteen members from every Yugoslav prov ince , was 
27 
to generate appeal among the allies for the creation of a single 
State of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.6 
The program called for the deliverance of all Yugoslavs from 
the Austrian yoke. There was a state of disunion between the 
v ,; nationalistic Serbian Premier Nikolas P&sic, on one hand, and the 
Progressive and Democratic collDlittee on the other. This proved 
to be a hinderance in creating an atmosphere where the purpose of 
absolute equality between the two main branehes or the Yugoslav 
7 � / race could be felt. Pa&ic was less interested in the creation 
of a Yugoslavia than in the acquisition of Bosnia which possessed 
a substantial number of Orthodox Serbs. Those Slavs liYing under 
the Habsburg umbrage pressed forth their issue of a unified 
statehood.8 
The program reached a zenith when both the Ru••ian ReYolut1on 
and America' s  new involveme nt in the War caused a aplit in the 
Serbian Radical Party. The dissenting younger radicals, filled 
with romantic z eal, called for national unity and equality and on 
July 20, 1917, the Declaration or Corfu was ratified and endorsed 
by both PauC' and TrumbiC: 9 
(New 
The Declaration opened with the statement that the union of 
6Hugh Seton-Watson, Eaatern Euro e Between the Wars 
York : Harper and Row u s era, , p. 2 • 
7 • A  Critical Moment for Jugo-Slav1a,• Literary Digest (December 
1918), 16. 
8seton-Watson, loc, cit. 
9c11as�ld, op. cit., p. 162, 
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all Serbs , Croats and S lovenes would combine to form a single 
nation. The state , itself , was to be a constitutional monarchy, 
/ democratic and parliamentary, having at its head a Karadjordjevic 
King . It further declared that the State would be named •The 
Kingdom or the Serbs , Croats and Slovenes . "  The Declaration 
stipulated that the three national denominations would be equal to 
each other .  I n  its tenth point the Corfu Document directed itself 
to the Treaty or London , 1915, by assuming that the Adriatic Sea 
would be free and open to all . The Treaty alao designated that 
national elections of the representatives of the parliament would 
be by universal ,  -.paal ,  di�ect and secret vote . This applied to 
all municipal elections and other administrative polls . The 
Constitution was to b4' established by a constituent assembly after 
the cessation or ho•t111ties. The mem'bers or the aasemblJ were 
to be elected by manhood suffrage . 
It was planned that the Constitution would serve as a basis 
for the entire life of the stat e .  The Constitution wa, to give 
all the people power to participate in the affairs or their local 
autonomous district s . 10 The Constitution had to be adopted by an 
absolute majority and the lawa voted by the constituting assembly 
had to be sanctioned by the King. The Declaration promised 
equality for both the Cyrillic and Latin alphabet ;  freedom of 
practice among . the three major religious sects (Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic and Moslem ) ;  and finally, the right to fly the three 
autonomous flags. 11 
10MacAdam , op. cit . ,  pp. 159-160. 
llKenneth s. Patton, ed. ,  Department of COllDlerce Bureau of 
Forei� and Doaestic ColBllerce , K1ifiiom or SerbaA Croa�a and Slovenes , Trade Promotion Series No . 61 (wa ngton: GO'f Pfiibeni Printing 
Office , 1928 ) ,  p. 5 .  
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The growth of the Yugoslav Movement reached a new phase when 
in May of 1918 , it received the support of millions of Czechs in 
Bohemia who demanded independence. Earlier in March of that year , 
a gathering of Yugoslavs at Zagreb which included Yugoslav deputies 
of the Habsburg government , the Croatian Sabor , the legislature 
which exerc ised limited local autonomy and other representative s ,  
according to the Hrvatska Drzhava extracts of that month , met and 
made the following s tatements : 
After having discussed the general political 
and national s ituation the assembly has agreed 
on the necessity of a concentration of all 
parties and groups which from the point of 
view of national self-government, demand the 
creation of a national and independent States 
of. Slovenes, Croats and Serbs founded on the 
principals of democracy. 12 
There were obvious echoes of Corfu in these extracts and when 
the assembly was broken up by police , youths singing Slavic songs 
rioted . The revolutionary ferment had reached a zenith throughout 
the regions. The following map in figure one shows the projected 
state of Yugoslavia . 
Figure 1. --Projected State of Yugoslavia 
12 
"Growth of the Jugoslav Movement, " Current History, VIII 
(July, 1918 ) , 117. 
13 Ibid . , p. 118 . 
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The Declaration of Independence of the Yugoslavs was eventually 
signed at Zagreb on September 2-, 1918 by the chief representatives 
of the Slovene, Croat, Serb and other independent groups. The 
same declaration was accepted. by representatives of the people of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina.14 Before long Austria-Hungary had ceased to 
exist and in December of 1918 the Prince R egent Alexander, in formal 
ceremony, proclaimed the establishment of 1The Kingdom of the Serbs, 
the Croats and the Slovenes. • 
In celebration throughout the world to inaugurate the new flag, 
muc h praise was raised for the new State. In Washington during such 
ceremony, Dr. Bogumil Voshniak, a member of the original Yugoslav 
Committee in London, made the following statements in his speech 
suggesting a great deal of promise for national unity and independ-
ence: 
The raising of the new flag of the Jugoslav 
State is a festival of brotherhood. Not by 
conquest, but by c ommon consent, by a social 
contract, seven million of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes of Austria-Hungary, who longed 
unanimousl7 for complete independence will 
merge with the Serbs of Serbia in a new 
Commonwealth. The new flag symbolizes the 
dawn of a better, more generous, more human 
relationship among all nations. We can 
expect that after the war the words of 
Emerson will be reali;ed: ' New men, new 
thoughts, new lands. •15 
The new Nation was comprised of a large agglomeration of 
ethnographical origins, languages, religions and customs. The 
14•Jugoslav Declaration of Independence,• Nation, CVII, No. 2789 
(December 14, 1918), 748. See Appendix I ,  Item I for text. 
151Birth of a Nation,• Current History, VIII ( September, 1918 ) ,  
48?. 
3 1  
Census of January 1921 revealed a mixed population of near twelve 
million people. Table one below reveals the size and territories 
of the new State. 
TABLE 1 
SIZE OF NEW YUGOSLAV NATION 
District Area In Square Miles Population 
Serbia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  42,098 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  4,955,631 
Montenegro • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  J,5)6 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2)8,42) 
Croatia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  17,405 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 , 7 15,237 
Bosnia/Hercegovina • • • • • • • • •  201 709 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  1,931,802 
Dalmatia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  5,090 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  621,503 
Slovenia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  6.790 • •  , . . . . . . . . . . ... . . 875.090 
Total 9.5,628 11,337,686 
Many perplexities faced the new system as the various 
provinces not only posseased different histories and customs, 
16 
but had their own form of currencies as well as local administrative 
systems, All of this had to be amalgamated into one efficient, 
governing whole. 
One of the greatest fears facing the new Kingdom was the 
t hreat of social revolt. The Russian Revoluti on appealed to the 
Southern Slav workers and intellectuals, while the conditions of the 
peasant precipitated a great spirit of r�sentment for all governing 
authorities. The only effective force to maintain order was the 
Serbian army and police, both of which were unsympathetic and 
harsh and were only s uccessful in provoking further social unrest. 
16 Herbert F. Wright, •Jugoslav1a: A Modern Kingdom, •  Catholic 
World,. CXIV (February, 1922), 668. 
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Fig. 2 . --Map of Yugoslavia, Showing Provinces and Countries that 
Constituted the New State 
Source: Ludwell Denny, •pacifist Revolution in Croatia , •  Current 
History, XVII (November, 1922 ) ,  257. 
While the ingredients for insurrection were present , there were 
no dynamic leaders to direct i t .  
) )  
Unti l  the Constitution received adoption, the administration 
of Serbia was based on the Serbian Constitution or June 5 ,  1903 , 
and the administration of the other provinces which formed part 
of the kingdom, on the local laws and the agreements arrived in 
December of 1918, between both representatives of Serbia and 
those province� who had joined her.17 
In order to di scern the ru&imentary philosophies assoc iated 
with the issues of centralism and federalism and the overall socio-
political s tructure during this period, it is neceaaary to evaluate 
and analyse the emerging political factions and their evolution 
within the Kingdom. 
The foremost political groups in these early years were the 
Serbian partie s .  In 1860, the Liberal Party was the first to 
fight the bureaucracy depending on the support of the peasantry. 
It was not unti l  the 1870 ' s  in Serbia, that the polit ical and 
economic aspirations of the peasantry were really championed under 
; / the leadership of SYetozar MarkoYic ( 1846-75 ) .  MarkoYic sought to 
apply socialist ideas to the conditions or the peasants through 
his newly-formed People ' s  Radical Party. Baaed on the peasant 
masse s ,  its p latform called for looal self-government , rights of 
Parliament against the Crown and bureaucracy, and improved agri­
cultural credit .  
17 
Ibid., p .  668. 
/ An offshoot of Markovic • a  Radicals, the Serbian or National 
Radical Party formed in 1881, became one of the strongest of the 
Serbian parties under the leadership of its first President, 
34 
� / v / Nikola Pasic. With the direction of Pasic it attempted to adhere 
to the socialist program formulated by MBl'kovi�18Playing an 
V /  enormous part in the moderniz ation of Eastern Europe, Paaic was 
also instrumental in ita consistent cultural and parliamentary 
progress.19 
Originally concerned with Agrarian Socialiam, the Radicals by 
1919 started to reflect the dea1rea of the Serbian bourgeoisie and 
peasants with lucrative assets. Stressing national unity, the 
Radicals were centralistic in opposing all demands of the non-Serbs 
for federalistie autonomy. M&JQ' Cl'08.t1an and Slovenian intellect­
uals Jl8de early prediet.iona of Sefil1a'  s s chemes for a Yugoslavia 
•ltil:h llOuld merely . be a �Greater Serbia• with eventual ambitions 
20 of becoming a major Balkan pewer. Largely representing the 
bureaucracy, the R&dicala furthered their aim of a atrong, unitary 
government. 
Under the Radicals, the next party in prominence directly after 
the birth of the Nation waa the Democrat Party which was composed 
/ of a faction of Independent Rad.1oals led b7 Ljubomir Davidovic, 
who in 1919 joined with member• or the former Serbian opposition 
18 / Woodford D. McClellan, SYetozar MarkoYic and the Origins of 
Balkan Sociali•• (Princeton, New Jersey: unlYeraity Press, 1964), 
pp. 270-271. 
19 B.V.A. Drignakovitch, •paahitch, Creator of Modern Yugo-
slavia, • Current Hi•tort• XXIV v(A�gust, 1929), 735. Also See Appendix I, Item II  (Ni ola Paaio ' s  Political Riae) 
20 •serb1a and Jugo-Slavia,• Living Age (December 21, 1918), 729. 
parties. They, in turn, were leagued with Serbs from Croatia 
and the Vo jvod1na under the direction of Svetosar Prib1o'ev1c.-: 
35 
The Democrats commanded oonsiderable support among the Serbian 
peasantr1, but paid little attention to the interests or the rural 
/ clas s .  Sporadic friction and disagreement broke out over Davidovic ' s  
� / liberal programs which were inconsistent with Prib1cev1c • s  enthus-
iasm for a atrong atate . In many respect• the Deaoorata poaaessed 
more or a deaire ror the Yugoalav ideal than the Radicals. The 
/ liberal element , or Davidovic • a  cohorts were known to ahow concil� 
1ator7 mea•urea toward the Croat oppoaition. 21 
Another Serbian party , but not as powerful •• the others , was 
the Save& s••lJoradnika (Union Gf Peaaants ) ,  sometime• known aa the 
Agrarian Party, wh1oh ••• created in 1919. It approached the 
peasant iaeue as a class problem and its program included many 
features of Agr&J"ian Soc1al1am. Claiming it wa• tbe onlJ purel1 
peasant party, it drew it• major strength rroa Bosnia and Serbia. 
A• the amalleat Serbian political faction, it represented the 
inter.••� of all the peasants and opposed oentralism and the 
goTernmental favoritism or the townapeople . It loat its value 
arter it split into liberal and reactionai-7 factions . Since it 
had little political aign1f1cance and the other two Serb parties had 
a bourgeoia character there 1• littl• Juat1f1cat1on in finding 
22 that th• Serb• had a peaaant party or an1 great atrength. 
21 
Naval Intelli�ence Divia1on, op. cit . ,  p. 338. 
22 
Jozo Tomaeev1oh , Peaaanta. P�lit1c• and Eoqrom1c Change in 
Yugosla�ia (Stanford , Californla : tanfor� Unlvers ty Pres s ,  l955 ) ,  
pp. 252-253. 
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The seoond clasaif ieation of the Yugoslav party structure in 
the Kingdom can be seen within the division of non-Serbian national 
" 
groups. Of these , the moat influential was the Hrvatska selacka 
stranka , or HSS ( Croat Peasant Party ) .  The HSS had been formed in 
/ 1905 by St jepan Radie. Thia Croatian demagogue catered to the vast 
majority of peasant• in his province. He was, perhap s ,  the most 
colorful figure in 1ntefllfar politics, rrequentl7 baffling his own 
colleagues and political opponent• with hi• vacillating , mutable, 
and near schizoprenic behavior. 23 
While Stjepan was the organizat1on • a  political rounder and 
moving power , hia brother , Antun , waa the creator or its principles 
and ideology. The aim of the HSS was to take power from the 
hands of the bui-eaucrat1cal minorit7 and plaoe 1t in the hands of 
the vast peasant majority. Philoaophieally the HSS maintained that 
the Croat peaaantry alone formed the Croat Nation and that it alone 
was its creator or an autochthonous national, peasant culture . 24 As 
the strongest peaaant party in Yugosl&Yia, ita platform was 
characterised by Pan-Slay orientation, Croat chauvinism and ant1-
cler1c1sm againat th• Catholic Church or Croatia whose anti-nation­
alism and reactionary tendenciea it deapised.25 
In Slovenia the largest political following was known as the 
Slovene Cler1oal Party or the Slovene Popular Party. In 1905 it 
originated with the union of the Austrian Chriatian Social Party 
23 
/. See Appendix I .  Item III ( The Political Rise of Stjepan 
Radie ) 
24 Tomasevich, op, cit. , pp. 254-25 5. 
25 Ibid. , p .  2.5.5. 
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and the S lovene Catholic Party . After 1918, its most influentia l  
v � 
leader was Father Ante Korosec, a Roman Catholic priest. Korosec 
was • one of the most atriking and complex personalities of Yugoslav 
politics.• He poaaessed a considerable educational background and 
rose to prominence during the Habsburg days as a leader of the 
Slovene• . 26 
Under the magnetism or Father Janes Krek, an outstanding figure 
v 
of Modern S lovene history, Korosec became the •exponent of S lovene 
claims in the Vienna Parliament.• Aa a parallel to the examples set 
v by Krek, Korosec, also propagated Christian Socialism and was 
involved in the rounding or co-operatives and. be.na.fit M oe1eties in 
many Slovene dioceses.27 During the World War, Father Koro�ee gather­
ed the Serb, Croat and Slovene members of the Re1ohsrat into the 
Yugoslav Club which roreeaw the creation of the Yugoslav Kingdom 
and issued the declaration or South Slav solidarity in 1917. The 
Slovene Popular Party was the voice of the Roman Catholic Church 
and repre sented their interest s .  SloYene autonomy, the promotion 
of oo-operativea and clerical control o•er schools, cultural 
movements and sports clubs were the main object ives in its platform. 
Supporting the central goYernment, the party gained a fair amount 
of adminiatrative control in S lovenia . 28 With its chief support 
in the village s ,  1t was constantly concerned with the economic and 
cultural improvement of its members. The Slovene Popular Party 
26 Hugh Seton-Watson, Ea•tern Euro 1 18-
1941 (New York: Harper and ow Pub is er• , 
27 A. o. Christiteh, 'Third Partner in Yugoslavia,• Contemporary 
Review, CXXXIII (June, 1928), 767. 
28 NaTal Intelligence D1T1sion, op, cit . , p. 339. 
dominated by its staunch Catholic political philosophy . held a 
paternalistic attitude toward the psasantry.29 
38 
The MO or Moslem Organization represented the Muslim Slavs of 
Bosnia. The party led by Dr. Hehmed Spaho was formed in 1919 to 
protect the interest s ,  religion, culture , and law of the Moslems 
in Bosnia. 
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, KPJ, was founded when the 
Social-Democratic Parties , who had suspended their activities 
during the war, convened in Belgrade for the configuration or the 
new organization in Apr i l ,  1919. JO Much of the KPJ ' s  ideology was 
clearly clarified with the adoption of the •Basis of Unification• 
and its •Practical Action P�ogram. • The former expressed the 
party philosophy of hi•tory and politics, while the latter set 
the guideline• for initiating political machination• to achieve 
party ends. In June , 1920, the KPJ joined the Third International, 
Comintern, and became a •mili tant organization • • • whose 
objective was to destroy capitalist society and to create a 
Communist society by any and all revolutionary means including 
those most extreme. •31 
One or its earliest legislative documents indicating an interest 
in the problems of the peasant , the Resolution on the Agrarian 
Question, a•aailed undesirable and archaic methods in agriculture 
and dist inguished between the village and country peasant . More 
29 Tomasevich, op, cit. , pp. 253-2.54, 
3�edor I ,  C ieak , •The Communist Party of Yugoslavia Between 
1919-1934 , •  Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Indiana Uniyersity, 
1965 ,  pp, 1-2. 
3101nko A ,  Tomasic, National Communism and Soviet Strategy 
(Washington, D .  c . : Public Affairs Press , 1937), p. 14. 
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importantly, this document manifested the KPJ ' s  inability to 
cope with peasant circumstances in a revolutionary situation.32 
The KPJ was more representative of the embittered and impoverished 
peasants of the South , especially in Montenegro. Because of its 
factional strife and eonatant disputes with the Comintern , this 
party did not play a viable, significant role in interwar Yugoslav 
politics after its banishment in 1921 when its revolutionary hopes 
disintegrated and it was thrown into confusion. 
v / The Party of Croat Rights, founded by Antun Starcevic, was 
one of the first to formulate Croatian nationalistic ideology. 
� / Starcevic, a liberal Croatian intellectual, baaed bis political 
ideology of Croatian nationalism mainly on the idaaa of the 
French Revolution. 33 v 
� 
After Starcevic died, the leadership of the 
Party of Rights went to Dr. Ivo Frank, a Zagreb lawyer. When 
several liberals left the party, it became known as the •Frankovici• 
group or Frankiata, standing as the symbol for everything that was 
reactionary in political, economic and cultural life. This 
revisionist faction found •their pockets emptied and shorn of power 
and position in 1919. • During the interwar period they attempted 
to foment animosity between the Serbs and Croats with an eventual 
goal of regional disintegration within the Kingdom. 
The Croat Union, another minor party, merged into the Croat 
Peasant Party after 1920. 
32c1cak, op. cit., p. 
)3ninko Tomai10', •Les 
le Developpement Politique 
62. 
It was responsible for bringing 
15. 
/ / Idees de la Revolution Francaise et 
Croate, • L ' Eve1 1- des Peaples, VI ( 1939 ) ,  
40 
together the moderately nationalistic Croat parties existing 
before 1919. 34 
Most of these peasant and urban political groups held 
conflicting opinions after Alexander issued his proclamation in 
December, 1918. Soon after this there was summoned to Belgrade 
v a Provisional National Assembly formed out of the old Skupstin�s 
in Belgrade, . Cetinje, the Diets at Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo 
and Split. The number of these representatives was in proportion 
to the former strength of those bodies. A ministry was also formed 
in January 1919 from the political factions represented, according 
to their respective aize. Separate local governments were 
established at Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Split. 35 
The National Assembly was not elected directly by the people. 
It was composed of member& of the pre-war national parliaments. 
Many of the Serbian adherent• could trace their political tenure 
back to 1912 . The Serbians felt that since they had displayed 
greater sacrifices during the Wait J·· they should have a greater 
political representation. The o.ther two major branches of the 
Yugoslavs rear.ad that the Serba would absorb them and impose their 
own kind of gov�rnment on them.36 
A cabinet was formed and consisted of : / Stojan Protic, a 
v 
former Radical chief, as Prime Minister; Korosec, representing 
34 Naval Intelligence Division, loc. cit. The electoral 
performance of the eaaan.�1 Yugoslav political parties during 
the first years of the Kingdom can be found in Appendix I, Item IV 
(Yugoslav Political Party Chart, 1919-1922 ) .  
35Pavle POJ'(>vic1and Jovan M. Jovanovic� • Tri-une Kingdom, 
Political &nd Economic, • Qµarterly Review, CCXXXVI (October, 1921 ) ,  
421. 36 Vladislav R. Savich, •Two Problems of Yugoslavia, "  Nation, 
CVI I I ,  No. 2797 (February 8 ,  1919 ) ,  129. 
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/ the Slovenes, as Vice-Premier; and Dr. Trumble filling the chair 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs. 37 The main duties of this govern-
ment and assembly were the negotiation of peace treaties, discuss­
ions and solutions on land reform, and reconstruction planning. 
Between February and April of 1919 the Serbo-Croat Coalition, 
the Slovene Liberals, and the new element from Boania formed a 
block creating the Democratic Party as deacribed in the previous 
section. In opposition to this, the Serbian Radicals joined 
hands with the Croat Union and the Slovenian Clericals, and thereby 
formed the Parliasnentar7 Union. The other minor political factions 
remained unimportant. It is significant to note that the pheno­
menon taking place was a combination of old part.7 divisi ons according 
to the similarities of view. For instance, the first clashes 
between the two political unions were over the agrarian question. 
The Democratic faction took active side• with the peasants to whom 
were handed over the landed properties of the Beys and other 
ownera. 38 The Pai-liamentary Union also adopted the cause of the 
peasants, but had reservations with the landholder•. Both groups 
agreed to recogni�e the landholders• prerogatives to indemnities 
for the loss· or their landed properties; and the sum of JOO million 
dinars reserved for the liquidation of these indemnities was paid 
off over a period of time. 39 
/ 
Protic ' s  government did not retain power for long and on 
37 Seton-Watson, op, cit. , p. 218. 
38Th1s waa more predominate in the territories of Bosnia 
and Croatia. 
39Popovi�and JovanoTic� op. oit. , p. 428. 
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August 1 ,  1919 , on account of differences with the Minister of Home 
Affairs and because of •the intolerable conditions which existed 
in Parliament , •  he res igned and Davidovic/took his place . Davidov1cf.s 
government met with ao muoh opposition that he was forced to resign 
on February 15 , 1920. 
/ 
Protic again took office on February 5 ,  1919 , 
but two months later retired , because he was unable to carry a 
majority. 
/ 
In May, M .  Milenko Veanic systematized a Coalition government . 
/ Vesnic was a leader or the Radicals and had a more f lexible 
temperament than hi• predecessor. Keeping his goverruaent together , 
/ . 
Vesnic negotiated the formation of the •petite Entente • and 
triumphed in paas ing the law governing the e lections to the 
Constituent A• aembly.40 Elections for the aaaembly to draft a 
constitut ion were held on November 28, 1920 and indicated a definite 
majorit7 for the Democrats and Radicals . 
TABLE 2 
RESULTS OF 1920 ELECTION FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
Party �ari1amentary Seats 
Democrat• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 94 
Radical• · · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9J 
Commun1at • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  j8 
/ 
(Radie-Croatian Autonomy ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  50 
Bosnian Moslem• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 24 
40 
�bid . ,  pp. 424-425. 
43 
TABLE 2--Continued 
Party Parliamentary Seats 
Catholic Popular Pai-ty• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 23 
Peasants of Bosnia &lld Serbia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  39 
Social Democrata • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  10 
National Soeialiat ( S loYene) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 
Minor Part1e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 26 
Total • • • • • • • •  430 41 
In the middle of January the return• or the elections were 
legally adjusted so that the total meaberahip was raised from 416 
to 4JO. One or the reaulta or the e lections waa the appearance in 
the assembly ot new parties previously unrepreaented. This wae 
attributed to the new electoral law which favored ainorities . 42 
Another outcome can be aeen in the memberahip growth and the 
electoral success or the Coamuniat Party in 1920. This was imputed 
to the di sappointed nationalities and minorities who had been 
slighted when the privi lege• of the new Kingdom were handed out. 
For example , by Toting ror the KPJ, the Macedonian peaaantry had 
round a way to protest against the national oppression of Serbia 
that severely threatened Macedonia ' s  unique cultural heritage , her 
language and her traditions. The Macedonian vote waa alao a 
reaction against the impoveri•hment or these regions and an 
41 •Record of Political Events , •  Political Sc ience Quarterly, 
Supplement ( September, 1921 ) ,  9 7 .  
42 
•Jugo-Slav1a 1 a  New Government , •  Current Hiatory, XIII 
( March , 1921 ) ,  521. 
expression of the peasants who desired the •abolition of the 
remnant• of feudalism and serfdom and for the expropriation of 
feudal estates.• 43 The Communist declined to take the const-
44 itutional oath and withdrew from the assemblage. 
\I , In December Pasic formed a new coalition government. By 
the middle of January he had reconstructed the ministry with a 
44 
S erbian majority. The assembly oonaidered a variety of plans in 
deoiding on a e�nstitution for the new State. One, advocated by 
the Croat Party was to give to the six provincial governments all 
powers, except juried1ct1on over foreign affairs, military affairs, 
posts, money and other areaa which were neceaaary for the function-
ing of the central government. The Serbian Democrats, on the other 
hand, suggested that there should be nine provinces led by nine 
governor-generals who would be responsible to the c entral government. 45 
A Constitutional Monarchy waa determined upon, but the peasant 
and clerical parti�s of Croatia, desiring a republic issued the 
following manifesto in February 1922 : 
• • •  that the Croatian nation was not represented 
in the Constituent Asseab}¥ . ... .  the ma.Jority of 
the Croatian national da, ties hav.ing decided 
not to aend repre•entative•-and that • the Croat­
ian nation will neither recognize this assembly 
nor accept its decisions brought against the 
will of the Croatian people and in the absence 
of 1.tJI delegates. •  It is charged that the Const­
itution '•�8 coerced upon the Croatian nation 
in a rradu!gnt manner and has no moral or legal 
basis • • .-
43 v / Tomasic, op, cit , ,  p. 16. 
44 / / Popovic and Jovanovic, loc. cit. 
45 R obert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in our Time (New York: W.W.  
Norton and Co. , Ine . ,  1967), pp� l20-121, 
46 N1 � .Fodor , •A New Country, but Old Mistakes , •  Foreign 
Affairs, III (April, 1922), 335-339. 
45 
While work on the const itution was delayed , because of dis­
� I 
agreement on the issues of federalism versus centralism, Pasic 
� / � 
and his following, including both Pr1b1oev1c and Davidovic were 
able to bring a majority to vote on centralism. In May, a 
preliminary vote was taken on the governmental draft and pro­
vis ionally adopted by 227 to 93 votes .  On June 2 8 ,  1921,  the 
final vote was taken : 223 deputies voted ror i t ,  while thirty­
five were opposed. The support of the Moslem Organization was a 
4? measurable factor in the centrallstic victory. 
When the f inal vote came the deputies from the Croat Peasant 
Part were conspicuously absent , contending with the Slovenes that 
the centralist decision had been implimented despite their pro­
tests . The • vidovdan Constitution• named af_ter s t . Vitus • Day, 
a Serbian nati onal holiday, wa� established and went into effect on 
June 28, 1921.  I t  owed a great deal to the Serbian Constitution 
of 1888 , which was re-enacted in 1903 . Many compare i t  as an 
48 
extension of the older documents ,  only to cover new areas . Simi lar 
to the older oonstitutiona, the V1dovdan Constitution provided for 
repre sentative assemblage and emphasized a parliamentary kind of 
. 
government. It also called for a unicameral chamber in the 
legislative branch . The provisions on budgetary control and even 
for the sessions or the legis lature resembled those provided for 
in the 1903 Constitution. The new Constitution like the earlier, 
47 
Naval Inte lligence Division ,  op. cit . , p. J21 . 
48 
Howard Webater Wolfe and Arthur Irving Andrews , •The 
Jugoslav Constitution , •  Current History ( February, 1922 ) ,  832. 
46 
also provided for proportional representation in e lections .49 
The essential provis ions of the Constitution were those 
dealing with the power of the King, legislative jurisdiction, 
administrative organization and religious l1berty. 50The most 
serious question before the Constituent As sembly was that of the 
administrative and judicial reorganization of the Kingdom on a 
unitary and equitable bas i s .  This question was closely bound up 
with the problem of autonomies, that i s ,  tendencies toward admin­
istrative and economic decentralization, in which the particular­
ist school exploited to gain veritable political separatism. 51 
The ceremony of Vidovdan was marred by an attempt on the life 
of the Prince Regent, and a month later , the Minister of Interior , 
Milorad Dra:kovi�was assass inated by a young Bosnian Communist. 52 
Aa a result, the Yugoslav assembly passed in August the •Law for 
the Protection of the State . •53 The Communist were declared 
outlaws by the mandat� .  and fifty-eight membera in Parliament were 
relieved of their office along with several Commuaiat mayors in 
49Howard Lee McBain and Lindsay Rogers , The New Constitutions 
of Europe (Garden City, New York : Doubleday, Page and Co . ,  1922), 
347-348. 
50see Appendix I ,  Item V (Constitution of the Kingdom of the 
Serbs , Croats and Slovene s ,  1921 ) 
51wright , op, cit . ,  671 .  
52 Clissold ,  op, cit . ,  p .  171.  
53see Appendix I ,  Item VI (Law for the Protection of the 
S tate ) 
many large citie s .  The "Law" also aimed at the nationalist 
movements in Croatia , Bosnia and Macedonia. 5
4 
It was very evident 
that discontent was growing among those provinces who advocated 
federalism when the Prince-Regent Alexander became King on August 
16 , 1921, at the death of his father, King Peter I of Serbia. 
47 
54 
"Repression in the Jugoslav State, " Nation, CXIII  ( October 12, 
1921 ) ,  40 3 .  
CHAPTER TWO 
PARLIAMENTABY POLITICS , 1922-1928 
48 
After the excitement of experiencing national unity had died 
down , the new State found itself seriously burdened with major 
problems . Faced with difficulties of administrative integration, 
economic dislocation and numerous provincial patterns , Yugoslav 
politicians fought for power instead of uniting their efforts 
toward the consolidation of the country . The essential political 
parties emphasized regional orientation instead of programs 
designed to deal with national questions. 1 
The basic task of Parliament was almost wholly neglected 
between 1922 and 1928 with the result that the country was left 
without uniform legislation. The greatest issue in Yugoslav 
internal politics during this period of parliamentary government 
was the open opposition of the Croats to the coercive dictates of 
centralism. Intrigue , arrest , murder and personal friction spawned 
political hatreds and jealousies that aroused Machiavellian 
craftiness among top party leaders . Propaganda was filtered 
through the channels of regional newspapers . Editors made 
"reckless sweeping, and slanderous statements about men in public 
life . "2 
1Joseph s .  Roucek, The Politics of the Balkans ( New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co . ,  Inc . ,  1934), pp. 70-7 1 .  
2charles A .  Beard and George Radin , The Balkan Pivot : 
Yugoslavia (New York : Macmillan , 1929 ) ,  p .  252 . 
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/ 
Stjepan Radie and his Croat Peasant Party elucidated their 
stand prior to the adoption of the Constitution clearly indicating 
that for the Croat Peasant a Republic was the only hope for 
national unity. 3 
The antagonism between the Serbs and Croats was greatly 
fostered by the vituperative denounciations in the speeches of 
/ 
Radie whose golden gifts or oration allowed him to sway the 
average Croat peasant into believing that the idea of having a 
republic would be as a Millennium, something that would fill his 
agrarian need• . A. vi s.1.ti.ng correspondent inside Croat territory 
/ found blind chauvinism backing Radic ' s  short-s ighted policie s .  
One Croat shepherd, according to the writer, confronted him with 
shouts of : 
We want a republic! We will have nothing 
but a republic! A republic is. wilen men are 
subject to no emperor or governor and are 
perfectly free to do anything that they 
may like. There will be no military service , 
no taJation. no tithes nor gras ing taxes !  
Radie haa promised to giv� us these things . 
He always keeps his wor4.4 
Another important feature evident during this period of 
experimental politics was the Serbian dominance of the state 
machine . From Dec•mber 1918 to January 1929, there were twenty­
four different cabinets . directed by approximately seven major 
ministers . or the 127 ministers in these cabinets,  fifty-five 
belonged to the Radical Part7, sixteen in the Democratic Party , 
3 .The Croats and Yugo-Slavia, • American Review of Reviews , 
LXV , .Po. 165 (June , 1921) , 8J8. See Appendix I I ,  Item I (Stjepan 
R&die' s Statement to the Prague Presa , Apri l ,  192 1 )  
4oudley Heathcote. ' The Problem or Croatia , •  Fortn1gnt1y 
Review, CXXIII (September , 1924 ) ,  390. 
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and thirty-nine in the remaining parties . An additional factor 
during this precarious stage was that the Serbs held the off ice of 
Prime Minister for 117 months ; Ministry of the Army and Navy for 
121 months ; the Interior Ministry, having jurisdiction over the 
police , for 111 months ; Ministry of Fore ign Affairs for 100 
months ;  Finance for 118 months ;  Education for 110 months ; and the 
Ministry of Justice for 105 months . 5 
Besides controlling the essential ministrie s ,  the Serbs were 
in cont�ol of the armed forces . Important diplomatic posts were 
filled with Serbian statesmen. The National Bank, State Mortgage 
Bank, the Postal Sayings System, and the Chartered Agricultural 
Bank were all headed by Serbs . Taking full adTantage of patronage 
as a polit ical weapon , employment opportunities for government 
services among the other nationalities were remote . 
The Serbian-oontrolled government used legal and manipulative 
device s to remain in power. In addition to patronage , this took 
the form of rigged elections , unfair electoral lawa , illegal police 
methods , bribery, espionage , graft and the redistricting of voting 
regions.6 
Political tensions escalated into great intensity after 1921 
and in the following 7ea.r a mani�esto waa aubmitted to the 
government by Croat ex-deputies or the conat1tut1onal convention. 
The members of the •croat1an bloc • declared that the new constitution 
had been thrust upon their nation in an illegal manner . ?  
5Joso Tomasevich. Peasants, Politics. and Eoonomic Change in 
Yugoslavia (Stanford , California : Universit7 Press,  1955), pp. 241-2 . 
6L. s .  Stavrianos , The Balkans S ince 1453 { New York : Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1958}, pp. 623-626. 
7seard and Radin, op. c it . ,  p.  74. 
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The second elections took place on March 19. 1923. and 
although a new census had been published, the Serbians , fearful 
or losing their strength, made sure that the elections were 
carried out in accordance with the pre-war census of 1910. 8 Even 
though this gave undue advantage to the Serbians , the Croat 
Peasant Party received more votes than in the preceding election 
as witnessed in the poll results represented in Table 3 .  
TABLE 3 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1923 
Parties Member• Eiected Votes Percent or Total 
Serbian Radioal• . � • • •  101 • • • • • • • • • • •  562 , 213 • • • • • • • • • • •  2 5 . 82 
Croat Peasants • • • • • • • •  70 • • • • • • • • • • •  473 , 732 • • • • • • • • • • •  21 . 76 
Democrats • • • • • • • • • • • • •  50 • • • • • • • • • • •  400 , 342 • • • • • • • • • • •  18. 39 
Slovene Clerioals • • • • •  21 • • • • • • • • • • •  126 , J?B • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 . 81 
Bosnian Mohammedans • • •  18 • • • • • • • • • • •  111 , 228 • • • • • • • • • • • •  5 . 16 
Macedonian Mohammedans . 13 • • • • • • • • • • •  71,493 • • • • • • • • • • • •  3 . 28 
Agrariana • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  9 • • • • • • • • • • •  153 , 379 • • • • • • • • • • • •  7. 05 9 
The election• or 1923 indicated that the governatent had only 
obtained a third or the aeata in the houae and tft&t the new govern­
ment and opposition had to devise coalitiona. 10 In mass ing political 
tJ / 
alliances ,  one quarter or the Deaocrats joined Pasi e ' s  Radicals 
8 'Elections in JugoalaYia . •  Nation, CXX , No. 3112 (Pebruary 
25, 1925) , 22). 
9 � • • p.  223. 
1�The Problem of Yugoslavia, • Speqtator , CXXX (April 7 ,  1923 ) ,  
580. 
52 
/ while the other Democrats under Davidovic with the Slovenian 
Clericals and Bosnian Mohammedans joined the Croats in opposing 
Pa�iC'. 11 Another conclusion, not so easily found , was that in the 
elections political and social distinctions counted less than 
regional and religious d1at1nct1ona as the partiea with racial 
emphasis gained cona1darablr.12 
In Ma7 of 1924, the Croat Peaaant Party that had been boy-
v 
cotting the Skupstina (Parliament ) ,  came to an agreement with 
/ � / Davidovic.  Pasic,  who found his majority coalition jeopardized, 
tried to prevent their acceptance into Parliament by dissolving 
the session. Refuaed by the King, he promptly resigned. 
/ 
Alexander requested DaTidovic to form a new government that would 
reconcile the Serb• with the Croats an4 the Slovenes. 13 
The Dav1do•1c gove�nment waa deeply injured by Radic'• s  
erratic habits and lack of political timing. In the summer of 
/ 1924, Radie had T1•1ted Moscow and ,  later , officially announced 
his party ' s  atf111at1on with the Bolaheviat Peaaant International. 
He further provoked the anger or the Serba in a apeech where he 
declared : 
The Soviet Government has promiaed me , 
through the medium or Ch1cher1n, (So•iet 
repreaentative ) that it will help us if 
we are threatened. In aueh a case we 
11�, February 8 ,  1925, Sect. I I ,  p.  4 .  
12Hamilton Fish Armstrong, •Jugoalavia Today , • Foreign Affairs , 
I ,  No. 4 (June 15,  1923 ) ,  88.  
13n .  Mitrany, •The UnJt&king of Jugoalavia , •  New Republic , 
XL! ( January 2 8 ,  1925 ) ,  254-255. 
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shall oppose the B�lgrade rule with 
all our strength.l� 
His real connection with the I nternational remained super­
f ioial and flirtatious, only a •means for forcing compromise at 
home . • 15 DavidoY1o'• a  pos1t1on · became untenable aa Rad16• s 
negative activ1t1e� were perpetuately aimed against the Serbs. 16 
/ The King, sensing that DavidoYic could no longer carry out his 
v / program, asked ror his resignation and Pasic was called back and 
allowed to dismias Parliament . 
There was joint protest rrom the whole opposition and the 
greatest vociferations - came from the Croat Union Protests. 17 
/ With the advent or the new year, Radie and hundreds of his 
fellow-workers were incarcerated and his party outlawed as 
subversively dangerous- to the State. 18 At the trial, the Court 
of Zagreb acquitted the Croat Peasant Party b1 dropping accusations 
of its communistic and revolutionary affiliations, finding it 
14Ham1lton Fiah Arm•trong, •Jugoslavia in the Making, •  � 
American Political Science Review, XIX (1925) ,  605. 
15George D.  Jackson Jr., Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 
1919-1930 ( New York: Columbia UniTeraity Press , 196�). pp. 213-216 . 
16Radic' mis j udged the opportunity to work out the Yugoslav 
Constitutional question in Parliament. Thinking it was a sign of 
weakness ,  he intenaified his attacks on the arm7 and incessantly 
disseminated propaganda for a separate Croat R epublic. In addition 
to hia relationship with the I nternational , he violently attacked 
government squandering. 
l7. The Croat Union Protests , •  Nation, CXX, No. Jl08 (January 
2 8 .  1925 ) ,  102. Se& Append.ix I I ,  x-.. I I  (Croat Union Protests) 
18.!!I, January 5, 1925, 6 ;  Januar;y 12,  1925 , 14. 
only •pacific and democratic . • 19 
With an appeal to the higher courts and the revelation of 
/ 
newly conscripted evidence, Radie and his fellowship were re-
arrested and placed •beyond all legal procedure . •  20 On February 
v / 
8, 1925, the new elections took place and Pasie, cutting into 
minoritie s ,  increaaed his representation which constituted a 
small, but abaolute majority. 21 
Parties 
TABLE 4 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1925 
Members Elected 
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Serbian Radioala • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  141 
Croat Peasants • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  68 
/ / Independent Democrats led by Pribicevic • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  21 
/ 
Davidov1c 1 s  Demoerats • • •  , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  39 
Slovene Clericals • • • • • • •  · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  19 
Bosnian Mohammedans • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  13 
Others (Forty-Odd Political Parties ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  14 
22 
One very significant consequence of the election was the 
indication that at least half or the population were opposed to 
Pa�id' s  centralism and were more desirous of regional autonomy. 23 
19•Elections in Jugoslavia , •  Nation, CXX (February 25,  1925 ) ,  
224. 
20NYT, 8 1 5 4 February , 92 , Sect . I I ,  • 
21 . 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong , The New Balkans ( New York : and Brothers Publishers , 1926 ) ,  p .  41. 
22Gordon Gordon-Smith, •Yugoslav Electoral Victory for 
Conservatism , •  Current History, XXII (April, 1925 ) ,  105 . 
23 !!!!, February 10, 1925,  5 .  
Harper 
/ / In March the nephew of St jepan Radie ,  Paul Badie , presented 
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his uncle ' s  new conviction in a •volte-face• declaration favoring 
monarchy and complete Yugoslav unity. 24 It was obvious that the 
Croat Peasant Party had heeded the persistent counsels of British 
Laborites to accept a parliamentary sola.t.ion.25 In effect, a Pa¥1c" 
/ 
Radie coalition was formed after the Croat leader received his 
liberty from prison and became the nominal Minister of Education. 
This coalition was doomed from the start and , therefore , on 
/ April 4 ,  1926 , it br�ke down. Radie was completely unable to 
v I 
refrain from vehement attacks and even publicly charged Pasic ' s  
son with criminal complicity.26 
v / 
Pasic continued in power until April 5 ,  1926 and died on 
December 10,  1926. His last years in power were marked with both 
victory and failure . His success in not sacrificing a single 
paragraph of his political program and short restoration of peace 
. / 
t and tranquility after Radie pledged loyalty and support to he 
Constitution, was marred by his growing senility which obliged 
him to surround himself with a number of political sycophants and 
inferiors who sapped his power ,  in order, to identify their own 
with the country ' s  interest. 27 It was this pernicious system of 
nepotism that corrupted the fortune of the government and gave 
v / 
Pas1c ' s  opponents their chief verbal ammunition to assail his 
24 Hamilton Fish Armstrong , •The Serbo-Croat Dispute , •  Nation, CXXI ,  No . )1)2 (July l5,  1926 ) ,  101. See Appendix I I ,  Item III 
(Speech of Paul Radie, March 27 , 1925) 
25 
•croat and Serb , •  American Review of Reviews , LXXI (April,  
1925 ) ,  426. 
26 
Beard and Radin, op, cit . ,  p.  166 . 
27A .  Vidakovitch, "The Jugoslav National Crisia , "  New Statesman, 
XXXII ( November J , 192 8 ) , 113-114. 
56 
centralistic program. One dominant factor in the passing of this 
great Serbian statesman can be seen in the dis integration of 
regional characteristics of parties . With the increasing contact 
of recurring responsibilities in office , these political fraternities 
were forced to accept more definite social and economic platforms . 
v / 
The period between the death of Pasic and the election of 
/ 
1927, was sadly represented with several cabinet crises and Radic ' s  
/ 
shift in alliance away from Davidovic ' s  Democrats ,  Slovene Clericals ,  
v / 
and Bosnian Mohauuneda.Jls , toward a reconciliation with Pribicevic'� 
Democrats .  The eleotiona held on September 12,  1927, resulted in 
an expected victory for the newly formed coalition government of 
v / Vukicevic. The Radical Party lost thirty seats and the Croat 
Peasant seven. Additional results can be seen below in Table 5 .  
Parties 
TABLE 5 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1927 
Members Elected 
Serbian Badicala • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  111 
Croat Peasants • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 1  
Independents and Davidovic{s Democrats • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  81 
Slovene C lerioals • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  20 
Bosnian Mohammedans • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  17 
Minor Group• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ll 
v / In February of 1928, the Vukicevic government failed in 
28 
attempting to convince the Croat Peasants to join in a new coalition 
28 
!!!!. September 13 , 1927, 50. 
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government . One of the most remarkable events occurred when the 
king, desperately trying every method possible to establish political 
unity , asked Radicito form a cabine t . 29 The Radic
/'
commission 
miscarried in propitiating the other parties and political bicker­
ing continued with tirades of insensate innuendoes .  
In June of 1928, demonstrations , coalition failures ,  party 
disputes and the seeds of general division reached a dangerous 
c..J v / 
zenith. On the 20th of June the inevitable happened . Punisa Racic,  
a Montenegrin deputy belonging to the Radical majority, was charged 
with misappropriation of land in his constituency by several 
/ 
parliamentary deputies including Paul Radie. A general turmoil 
v 
followed in the Skupatina and while the President tried to adjourn 
v / / 
the aeesion, Racic fired six shots killing Paul Radie and Dr . 
v / 
George Basaric1c , a noted Croat author and Vice-President of the 
v / / 
Croat Peasant Party. Racic wounded Stjepan Radie , Josip Grandja, 
Dr. Jelasic
/
and Dr. Pernar , all members of the Croat delegation . JO 
This event intensified the hatred between both Croats and 
Serbs. When the Cabinet sent condolences to the Croats injured , 
the message• were returned in red pencil •not accepted! •  3l The 
/ 
King, who himself had recently befriended Radie , sharing his 
fascination for rare books , arranged for hi• convalescence under 
/ a royal specialist and ottered to eend Paul Radio ' s  orphans to an 
29 
3 0  
!bid . ,  February 9 ,  1928 , 14 . 
Ibid . ,  June 2 1 ,  1928,  1 .  
31 
Frederic A .  Ogg, •Th• Political Murders 1n. Yugo�lav1a , •  
Current History, XXVII (August, 1928 ) ,  87J. 
58 
32 exclusive school abroad , but was graciously refused. Immediately 
following the shooting, the outraged representatives of the Croat 
Peasant Party left Belgrade and gathered at Zagreb. The7 demanded 
the resignation of the government for a neutral cabinet to carry 
through free electiona . 33 
In August , a r1Yal parliament was formed in Zagreb by eighty 
of the eighty-f1Ye aeeeding Croat delegate s .  They derisively 
alluded to the Belgrade government aa the •Rump Parliament . •  The 
Croats demanded the reconstruction of the whole state and declared 
the abrogation of the exi sting constitution. They were especially 
v I 
annoyed with the laxity ahown in Racic 1 s  trial and sentence , inter-
preting it as further proof that the goYernment inspired the act . 34 
v / Two month• after the Skupatina alayinga , Stjepan Radie died 
as a result or oompl1cat1on to hie wound brought on by dropsy and 
diabetea .35 While the colorful Croat leader left no political 
testament , his final Yiewe remained steadfast to the tenets he 
embraced in his political �areer. In summary he demanded Croat 
autonomy inside the YugoslaY State with th• King serving as the 
personal union between Belgrade and Zagreb. His greatest ambition 
32 
George Glasgow •serb Dictatorship, •  Contemporarz Review, 
CXXXV ( February, 1929� .  249. / The closene s s  between the king and 
his ramily with Stjepan Badie in the late twenties i s  fundamentally 
described in Stephen Graham' s  Alexander of YugoslaYif• New Haven, 




•Troubled Jugoalavia , •  A .. riopn Review of Reviews ( 1928 ) ,  
•aelgrade and Zagreb , •  Spectator , CXLII ( January 5 ,  1929 ) ,  5.  
J5 
R .  H .  Bruce Lookhardt, •stephen Raditeh : Peasant Patriot , •  
Fortnightlz Re•i•w, XXX ( October , 1928 ) , 518. 
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to establish a united peasant state which would encompass all the 
Slav peoples of Southern Europe , remained with him to his death. 
/ Stjepan Radie can be criticized for many things- illllloderate 
demagoguery, inoona1stenc1e a ,  illogicalitie s ,  inflated nationalism, 
nepotist1c selection of officials and revolutionar7 public denounce­
ments .  Although he had poor diacernment of political compromise , 
he exercised a supernatural influence over his fellow Croats who 
marvelled at his captivating orator7. It was hi• own puerile , yet 
sinoere idealiam that won hi• the devotion of the Croat peasantry. 
His death exalted him in the minds o! ll.1a �am.patriots far. above 
his real raeri ts . King Alexander of'f'ered an . . official funeral , but 
36 (/ / /. was flatly reruaed. Pribicevie, Radie '• oollaborator 1n the Serbo-
Croatian politic1 was not prepared to concede to full autonomy with 
only a personal union under the King , and did not retain the 
confide�ce or Zagreb. 37 
Bitterness between Serbs and Croats 1nereased during the latter 
part or 1928. When the state of affair• had ahown that the govern­
ing system was on the verge or collapse , the King requested audiences 
· v I v / with Dr. Vladko Macek,  Radie ' •  successor, and Pr1b1eevic. Later he 
heard the Serb Radicals and the Democrats vocalise their positions . 
All groups were deadl.oc.ked and continued .t.a be Wl1'ie.ld1ng 1n their 
demands . At tbia point Alexander decided that t!le antagonistic 
ideas held by the various parties had no hope of aolut1on. On 
36•croat1a' •  Peaaant Martyr, •  L1ter�y Dige• t ,  XCVIII (August 
25, 1928 ) ,  14. 
37•a&d1toh and Croatia, •  Saturday Review, CXLVI (August 18, 
1928 ) ,  202 . 
/ 
January 5 ,  1929 , a communique was i ssued from the royal palace 
declaring that no parliamentary answer was possible that would 
preserve the unity of Yugoslavia and on June 6 ,  King Alexander 
addressed his people with the proclamation that : 
The hour has come when there must no longer 
be any intermediary between the People and 
the King. Parliament institutions, which 
as a political instrument were a tradition 
of my regretted father, have remained my 
ideal as well.  But ,  blind political passions 
abused the parliamentary system to such a 
degree that it became a hinderance to all 
profitable national work • • •  Agreement-
even the most ordinary relations between 
parties and individuals-became utterly 
impossible • • • It is my duty to safeguard 
the unity of the state at all cos t .  I 
have resolved to fulfill this duty 
unhesitatingly to the very end . The 
supreme ideal of my reign is to maintain 
the union of the People. This ideal 
ought to be the supreme law not merely 
for me but for each individual • • •  To 
seek to remedy the present evil s ituation 
by a parliamentary change of government 
or even by new elections , as has been done 
heretofore , would be to lose valuable time 
in more futile attempts of the sort which 
have absorbed us for several years.  We 
must look for new working methods and blaze 
new trails . 3 8  
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The experiment of parliamentary government had failed and was 
now to give way to five years of dictatorship under King Alexander .  
38 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong , •The Royal Dictatorship in 
Jugoslavia , •  Foreign Affairs , VII (June , 1929 ) ,  600-601 . 
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King Alexander had made no sudden decision tn initiating 
hi$ proclamation on January 6 ,  1929.  Prior to his issuance of 
the royal decree , he had withdrawn to a small retreat at Topola, 
in order to rw&inate the immediate political stalemate . Confronted 
with the fatal convergence of administrative inefficiency , const­
itutional over-centralization and the lack of genuinely national 
political parties , Alexander recognized the urgency of responding 
to the exigencies of the moment . l  
Recollecting his audiences with Dr. Ma�ek and svetozar 
v / Pr1bicevic,  the King weighed the proposals of a neutral cabinet 
with a country divided on historical lines into seven province s .  
Not only were these •historical frontiers• hard to define , but the 
entire plan submitted by the Croat delegates ran the risk of 
destroying the meagre unity still possessed in the State , the 
economic development and the defense preparedness of the military.2 
/ P.  D .  Ostovic, supporting the Croat climate of thought,  
� � / maintained that the concepts of Dr . Macek and Pribicevic were 
1Malbone w .  Graham, •The Dictatorship in Yugoslavia , •  American 
Political Science Re?iew, XXIII ( May, 1929 ) ,  454. 
2Hamilton Fish Armstrong, •The Royal Dictatorship in Jugoslavia , •  
Foreign Affairs, VII (June. 1929 ) ,  605-606 . 
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completely passed over with preconceived judgement on the part of 
the King. 3 The truth of the matter rests on Alexander's discreet 
examination of the alternatives available . Coalition was improb­
able as it had often failed in the pas t .  New elections under the 
existing electoral system would return the same political inadequacy 
v in the Skupstina as before . The country also risked the prospects 
of foreign intervention by way of her frontiers . 
Bearing the entire burden of the State , Alexander decided to 
end party wranglings , cabals , partisanships within the political 
makeup and tear away the barrier that had been erected between him 
and his people .4 His decision averted anarchy and prevented a 
serious calamity which could have threatened the peace of the 
Balkans , and perhaps , the peace of the World. 5 
Alexander abolished the Constitution of 1921 and dismissed the 
../ 
Skupstina that had been elected on November 1 ,  1927.  He announced 
that laws then in existence would remain in force unless cancelled 
by royal command . The dictatorship officially dissolved all 
minority parties and with its arbitrary electoral reforms and 
elimination of civil rights , promoted underground contravention 
from restive anti-Serb spokesmen.6 
/ 
General P .  Zivkovic , a cavalry commander and leader of the 
3p .  D .  Ostrovi/, The Truth About Yugoslavia (New York: Roy 
Publishers , 1952 ) ,  pp. 148-149. 
4A .  o .  Christitch , " King Alexander of Yugoslavia , "  Contemporary 
aeview, CXLV (February , 1934 ) ,  p .  52 .  · 
5"Another Dictator , "  Living Age , CCCVI ( March, 1929 ) ,  5 .  
6 Andrew Gyorgy , Government of Danubian Europe ( New York : 
ninehardt and Co . ,  Inc . , 1949), 178. 
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King ' s  Guard , fulfilled Alexander ' s  standards of perfection on 
loyalty. Lacking national signif icance and political experience , 
Zivkovil won the admiration of the King with his modest and 
temperant living standards and his diffidence in using personal 
/ influence . St jepan Radie was the first official who suggested in 
/ 
making Z ivkovic , Premier , explaining that the peasants would enjoy 
the leadership of a Serbian officer •outside of the antagonisms of 
politics • • •  who would likely be impartial. 7 
/. Evaluating Zivkovic ' s  integrity and potentiality , Alexander 
appointed him as a neutral Premier , but he could not give him a 
supporting ministry drawn from capable men who were outside politics . 
Instead , Alexander collected the strongest cabinet he could from 
men he felt trustworthy and able . Of the eighteen chosen, nine 
were Serbs , five were Croats, one was Slovene , and the rest were 
Bosnians . While the Peasant-Democratic Coalition was not included , 
the Croat ministers were placed in charge of finance,  trade and 
agriculture , which had been previously exploited by the Serbian 
officials . 
The offices of all the political parties were closed and 
cordoned off by the police . Newspapers were restricted by an 
austere censorship law. Spontaneous reaction within the State 
preferred the new autocracy to the former recurring governmental 
crises , however Serbian politicians were naturally dissatisfied 
with the transition that menaced their professional future . 8 
?stephen Graham, Alexander of Yugoslavia ( New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press , 1939), pp. 160-162 .  
8tt.  Charles Woods,  •The Jugoslavian Coup d '  Etat , •  Fortnightly 
Review , CXXXI ( March , 1929 ) ,  388. 
In Croatia, the populations in the cities literally 11 threw 
their caps in the air for the " coup d '  etat , •  expressing the 
64 
sentiment that to them it meant the abolition of a despised 
constitution and the hope of better things to oome . 9 The respon­
siveness outside of Yugoslavia was mixed. Most journalistic 
sources interpreted it as a new addition in an area that was 
swiftly becoming familiar with dictatorships . Meditative estimat­
ions can be aptly captured in coeval political caricature like the 
creation below that directed puns against Zivkov1c?. 
I ,,... 
I , 1 I 
10 
Fig J--Political Caricature : Caption refers to� Yugoslavia ' s  � Constitution Going to Pieces. General Z ivkovic to Father Korosec 
(his predecessor ) :  •A touch of iron, my friend is good for the 
Constitution ! "  
9 •Dictatorship and Democrary, •  New Statesman, XX.XII (January 
12 , 1929 ) ,  4J2. 
10•Another Dictator, •  loc, cit.  
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The "Christmas Cabinet• commenced its  activities with decrees 
that outlined distinctly the character and composition of the 
dictatorship. The first three months were exclusively devoted 
to law-making. The first precept established the position of the 
King and proclaimed that he was the sole source of power through­
out the country. The second mandate dealt with public security 
and it prohibited the danger of Communistic and Nihilistic ele­
ments . It stressed that any nationalist or chauvinist political 
party would be instantly dissolved. The third statute was a 
severe press ordinance which limited freedom of comment . All local 
elective and self-governing bodies were abrogated under the fourth 
11 rule which changed the previous law of municipalities and Provinces .  
/ Entrusting Zivkovic with the task of political administrative 
renovation, the King recommended the appointment of a •supreme 
Legislative Council•  of about fifteen lawyers and professors from 
different parts of the country, which was to consult and advise the 
Premier on all the propoaed laws . With this •brain trust• , the 
King felt certain he could raiae the standard of administrative 
efficiency . Reorganization of the civil service was extremely 
essential since many of the employees were corrupt and inefficient . 
12 They were replaced with more qualified specialists . 
In attempting to revitalize the national organism, the King ' s  
Cabinet speeded up the machinery of government by centralizing the 
11 
Frederick Ogg, • The Military Dictatorship in Yugoslavia , "  
Current History, XXIX (February, 1929 ) ,  868. 
12 
• The Situation in Jugoalavia , •  Central European Observer , 
VII (February 1 ,  1929 ) ,  59. 
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statistical section of all ministries in the Premier ' s  office . 
While the ministers were reduced and every portion of the country 
represented by their social classes,  the debates on sectional 
dictatorship were practically dispersed. 13 
Several ministries were consolidated into more uniform depart­
ments .  The ministries of Post and Telegraph were merged into 
Public Worka ; .. aellgion in that of Juatice ; Agrarian Reform in that 
of Agriculture ; and Health in that of Social Wel�are . Duplications 
were prevented with the aim of saving State expenditures .  This 
affected salaries which were lowered for the same purpose . Increas­
ing the representation of Croats and Slovenes in the diplomatic 
service , fifty Serbian ministers were coerced into retirement 
pensions. In the army, thirty six generals were discharged from 
service and younger off leers were commissioned from different 
sections of the country and were remunerated with lower scales of 
pay. 
By preparing a number of commercial treatie s ,  eliminating 
graft, setting up a bureau to encourage foreign trade , the admin-
14 istration produced a favorable impression in the economic field. 
King Alexander substituted the name Yugoslavia for the oumberous 
appellation of the Kingdom of the Serbs , Croats and Slovene s ,  in 
order to convey the civic equality of Slovene s ,  Croats and Serbs 
without priority for any one or the group. 
The Premier , in elucidating the King ' s  manifesto, pointed to 
lJ / / , Albert Mousset , •Les evenements de Belgrade : une nouvelle ere politique en Yougoalavie , •  L 1Europe Novelle , X I I , No. 570 
(January 12 , 1929 ) ,  48-49. 
14Armstrong, op, cit . ,  607-608. 
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the administrative aim or establishing complete order and discipline 
in order to unify the laws and reconstruct the country ' s  economic 
life . / Zivkovic also declared that this was a temporary measure 
designed to promote the return of a more mature national democratic 
system of government . 15 
The immediate impact of the government • s  legislative drive 
toward the betterment of the economic condition of the peasantry 
can be readily observed in the institutionalization of the 
Privileged Agrarian Bank in August, 1929. Meeting the credit 
needs of the agrarians with a f iscal lending level of ten percent . 
with easy terms of repayment and with a dividend of six percent , i t  
substantially ameliorated the need for peasant oapital prior to 
the depression period. 
Alexander , who had mingled freel1 with the common farmers , was 
sympathetic to the pea .. nt. mode of existence. As ruler of Yugoslavia, 
he dedica.t.ed himself to raising the standard or life among the 
peasantry in the moat poverty stricken areaa. 16 Alexander , who 
from early childhood enjoyed botany, was alao a farmer of no small 
repute.  In Topola, he frequently competed with local farmers in 
ag�icultural produce . 17 As a result of this fond interest, he 
was instrumental in promoting the inspection and etandardizing of 
various crops , and programs of pesticide control. 
One of the largest &dll1nistrat1ve 1nnoTations came in the 
15
NYT, January 11, 1929, v • •  J .  
16 
Christitch, op, eit . ,  215. 
17 
I).?14. , p. 217. 
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following October . The thirty three administrative divisions which 
were decreed in 1922 , were exchanged by nine provinces or banovinas . 
Eight of these banovinas were named after hiatorical rivers and 
the ninth was alluded to as the •Littoral Province . •  These new 
frontiers superseded the old national and provincial lines in 
order to diminish the importance or religious and party factor s .18 
Bans or goTernors were appointed to go•ern these new provinces 
and were directed to giTe first electoral considerations to chief 
local officials. The population area and capital cities of these 
nine banovinas preaents a clear perspective of this major transition. 
TABLE 6 
STATISTICS ON THE NINE BANOVINAS FROM THE MARCH 19)1 CENSUS 
Banovinas capital Population Per Sq Mile 
Dravska • • • • • • • • •  Ljubljana • • • • • • • •  1 , 144, 298 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  186 . 8  
Drinska • • • • • • • • •  sarajevo • • • • • • • • •  1 , 534 , 739 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  142 . 8  
Dunavska • • • • • • • •  Novi Sad • • • • • • • • •  2 , 387 , 295 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  198. o 
v 
Moravska • • • • • • • •  Ni a • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  1,435 , 584 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  146 .o 
Primorska • • • • • • •  Split • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  901 ,660 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  118.9 
Savska • • • • • • • • • •  Zagreb • • • • • • • • • • • •  2 , 704 , JBJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  172 . 8  
Vardarska • • • • • • •  Skoplje • • • • • • • • • •  1 , 574 , 24) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  111. 2  
Vrbaska • • • • • • • • •  Banja Luka • • • • • • •  1 , 037 , 382 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  142. 0  
Zetska • • • • • • • • • •  cetinje • • • • • • • • • • • •  925 , 516 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  ?7 . J  
Belgrade • • • • • • • •  Belgrade • • • • • • • • • • •  288 , 938 • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  1 , 979 . 0  
18 v 
1 
Borivoje z Milojeviteh, •The Kingdom of the Serbs , Croats 
and Slovenes : Ada1n1strative Division 1n Relation to Natural 
Regions , •  American Geograyhical Review, XV (January ,  1925 ) ,  70-73 . 
See Appendix III, Item I or a Comparative Study : Geographical 
Review of the Administrative Divisions of 1922 and 1929. 
19 M.  Epstein , ed . ,  The Stateaman • s  Yearbook : Statistical and 
Historical Annual of the States of the World ror the Year l 4 
London: Macmi 3 • 
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Realizing that the Croat autonomies were going too far in 
proposing the division of the country •on historical lines , •  
Alexander compromised with his administrative division that 
embodied efficiency, economy and national solidarity. 20 Opposit-
' 
ion to the regime was partly silenced but waa not destroyed. The 
dictatorship, because or its oppressive nature , engendered 
disputatious antagonism among the Serbs , Croats and Slovene s .  The 
Serbs complained about the abolition of the democratic institutions 
and the increase use of espionage . The Slovenes gained the most 
of all the nationalities but resented the dictatorial interference 
in their parochial schools .  From the first there was a great degree 
of suspicion in the minds of the Croats who had their Peasant Party 
dispossessed and party records conflscated. 21 They felt that the 
dictatorship was a continuation of the previous state or affairs. 
The Croats had faith in the King ' s  integrity , although they greatly 
feared the duplicity of the Serbian politicians in the new govern­
ment . 22 They had ample justification in pointing to the ill-treat-
v / ment of their former statesmen. Pribicevic had been arrested and was 
not given much needed medical attention 1n the course of his confine-
ment. / / While Davidovic was arrested and relea•ed, Dr. Ante Trumbic, 
a Croat leader ot moderate convictions . was put under police 
v 
surveillance. The trial and acquittal or Dr . Macek in connection 
with an alleged complicity in a bomb plot. did more than anything 
20 •New Kingdom of Jugoslavia . •  Foreign Affairs, VI I I .  No. 2 
(January, 1930 ) .  299 . 
21 
!!X!, January 22,  1929 , 31 . 
22 
Milan B1111ch, • Yugoslav Crisis a Result of Croat ' s  Discontent 
under Serbian Domination , •  Current History, XXXI ( October . 1929 ) ,  133 . 
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else to expose the iniquities of police state methods imposed 
upon all opposit ion by a select group of corrupt Serbian official s ,  
who had avoided Alexander's purge . The unfavorable publicity of 
thousands of people, chiefly students, aroused the King's attention. 23 
In 1931, he made his first lengthy visit to Zagreb, winning great 
admiration among the Croatian people for his simple democratic 
ways . However, the World Depression made conditions for both the 
peasant and towns people much worse, especially in cases where 
small land holders in Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia 
lost everything they owned. As the suppression by the gendarmes 
acerbated the already intolerable conditions of most peasants, 
unrest steadily grew to new crescendos .  Radical sentiment to the 
dictatorship regime was distinguishably obstreperous among univer­
sity student s .  One of the main centers of this revolutionary 
thought was the University of Belgrade . Several students attending 
the school had come from impoverished peasant families and had to 
work themselves mentally and physically into exhaustion , in order 
to remain in academic residence . Consequently, they grew to hate 
the system which caused their hardship and suffering and were 
driven to the conclusion that only revolutionary methods and 
solutions could improve the country . Both by propaganda and by 
personal precedent they spread their concepts about the country 
and magnetized peasants and townspeople alike . 24 
Of all his reforms , the educational policy of Alexander fared 
23 "Reign of Terror in Jugoslavia, w Nation, CXXIX (October 23 ,  
1929 ) ,  476 . 
24Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Euro e Between the Wars 1918-1 41 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 19 7 , pp. 229-23 1 .  
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the worst under inconsiderate administrators . This was 
particularly evident in the establishment of a compulsory system 
of education and the passage of decrees limiting the scope of the 
Church and of national minorities in education. Other nationalities 
in Yugoslavia were victimized by a growing Serbian hegemony in the 
centralized autocracy. The Macedonians , who had been allowed 
considerable toleration under Turkish rule were forbidden to use 
their native language in their schools . Serbian officials added 
further disgrace to the Macedonians by seizing their church 
property. 25 In recompensing these impositions , the dictatorship 
had benefited Macedonia by spending money on her roads , markets 
and schools and by arming the peasant communities so that they 
themselves were in a position to resist Comitadjis ( revolutionary) 
26 incursions from Bulgaria. 
After abolishing the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921,  King 
Alexander had promised to grant a new one and had his Cabinet work 
upon a draft . Between November 1930 and February 193 1 ,  several 
Croatian exiles had compiled and submitted a memorandum on conditions 
in Croatia. It contained a listing of officials incarcerated and 
details on the practices of brutality and torture . A group known 
as the �German League for the Rights of Man• s ided with the Croatian 
plea and appealed to world consensus to bring pressure to bear 
against the Yugoslav government , most pointedly after its failure 
to prosecute the assassin of the Croatian scholar, Dr. Milan Sufflay. 
25E .  Boyle , •serbian People and Yugoslav Problems , •  Contemporary 
Review , XCLII ( September , 1923 ) ,  302. 
26Hamilton Fish Armstrong , "After the Assassination of King 
Alexander , •  Foreign Affairs , X I I I ,  No. 2 ( January , 1935 ) ,  215. 
v 
Dr. L .  D .  Kezman an ex-member of the Skupstina from Croatia 
castigated what he labeled the "dynastic ambitions , militarist 
organizations and foreign imperialism that oppressed all the 
Balkan people . •  27 
In addition to these problems , the King feared a recurrence 
in Yugoslavia of what had happened in Spain April ,  193 1 .  He 
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recognized the economic necessity of French loan support and that 
in order to obtain 1t ,  certain measures had to be taken to 
appease the opinion of outside observers . This more than anything 
else stimulated the exP'dition of the Constitution promulgated on 
September J ,  1931.28The new document provided that the State would 
have a bicameral structure consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of 
Deputies.  Yugoslavia was officially declared a constitutional 
/ hereditary monarchy with the Karadjordjevic house as the ruling 
dynasty. The three languages of Serbian� Croatian and Slovenian 
were announced as the official languages of the State . The 
Constitution guaranteed personal liberty , equality of religions , 
freedom of the press and assembly. 29 
Alexander felt the Constitution represented the first step 
toward a more meaningful democracy. Keeping royal power intact ,  
it was to insure national unity. The spokesmen of separatism and 
autonomy attacked what they called the •sham Constitution , •  retort-
27 
L .  D .  Kezman , "Tyranny in Croatia , •  New Republic, LXVII 
(June 8, 193 1 ) , 210. 
28 
Great Britain Naval Intelligence Div1sion
4 
Jugoslavia, Vol 
II (Norwich, England : Jarrold and Sons Ltd . , 19 4), p .  166. 
29 
For further details reference is  made to Appendix I I I ,  Item 
II (The Constitution of 1931) 
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I 
ing that it was •an insincere return to the constitutional regime" 
and a "masquerade for the continuation of autocracy and Serbian 
domination. •  30 Other Croatian sympathizers blamed Alexander for 
•whetting his appetite for personal government• which had been 
perpetuated by his distrust of popular institutions . To these 
anti-Serb antagonist& and historians like R .W .  Seton-Watson , the 
originators either were very indifferent to public opinion or 
plainly mediocre in political aptitude . 31 
Aside from contemporary conjecture , a closer scrutiny of the 
Constitution • s  ramifications acknowledges that the document was 
hostile to the formation of minority political parties , because this 
kind of regional partisanship threatened the coherence aspired by 
the composers. NeTerthelea s ,  the Constitution of 1931 succeeded 
with only minor amendments , in remaining the public law until the 
German invasion in April 1941. 
The electoral law was published on September 12 , with the 
promise or a later separate mandate to govern the election of 
Senators . This regulation provided that all voting would be open, 
that i s ,  both oral and publi c .  It conferred special privileges on 
parties obtaining majorities and eliminated to a great extent , 
minority parties from any participation. Voting was to be national , 
rather than by diatrict , and lists had to carry more than 50, 000 
votes , in order to be allotted seats . 32 The elections on November 
)0 
Emil Lengyel ,  •Jugoslav1a • s  Sham Constitution , •  Nation, 
CXXXIII ( NoTember 4 ,  193 1 ) , 449-500. 
31 
R .w. Seton-Watson •The Jugoslav Dictatorship , •  Contemporary 
Review , CXLI (June , 1932 � , )1.  
32 •YugoslaYia ' s  Electoral Law, •  Current History, XXIV ( October, 
1931-March , 1932 ) ,  612. 
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9, witnessed 1,200 candidates bid for 310 seats in the lower 
chamber. Only 2,324,645 votes were cast, despite mandatory 
requirements that every qualified voter haq to sign a ballot. 
The results of the election strengthened the determination of 
/ 
the Z ivkovic Cabinet to continue its suppressive measures against 
the separatists. 33 
Following a wide tide or autonomist vociferations, the 
� 
Cabinet was reorientated and King Alexander called upon Dr . Macek 
/ and M. Aca Stanoj evio to form a new government. However s ince the 
old c ontentious Croat autonom1st demands and Serbian nonacceptance 
prevailed, the King fell back on the alternative or creating a 
nation-wide and uniform Yugoslav Party whose fundamental credo 
was to be the concept that the free Slav people united under one 
crown were raoially one , that 11 , there were to be no Serbs , Croats 
or Slovenes, but only Yugoslavs . 34 
/ General Zivk�ic, in diaagreement, resigned his position to 
/ Dr. Marinkovic, who announced the inception or the Yugoslavian 
Radical Farmer• Democ�atic Party. This departure caused rifts in 
the government between the •Yugoslavs• and the Serbian Radical 
faction. The growth of Croatian opposition peaked after the 
v 
appointment or Dr. Srskic as Premier, who was a known centralist,  
unpopular with both Croat and Serbs. Added to his political 
misjudgements, the new Premier received a great deal of pressure 
in rural areas. Starving peasants in the worst poverty-stricken 
33 •The Election in Yugoslavia,• Curren\ Klater1, XXIV (October , 
1931-March,1932), 612. 
34 
NYT , September 3, 1931, 4. 
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regions were encouraged by Croat terrorists to rebel against their 
privations . Furthermore , they were supplied with arms by Italian 
sponsored organizations . This was complicated by extreme resistance 
to the government in the beginning of 1933 . 
The •zagreb Manifesto• drawn up by the parties of Ma�ek and 
v i 
Pr1b1cevic in November of 1932 ,  had fallen into the hands of the 
goYerrunent , reyeal1ng a resolution denouncing the hegemony of Serbia 
and advocating the application or popular sovereignty.35 It 
suggested the reatructuring of the State on the basis of an 
association of interest to safeguard the Serbian, Croat and 
Slovene nations . The government interned the SloTene and Muslim 
� 
leaders ,  who approved of the resolution and Macek was placed on 
trial in April 1933 , and sentenced to five year• ' tmpriaonment. 
The probability or a Croat insurrection ran yer7 high and was 
only eclipsed by the rear of Italian aggression. It was during 
thia tense and electr1ty1ng period that the King' s  adv1aors were 
diligently at work on a project of law considerably broadening 
the jurisdiction or the banov.iaas . It was Alexander • a  intention 
of introducing it upon his return from France . It is rather 
doubtful that he intended on splitting the country into two halves : 
Serbian and Croatian, as aome contemporary Croat propagandist 
would make the World belieYe.36 
Throughout the dictatorship the Croats remained intransigent 
and unanimous in demanding separate statehood. The Peasant Party 
35see Appendix I I I ,  Item III (Reeolution Adopted on March 7 , 
1932, at the Meeting of the Leaders of the Peasant-Democratic 
Coalition and Dr. Vladimir Mate k ' s  Indictment ) 
)6 / Ostrovic , op, cit . ,  p.  152 . 
?6 
pursued a nonviolent course , sending many of its representatives 
abroad to urge foreign supporters like France to withdraw their 
support of .. the Serbian dictatorship. In part they were successful, 
although sharp contrasts in Croat tactj.cs can be discerned in ·.the 
progeny of the Frankist Party, who continued the anti-Serb Croat 
nationalistic policy of their predecessors . These radicals found 
the steadfast resistance of the Croat Peasant Party was a 
debilitating gradualism tbag 1eould . eventually sap the virility 
of the Croat . crusade for autonomy. Etndtng aupport among the 
Croat middle classes, the Croat Youth Movement sprang into life 
in 1928. In!amous.l.y known as the Domobronski Pokret,  . 1.t produced 
in 1931 a hard-..c.ore faction charged with clandestine political 
; 
warfare and terrorist actiYitie s .  Ante Pavelic, .a weJ.1-known 
/ 
Zagreb lawyer, .became its supreme chief or PoglaYnik. Pavelic 
was determined to break up the Pan-Serbian Kingdom at all cos t .  
This Croat Revolutionary organization catered to unemployed youth, 
disgrunted vagabonds and hardened criminals . 
With the leadership assistance of Gustave Perchete and 
/ / 
Branimir Yelio, Pavelic made Vienna, which waa the emporium for 
emigrant movements or intelligence services ,  the center for their 
early plotting and scheming. Conaidering Croatia as being at war 
with their Serbian oppressors, the Usta-re swore to fight militarily 
for a free independent Croat State . Ardently opposed to the 
/ 'V 
dictatorial regime , the Ustase heralded King Alexander ' s  death 
sentence publicly in Belgium, and furthermore its motivations were 
clarified at a meeting in Pittsburgh, Pennsy}vania. 37 The 
I I v Serbian historian, Valdeta Milicevic, analysed the Ustase and 
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their connection in Europe . He explained in his commentary how 
recruits enrolled in Croatia were transported to training camps in 
both Hungary , and later , Italy, where they were trained in terrorism 
and political murder. 38 
It was not until October 9 ,  1934, that the UstaS'e achieved 
their treacherous goal . During a s tate visit to France , Alexander ,  
and his close friend, Jean Louis Barthou, the French foreign minister, 
were assassinated at Marseilles by a man known by the alias 
•v1ada the Chauffeur, •  a Macedonian terrorist directly affiliated 
J 
with Pavelic . The identity of the assas.sin was with held so that 
/ 
the Yugoslav people , despite their anguish with the regime , would 
not create a public outcry to declare war upon a country with which 
they had cordial relationa . 39 To a people , saddened by the murder 
of their King, unity 1n Yugoslavia seemed farther away, and a 
solution to the Croat problem, an even more distant prospect .  
37T1bor Eckhardt ,  Re
f
icide at Marseille (New York: American 
Hungarian Library and Hla orioal Society , 1964) ,  pp. 21-23 . 
38 / J See Appendix III , Item IV ( Milicevic • s  Disoussion on the 
•Prepa.ration for Marseille • )  
39Allen Roberta ,  The !urning Point (New York: S t .  Martin' s  
Press , 1970 ) , p .  141. 
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/ 
Even before Alexander ' s  body was interred in the Karajordjevic 
crypt in Oblenetz near Belgrade , prompt arrangements had to be 
carried out to insure governmental stability. In the same month 
of his father ' s  assassination, Peter was proclaimed King in 
accordance with the national constitution. Since the boy was not 
of age , a regency had to be selected. King Alexander had left a 
will appointing a triple regency consisting of his 
/ 
Pau l ;  Dr . Radekno Stankovic,  a distinguished heart 
I Alexander ' s  personal physician; and Ivan Perovic, 
the Banat of Sava . 1 
cousin Prince 
specialist, and 
former Ban of 
� 
Of the three , Prince Paul was vested with the major authority. 
He had been educated at Oxford and his wife , Princess Olga, was the 
sister of the Duchess of Kent . Paul was considered more at ease 
with foreigners than with his own people and, consequently, pre­
ferred to be among his European friends than to be Regent of Yugo-
2 slavia. Regardless of his reluctance to assume this post, Paul 
labored to furnish the country with good administration in a 
1 
Frederick A .  Ogg, •Yugoslavia ' s  New Rulers , •  Current Historx, 
XLI (December, 1934 ) ,  368-369. 
2 John Gunther, Inside Europe ( New York : Harper and Brothers ,  
1940 ) ,  p.  457 .  
trying epoch . In November he was confronted with the •zagreb 
v 
Memorandum, •  which called for the release of Dr . Macek , from 
prison, amnesty , freedom of movement and free elections . This 
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was supported by an additional memorandum endorsed by eminent Serbs 
in December of the same year . 3 
Prince Paul handled the first tests of his new off ice success-
/ 
fully. Premier Uzunovic ' s  efforts to reform his cabinet and pack 
it exclusively with Serbs , failed. The Regent , adopting a positive 
attitude , passed the reins of office to a trusted servant of the 
/ late King, Bogolub Jevtic , who as Foreign Minister had been assid-
/ 
uously fixing blame on Hungary for the murder of his Monarch . Jevtic 
began well,  and his cabinet contained a number of non-Serbs . He 
\,/ 
promised free elections and released Dr. Macek from prison and 
proclaimed his intention of following a progressive program of 
decentralization and Serbo-Croat reconciliation. Unfortunately, 
/ Jevtic proved unable to control his political balance over the 
oppos ite demands of either liberalizing the government or extending 
the foregoing dictatorship. Avoiding the responsibility of making 
v 
a major decision, he dissolved the Skupstina and called for an 
election.4 
The elections of May 193 5 ,  were scandalous. Voters were 
intimidated, candidates of the opposition were held in confinement 
3 
See Appendix IV, Item I ( The Zagreb and Belgrade Memoranda ) 
4 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, •Jugoslavia in Transition, •  Foreign 
Affairs , XIV, No. 1 ( October, 1935 ) ,  160-16 1 .  
80 
and non governmental parties were impeded from holding campaign 
rallies. / The Jevtic candidates received 1 , 747 , 037 votes giving 
them JOJ deputies in the house , whereas their rival secured 
1 , 076 , )46 with only sixty seven representatives in the Parliament . 
The latter contested the elections citing abnormalities and acted 
by boycotting Belgrade . The fatal stalemate of the past loomed 
ominous again. 5 Prince Paul anticipating drammatic consequences ,  
conversed with the principle party leaders on the question of 
v settlement . Dr. Macek acquiesced to a Cabinet slate , that was 
/ presented to him. This ticket included Dr . Milan Stojadinovic , 
v 
former Finance Minister, as the new Premier. Macek expected in 
good faith that a new electoral law would be adopted and free 
elections held.6 
The new gover�nt began to organize a new political party 
combining all the pro-government components under the title of the 
Jugoslavenska Radikalna ZaJednioa (Yugoslav Radical Union, JRZ ) .  
It included in its executive committee such notables as Aca 
Stanojevic(. Father Koro�ec and Mehmed Spaho . 7 The JHZ was utilized 
/ by Stojadinovic to 8dvanoe his authoritarian ambitions. This clique 
in power was viewed with much skepticism by Croat circle s .  They 
hoped that Prince Paul ' s  liberal policies would become the dominant 
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ness and integrity of the State and believed that this could best 
achieved by upholding the Constitution of 1931 and establishing a 
policy of decentralization on a regional basis among various sect­
ions of the population. 9 Dr. s.to¥adino:«i� s r�1me was later 
characterized by nationalist and centralist tendencies and hard­
line persistence in refusing to revise the Constitution. He 
declared: 
that such a change could not be made for 
autonomy and that it would be to concede 
the principle of aecession; and that any 
further measure of decentralization must 
inevitably involve a period of time dur­
ing which public order would be menaced 
with the methods of the Right. 10 
/ 
The posture accepted by the Stoyadinovic government did impel 
many Serb and Croat constituents into the United Opposition ,  which 
was guided by the Croat Peasant Party. This waa one of the first 
indications that traditional cleavages could be reoonc1led. 11since 
1929, the Croat Peasant Party ceased to be a purely peasant party. 
Croat politics aa•umed a new monopolistic position as factions of 
the Zagreb bourgeo1&1e , jealous of the economic domination of 
Belgrade which had lasted so long, became intrigued with Nazi and 
clerical fasc18t ideology . 12 Conscious of their nationhood , the 
9rnformat1on Department of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs , South-Eaa•er-n Euro A Political and Economic Surve 
(London : Oxford nivera1ty 939 , p. 9 .  
10 
11 
Ibid . , p .  82. 
M .  George Zaninovich, The Development of ·Socialist Yugoslavia 
(Baltimore : John Hopkin• Presa , 1968), p .  29. 
12 
•JugoslaT1a , •  New Statesman and Nation, XVI I ,  No . 426 
(April 2 2 ,  1939 ) ,  602-603. 
peasant movement , which had been the center of Croat national 
sentience , possessed a record of anti-clerical traditions . The 
demands for schools , hospitals, railways,  employment , bread and 
� 
water, and above all , the •raison d '  etre • ,  freedom and humane 
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treatment , had been rejoined by exorbitant exploitation, gendarme 
suppression, the building of ministerial palaces by wealthy 
interventionists , uncontrolled and ineffectiTe armament and the 
increased membership of Serbian Civil Servants • . More trenchantly 
they oould look with acorn at the two percent spent by the State 
budget on agriculture , while twenty times as much waa spent on the 
army that oonTeyed Croat divisions to distant proYineea. 13 
Never was the need for a resolute and effective transition 
in the social structure and the State machinery greater . Even the 
typical Croat peasant. recognized the neceaaity foP solutions to 
correspond to the real problems . / Bitter against the Stojadinovic 
/ 
regim&, he felt that the Croat regions were not fairly treated in 
the distribution of the tax burden and of governmental benefit s . 14 
Most of hia petitiona , that had been drawn in the past from the 
newspapera and pamphlets of the Croat Pea•ant Party, were now 
going unnoticed. 
In January 193 6 ,  some Croat peasants were shot near Zagreb and 
in the ensuing month the capital see thed with demonstrations and 
several thousand armed nationaliata threatened upriaings. 15 Regard-
13 / / Rudolf Bicanic , • central European Stability and Yugoslavia , •  
Journal ot Central European Affairs , III (April•  1943 ) ,  3 1 .  
. 
14 /' Philip E .  Mosel7, •Adaption for SurTival : The Varzio 
Zadruga, •  SlaTonic and Ea•t European ReYiew, XXI ( Maitoh, 1943 ) ,  
169. 
15 •yugoslav Cauldron Boiling , •  Literarz Digest, CXXI 
(April 11 , 1936 ) ,  15. 
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/ 
less of the civil disorders and internal strife , Stoyadinovi c  set out 
to make Yugoslavia militarily powerful,  expressing his policy to 
his country ' s  neighbors that " i f  the necessity arose , they would 
not defend their territory by spilling ink . " 16 
While the Premier was preoccupied with foreign policy, Prince 
v Paul had been seeking some kind of mediation with Dr . Macek over 
the number one domestic issue- the Croat question. Carefully, the 
Regent had tried to pull the diverse peoples of Yugoslavia into. 
a working unit scrupulously reaching accord with the Croat leaders 
over the necessity of federalism. 17 
This encouraging sign was d ispersed by the fresh animosity 
bred by the ill-fated Concordat of 1937.  The Orthodox Serbs 
preceived this legislative step as a threat to their prerogatives .  
According to them, the implications in the bill ' s  text augmented the 
privileges accorded to the Roman Catholic Church . 18 Ma�ek refused 
to treat the Concordat as an overture and the majority of the 
Croats ignored the entire affair. The government exercised 
belated caution and withdrew the bill,  but did not rectify the far­
reaching damage sustained by its previous passage . The position of 
the Croats had been fortified by the agreement, and the antagonism 
propagated by it resulted in the formation of the United Opposition 
16 Henry c .  Wolfe , "Yugoslavia ' s  Design for Democracy , "  Current 
History,  XLVI (Augus t ,  1937 ) ,  51.  
17 
"Trustee : Prince Paul , "  Time , XX.X I I ,  No. 24 (December 12 ,  
1938 ) ,  20-2 1 .  
18 
w .  B .  Sharp, •Yugoslav-Vatican Concordat , •  Current History, 
XLVI (September, 1937 ) ,  82-83 . 
Bloc on September 15,  1937. Comprising the Serbian Radicals , who 
/ had opposed Stojadinovic ' s  policies and the Democratic and 
Agrarian Parties , this association was formerly known as the 
United Opposition. Reaching concordance with the Peasant Demo­
cratic Coalition, this political formation emerged as the oppos-
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1 tion bloc , and possessed considerable potential as a political 
striking force .
19 The United Opposition Bloc declared its intention 
to work in conjunction for the furtherance of a democratic govern­
ment and to strive toward a pragmatic answer to the Croat question. 
The adherence of the Yugoslav Nationalists to the United 
Opposition Bloc meant that the opposition included rigid centralist 
Conservatives . With a primary aim of a strong government these 
Yugoslav Nationalists , a right wing splinter section of the Yugo-
/ 
slav Radical Union under the direction of General Zivkovic and 
/ M.  Jevtic , it shared with another minority part7, the semi-Nazi 
/ / Zbor , an abhorrence for the Stoyadinovic regime , especially for 
its allegedly liberal tendencies . Surprisingly , this group threw 
v 
in their lot with Dr. Macek for the purpose of the election of 
1938. 
By the end of 1938 ,  both Croat and Serb alike , were commonly 
/ v dissatisfied with Stoyad1novic ' s  control. Macek was looked upon 
more and more aa the champion of Democracy and the Messiah of 
the Peasants .  In August of 1938,  when he came t o  Belgrade to 
confer with Serbian officials , he was greeted by a crowd of 50, 000 , 
19 
John Keyser , •Discord in Yugoslavia, •  Fortnightly Review, 
CXLIX ( February, 1938 ) ,  219. 
85 
most of them Serb peasants . 20 
In a period when the Croat Peasant Party had dropped its Pan­
S lavic orientation and had wandered from its primary peasant 
v ideological tenets , Macek and his fraternity negated the hypotheses 
/ 
of mass industrialization propounded by both the Serbian elite and 
rural classes . The possibilities of transforming thousands of 
peasants into industrial workers was deemed an outlandish move in 
which the urban leadership had only their own profits to gain by 
such a move . Thia resurgence of members within the HSS , appealing 
for basic peasant concern• , discerned the revisionists within the 
Peasant Party, as fellows who had mi sconceived ideas to curb the 
increasing agriculture overpopulation. Therefore , they menaced the 
vital core of the Croat peasantry- its cultural heri tage and unique 
patterns of life style . 
The Croat Peasant Party had thus become more than a political 
organization within the State during the latter part of the inter­
v 
war period. Even Macek, who spoke with great authority in Croatia, 
was acclai-med vodJa ( leader) by hiJ eohorts and was personally 
v 
placed in command of the Croat Peasant Guards .  Much of Macek ' s  
21 
power flowed from the accomplishments of the peasants themselve s .  
The union of peasants , at which the Croat Peasant Movement aimed , 
embraced all sides of peasant life ; helping them in the building 
York : 
2 0  
Hugh Seton-Watson , Eastern Euro!: Between the Wars ( New 
Harper and Row Publlsners , 1962� p. 236. 
2 1  
Hoptner, op. ci t . ,  p .  152. 
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22 
up of their economic position ; and developing their peasant culture . 
An example of this can be found in the founding of the Gospodarska 
Sloga (Economic. or Farm Agreement) in 1935 as the economic branch 
of the Croat Peasant Movement . Between 1935 and 1940, it made 
remarkable progres s ,  assuming leadership of 5 , 000 village centers 
and accruing 230, 000 recorded members . 23 At the same time that the 
Gospodarska Sloga was formed , the Seljaehk& Sloff& (Cultural and 
Educational Agreement ) was inaugurated to unite and promote the 
efforts being made for the enrichment of village cultural life and 
for raising the standard of peasant education. This Sloga under­
took an adult literacy campaign in which tens of thousands of 
24 
peasants in various regions learned to read and write . 
Even though these nationalistic activities did something to 
better the standard of living of the peasa.nts ,  the Government was 
determined only to let these local agencies have financial succor 
on its own 'terms and tried desperately to make the Co-operative 
Movement a department of the State . 25 Dr . Magek, re jected this.  He 
was interested in convincing the Government that an agrarian policy 
more in tune with peasant ideals was imperative . He objected to 
the economic manipulation of the peasantry through investment 
schemes .  Aware that only one-fifth of the agricultural population 
actually owned land and that many small-holders were forced to work 
22 Ruth Trouton, Peasant Renaissance 
(London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd . ,  
23Ibid . ,  p .  160 .  
24 
25 
Ibid. , p .  191 • .  
Ibid . ,  p. 161 .  
0 
v 
on bigger estates , Macek wanted more for his people . He did not 
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really want complete separation for Croatia fearing that such a 
sudden transition would lead to greater economic difficulties . 
There is  the supposition that he preferred progres s  affected in 
this direction with the basic end that it might prevail upon his 
people to reduce their absolute demand for full self-government 
and social autonomy . If thia plane could be reached with the 
centralists conceding to i t ,  a settlement to the perpetual Serbo­
Croat conflict might be obtainable. 
The e lections in December , 19J8 ,  indicated that the government 
had made no headway, while the United Opposition had made substant­
ial gains . The administration ' s  list procured 1 , 64) , 783 votes or 
5 8 . 9  percent against 1 , 364 , 524 or 40.9 percent cast for the 
opposition; therefore the former received approximately 5 2 , 000 
fewer , and the latter 250, 000 more votes than in 1935. 26 
After the elections it was reasonable to assume that Dr . 
/ 
Stoyadinovic was still securely in power. What changed that 
position was the cabinet crisis that occurred in February , 1939.  
The moral victory of the opposition in the electoral year , 19) 8 ,  
coupled with the growing danger of a European war and the govern­
ment • a growing pro-Axis policies , led to the resignation of the 
/ v / Cabinet. Dr. StoyadinoTie ' s  replacement, Dragisa CY�tkovic, 
Minister or Social Policy and Health, had been a member of the 
GoTernment Party. He was cha?"ged with the task of reaching an 
26 
Royal Institute of International Affair• , op, oit . ,  p. - 8 1 .  
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early accord with the Croat s . 27 Hardly any negotiations were under­
taken by the new Premier . The most that Belgrade did was to 
promise the Croats that after the formal accession of King Peter 
II upon reaching his majority on Septeaber 6 ,  1941 , the Regency 
Council would allow an objective reexamination of Serbo-Croat 
relations .2 8  
The tension in Europe on the yerge of war accelerated nation­
alism in all the Balkan State s .  This was particularly true in 
Croatia where public opinion was intense for German protection 
rather than the continuation of Serbian rule . v It was Dr. Macek 
who acknowledged that it was inadvi sable for him and his party to 
contribute to the disunity of the country by re11&ining in opposition, 
while the armies of Hitler were progres s ing toward the Balkans . 
Seiz ing this opportunity, he cleverly utilized the same political 
/ 
stratagem 1nToked by his predecessor Stjepan Radie when he flirted 
with the Pea.ae.nt International in 1924, in order to bluff the 
Serbian centralists. Only this time the courtship was to be with 
v 
Hitler ' s  Germany as Macek claimed he would • accept help wherever 
he could find tt•  suggesting Germany could even come in and make 
order . 29 




and Cvetkovic were allowed to impose their will upon the expertise 
27 
Joseph s .  Houeek ,  Central-Eastern Europe : Crucible of World 
Wars ( New York : Prentice-Hall, Inc . ,  1946), p. 512 .  
28 
Malbone w . Graham, •constitutional Deve lopment 1914-1941 , •  
Yugoslavia, ed. Robert J .  Kerner ( Berkeley California: University 
of California Press , 1949 ) ,  pp. 131-134. 
29 
•croatian Coup: Matchek Bluff• his Autonomy out of Yugo-
slavia' a Rulers , •  Newsweek ,  XIV (August 14, 1939 ) ,  19.20. 
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of the political theorists whose calculations failed to reach 
a compromise over the issues . On August 24, 1939 they were 
instrumental in establishing the Sporazum (Agreement ) after many 
years of bitter controversy. One Balkan apothegm suggests that the 
only difference between a Croat and a Serb is that a Croat i s  ten 
minutes late, a Serb ten minutes later. 3 ° Both had been too late 
too often to make this new Sporazum mean much. The Sporazum 
prought together into one administrative uni t ,  the provinces of 
Croatia and Dalmatia and seven adjoining districts where Croats 
predominated. The central government retained control of foreign 
affairs , national defense , foreign trade , commerce,  transport , 
public security, religion, mining, weights and measure s ,  insurance 
and educat ional policy. A separate budget and a legis lature in 
Zagreb were granted to the Croat s .  Its Ban would serve at the 
pleasure of the crown. Both the Monarch and the Croat legislators 
would share in the making of the laws. 31 
No one was sure that the Sporazum would pacify the country ' s  
internal discontent . The 1939 Serbo-Croat agreement did make 
Croatia an equal partner with Serbia, although it did not establish 
an independent Croatia, nor did it solve the national aspirations 
of the other Yugoslavs . 32 
A new government was formed on the basis or the new bond . 
, v 
Cvetkovic was made Premier , with Macek as Vice-Premier. In 
30 
•sporazum, •  Time , XXXIV, No. 9 (August 2 8 ,  1939 ) ,  2 5 .  
31 
Hoptner , op, c it . ,  p .  154. 
32 
Bogdan Raditsa, •Yugos lav Nationalism Revis ited : History 
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Croatia the new autonomous machinery was set in motion as the 
strident clamor in this region was : •the peasants want to be and 
will be , the chief factor in their fatherland . •  33 
Time , however , had run out in Yugoslavia. The hope and promise 
procreated by the Sporazum gave way to the barometric wax-and-wane 
political pattern that was so familiar in the past two decades .  
German intimidation and their economic dominance in the country 
had coerced the Regent on March 26 , 1941 , to sign the Axis Pact. 
The reaction to this act was expressed in a bloodless •coup d 1  etat . •  
On the eve of war , Serbian and Croatian Nationalists fought 
each other and the powerful Serb elements refused to recognize 
Croat autonomy . The two important nationalities in this late 
period remained predominately unreconciled as they were in the 
beginning. When the invasion came in April,  1941, the peasant 
reflected upon the last twenty years of political strife and 
vacillation with much misgiving, finding that the State was 
nothing to him and , therefore , not worth sacrificing his life 
for. The experiment had fallen short of its expectation and the 
State crumbled. 
33 
Stephen Clissold, ed. ,  A Short History of Yugoslavia ( Cambridge , 
England : University Press ,  1968), p.  200. 
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CONCLUSION 
German occupation ended aspirations that existed in settling 
the disunity w�thin Yugoslavia. The last glimpse of democratic 
enthusiasm can be witnessed in the National Revolution of March 
1941. Combined with contingents of soldiers and peasants ,  the 
Movement ' s  fai lure was largely attributed to the absence of a 
stable ideology and a s tandard base of operat ions . 
In retrospect , the Kingdom that lasted a little more than 
two decades was dominated by one crisis after another . The great-
est political intractability can be seen in the s truggle between 
the issues of federalism and centralism. Under Serbian hegemony 
continual unrest , animosity and suspicion grew among those national 
groups who were anxious to preserve their historical, administrative 
and cultural backgrounds .  Political conflict between the Serbian 
elite and the resisting nations in the Kingdom of Serbs , Croats 
v 
and S lovenes sharpened with the Skupstina murders .  
The absolute collapse of Serbo-Croat relations during the 
,/ 
ten years , 1919-1929 of the parliamentary regime made necessary 
the need for a more objective democracy. Since its immediate 
inception was an impossibility, the dictatorship that followed 
stemmed the rising tide of anarchy and endeavored to pave the 
way toward responsible government by and for the people . It is 
the contention of this writer that while the Alexandrine Period 
initially sought to unify the divergent elements and promote 
social cohesiveness , this was thwarted by major politicians 
who would not recognize common political traditions and respect 
variegated historical differences .  Furthermore , politics was 
uti lized for the advancement of individual social and economic 
desire s .  
The removal of minority leadership and the prohibition of 
its organizations merely intensified the social consolidation of 
the peasantry and its political orientation. While the Croat 
Peasant Party did not achieve any substantial power unti l  the 
end of the interwar period, its early motivations were directed 
toward suppressing the tide of apathy, inertia and torpor among 
post-war peasants and enhancing agrari an needs in a time when 
the peasant felt no common bond or could identify himself with 
the State . 
With the dissimi larities germinated between the interests of 
the city and the countryside , the Croat Peasant Party became 
intransigent when there was a nation-wide need for settlement . 
At the same time , the political and economic questions were 
I. continually neglected by the ruling elite and intelligentsia 
whose energies were wasted on hopeless intrigue and theoriz ing . 
The refusal of the Croats and other separatist factions to 
participate in the government ,  except on their own terms , 
92 
created controlled. elections and police surveillances . Corruption 
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and manipulations accompanied the elections as the general 
resistance to transition and the disunity, maintained by dissent , 
severely debilitated the socio-political structure within the 
nation. Reinforced by inflexible constitutional patterns , the 
government could not concentrate enough attention on the economic 
situation of the country. Failing to provide the techrtology of 
modernization, it caused widespread dissatisfaction with inadequate 
programming. 
· The Sporazum gave Yugoslavia only a short-lived political 
unity and did not resolve the "Croat Question . "  Its failure to 
achieve a complete solution can chiefly be attributed to its 
lateness and, also , that it did little to change the Yugoslav 
Government . The individual Croat ' s  satisfaction of gaining control 
of the Banov1na Croati a ' s  administration overshadowed the original 
goal of internal oneness within the country. While the Croat 
peasant was gleaming with the glory of victory, peasants from other 
regions found very little change in their S ituation . Had all the 
peasant classes , which represented almost eighty percent of the 
Yugoslav population, occupied the center of political attention, 
perhaps the country ' s  ability to collectively organize resistance 
against the enemy and her competency to deal with domestic conflicts 
might have been greater . 
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....., / 
Signed at Zagreb on September 24 , 1918 by Father Ante Korosec 
for the National Slovene Council;  Dr. Gajo Bulat, for .t he ._ / 
National Council of Dalmatia ; Dr . Ante yavelicf, for the Starcevic 
Party (Right ) of Croatia ; Stjepan Radie for the Croatian 
Peasant Party; Dr. George Drasojevij": for the Radical Serb Party ; 
the Croatian deputies Budisavljevic , Lorkovic', and Dr. Simrak, 
for the independent groups ; and Citizens Bukseg, Korac� and Delic!, 
for the Socialist Party. The same declaration was accepted by 
representatives of the people or Bosnia-Hercegov1na. 
The tol)owing text is a translation of the one read by Father 
Korosec before the Austrian Reichsrat on October 2 ,  1918. 
We , the representatives of the Slovenian , Croatian, and 
Serbian people , deem it our duty first of all to call attention 
to the known fact that the Austro-Hungarian Government i s  
authorized to speak in the name only of the two peoples , who are 
the masters or Austria-Hungary, and that , consequently, the 
principles of peace which the Imperial and Royal Government 
may propose to the representatives of the belligerent states 
cannot in any way correspond to the needs of the oppressed 
peoples of the monarchy . For this reason the f�ure organization 
of Europe , if carried out on the basis or those principles , far 
from affording a guarantee of the d.u�al\l.e peace which is necessary , 
would on the contrary carry within itself the germ of new 
international conflict s ,  as i s  already shown by the declarations 
and desires of responaibl.e a�men, Austrians as well as 
Hungarians who, at the very moment when they are presenting 
themselves before the whole world as apostles of a societY. of 
nations equal one to the other, are doing ev917t&aing to render 
impossible the political and administrative progress of our 
action. 
It is our profound conviction that the basis of a durable 
peace can be established only on the new principles of an 
international law founded on truth and equity. 
One of these truths is the fact that the Slovene , Croatian , 
and Serbian people are ethnically one nation, and that 
according to a national principle , universally known, this unity 
should remain indivisible and free from any condition regarding 
either the permanence of its territory or its s ituation as a 
state . It is on this fact that we base our national rights and our 
claims all of which accord with the principles , internationally 
Item I Cont . 
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recognized , of the democratic organization of civilized humanity. 
Accordingly, relying upon the right, always alive in our 
people , which every nation has to live its own life , we declare 
in the name of the Slovene , Croatian and Serbian nation, that 
we accept absolutely and in its entirety the idea of universal 
peace based on the right of the people freely to dispose of 
themselves in the sense already internationally recognized , 
namely, that the people alone decide the question 9f their 
existence and whether they prefer to establish a state of their 
own or to effect with other peoples a union of state s .  This 
right of free disposition we claim also for the S lovene , Croatian, 
and Serbian nation, and we desire that the unrestricted application 
of this right may be guaranteed among the nat ions . 
In accord with the democratic aspirations or both belligerent 
and neutral peoples ,  we demand also for our .. people a yaeace which 
shall bring us union, independence , and liberty, for only such a 
peace can assure· to our people , who inhabit what has been, s ince 
the beginning of the history or these regions , the most dangerous 
point in Europe , their peaceable and independent development . A 
peace which subjected to the domant1on of an alien people even a 
portion of our geographically continuous natural entity would 
carry in it the germ of future people to exert all their powers to 
obtain, for ita complete national organism, the right to exist as 
an independent state . 
The SloYenian , Croatlaai, and Serbian people are conscious 
of their will and of their strength , and will use their power at 
every opportunity in order to become a member of the society of 
nations , and to work with their sister nations for the welfare and 
the progress of humanity. 
In the name of the entire nation we accord to the minorities 
of other nationalities existing among our people ,  who are 
territorially separated , all the rights necessary to their national 
development ,  economically and socially. 
The Adriatic ports which , by reason of their population, 
their islands,  or their hinterland, belong to the economic domain 
of our people,  shall be open to all peoples , including those who 
11Ye in our hinterland & ,  for auch coJ11JDercial needs as they shall 
eventually haYe ; our nation will conclude international treaties 
to proYide for and guarantee this freedom. 
In the name of the entire nation, we further declare that we 
do not allow any one , not eYen at the peace conferences to d i scuss 
the destiny of our people without our full participation and for 
this reason, and by Yirtue of the right of free disposition, we 
demand the participation of the Slovenian , Croatian, and Serbian 
people , through its national representatives elected expressly for 
the purpose , in the future peace congress . 
Source : 1JugoslaY Declaration of Independence , • Nation, CVII , 
No. 2789 ( December 14, 1918 ) ,  748-749 . 
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v / 
To comprehend the motivations behind a politician like Pasic 
it is essential to survey his background and personal history 
v / before 1918. Nikola Pasic was born in the town of Zajetchar near 
the Bulgarian border in the 1840• s . 1 He obtained his formative 
education in his native Serbia and graduated from the University 
of Belgrade in civil engineering. In 1868 ,  he went on a govern­
mental scholarship to the Polytechnicum in Zurich, Switzerland . 
It was here that he came into contact with several politloal exiles 
who had been banished from their homelands for revolutionary 
behavior. 
"" /  
From them, Pasic learned the philosophy of revolution as well 
as the Russian language . 2 One relationship in particular with the 
/ ;' Russian emigre , Michael Bakunin, a •misfit among the revolutionary 
intelligentsia , • who acknowledged anarchism and dreamed of a mass 
v ;' 3 peasant revoltion in his country , influenced Pasic immeasurably. 
1 v ;' 
The exact date of Pas ic 1 s  birth is still left up to conjecture 
since there are no surviving birth records to substantiate a precise 
date . According to some record s ,  the late Premier celebrated his 
eightieth birthday in 1925. 
2 "' / 
Pasic never spoke Russian and was known for his inconsistencies 
in foreign languages .  In defense of his ineptitude for linguistics , 
he explained that in periods of crises he could claim to be misunder­
stood or misquoted. 
3Jesse D .  Clarkson , A History of Russia ( New York : Random 
House , 1963 ) ,  pp. 324-325.  
He admired Bakunin and the two formed a close friendship. 
v / 
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Pasic became convinced from his discussions with the famous 
nussian anarchist that the support of the Slavic relative , 
Russia, was necessary for the realization of his idea of national 
liberation through social revolution. Upon his return to Serbia, 
v / 
Pasic was nominated Municipal Engineer of Pojarevac , a medium-
sized, Serbian town. Here he reflected philosophically upon the 
despotic rule of King Milan Obrenovi/ and became adamant that the 
constitution was unjustifiable . Later he edited a newspaper 
entitled the Rad in which he disseminated his liberal ideas about 
� 
v / 
constitutional changes .  After the Turkish War of 1876-187 7 ,  Pasic 
was elected to the Financial Committee in Parliament . 
� / 
Pasic was 
regarded by some as a Communist . His first speeches were far from 
revolutionary . They revealed "rather the ideas of a village dema­
gogue who seeks to lower taxes and state expenditure to the limi t . "  
In all budget debates . as a member of the F inancial Committe e ,  he 
advocated the lowering of counsellor ' s  fees , and the lowering of 
the salaries of ministers , and the "wiping out" of the dispozicioni 
fund .4 Belonging to the minority ,  he astonished his peers by 
issuing a manifesto to the peopie calling for constitutional reform 
which led to the dissolvement of Parliament . In the ensuing election, 
his party won forty-four seats out of 141 and by 134 votes he was 
elected Speaker of the House , however, it  failed to receive the 
4 
Gerald G .  Govorchin, "The Emergence of the Radical Party in 
Serbian Politics , "  The American S lavic and East European Review, 
xv ( 1956 ) ,  514. 
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sanction of his bitter enemy, the King.5 
On January 8 ,  1881 , the paper , Samouprava, (Self-Government ) ,  
.J' 
�
6 the organ of the party, was started under the supervision of Pasic.  
During the 1880 1 s  he was very much occupied with the framework of 
his new organization, laying ground rule s ,  promoting memberships , 
and selecting officials .  The Party then had the following program : 
Prosperity of the people and internal liberty; 
national independence ; liberation and union of 
Serbian elements under Turkish and Austria rule ; 
revision of the Constitution of 186 9 ;  reform 
of the administration of Finance , Judiciary , 
Public Instruction and the Army ; alliances with 
the Balkan States and , first of all , complete 
accord with Montenegro and Bulgaria; extension 
of personal and property rights , and finally, 
freedom of speech and of the press . 7 
..../ 
In 1883 , bloody skirmishes were fought in Zajecar within the 
Timocka district between the res idents and the Serbian army. 
Several Radical leaders were indited for their alleged supererogations 
V' / 
in citing the riot. As a result , Pasic and ninety-four members of 
his party went into exile . During his temporary domicile in Bulgaria 
v /  
from 1883 to 1889, Pasic became involved with the concept of a 
Serbian-Bulgarian alliance as a step toward Balkan union against 
the contradicting compulsions of the Turkish and Habsburg powers . 
v' / 
King Milan whose antagonism toward Pasic grew , engineered 
a war against Bulgaria that met with disaster and was only saved 
5 Ibid . ,  p .  514. 
6Govorchin, op. cit . ,  516 . 
7rbid . ,  736 . 
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from defeat by Austria. Milan had turned into a staunoh Viennese 
agent and following personal scandals , threats on his life and 
general discontent with his rule , he abdicated in 1889 in favor 
of his young son, A lexander , who came to the throne under a 
regency. 8 
� / 
Pas ic went back to his native Serbia and took part in the 
supervis ing elections . When the votes were counted it became 
known that the Radicals had won an overwhelming victory taking 
108 out of 117 seats in the assembly. Representing Belgrade , 
Pasic became , first , Speaker of the House in the National Parlia­
ment , and in 1891 , graduated to the position of Prime Minister . 
It was at this moment that he began to stamp his name on Balkan 
politics . 9 This was also an important turning pQint in Pa'ii� s 
philosophy as he exchanged his youthful radical and revolutionary 
ideological energies for the more somber, conservative inclinations , 
in order to safeguard Serbia' s  new constitut ional exi�tence . 10 
� ,,  
With the new King, Pasic made a state visit to Russia which 
fortified Russ ian and Serbian relationships , thereby fulfilling 
one of the major aspirations of the Serbian Radical Party . Upon 
...., ,,, his return to Serbia with the Monarch, Pasic found to his dismay 
that the Radical goYernment had fallen under the political 
machinations of the former king. Alexander quickly ordered new 
8Ham1lton Fish Armstrong, •pashitch, the Last of the Balkan 
Pashas , •  Current His tory ,  XXVI (July, 1927 ) ,  612. 
9K. Boegholm, •Maker of Modern Serbia , •  Living Age , CCCII 
(April 15, 1927 ) ,  713 . 
10 Armstrong, loc . cit. 
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elect ions and Pa�1c' was restored to his post as Prime Minister. 11 
"' / From 189) to 1894, Pasic served as Ambassador to Russia, 
although ex-King Milan, taking advantage of the Prime Minister ' s  
absence , came back to bring about the fall of the government once 
again. ., / In protest to the action, Pasic formally res igned his 
posts as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of 
the Czar ' s  court . 
"V' / After an attempt on ex-King Milan ' s  life failed, Pasic was 
taken into custody and accused of conspiring political murder .  
Consequently, he was sent to Pojarevac prison, and later after 
Russian intervention through German and Austrian intermediators , 
was pardoned on condition that he would leaye the country • 
.., / 
Pasic reappeared once again in Serbia after King Milan ' s  
final banishment . A new constitution was voted on in 1901 and 
..,, ,,. this was followed by the creation of the Senate and Pasic became 
- / one of its first members .  The National Radical Party and Pasic 
went into open opposition with King Alexander and Queen Draga. 
After the military • coup d '  etat• on May 29, 1903 , the Radicals 
and their chief leader were cleared of any implications in the 
/ 
bloody regicide . Prince Peter Karadjordjevic succeeded to the 
...,, / . Serbian throne and Pasie and his Radicals who long held Kara-
,,,, 
djordjevic sympathies , established a new government .  
- / Pas 1c continued his political career , holding the appointment 
of Pr� Mla.1.ster from 1909 to 1910, and then again, from 1912 to 1918. 
11DrignakoYitch, op, oit . ,  737. 
/ After the Sarajevo Assassination in 1914, the •Jovanovic 
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v / 
Revelation" insinuated that Pasic know of the plot and took no 
effective measures to prevent it.  This brought considerable 
anxiety to the Radicals ; however, the revisionist theory had 
v / 
never conclusive proof to substantiate its claim. Pas1c acquitted 
hims.elf ot all guilt by declaring: 
/. It 1a a lie. Ljuba. (Jovanovic ) may be sorry 
that a lie which he told for political pur­
poses has hurt the country� That makes it no better. It is a lie . l� 
v / 
. As Prime Minister during the war years , Pasic came into 
contaot with $embers of the Yugoslav Committee and with them 
co.signed the famed Declaration of Corfu. As head of the Peace 
Conference in Paris , he was instrumental in assisting to estab­
lish the realization of Serbia ' s  territorial aspirations included 
at Corfu . 
v / 
Pas·1o did not foresee clearly the outcome of the fall of both 
Ottoman and Habsburg powers and tended always neither to forestall 
nor to precipitate events ,  but to react with instinct at the 
proper moment. 13 This was one of his special qualities as a 
skilled s trategist. He and his party stood, at least in principle , 
for parliamentary democracy with shadowy emphasis on peasant 
interests . In Serbian domestic politics he was an advocate of 
gradualism, standing for traditional Serbia with its faults and 
12 
Armstrong, op, cit . ,  p .  614 .  
13 v / 
Hermann Wendel ,  • Nikola Pasic , •  The Enciclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences ,  Vol. X I I .  ed. Edwin R .A.  Se igman (New York : 
Macmillan Co. ,  1934 ) ,  p .  9 .  
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v irtues. 14 
v / 
Nikola Pasic ( 18457-1926 ) .  Serbian and Yugoslav Statesman. 
Eleven times Prime Minister. over thirty times a member of the 
Government. twice President of the municipality of Belgrade . 
President of the Supreme Council , Senator . Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary. Speaker of the House , Presid:ent of 
the Peace Conference in Bucharest and head of his delegation at 
Paris in 1919. Frequently alluded to as the creator of Modern 
Yugoslavia. 
Many foreign correspondents and pol1t1cal satirists have 
delighted in both characterizing and car1oatur1z ing the classic 
figure of the late Stateman. H.F. Armstrong, Managing Editor 
tor Foreign Affairs ,  who frequently visited the new Kingdom in 
its infancy found that : 
v / He ( Pasic ) had an impressive face with active , 
knowing cheerful eyes. His solid shoulders 
fi lled out squarely his invariable black 
broad-cloth. His shoes were square-toed and 
heavy ; he was of medium height and stood 
14 
Boegholm, op. cit. , p. 714. 
firmly on his fee t ,  though hunching s lightly 
forward . His hands were short , heavily 
ve ined and brown. His whole appearance was 
of a man of the soil-courteous , cautious , 
impassive , inflexible • • •  
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Item I I I  
� 
THE POLITICAL RISE OF STJEPAN RADIC 
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Radie( was born on June 11, 1870, at Trebarjevo , a small 
Croatian hamlet lying on the banks of the Sava. He was one of 
eleven children living under the roof of impoverished peasant 
parents .  Radi�s early life was one of severe penury . 1 Leaving 
his parents •  seven acre farm, he and his brother Antun, despite 
great financial difficulties,  attended the Zagreb Lyc� . 2 
/ 
Radic ' s  industry and application were astounding in school 
even though he surrered from extreme myopia. Born with this 
ocular malady , he : 
was all his life dependent on the kindness of 
others for his reading and it was doubtless this 
necessity of sparing his eyes which developed 
his prcxligious powers of memorizing . 3 
/ 
Radic ' s  interest in politics began in his early childhood 
as he related during his first travels : 
11n October of 1928 the Current History Magaz ine of the New 
York Times translated an excellent and enlightening autobiography 
of St jepan Radie from Bozicnica, " 1926 • ,  pp. 5)-84. As there are 
very few translated works on the life of Radie this source has 
been cited by several Eastern European historians as an excellent 
repository of information for students pursuing research in the 
interwar area. It is  undeniably valuable in its description of 
the formation of the Hrvatska seljacka stranka . 
2stephen Graham, Alexander of Yugoslavia (New Haven , Connecticut : 
Yale University Press ,  1939), p .  125 . 
3 R . H .  Bruce Lockhart , •stephen Rad.itch : Peasant Patriot , •  
Fornightly Review, X.XX (October , 1928 ) ,  512. 
I undertook alone my first student tour from 
Zagreb to Koprivnica, and then through the 
Drava and Danube Valleys to Zemun and Belgrade, 
and through the plain of the Sava returning 
to Sisak, the governmental district to which 
my native village belongs • • • I wrote my 
travel-diary regularly , describing part icularly 
what people thought of officials , of government , 
the economic position of the peasants in one 
Department or another ,  the organization and 
value �f the schools , state of the roads , and 
so on. 
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His first demonstration and arrest occurred after a decree 
suppressed the Croatian Opera. As a first in a series of political 
escapades that would mark the rest of his life , Radie' decided to 
make a public protest against this decision and : 
On April 13 the opera •Nikola Zrinjski was being 
played for the last time . The libretto was by 
the poet Hugo Badalich . I lmew that in a passage 
of the third act the Paska Sokolovioh offered 
Zrinjski , in the name of the Sultan, the crown 
of Croatia if he would surrender the fortress 
to the Turks. Zrinjski replied : ' The Croats 
need no King, for the Ban is King to the Croats . •  
I took advantage of this scene to shout three 
time s :  'Glory to Zrin j ski , down with the tyrant 
Hedervary ! ' I was arrested. When • • •  
quest ioned • • • I replied that I had made this 
demonstration with full deliberateness and in 
the deep gonviction that Hedervary was • • • 
a tyrant. ) 
I Radie , who frequently travelled in his younger years , went to 
Russia and received some of his education in a Russ ian Academy. 
There he came into contact with Russian social revolutionaries and 
acquired from them the first theories of his land reform policy. 6 
He had an extraordinary facility for learning language , and 
4stephen Raditch , • The Story of my Political Life , •  Current 
History ,  XXIV ( Octobe r ,  1928 ) ,  85-86 . 
5rbid . , 86 . 
6Lockhart , loc, c i t .  
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consequently mastered Russ ian very rapidly. 
Upon his return , he was expelled from his school in Zagreb 
for discuss ing politics . His behavior fell under police suspicion 
and his mental state questioned and, therefore , he was committed 
to the Brothers of the M1sericordia, a Zagreb mental hospital , 
where he was placed under observation for melancholia neurosis . 
He was released and managed to complete the first phase of his 
college career , receiving a BA degree from Zagreb University . 
After this he organized his first political school and in 1893 , 
was incarcerated for speaking against Count Khuen-Hedervary during 
a Croatian Centenary celebration. While serving a term of four 
/ years of hard labor at Petrinja prison, Radie learned the Czech 
language . Pardoned shortly after, he went to Prague , where in the 
course of his studies at the University he met his future wife . A 
nat iTe or Bohemia, her only ambition was to become an e lementary 
school mistre s s .  Later, after marriage she proved an invaluable 
/ 
aid to Radie acting as his amanuensis and a reader during his life . 7 
In 1895 , he and his students organized an anti -Hungarian 
demonstration during which the Hungarian flag was burnt as a 
protest against what he called • i l legal Magyar supremacy . • 8 After 
/' 
serving an additional sentence 1n the Parague goal , Radie unexpectedly 
received f inancial aid for a trip to Moscow from the relatives of 
the very Chief Justice who had him conTicted. From Russia he went 
to the School of Political Soienoe in Paris and approximately at 
7Ib1d . ,  p .  514 . 
8 Ra.ditch, op. oit . , p .  89. 
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the same time , commenced publication on his famous review, 
/ 
Hrvatska Misao ( Croatian Thought ) .  Radie married in Prague on 
September 2 3 ,  1898, and with his new bride ' s  help, finalized his 
thesis , • croatia of Today and the Southern Slays , •  in Paris . The 
treatise won him great praise and he was recompensed with financial 
funds and won the honor Laureat des Sciences Politigues . 9 
/ 
Radic ' s  life as a journalist began after he completed his 
scholastic studies in Paris . The Croatian youth had turned into 
a man and was now •at home in every city and every university, 
speaking all the principle languages in Europe . • 10 
/ 
In 1899, Radie 
reappeared in Prague contributing to almost all the literary and 
nat ional economic periodicals in the country. The nature of his 
revolutionary writings in two weekly papers , the Samostatnost 
/ 
(Independence ) and .,he Radikalni (Radical L!aves ) ,  caused him to 
be expelled from that city. Deciding to be on Croatian territory , 
/ 
Radie went to Zemun and wrote several reviews and books in Czech 
for which he won a title in the Czech Literary Society. He 
remained in Zemun from the Summer of 1900 till the beginning of 
1921, spreading pro-Croatian propaganda among the peasants . 11 At 
Zemun much of his compoaitions reflected the rhetoric that would 
be included in his program for his peasant policy. In a pamphlet 
entitled How to Find a Remedy for our Trouble s ,  he listed twelve 
pointa that formed the embryo or the social program connected 
with the Peasant Party .  In The Strongest Party in Croatia, 1902 , 
9 Ibid . ,  p. 92. 
10 Graham, op, cit , ,  p .  126 . 
llRaditch, it 4 op. c • , p .  9 • 
/ Radie advocated the idea that the peasants: 
• • •  constituted the strongest party because 
their life and their conception of the rights 
of the State, as well as their national 
consciouaness naturally inspired them with the 
best or programs, and that it was necessary 
only to organize them in order to realiz e 
��1�h�
r����n
�l2means of the real vital forces 
In 1904 Rad1c--'organized the Croat Peasant Party and from 
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the date of its formation till the outbreak of World War I ,  he 
bitterly denounced the efforts of the Magyars to denationalize the 
Slavs of Hungary, and as a countermeasure preached Serb and Croat 
Union. 13 In order to sustain the expenses involved in politicking, 
/ Radio started a Slavic bookstore and here met with many of his 
key and essential comrades. 
When terroristic tactics were cropping up in the Austria-
, Hungary Empire, Radie ex�laimed: 
I was • • • convinced that a terrorist action 
could hinder the growth of even great nations 
and could bring about the ruin or a small 
nation, without considering the fact that 
terrorism and revolt �re outlawed from a 
moral point of view. l� 
/ 
Antun Radie, who through the years remained close to his 
brother, was really responsible for formulating the party's 
ideology. Antun was especially trained in the social sciences and 
in regional ethnology. He had made a complete study of his native 
culture, institutions and philosophy of life of the Croatian and 
12 Ibid., p. 94. 
13Lockhart, op. cit. , p. 514. 
14R ad.itch , op. cit . ,  p. 100. 
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other S lav peasants in the Balkans . His idea was that in a country 
mainly composed of peasants ,  all exclusive 1nr 1uence on vital 
questions concerning the life of the community should rest with 
them. Emphasiz ing the • great S lav tree• in his writings , Antun • s  
ideal was a world based on the brotherhood of man and • permeated 
with a sense of humanity, believing that it was characteristic of 
the S lav• and all peasant people to . live in accordance with this 
ideai• . 15 
/ Sejepan R&dic ' a  program for his party called for a struggle 
by legal means for the emancipation of Croatia which had already 
been conditioned by the spiritual awakening and strengthening of 
its agricultural population. Following his brother ' s  tenets , 
Stjepan felt this end would be only achieved by education and 
elevating both the cultural and economic level of the peasants .  
St jepan extended his brother ' s  theories on the peasants by 
envisioning a new social order whioh was to be based on the peasant 
family serving as an economic and cultural unit. By the break-up 
of the large landholdings , the number of these units would be 
multiplied. Much of his philosophy for the Peasant Party is 
contained in his Najjaca stranka u hrvatskoj ( Founding of a Croatian 
Party ) , published in 1902 . 16 
/ Before the outbreak of the World War, Radie advocated a 
triune system in which Croatia would become the third state in 
Austria-Hungary . During the war , he was almost conscripted into 
15ninko Tomasic; MThe Struggle for Power in Jugoslavia , "  
Journal of Centr&l European Affair s ,  I (April , 1941-January, 1942 ) ,  
150-151. 
16Josef Matl ,  
Sc ience s ,  v .  XII I .  
1934}, p. 5 1 .  
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/ 
the service by his enemies . Radie was very much a pacifist and 
not only refuted the concept of class struggle , but also , all 
national and imperialistic acts of aggression, proposing that 
his country remain neutral at all costs.  
In November of 1918, when the Croatian National Committee 
/ 
voted for union with Serbia, Radie favored the creation of a South 
Slav State . It was really only after the formation of this State 
that he entered the opposition. 17 Concerning his wish for a 
federalistic state he remarked : 
We are all federalists in Croatia; at 
bottom it  i s  only as a matter of tactics 
that anyone calls himself a centralist , 
believing he will find this the shortest 
road to unity. That is a mistake . Our 
history has made us federalists. Our 
geographical situation, our orientation 
toward Hungary-a European state-makes us 
federalists in order not to become 
dependent upon the Balkans , which are , 
whatever one may say, an extension of 
Asia. Our duty is to Europeanize these 
Balkans and not to Balkanize the Croatians 
and S lovenians . 18 
/ 
Preaching a federate republic, Radie explained that the rural 
people needed a peasant democracy and that " the Croatian peasant 
wished to be an active agent in politics , not to be acted upon" . 19 
/ 
Radie believed that federalism had to be complete and that only 
external affairs and finances should be centralized. The personal 
/ good fortune of Radie can be visualized in his universal appeal to 





Ibid . ,  p .  51.  
"Political Parties in Croatia , •  Nation, CVIII ( March 22, 1919 ) ,  
Ibid . , p.  453. 
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difficulties and won their respect and affection by becoming 
interested in acquiring land for the landles s ,  in eas ing the load 
of alien landlordism and in reduc ing taxes that were i ll-represented. 
It was because of him that they turned to English rather than the 
•poets and dreamers •  whose •projects of the great day of union• 
were discussed in the cafes of Belgrade , Zagreb and Sarajevo. 20 
/ 
Stjepan Radie ( 1 871-192 8 ) , rose from a humble peasant home 
to a position of power within his own country as the founder of 
the Croat Peasant Party . Dorothy Thompson, writing for the New 
York Evening Post as fore ign correspondent in 1928 characterized 
him as : 
20 
A peasant with the face , the manners , the 
mind, and the methods of a peasant , Raditch 
spoke for the peasant . A l l  his life he 
championed the cause of the peasant,  fear­
lessly, unscrupulously , adored by his 
followers and hated passionately by his 
opponents • • •  
Charles A .  Beard1 • The Last Years of Stephen Raditch , "  Current His tory, XXIX ( uctober ,  1928 ) ,  82-8) . 
mr. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS , CROATS AND SLOVENES , 1921 
The copy of the Yugoslav Constitution that follows was given 
to Arthur I .  Andrews , then Professor of American Foreign Policy 
at Charles �Un)versity, Prague , by the Premier of Yugoslavia, 
Nikolas Pasic. From it the translation was prepared by Howard 
Webster Wolfe . a lecturer and instructor at the same Charles 
University, in collaboration with Professor Andrews .  Parenthese 
( - )  are used to indicate freer rendering than a literal trans­
lation would justify. Words enclosed in brackets I-I are added 
to clarify the meaning . The translation had the goal of corres­
ponding to the original text as much as possible . 
PART I. 
Uc11crnl l'rovisions 
:<E('TlllX 1 ·-Th<' !:'tat,. of lh•' $crb11, Cro:l.ts 
and =-'lv\'Clh'S I:; a ,·<mstitutional, 11a1·1lamentary 
:lthl ht.•J'\.'tlit:�1·y 1u1•na l'c.;hy. 
'\'he oftlci:tl n:tmc oC the Stale Is the Klni;<lom 
t'( the Serbs, Croats and SIO\'Cncs. 
SECTION :!-The coat-of-nnns of the klns-­
,1om is a <.loublc-hcatlctl sprc:11l cai;le In Clight, 
<Ht n l't'd i;hl\'111. O\·cr both h·�:uls of UH� 1l.,ul.>lc­
IH•ach:,l >il>l't':ll.l t'a&IC' Sl<\l1thl the Cl'O\\'l1 of the 
kingdom. On the l.>reast o! the cai;lc is a shi<•ld 
on which nre the coat1-ot-a1·ms, s.�1·1.>-a croll� 
on a rl!d shkld with a slnsle !it'''"tel'I by c:i.r:h 
1.>ar : Croat-shil!lti with twenty-five flchls, altc1·­
natel�· l'e,l and ,,:IJ\·c1·: Sl•)\'enc·--On a blue field 
three sohlcn six-pointed stars and un<.lei· this a 
white- hair moon. 
The State f1:1:; Is blur, whil<' and l'ed In a 
:101·izontal position facing an \ll>right stafr. 
Item V Cont . 
:ot:C'TIOJ\' 3--'l'he o{(lchl l:1ni,•u:,se ot tho 
1:1ni;1!0111 Is SL•rb-C1·oat-Slov<:ne. 
PART II. 
Bu»ic Rights and Duties of Citizem 
:>l:C"TION 4-'fhcrc ls one citiz�ni:hip In the 
"hole kingdom; all citizens are N1ual bcC01·e 
1 he In w. All enjoy the sam<? protection from 
c�iateJ authority. 
'fherc Is no recognition ot nobility, . nor titles, 
1111r vre-�minence ot birth. 
�F.CTIO:S 5--Personal !reeJom ii: gu:irantced. 
:\o one can be called to account, nor be ar­
r�stc-cl, nor othe1·wise be depri\·cJ ot freedom 
b�· 11n�· one except In cases it.in th•� law has 
Jlrt·scl'lbed. 
:\o one can he lmpl'isoned !or an�· crime what­
ooc,·c-r without a warrant ot c»::1p..-tcnt author· 
itr In writing and furnished with :;.-:1.son�. <rhal 
wan :int must be shown to the p.-r�on arrested, 
dlhE.-r nt the time ot the arr�t or. if that be 
lntPO��iblc·. at tu1·thest within a l·-'riv•l or twen­
ty-fonr hours Crom the tim� oC the arrest. 
.\i;aln.-t this wanant Co; •ll'r,.�t hP. has the 
rl�ht to appeal to a. comp•!lent c.:urt wit1lin a 
r.:rlod of three dn>·s. Tn caS•! there has been 
no Ul'PC-al within that limP, t!1.: inn·:;tigallng 
boclr must send the eviJ.,,nc•! to the court 
'.l'llhln twenty-fou.- hour,,. fli.: cuurt ls bound 
to j;l\'C: its clccl:<lon within/a p-:ri·'·I oC two days 
fMm the time or recei\'lr.g- th·: "' l•l..,nce. The 
C<Hlrt ch·d:::ion Is tin:il. 
OCC!clal nuthorltl('S who tran�;-:r<'SS against 
lhc�e ,.ta tu tel< 'Shall be Plmishe•l f··r ill<:s-al <le11rl­
\'a\lon or frecclnm. 
f\J::C"TION a-No one can 1)� trh:·l b)· an in­
comp, t<:nt · Juoli;c. 
l'l::C".rtO:\' 7-No one c:in be c-�r:.J;-mncd until 
he sirnll have been i<ummon·!·l by an official 
l:i wfully 01· in lcc-nl mnnner to ,;.,f.:nrl himself. 
St:C'TIO:'.'l 8-Punli<hmcnt m:t�· b,, fixerl only In 
:iccor<lanec ,.,·ith the law ancl c:.11 be ap1>lied �olc·ly to acts !or which the �a!\} lnw stated 
bHorehand thnt thc:y shoul11 b·: puni�hed ac· 
cor,lln;; to said law. · 
):"ECTJON 9-Capital puni;;hm··!'lt cannot be 
lnrli,'tc·d for mc1·1:Jy politk::t 1 crlm.::s. 
Ext·q>to:d arc the c:iscs of th<! cvmmisslon or 
"r :ittMn1>t a t  a:-::-::111i>ination on t!l·: p,-r,.,on of the 
ruler or members •>f the 1·oyal h·JU"•'. for which 
th(' ;J .. a th p••nall�· Is flxccl in cr:mlnal l�nv. 
1:, >hies this :He :1lso excepte·.I nds in which. 
to 1•11r1 l�· 1>olitkal culpability the-re is a<hlcd 
•<'Ill•' 1•1111i:;hable act tor whh:h th<! •lcath penalty 
I� fix, d in the eriminnl l•lw, an-1 such acts also 
whkh milit:u·y law punishe; with <l<:ath penalty, 
i-l·:('TION 10-No citizen can oo banish.:?<l from 
lh•· :"t:it<·. JT•J C:\nnot be ,Jrl\""n within the 
rountry from one 1>lace to :moth.;r, nor be ban­
l•h1 d to one particular place exCt,f1t in cases 
\Vhich the law hai< expressly !or.-��en. 
Xo ''nc c-an, in nny e,·1:11t, b.? banish.:?d from 
hi> "" 11 nati\·c J1l:1ce without j;i.ii<:i:1l nction. 
�1:1 '1'101' l t- A ;lw<:lling is in,·iolable. 
Ti . ..  :i11tl10rltic·s [the Stat.:?) m"y not un1l1'l" 
1··k. :1J1}' i11\·t·sth�ntto11 or �\·"\ rc:1 in lih· h11u: ,. 
' f  ' l iti'l.t>n, t"'Xt'l'l•l in �\"··ni�: :iti· ·' ,,·!1i .. ·1' tlH! 1, \'' l1a:-: f1ll'\'n·en �uul in ti· · :it�., . . , i�i· h •h·"' 
! '"' l1a..; 1•n·s-·1'i1J,·t1. 
!;,rur,· the: ill\'1•,;t1katio11 [•11· -�-'rdt) lhl! .tu· 
lhorJl.,·s :ire 11l1l li;-.,.1 to i;h·e 111 lh•: pr:rsrm who1111 
tlwcllini; la heinc- se11rc-hc•I a writt.-n w'11T int 
tor the :-:carch, the autho1·1tJ<:s [stating] on '" h:ct 
grounds the ln\'c'-4tlgation Is ullLlc,ct1<ken. ,\gninoit 
this warrn.rt he has the rig� · O�'; al to a court of Ch·i:.L lnstanc�!Dul t�� c11I cloe:t 
not prc:\'ent the carrying out .... t e :>1·:t rch. 
The search .!ohnli be cacrled out lrnmedlatcly In 
the pres�nC<' Cit two [other] citizens: 
Immediately after the completion of a search, 
the authorities are obliged to give to. ta 11crson 
whose house Is searched lnCormatloa-it>out thP. 
outcome ot the sea1·ch and' a l!lgned tbt oC ar­
ticles taken away ror further examination. 
At night police officials may enter a prh·atc 
house only 111 cnscs or suddl)n emergency. a>1 
when they shall be called on trom the house 
tor hctp. At this act oC the authorities there 
shall be present the Pr(!1<l·l�nl ot the municipality 
or two neighbors summoned. 
Officials ot state who haw: acted contrary to 
tiles..,· pro'"ii:lons shall be punll'l�d for Illegal 
\'lolntion ot a. 1h,�clling. 
IS:ECTION 12-Freerlom of belief and con­
science Is guaranteed. The adherents ot dlf­
!.:?rent i:;ontesslons are of equal rights betorn 
the law and ma}' practlcq .tlwlr religion openly. 
The enjoyment ot ch·ll and J>Olitlcal rights Is 
not dependent on confession or belle!. No one can· 
be freed from his civil and mllitary duties and 
obligations b�· a11J>ealinc- to the tenets of hh• faith, 
Those Caiths nre permitted which haYe thus 
far obtainctl lei;al 1·ecognltlon In any vart oC 
the .)(ingdom. Other faith::i can obtain recog• 
nltion only In accordance with' the· law.· .\c• 
ccpterl and rc1·os11iz.:?d faiths regulate indcpend• 
4!ntly thch· lntcrn:-tl 1�1igious a!fairs aml control 
thch· own Institutions antl fmllls within the 
limits oC the lt1w. 
No one Is oblii;.:-d to .:?xpress publicly his r�· 
ligious con\·ktlons. Xo one is obliged to take 
i>art in •·c!islous acts, c.:?lebr::itions, l'ites and 
practices, cxCl'Jll o n  Stat-:: holl,Jays and ceicbra• 
lions and in so Cai· ns the law enjoins this upon 
persoi�s who urn i>ubjcct to ·va ternal, i;-uardlan's 
or military authorit)". 
Accepted aml l'l'Cogni�ed faiths may maintain 
relations with their ;;o,·.:-1·.:-lgn superiors e,·cn 
oul�ide th<! bor11 .. 1·s of the �tale, in so far as 
the o:piritut'l 111'\'>'C'ripts oc the se,·cral confcll• 
�Ions tlcm:tncl thi:;. 'fhe mannl'I' in which th•'se 
relations shall bl! maint:\ined shall be l'l'gul:\ted 
by law. 
In so ra1· ns i::< for" .. , n i n  th.:? St:1t.:? budc-l!t 
tor i·,..lir;i\\n, t\u� \•ull·\� i ..... lo h\' \lh·hJ�,1 :ttn''"b 
the l:'l!\'l0l':ll :H'•'.-pk<I ·• 110( l'<'•"-'!:"llh�<!d fai th:!. :IC• 
cor11in;;- to th,, numlJ"r of t11,·i1· adh«t'\'nts and 
their CIC:ll'h' ::1i•1•\\ II llt'•'d. 
•Hclig-lo11s l1•a<h'1·::: ma�· n.:ot �mrl,,;·· lli.•!r :$I'll" 
itual authority f,, .. 1•:1rti:::111 ain•s •.>t tt>'i 1 .. th• :1· 
hoUSl)S oC wor:<hip, or bc;·1•111I ;11·«,-,·.-il'l " vi a 
religious �haradcr, or othcl'\\ 1;10: 111 th.• cu;rnt­
mcnt of t ht•h· ,,fficl:\l duty. 
:,;1-:CTIO::-.' 1:1-'l'he prc:.<S is lr1.•('. 
'TlH.:l'� t':lttn�·t h ... · ... ·=--tabllshctl :tn�· pr�n·,·ntiv\• 
nH'aS:ur0 \\'hkh hin\h'r!'l thr :\op.•:\l':tll\'1•, , ,tJ.• 
an,1 c-ir,•\1Ltti•\f\ •• f !'\�bli\· 'tt••n:t . 1 1hl lh·w�p·q•t't' .•. 
c, l1$'.\H':..:hip ···10 ,,, :-t �·!•..,,h, l ,.nly ilud1\!� thu .. 
,,f ,\:tt' \,,. r ht1: l:, ., t' t d• t< 0!t ,, 111 :t�n··r 
lH',•\ hHI�.;.(> ·"'! ' " l!, : ;,� t "\ \'.-: :,!.:1!1•ti i..; th4! 
c..·h·'-·ul;llh.•n att1l .$.,l'"· ,�c a •. ,, :-.,,,\,·t_·1·:-: dr" itl Int l 
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>11.l (l,1  ''hhh l'OhLliJ .. al•u:-.1· ,.f tht t ttl·;· c.r 
>nt·n1h,•r:: "'' th"· t ., .11 h\•\.�•·. h· l•!'.'- vi ft.·l ·  i;.:.u 
!--t:tt• . tt.. :\ali .. ,.;•J f:t,111·>'i1t11• .. ,,,.;, , .  • l in­
<'it1·m<11t ''' 111e dt1:<o 11� to futdhl, d1':llt:•' (lr 
ti"' t'1>11><tit11tion or law:: 1>f th<! la11.1, or "hkh 
<'<llll:iin:< :<Ct'lous of!cns.:i 11i;nlnst 11111.Jlic 1111ll'al>'. 
);111 In these <'nscs the authoriti<'s mu:::l lay tl11• 
m:tll< r bdorc the court within tw1.:111y-f,,111· 
hClu1·.- o! the infringement Cl( the pn>hihilion, 
:111<1 i;ald court mu,;t all'o within twcnt�·-rour 
hOt111' enforce or annul the i;upf>l'<,S>'ion. I n  a 
<'Clntrary cv1•nt, it is conshlerul th:1t th.:- sup­
})t\·:<.,f• •n Is :u111ullc1l. T!11! r<'i;nla r <'um·t,; !'hall 
<kchlc about the in1kmnlfi<'ath1n for ::t ·wrong 
do1w, lrnh•p.:-n<lcnlly o( tho: court <l<'<'isi1•n about 
tht' l'llf'Jll'l'i<"lon. 
· :For suc-h <'rime committ1'd b�· the Pl'•'"" nro.! 
t"l.'l'l'On�lbl1•: .\uthor. C'<litor. prinl<'l', }>ubli:<h<'I' 
an<l drculntor. It shall be '""'i«'ribcll b�· a l'I'•'· 
cial tnw rci:;n r<ling the prc-io:<, when and in what 
event lhc l'<'rsons em1mc·r,1tl'1l nuO\'<', an.t in 
whal manner thl'Y shall :tn:<wM· for crimes com­
mitted by the press. The 1· .. �ular courts �hall 
·try all cl'lmes <'ommillccl by lhe pr!.'>">". · 
SJ·:C'rJOX H-Cilizcns haw the rii;hl or ai:· 
scmbly nnd cliscul:'sion. F11rthet· stipulations 
about this, the law shull prO\'idc. They may 
not t·oine into assembly under nrms. Asscmblfr" 
in th" Clpcn must uc announC'•"l to <'Ompd1'11\ 
authol'itles at Jc.ast tw•·nt�'-f<il1r lwm·s bdorc· 
ha nil. 
Citiz• ns ha\'e the right to ai<semblo.! for J>UI'· 
posC's "ldch arc not punishable un1lcr th\' Jaw. 
SJ·:CTI OX J!;-Citizcns lt:1 \t: the l'ii;ht or PC· 
tilion. J'c·tltlons may be s!i;nctl 'by one or mor•: 
indivl<luals or by all lci;al persons. Petition:< 
may bo 111·cscnlc·ll to all authol'ltlc·s without clis· 
tincUon. 
S:t;<'TIOX JG-Science and art an� um·cstrlctf«l 
and enjoy the protection ancl support o! the 
State. 
Unl\'crslty instruction Is unrc-s1rlctccl. 
Education fs a prcroi;ath·e or the State. 
Jn the whole land c1lucatfon re�ts on one antl 
the same plan, .bcin& a1la1>tcd to the purpose tor 
which It Is Intended. 
All i;chools must gi\'C moral instruction and 
· develop the ch·ic consdou,.ncss in the spirit or 
national unity and religious tolt·raUon. 
Public Instruction is lndh'ld11nl, general, and 
obllsatory. 
Religious Instruction Is gl\'cn nccorlling to th<' 
wish of lite pa1·ents or i;mu·dlans respective!)". 
divitle<l Into g1·ou11s accorl!lng lo <'onfesslon and 
in harmony with their religious 11rlnci1>lcs. 
Technical schools shall be 01>eneJ In 11ccorrl 
wllh the nc<"cls of bu:<incss. 
State Nlucation Is gh·cn without enroll.no•nt 
fees, i;chool tuition, or other chn1'l;c1< .. 
Jn how far th1·re shall exl!lt prl\'atc school!< 
anc1 schools of the scvcral relfi;loos sects 11nol 
unckr wl"tt 11rrani;cment>< the)' shall operate 
sh:..ll h•· 1·stahlfshl'l! by law. 
All i1111tlt11tions for Instruction are 111111 .. 1· f:lat.: 
,.;1111c1·vislon. 
•rh" !':1:1l,. ><hall as1il>1t tl11! work of 11aUonal 
.. nil{; hi . ...... 11l. 
To mlnn11li<.s of ollwr 1·:w•: M' lanl!uas;1• 1 1  ... 
ment:i ry l111-tr1wtion iihall 1,. i;h.,·11 111 .. 1<.:r t·u11-
11lU011s wlakl. tlic Jaw J'laall '''" M l'lbc. 
,.;J.;('TIO:-i l<-'J'h1 rii.:l.t of prh·ate l'vl 1 .. ::1 .. ,r. 
<II<'•' :111.t t•·l•·l:•·•flh :11i.l 1"1.·pho11c co1111n11111• 
tion Is 111ai11fl'inc;1·.I ·,.�c1.:11t in the case or <:ri;;:: 
lnal ilwcsligation, mobilfzation, or war. 
All tho"c who \'lolate prh'n.te cpnci<)>cl111l,.n, .. 
'"' frh'{:"raph and t<lll!phone commun.J.catlon ""·>ii 
he 111111l:::hNl acco1·,t1ng to law. . .. . 
:-rn('TIO:-o; Jll-B,·cry cltl;r.�n 11ns t�. r·ii;ht •H-
1·cc·tly anll ·wllhout any sort ot [p�1t1• l u(fi. 
clal a111horizatlon to brini; charges agRln�t !-:t:.1 
courts 01· min<•I' autonomous [minor ch ill <•fL­
clals for criminal aC'ts, which they may ""' 
committed ni;alnst him in official ltetivity. 
Special n·i;ulatil\111' :cpJJl�· to .:\Ilnlstcrs, Ju,1:;._0 
nnd soldiers- uncle1· the !lag. 
For a. wrt1ng wlil<'lt a Stat� 01· ll\JlOllf\lnc•u, 
official <loes to citizens b�· Irregular fulfilh'rll'nt 
or 1lu1�-. the Stale 01· autonomou" bo.HI)' h; an-
1<we1·ablc l>cforc the J'<'o;-11ln r court,:. Tho· oHieial 
conceme1l ii' an::we1·a'blc to th .. m. 
A com1,laint or a wrong ls in\'ali<I artc1· nine 
months. 
s1·:C'TIOX J!>-.All o!fkt:s i n  all brnnchcs eor 
!':late scr\'icc arc open alil'c within thcjr l�i;"I 
requirements to n fl [J ugosla\'] citizens by bil'th 
ns also to clti:r.t'ns who arc by birth oC Scrbo­
Croat-Slo\',.ne na t lon:\lll)'. 
Fort-ign-born dthwns can enter Stote !tcn·lc·: 
only when lht·Y ha \'e been ten yen rs rcsi1lent 
In the klni;dom; nn,1 by the cxprc!<S authority 
o! the Counl'il or !':late and with lhc wcl!­
found«<l !<uppurt of a t·omp�·tcnt :\linl.,tc1· l>cfo.-. .. 
ha.ncl (prn·ioul'ly i;h'l'll), 
SJ•:CTIOX :!O-J·;,·.,ry cltl?.cn enjoys the 1,ru­
tecUon or the i-:tate In foreign States. E,·c1·y 
citizen has the r!i.;ht to J'l'lh•unce his dtlz1:11:<hi11 
after fulfilling his oblli;a l Ions tow:i nl the Stat ... 
The surr('nclcr of its c.wu dtiz1·ns I:> 11rohiLit ... •l. 
SF:CTTOX :?1-E\'C'r)' citizen i!: uncler obligation 
to obey the htwi<, 1t1.:n·c the inlcrc.'<tl! of national 
unit)-, protect the !athcl'land, support the bur­
dens oC the �late . uC'corlling to his lnhel'ite•I 
ability am! In accord with the J>l'O\'islons oC the 
law. 
PART III. 
Social and Eco110111ic l'rol'ii;fo111; 
Sl:CTl01' 22-"'ith the purpose that uniform 
prosperity be b1·ought t o  all cllizen,., the Stale 
will provide a place o! clis11lay for thc economic 
products to which thi:y i;h·c tlJ<·ir efforts. In 
k<:eping -with this it will c!<lablish a. perm�1wnt 
scientific ori;anizatton nnd lnslltute coMtnnt 
,.u11port ot !:'Choo! attcnclancc Cor capable 1>onr 
chlldren. 
St•:CTIOX 23-Thc wol'l.lni; class Is un,l•'r th· 
J>rotcclion ot the !':ta te. 
"'oml•n an1l l'l1lhlrcn not full}· grown a1·" •'"l"­
C'lall)' to b<� 1.roteetl)cl from oc<'upatlon11 harmful 
t<' tl1<-ir Jwalth. 
'J'hc lnw !<hall establ111h SJ1eclnl mea11ur•·:< r..r 
the security and p�ot<:ctlon or wor.kcrs nn1l ,-hall 
11rcscribc: tl11· hours of work In all ocn111:ati1111:<. 
s.t:(:TtOl'i �4-Tl11: produ<'ts o! mentnl cx1·1·1h•n 
ttl'c lhc prupcr1�· "' thc author ar•l cnJ11y �1:11>! 
1•roll!1.:tlon. 
SF.C'l'JOX ::?r,_J•'rcc1lom or ai:;rcC'mcnl In tr:ul" 
n·latit.r1s i� 1·�·cu1�r,Jz,.,1 in .�n f:11· as h J:-' H• l 
ClJ•JIOl'c•I tu U1c lull ro:»li; of "ocfrty. 
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>:1:c·r:o� 2:1-tt i s  thr rii;ht an•I duly o r  th•· 
Hat.:' lo intcn·""'' in the 1•uh'lc l11t1;rcst alltl 011 
th<' basis or the law, in lhc cconvmic relations 
p! ci1lzN1�. 111 the spirit of justice uml Cor th.: 
pr,·,·C'ntion ot social trlcllon. 
$}:CTION 27-Thc State shall gi\'C attention 
to ( 1 ) The betterment ot !;'t:lllH'lll hygcnic nn<.l 
$vdal conditions which acre�� the natlonnl 
t.t·:ilth: (2) special care for mothers :rn<.l young 
childnn ;  (3) the preservation or the health o C  
tilt! whole citizenship : (4) the sup1>ression ot 
:1culc nn<l chronic lnfcelious dliwases, as well ns 
tile f\lppresslon ot the abuse oC alcohol : (J) 
111.-.1\ical ns"lstance witho11t cost, the furnishing 
or mHliClncs and other necessities without cost 
rc•r the JJrc-servatlon of the general health of tht! 
,,1:<-<lY citizens or the nation. 
::-t;CTIO.S 28-1\larriag•! !"lulll b•! un<lcr tho: 
prot�ction ot the Stnt<". 
SJ:<·TJOX 29-The State shall assist material ly 
th•! ::-;ntional Syndicatc. Likewise the State 
�hall tts�i;,it materially other n:1tlonat economic 
on;anizations which arc 11ot working Cor profit. 
r1·ecedencc shall be gl\·en over other private 
undc·nakini;s under otherwise equal conuitionl< 
to su<"h !'Yndlco.te and such economic associa­
tions \\:lthln the circle ot their aC'll\'lli!'s In \'lcw 
<>f thr-!r co-operation. 
ThH� shall be passed a law with reCcrcnce to 
a�;ociation!', which shal l  appl)' to the whole 
11'!tiOn. 
Sl::<'TIOX SO-Farmers' insurance unions sh:1ll 
b(: E-�tn blll:<hcd b�· a special l<'S'U I enactment. 
Sl:CTIOX St-'rhc ln!j n·ancc of workingmen 
n�aln!<t the event of acc,<lent . lllnl'!<S, 111wm1)loy­
n'<·nt, incn1mcll)', old age and deuth shall be es­
tabli�h,:tl by a sPcdal law. 
S:t:CTIOX S'!-lnvalids, war or1>IH1n!<, "·:i r 
"iflow>< 11nd the poor parents, un11 bl•• to work. 
or sohlit>r!< who roll or died In the wnr i<l!llll 
(:11joy special State protection and h!'lp In token 
or r<'cognltlon. · 
In nccord with the law, )ll'O''l.•lon i::h:1ll b•• 
made for the feeding Of lnvalltli< lnca1>ablc or 
,·.-ork 11n1\ for the training or wa1· orphan>; for 
work uml for lite. 
SECTIOX :Ill-The rit;"hl or workini::nwn to or· 
i:aniit· ror the 11111·1'1>s.: oC obtalnini; hcttN· work­
in;; cc•nJition!I I-" i::uarantN·1l. 
!<:t;('TIOX Sl-f.1wclal nltcntiun !<hall be i;h·c11 
tc· tlk mari11C' nntl to s!'a fl:.<hC'l'it'>'. 
1'h" ln�urn ncc of p<'r�oni< c11111l,,yccl on th" sea 
t·�:<tl11H the cn•nt or i::ickn.·s�. lnc:11•acit�·. olol 
H!;e an.I tll'ath shall be. cstablil{h,•d b�· n Slll'Cial 
l:•w. 
!<J<:<·T10� :17>-Thc �lat<' sh:ill c:1r,• for lh<' 
<:c•n"11 uclll'll uni\ mninlNlOlll'C or nil means oC 
lr.t(·n·,1mnl1111kation when:n'I' th<' f:l'lll'n\l Slah' 
int•'rt::O:l$ -.lcnulnd. 
,:};('TIO� l!C-U>'urr (cxtorllon) l'lf C'\'N'Y sort 
is forblthll'n. 
:->J:('TIO.S 37-l'l'upcrtr rlr;hli; nrc 1nmrnntt"C'•I. 
l·1·0111 pro1>c1·ty arl:<c also oblii;ut1011s. 'l'lwr•· 
�h:ill l>e no cmplorrncnt ot propcrtr to llw 11..trl­
r.1.-m of the 1n1bllc. The content, .-xtt-nt and 
1:1111tatltms or 1>rln1tc property �hnli b� Cixt•tl 
b�· law. 
J-:1qo1 n111·l11 llun t>C l'rh·a t<' Pl'Ol>l'l'ty r.>r tl11• h,•11t•· 
fit or th1• p11hllc Ii: 1tt·r111lttl'•I ''" th" ha,.I:> or 
ll1t· law 111 l't't11r11 !01· Ju:>l co1t1JJt•11,;atk•n. 
�E<"TIOX 311-J;ntail :,h·dl br• ah•1li11h•·•I. 
J ·ou111lations wilh JHlr•;ly h"nt:ric:•·nl l•llrl•'""'i 
sl•ull b•: l•<:nnittt·<.l. It J>lo:tll b·: fix,.ol 11)' 1-.·.v 
h1 what <;vent aim� u1ul ohjt:<·l.< r,( f1n111d" r ; .. 11.� 
21.1.111 h•· chan.r;.,11 to mcl'l chi ini;•;•I 1·onollti1,ns. 
SJ-:C'TIOX a0-.Acc6rdln.r; to law c<1n1· ..  1·n111� 
tuxrs on an lnhcrltuncc, :in l ntt�l in tlw Jn­
ho.r·ltance i;hall be CiSsurcd to the Slute;; i11 
this, basini; the calcul:.tion on the cl,·�I'•··· or 
relationship between the heir un•I l111; t1r:c .. :os•·ol 
pcr!'on and the Ynluc oC th'; lnlO'·rltunc1._ 
SEC'TIOS 4G-Thc requisition or & room nn•I 
of other necessities tor lhc militar)· i<hall b·· 
ur.nc only In return tor Just compensation. 
!:;Jo:<:TIO� 41-LarG'C prh·atc for1:st tracts .shall 
be expro1wbtc1l :1cco1.,llng to the lnw u11<1 :<h:i l l  
!lass Into the posseRslon or the State or uC a11-
lo11omous bodies. The law shall stipul:tt•1 in 
liM\' tnr great forest tn1cts can l>c the J>ropl'rty 
oC olhcr Jcgal bodies which atr ... -o.d)' t·xl:;t or 
" hich shall be toundc<l. 
Real forest lan<l, whose forestation Curthc:r:> 
cllnirttlc. and cuitu1·al consltl'-'r'ltion!<, -sha ll Jm»:> 
likcwiRe In aeconlanc� with the law o( expro­
priation Into the propert>· ot lht: St!l.l.t! or or 
e.u tonomous bodies, In so far as this fon·stalion 
cannot be accomplished in any other manner. 
Great forest tracts which foreign aulhorit» 
hnnuc:<l o,·er lo Individuals shall pass. arcord­
lng to the law, Jtlto Stale or municipal poss•!i<­
sion without any recompense what'!ver to thos., 
ln<llvlduals. 'I01'? !�.w rci;arJinS' torP.sts shall Cix 
tht: conditions unocr which peasants culti\'atln� 
the land, nnd lho::1c who support lh('mn•l\"d• lra­
cldentally by wwk on the land, may. help them­
sel ves by cutting wood for building 111alc1·i..t or 
tuC'l, as well ::is for the pasturing or C'atll·· ht 
Slate and comm1111al forests. 
S>:C'TIOX 42-Fief 1·e1."lfl0t1snips a•.? legall)· r<'­
i;ard('J as lcrmlnntc1l on the clay ot frt!t:•lo111 
C•'Om foreign domination. In ho"· !ar lnjus­
tiC"Cs were done tH\ywhcrl' b!'fOrl' that time b)· 
thc dissolution ot Clef rt>l:\llonships · or tht!lr 
1<!mulalions Into priv;.1le .tc-i.:-al r,'lationshl1>:> shall 
be passed on by llw law of r,•l·tificatio11<1. 
Vassals (scrCs), ns nl::io in g..-1wral l:tml work­
ers who till lhc land In !i,•!-likl' r,·tation�hlp$, 
shnlt be cstablish,•11 as rr,.,, po;:�"s:;ors or �1:.1.1,• 
la1111s, not paying th,•ms,h·,,,. nn�· sort oC com­
�·c·nl'atlon whal<'ver !or l l nthl ..!'hall be 1·,·i;;\r,J..-J 
us ha vin:; h.;>r,•1titar)· rh;ht,-. 
i'E('TIOX �:1-'l'hc cxp1·opl'ialit•ll of ;.:l't':ll POi'­
.... � .. 1,>11s :m.1 ll1t•lr <li\'ISh•n i111,, Pl'•'P•'l'ti,•s for 
tht'>'•' Will> till tht' la11ol >:<hall h,• r,•i;111:1l,.<I b)' 
law. The law �hall tlx :ti"'' what :«•1·1 ,if 1·o>111-
l>l'nsation shall h,• i.;h·,·n ft•r l'Xl'n•prla1,.,1 111>:<­
:-4\'Ssf,,n:-:. F·cll" ;::1·,•at 1't'�:O:l·s�k1on:', \Vhic-h h\·h'tl��''• l 
l\l nt\·ntb""rs tlr Cvt nh·r r,H·,·i;.:-n •lyna:oo:ti,·:4. �t1hl f\H" 
tho:;;,• \\"hh.•h f,1r,•i).:'n U\llhln·it�· fl'-·$(tl\\ l'•' '-'I\ in­
ttl\'lt\i1al:<, Ill> ('\>l\lpl'll;<:ltlt•ll \\ h·1ll'Vl't' ,h:!ll b1' 
i.;h·.·11. 
�··ttlo'11wnt=- shall ht• ,•rr.-,·t•'•l p1·im:11'1ly with 
llh' lh•lp or $\•llh.'rlh.'1\l n�.�h'\"iath,ns l'l'�·tnii'.i.'d 
frn•ly, all<I i.:-h·l n;.: ntlt'nli••n :d:<t• th•'l'l'll• that 
th•• >'dth•r" m:iy h.• >'lll'Plk,t wi th th« h1<lio<1•<·ll­
"lbh· l'<\Uipnwni ft>r fll't>lhtd l,•n. 
Tn :<..tth·ni.·111,. 11>< wl'lt a� In ll\\' tli\'l><h>n of 
'''l'"''l't'Lt.h"'' t1·�u"l�. pr,·f,·r,·1h,·,· sh;l.\I h,· ,:h·,•t1 
ti• llt'•'<h· ,.,,1,11,•rs wh" foui;ht c,w th" "'''" ,·1·an.-.• 
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or th<' f;, l'b:<, ('ft,:lls :tll•l �hn-1·11•·"· all<! llwir 
f :uni Ii 1'�. 
The:' amo1111t o( g1·0111hl :i,>'ipi.·d \,1 th•• l:intl 
worl;,•ri. :<hall be i<1•1'<·irh't1 by law. al:011 th• 1·1111-
tlition" 1111Jcr which thi:; 111ay ""' h·· iii\ ;,1,.,1 
;imon� heirs or in any manner h1 taJ..,·11 away. 
ISY.('TIOX -1-1-An l 111l11!'trii1l (;011111'11 ><h:1ll l.11· 
creatNl tor tlw wor'hlllS' out o! .soc·lal 111:111"""' 
:111<1 th<' formulatlni:; of imlu!'trial law:;. Fur· 
th•·1· dctnlls abo11t Its com11osillo11 :.111•1 compe­
tenry shall be !ix<'tl by law. 
PART IV. 
Sta tc A uthorities 
SECTJO:S- .a:>-.All Stale authorltic� shall be 
establishc<'I in acco1·1lan<'c with the IJl'O\'i;>ions or 
this Conslltulion. 
SJ.;('TJ01' 4tl-Thc King :tml the X:\llon:tl 
Skupshtina (Assembly) toi;Nher shall constitute 
the law-s"·it1i: ni1thorlt�·. 
SJ;CTJOX -17-Thc Kin:; shall cxer<'l�c admin­
lstrillive a\1thority th1·ous-h a rcsponl'lible ::llin­
lstry in aec.onlancc will1 th.: pro,·islon!' of this 
Con'1titution. 
Sl>(.'TION 48-Tilc co\11 •� $hall exercise judi­
cial a1{tlibrity. Their j11di;ment:o aml tlcclsions 
shall be hamh:tl down nntl carried out 111 the 
name of the King on the bal'iS oC the laws. 
PART V. 
The King 
i;t:CTIO� 411-TIH' Kini:- �ho.II .confii·m 11nd pro­
claim th1: laws, ;n•roint State officials, and give 
out military commamls ac<'Onllni; lo the pro­
visions oC the law. 
The King Is the Commancler-ln�Chie:C of all 
military forces. He gl\'cs out d<:corations and 
other dis ti ncllons. 
SJ;CTJON so-The King has the right or am­
ne:sty tor political anti military criminals. 
Through amnesty the legal consequences ot the 
et·imlnal act may be i<·l'scncd, but the right ot 
private persons to compenso tion Cor Injury can­
not be lnfringe<l hr it. Amncst)· may be Si\'en 
before the beginning or court procecdlni;s. dur­
lni; the cour!<c of Ille 11rocccdlnss. or after the 
judi;mc·nt i" rcnd('red. Amnest)· is general or 
lndivlclual. 
For amm·�ty or a )linist ... r there l!I necessary 
a prevll)us concurrence o! the National Skupsh­
lina, but thi:o ('llnnot be sin:n . to a. J\llni:oll•.r 
In any event ·b<'forc thu r"ntlr:rlng or Sutlgmcnt. 
Tht: King ha:< the right of 1>al'don. He can 
amnion, or .shorten, or molllf)· a punishment 
fix1:d by the coul'l. 'fhc right oC amnesty tor 
act11 punl11ha blc only through pl'lvatc complaint 
I:< fixed !Jy the lnw rcsartling Judicial procE-d11rc 
in criminal cases. 
i;J-:CTJON 51-'l'hc Kini; shall rc1•rcs1:nt th•! 
Xtalc In all Its rchtlioM with forclsn �talcs. He 
1<hall declare war an(! conclutlc peace. It the 
Xtatc Is not attack<:1I 01· w111· d•:Clan:<l u1>0n it 
t,y some other State, a 11rcvlo11s approval by 
the- National Skupshtina ls n1•('t'ssa1 y tor lhl' 
cll·daratlon of war. 
If war be proclalmccl on thl' """"'"Y or IC i t  
xhali h•· atla<'k<·•I, 1111: National Sk111•:<htina mu:<t 
IJ<: 1·;1ll•:tl tog..thr.r at one•;. 
f;J:CTJON :i:! -Tiie Kini; shall t;UllllllOll tl1l' Na-
tl"'1al :';lu11•:<l.ti11;1 '"" onlina1·y <•1· t•xtl'aor.Jinary 
Jo-l :-;�it,n. 
lk ><hall ••1·•·11 and c·los1· th<· siltirri; In 11<-r;:ori. 
with ;i i-1" 1 c-lr Crom the tin one or tlrr·uuc;h 11 .. 
1 ·1·1111,·il .. r .\l irri>'l<-1'" with i• 111c::1s11gc 01· 11l1us. 
All th,· .\linlstcrs �hall countersign a sixcth 
fr1l111 lh1· 1 hrc•nl-. a lllN•sagc ancl ukas. 
A uk�s by whi<'h the slttlni;s o! one se:��itm 
ar,· cl<1''<'•1 shall 1<lways contain also an a11-
n<.>u1u·1·1111·nt of the date of the new session. 
The Kini; cun at any time, in State nc 1·s�ity, 
convcnc th<- :\atlonal Skupshtlna which h:1<l 
J>l'Orosuetl its �ittini;. 
The King h11s the rii;ht to dissolve the Na­
tional �ku11;:htlna. but the 11kas concerni111; th1 
t'Hssol11lion must contnln a call for new clc1· 
tlon;; within a JI<'• !otl of three months at Jalc�t. 
oncl a call for a sitting ot the Nutionul Slwpsh­
tlna within four months al latest trom the 
1lny of di!'i:olutlon or the Sk1111shtlr1[�. All lllin­
lsters shall cc.unl<'r;:ii;n a uka!' !or the disso­
lution of t!l<; :\ational Skuµshtina . .  
$1':('1'10X ih'l-Th,. King cannot a t  the same 
time be the rul<'r or any other Slate without the 
con;:ent of 'the :\ational Sku11shUna. 
1f the Kine;-, contr>1ry to this provl11lon, still 
accepts the crown of any other Stotc, he shall 
be rcgarde:d as ha \'ini; rcnoun<'t•tl th1: throne: or 
tbc Kln:;dom of thc Se1·bs, Croats anll Slovene><. 
S:t:CTJOX 5.t-Xo act of royal authority shall 
have torcc nor can It be entorce,1 If a. com11H<'nt 
l\Ilnh•lcr h11s nol co11ntcrsii;nc1l It. For all :lCt:< 
of the Kine;, <.>raJ or written. countcrsii;notl m• 
not countersign<:,!; as also for all his proceedings 
of political charac·tcr, a comprtent Minister shall 
be responsible:. 
For thl' King's aNs as military Comman<l('r­
ln-.Chlc! lire :lllni�l<:r of '"ar nnd )\!urine !'hrrli 
be 1·espon11lble. 
SECTJOX r.r..--Th" King o.nll his heir arc of 
ai;c when the>· cc.mplc:te eighteen years. 
The Kin:;'>< person ls unasso.llablc [lnvlolablc). 
No chari;e can be broui;ht Involving the King's 
responsibility. nor can a complaint be made 
against the Kini;. This [invlolabllity] docs not 
hold of th<' Kin;-'s private stnt11!1. 
SI-:C'TIOX 56-ln the Kini;dom ot the Scrh�. 
Croats an,1 �lo,·enes the ruler Is Peter I., Kar­
ugcori;cvi{'h. Kini; Peter shall be followc1l b)' 
Heir to the Throne Alcxan1lcr an<I his male oC!­
sprlni; from leg;,! marriage by the rli;ht or 
primog.:nltm ('. 
tr the King 1.as no male off><prlni; he llhnll np­
µoint an heir to himself from the ln<'llrcct !inr 
with thl' con:<cnt or the National Slrnpshtlnn. 
For that I:.: 111•cc·�sar�· a decision or hal! plus on•' 
of the Cull nu1nb1·r o! the membership of the 
Xatlonal f;k111ishtina. 
S:t:('TIOX ;,�-Th<· royal house i<hall <'Onsi�t 
of the Qu<'<.:n Cc.nsort, the living fo1·ebcars an•I 
•l«l'C('ml:111ts in <lircct line with their consorts. 
the r1111 hroth..rs and their clcsccndnnts, with 
th«ir conl'orts, ancl the sl><tN·s of the r111ini; 
King. Th" 1·<·l1etlons' and 1<latus In the roynl 
h1111sc· :-:h:tll h1· <l,.finc-d by a statute whlt'h shall 
be cxtrit )('gal. No mcmlic1· oC the roynJ ho11�<' 
('an ht· a )lini:sl<:r or mcmhl'r of tlu· N:itinn:il 
!"kup>'htin:1. 
SJ·:('TIOX :.11-Jn the J•r<'"t'n<'c of th" Natlou:d 
Sk1111shtina tl11· J<hli; 1>hali takl' nn ttnth w11i<h 
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• • 11.� :1!'- fulhJ\\'�: (nantP), a�c· .. n1firu; th•· 
1;,n•r "· or the Kini;•hrnt of ll11• !:'crlll<. Crvats 
iO•l �JoH·n1·>:. and IU<Huming royal 1.1uthnrll)'. 
,w,·al' oy Alml,i;at)• Cod that I will JH'C>!l'r\'" 
iii.- unit» and fndepcndence .:ir lh1; State anrl tlw 
u1t•·!'rit�· ot Stnte t<!rrltory, nn'l that r will hol rl 
tl:c ('oni:titulion lnvl<,lublc; that I will rule ac­
:i<'<'"nlln:; to It and the laws, and that I will 
\..<1·1• b .. fure me wit!• all my mli;ht the wclta1·c 
,,r tht· nntlon. So h<'IJ• me, Lord Goel. Amen! 
:ot:<"rlO:S a!l-The King i<hall lln: constantly 
1n th<' C'Otmtry. If the necessity flJlPears that 
thl' J�ins i;o out of the country for a short time 
thl' h1·ir to the throne shall represent him. H 
11tc )1(·11' to the th1·one Is not o! age or It he 
1� pn:nnt1;d fin any way). the C1•111cll of lll in­
i�ter� �ha II rcprcRent the King. This represcntn.­
tior �h:ill be carrie<l out according to the direc­
tion!c' which the King sh:1i1 i;l\·c within the limits 
or th(' Constitution. Thi;; also applies i.11 the 
�wnt of lllneo><s of the King which shal l not 
pr(lduc" permauen t  lncapaclt>" 
Du1ing the time or absence o! the King or 
heir to the throne, the Council of Ministers 
�hall not haYe the right to dissolve the National 
�ku11�htlna. 
ThE: rc1wesentntion of the Council or llllnls­
t•:n; C'an last nt Jongc!lt stx months. At the 
1111: tf this time shall come Into pla)• ti1c conxli-
1u1ional l'C&Uhltions for a J'<'S'Cll<'�'. 
PART VI. 
Regency 
�£('TIO:\ 00-The King's authorlt�· /1in.11 be 
as�tmh:J by a regency: (1)  If the King Ix n. 
minor; (2) lf, on ac<"ounl of mrntal or physical 
illnH!I. ho. Is p1•rmancntly lnct1pncllatetl from 
nuumlng the Klni;·s nuthol'il)'. 
The ::\11tio11nt Skup!:htina shttll llecldc b}· secret 
\'OtE: rq;nr.tlni;: the eiotablishm,•nt n"lltl abolltlc>n 
of a n:i;t-ncy. 
It the Council of �Clnlstcn; shall lh!Cidc thnt 
the ('n·nt or ·the King's inca1>ncity ha;; trans­
pired. it shall lm1>art thli< to the Nali(ln11l 
Skup�htlna, fogclhcr with the opinion of th1·c .. 
Jlhysl<'i:ini< sdcctNl from the l'\atio11al '.\!o•tll<"al 
Fllculty. The proccc1llngs sh:•ll be th,• t'altl•' If 
th<: h1:lr to tho th1·one Ii< in qu1•i<llon. 
i"l:('TIO� 01-'l'hc authority 'o( H1•g-cnt shalt 
f:ill by rl�ht t•) th .. lwlr In th1· thrn1w. ir ht' Is 
of at"t-. Tr till' lu'll' 1<1 tltu tht'o>nc. for 'n•n,:1111>< 
• n11m�·1·atc-tl In :-: .. c·tiun fiO, 1·annol l\!l!ltlllh' the 
nuth(•t·it)' o! H1•gt•n t, th1• Natlonnl �kup!>lttlna 
�hal!. b�· seer<!! \'•>l<'. ('hO(li<e tl11�c lh•i;1•11t:< r1w 
th.: Kini:-. H1•i;1·nt:; for tlw Kl11i; shalt l.>t• ch0>'1'11 
fo\1· flour )'1•:11'!<: 11itt•1· thi,; tlm1·. In th<' C\'<'lll 
thnt th1• n·i;cnry nrn"t uc prohmg,•,I at J.•a;<t 
!1w n >":ti', the-re shall bl' a II<'\\' c-lc\·tlon: H th\' 
t 4  g-,·nt·Y is to last lonbt.\r. a �l"C'l','l t.'lt:'t·t 1<.H\ 
�hall lw heltl a!;"aln (or !0111· y1•a1·s. 
l·:li�ihl .. for Hei;cnts nn• only tho<'e bon1 i::,•rb:1, 
C'roatl'> antl Slo,·cnes, clllz .. ns \>! tl11• Kl11i;1lt1m 11f 
th(· �t>l'bs, Cron ts nntl l"IO\'•'llC:< who a r1• 4:i )'1•:11·s 
M ai;e nntl have n higher 1•\h:i-ation. 
l:.r.,, .. th<'}' tnkc th1� Klni:'s aulhM'll)' Int" 
lho·i1· h;1111li< the H1'i;-1•nts 11111:<t lakl' 1111 oath. lw­
f,q.,. lit•· Nati•>nnl l"ln111><htina whkh has l'l11>><•'" 
tho Ill that th .. y �dll lw 4aithCtll .to th•• l.(ln1: anol 
lh:1t tlu )' will 1·ulo• "'""""11111: l•• th,• t'onstlt11-
tl1011 und th" law:< l•f tltt· lanol. 
si-:c·Trox ro·!-IC ""'' ,,r the tl•rt:•: J: .. i:•·11t" '" 
Col' th•; linH: ah1<c·1H CH' 111 1  r111y wayf ,,,.,,,.,.11tr·d. 
the two other H,.g,·nts shall h:I\· .. :.utht>rity :111>1 
shalt curry on Sl;.itr: bu.<ines:1 without Jtirn. 
SJ·:CTIO:S G3-Tho Rcgf'nts shnll Ci\l'C rt>r tlH; 
education of a minor Ki
.
ng. 'l'he admlnislratn1·s 
aPJ>Ointc<l by the wll1 of o. Kini; shall en r·· Cnr 
the property of n minor King. Jr the J<'c•:aso'll 
King h"i; not uppointcrt r11lminiRtr'ttors, tlH; !!•:­
gents l'lhnll appoint them. confct'l'ing with thr· 
Council ot !';late. 
SEC'TIO:S G-t-L' ntil the selection or Ri;g,.nts. 
the Council or )Jlnlster:1 shall f'Xerclsc. pi'O\'l­
slonally. the royal authority under · their own 
responsibility. 
SJ,CTIO::S 05-In the event ot the ucath or 
resignation ot the King, the heir to the throne. 
It h$! ls or age, shall assume the Co"ernm•:nt :1t 
once and shall announce this to the nation by 
proclamation. At the end or ten days he shall 
take the prescribed oath be!o1·c the· ::-;,.u,,nal 
Skupshtlna. If the National Skupshtlna hal< 
previously been olssol\'Cd and the nc\,· one ts 
not yet elected. the oltl National Skupshtma. 
shall be co1woked. 
SECTIOX GG-lC the King, afh�r his death. 
has not \ctt male Issue, but the Queen shoul<l 
be p1·egnant at the time of the King's death, 
the National Skupshtina. shall choose R�g�nts, 
who shall exercise the authority or the King 
only until the time of birth. The CO\'t'rnment 
Is bound to submit to the Natlon·tl Skupshtin:� 
before the selet•tlon oC Rt•gents. the opinions or 
thrCt' phy><iria ns srlcctecl fn\m the Xsttlonn I '.\Iell­
leal Facult)· !'<'S'11rding the pregnant.:)· of the 
Qu.:N1. Th<' snmc 1·cquln·ment hol<ls abo In the 
event lhnl thl' h<'ll' to the lhron1• i<houltl iii.: and 
thnt his wife should be p1·eg·nant at th<? time or 
the Kini;'s death. 
SJH'TIOX 6•-ln the event th:1t the throne. 
according to the provisions of this Constitution. 
shoultl remain wlthour an h'clr. the Council or 
'.\!lnlsters shall tnkc into th<'il· h:tntls the amhor­
ity o! the King. and shall at once cnll the ;-;a­
tlonnl Sku1>,;htlna to n special SC'S<'ion. In whlcll 
u solution nbout the th1·01w shnll b.: r.,aC'hco. 
s1•:c1•1ox Gii-The ch·ll list ot tht• Ring- shall 
b� fixed by law. Th.: ch·ll li::;t, one-,• Clx1•1l. can­
not b.: 1t11·1·ca:!C'<l without th1• \'C>ns.:11t o! the 
Xntivn:tl :i:kupshtlna, nCll' .i,•c1·ras"'' with,,111 the 
1·tH1� .. 11t or t h1• Kini;. 
Th,, Ki111:"s lt.•i;1•11t:; shall tak.· ft'tnll th1• �tat.' 
•rt'\•:u<HI')'. f»t' th,• ful!lllm .. nt 1>f t!1,•ir ,luti""· 
only so l\ltt<'h as the Xati1ltt:tl :':latp,.htina ::<hall 
fix f,,,. th\'111 al th;• tinw 1>f tlt .. 11· .:.:\'l,••·ti.,n. 
PART VII. 
1\'o I iv1wl Sk1111�/i I i1111 
Sl:('Tlll� IHI-Th.; l\athlll:tl �\,u11,:i1tlt1·1 .:.:halt 
b'' ,.,'Hlt&UlS\'\1 ,,r t',•&H'\'$Cnlall\0\'J: \\ hic-h tlh· It:\• 
tiou :.-hall ,·lhlllS'' ft"t't'ly In u g-,•th't·nt. ,u .. ,•,·l �Uhl 
:-;,•c.·r,•t t•lt•t•tit\l\, ht'h1 t'\"t'l'Y\\'l\\•I'\\ l\l th .... Sall\\' 
tiuh·. with r .. ·pr,•:;.,•ntath'n tlf lht.' nah\\,riti,•s.. 
1•'1>1· ''''"I')' ·ltl.tlllll l111t:i bi t:u1t:o ''"" rl'p1-.•:<,•nta th"• 
slt:tll lh· 1•l1o•><<'n. I f  th•· 1·x'"'"" •• r inhal>lt·111ts i11 
an�· l'kl'lh111 1lislt'i1•t shall t>,• lll•'I'•' Chan ::;._11t1tl, 
'''"' 1·,·pr,•:;."'nl:tth·,· sh:\lt h .. · ,.h,,$\'ll tl''r that 
l'\'lllll:lllt. 
'l'h,• Nat ivll:ll Slrnp:sht\11:1 sh:\.ll l•<' .. i.•,•t•'.l C1•1· 
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four � ' " ' "· Th,· f111th··1· 1ktall:< ,,l>:•:il lh•· 1·ln·­
tlo11 shall b1• lll'\$1:rfh,•d 11�· law. 
SJ·;t;TJO;:\ 70-J-:\,•t·y dtbwu li;. l>inh or 11:11-
\H'alization shall ha''•• ,,1 .. c•t1>1:tl  r·i;.li l if I>-· :-h:oll 
ho.vc rcach«d th" ai:<' 1•r :!l �·· :11·.-. 
Actln: o!fi<'C'r;;, ,.,.,.'11 th01t!;h 11<\l in scrvic1•, 
:\$ well as un1h'r offk1•r:s a 111! .sol.tl,•r,; under the 
!l:t&, cannot exerl'i"c Clc<'ll•1·a1 rii;hl or be 
,.1 .. cted. 
The law .shall dcchl.: al!<O nooul woman's rii;hl 
h> lite \'Ott!. 
i-J::('TIO:\ 7 1-'fh,,sc pcr:<on.s !'hall be dcprh·c1l 
tt-11ipor:o ril�· of elc-cto1·;1 l right: (1) ·who :u·e 
c·1rndC"111111·.I lo �la r,l la·b0r ( ln11>rfsonmc'nl), 1111til 
tl1cy sh:\ll be restore,! ·to their rights; (2) who 
arc condcm11c,1 to till! lo:<>< of th;-, pl'!\'ih:g'c:: o! C'ltizcn!<hip, !or tl•t' .turn 1!011 or this punishment ; 
(3) who arc \tnder r<'Sll':linl (t1'mpor:i.rily men­
tally incompdcnt) ; (4) who arc under gu;ird­
Jo.nship. 
isl-:CTIOX •"!-For rt'IH'<'.scntnth·c in the :Na­
tlcmal Skupshlina cnn � chosen only tho�c per­
sons who ha,·c ekctornl right, rcgar·dless of 
whether the}· arc entered on the clectornl list. 
l•'rom c,·cry rcpres.:>ntath·" nrc dcman<lecl the 
following conditions: ( l) That Jlc sh:i.11 be a 
cltlzen by birth -01· 11ntu1;:1ll:.mtlon or the King­
dom or the Serbs, C'roat;:; and Sto,·encs. Nat­
urallzccl citizens, If not of Scrb-Crnat-Slo\'cnc 
birth, must be rci<hk·nl nt )C{�t ten �·cars count­
ing from the da�· of naturalization: (2) that 
he .bt 30 yea rs or age: (3) that he spca k antl 
write: the nationnl lani;uni:-c. 
National rtprcscntntln�s c:i nnot be• at the 
i<amc time pun·cyors 01· Stall' contracto1·,;. 
f:ECTJO:-; 73-PolitiC'al. CinanC'ial :intl forest 
ofCicials as well as officl:ils o! the> agrarian 
1·-,!orm cannot be candltlntcs except they have 
1;lven up oCClce a year \icforc th<: announcement 
of the election. 
. Other officials who cX>Crclse public authority 
1:annot •be candidates In the electoral clistrict 
of their territorial competence. 
Otticials who shall be chQ.q<:n for national rev­
l'C!lcntatlvcs sh:rll be placed In official retire­
ment durlng the 1>Criocl o! the durntion of the 
mandute. 
7'llnlsters, acli\'c and in retirement, and pro­
fessors In the uni\'crsltl<:s can be candidates. 
an<l i! thC}' are el1,;cltd :.hall hold th<:ir }.>Osition. 
s>;CTI0:'.1< 74-E\'ery national rcprcscntative 
11hall reprcse:nt the whole nation and not mcrely 
those who electccl him. 
1·;1ector.s cannot give, and natlono.t representa­
tives cannot receive, manclato1"3' and obligatory 
�nstructions. 
All national rci;rcscntnli\'CI> i<hnll tHkc oath 
itt•al tl1cy will faithfully prcs"rvc the Consti­
tution. 
810:C'J'I ON 75-Thc l'\ational Sk Ullshtina !'hall 
rn1 :ct In the capital city, "H<:li;radc, In rcg11J111· 
>1<.J<slon every year Oct. 20, i! It Is not call..:cl 
�wCor<: tha l date into extraonlinary sl!ssion by 
tlu· Klni;'s ukas. 
If in the e\·cnt or wnr the ca11ital ls changed, 
tl1(: Nation.:.! Sku1,,;htina .shall mect In the f1ro­
vlsio11ul capital. 
'fhn 1·c:gul:u· >C<·:<slo11 cannot b,. dissol\'cd until 
the Stut<- bu<h;<:l i;hall bt. tix<:d. 
l>uri111; tl11: thrn: of w:. r tli•· Nalio11:d Sku11sh-
,.. 
1 i h  i i.· \\.•U:O:l:tnlly iti :-;•·='�ion t\X\�,•Jll If fl i!'· ..}i: 1 1I  d••\.'h14 \•llh l'WiSl'. 
�J·:C"l'IO:'\ •t•-·Th1• )oiatio11al :::1cu111<ht in.1 >ii:•' 
�· ru1l niz,. th" <'l'c'll<•mi:d,: oC l l;:; own lll•·ntl .. ;-_ 
:11111 :-hall •kchk ;:iboul them. 
'J'he Xatiou;il Skupshtina. shall Jlrbnibc it.• 
own onl<:r· C>f business. 
1;1.;,<."J'lO:-; 77-'l'he National Skupshtina i:h:1;1 
choose for c:1ch session Jts or!lclals from It� 
own memb1'1·ship. 
SF.CTIO:-; 711-Thc Council ot ::\llnlstC'1',; or in­
<lh·ldual ::\1ini>sters shall l nlrocl ucc bills on th·: 
Rlni;·s authurit�·. 
The rlsht o! Introducing bills bclon�s to C\'ttv 
mcmber oC the ·Xational ..Skupshtina. · 
8ECTJOX 79-Thc Kins shall concltHln trcali(s 
with !ort:isn Stafrs. •but a. ,-Pro,· isl on a I confirma­
tion o! the National Skup.shtlna. Is n<•ccssary 
!or the Yali<Uty -:>! these t rcatl.:-s. The Provi­
slonnl confirmatfon of the National Slrnpshtin:i. 
Is not necessary !or the Yalidlly or merely po­
litical ai,.,-cements, Jr they arc not contrary to 
the ConstitutlDn and laws of the State. 
An ai;rcemcnt th:it a !orcl&n nrm}· shall oc­
cup�· land or thc kingdom 01· shnll i;o acr·oss it 
Is nol \'alltl without pro\'lslonal confirmation or 
the Natloual Skupshtin:i.. 
The !'\atlonal Skupshtina can, iC State ncccs­
slt}' <knu;tll.(ls it, by resolution bcforchnntl, em­
JJOW<:t' the C'ouncil o! '.:\linisters to take mcasm·c� 
tor the acceptance or a propos,'<I treaty I! It 
cannot be postponed. 
Sta tc territory cannot be d ispose"! or or c'X­
chani;E>d wllhout the ratification or the National 
Skupshtlna. 
SEC'TIO:\ 80-The King shall proclaim the 
laws by ukas which shall contain also the Jaw 
its(:)! it pttssed ·b�- thE' :National SkupsMina. 1\ll 
the ::\tlnlsters shnll · countersli;n the ukas. The 
Minlsttr ot Justice shall pince on ll the State 
seal and shall care for the publication of the 
Jaws In the Of!icial News. 
The h1w shall haYc binding torce· !lflt•cn <lays 
ofter publication in the Of!iclnl News, it the 
law Itself dol'.'s not stipulate othcrwl.;e. The cl:IY 
of p,µbllcatlon Jn the O!!lclol News shall be 
counted. 
SF:CTION 81-T.lic Notional Skupshtina'. has 
the l'l&ht. ot inquin· am! evcn ot hl\·cstlgation 
I n  electoral and purely atlministrnth'e question�. 
SUTIOJ\ 82-J:;vcry member ot the National 
Skupshtlnn has the right .to vut <tut•stlons ond 
l'lterpellations to the .i\linlstry. The Ministers 
;ire oblli;cd to gi� answer to them In thc course 
of the same session at the time which the order 
of \luslncss fixes. 
frnC'TJON' 83-The Nntional Skup11htln:1 �hall 
dwl only Indirectly with the Ministers. 
foa>CTION' 84-0nly Jts members, mcmbcr5 ct 
thE: GO\'Crnment, ancl Government con!lclant:< 
ha.\'C th<' rli;ht to svc:i.k In the ·Nntlonal Sl11111sh· 
tina. 
�l-'.C'TIO� 115-Tht• National Skup:<htlna C'an 
make a Cully bindin& decision If there arc on<'· 
third 1•f ull the mt:mbcri. vre.!!Cnl In the 11lttit>&· 
For n Cully bindini; 1h.-dsion n. majority of th•' 
votu11 of the re11rcs .. ntntl\'cS vresent Is n1•c1·ss11rY­
In tl1•· cv<'nt of an t'Qunl division of \'Ott-:<, t11e 
J>rof)u�al voted u11on shall be rci;arl!.,cl us lv>l· 
tmC:TJON llG-No bill CUil be• j)llSllCC! Jn II IC'i:lll 
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·::.inn• r hy tlw :->atio11:d !'k111•"hllna until it i<h:.ilt 
1,:n·c 1':t,.·s1.·d Cin<l throui;h a com11..t1•nt com-
!!litt' '" 
\°<'ting in tlic National l'kup!':htlna is usuall>' 
..;••·n: e>nly eh:cllons am dcci1lNl ·b» secret bal· 
h>l. A vote can be cast only In person. 
f.nd1 bill must be voted on twice In the same 
$�:'�Iron of the National Skup!<hllna before It is 
fir.nlly adopted. 
�ECTIOX 87-No one can ever call a represen­
wtln· to .account !or a vote which he has cast 
0� a n"mb<!r or the National Skupshtina.. 
For nil utterances and proceedings In exercise 
ot a mandate, whether In a sitting or .the Na­
tlon:il �kupshtlna, or In a committee, or on an 
ln<ilvhlual mlssi(m, or In an Individual duty at 
th<· 1llre<'tlon of Jhe Skupl'htina, representath·es 
11rc ncc-ountablc only to the National Skupsh­
tin11 ac-c·orcling to th'C provisions or the order of 
11rc>culure. _,., 
!:JO:<"TIOX RR-,Vlthoul the authorization of the 
Xntlonal Skupshtlnu no. members can be held 
:o ans\H·r tor any crime or whatever degree. 
r.C'r In any event or on any, authorl·lY be dc­
i:1 lvctl o! their !rce<.lom, as long as their mun-
1!ete last$, unless .they are caught Jn the very 
pi:t ot crime or mlsdcm<!anor. But even In this 
l�$l Ht-nt the National Skupshtlna, Ir it Is In 
So!�sion, shall be ln(ormed al once an<t shall 
gh·c: or refuse authorization tor a competent 
trloJ to be carried on during the time o( the 
s�s�lon. 
Rlt"hl o! Immunity o( the rcprcscntath·e be· 
i;:hs with Uie day of election. 
lt any one becomes a. r�pl'escntative before 
a Judgment against ,hirn on account or any 
trime is carried out, the authority which made 
lh1. lnquir)· and ln,·estigatlon shall give ln­
tcirmation nbout <this to the Natlon11l Skupshlfna, 
,,.hlch shall give or refuse authorization for the 
tc>ntlnuance ot the proceedings. 
A rr,t-mbcr ot the National Skupshtina can 
� htld to account only for that net or which 
l.1: Is charged. 
�F.CT1ox 89-To the National Skupshtinn 
falls the exclusive right of maintaining ordtlr 
1!1 Its midst through Its presiding Dfficer. No 
nrnH·1I force can b..- po::tccl In the building o! 
the. Ni1tional Skupshttr1a, nor In any courtyarJ, 
'l\"lthout the consent or the President or the Na­
tional Skupshtlna. Likewise no Stale oCCicials 
ran Jkrform nny ac-ts of authorll)' In tlw Na­
tlcmal Skupshtlnn. without his co11�,·11t. 
No armed person may enter thl.' building or 
tl11· Xatlonnl Sjrnpshtinu except 11,•rsons who 
ar .. i.uthorizcJ to wear arms uml urc t'n:;nge1l 
In sc-n·IC'c un1h:r the National l:'ku11shtina. 
PART VIII. 
Admillistrath·e A11tltority 
St:CTIO:S !JO-All tht' "llnll'ters fc>1·m th,· C'oun­
til (1f '.\linislt•rs. which �t11n<l:1 1lin'1·tly unJ,·r Ui.• 
1'1ni:. The Kini; names tht• Pr,:,.1,1"1\t anti th,• 
"11:mb1er:< ot the Council of Mlnlst.-1·:1. 'l'h<' :\tin· 
ht( ri: stand at 011• heu1l or tlw Sl'\"\'1"�11 brancla•s 
ot Ila !'talc .Athnlnl><trntlon. 
r-11111�tcrs <'11n 111:<0 hll without "''rlColio. 
In th•· ,\llnll'lrh•s th••r,• ••nn bll i>l:ll',•d, wh,•r,• 
th .. "' c-.. s,.lty ls shown, Stntll \lmh'r :)el·rctarl"s 
l•Jr on•' •lt.:rlnit•· !'art c>f th'! bu:<in<:.<.i c,f ll1•·�·· 
branchc>< of th•: Stal .. A•lminii<trali••n. St:J\" 
t:ntlcr Se:<:ri:t;.i rl•:s. lf tll·'Y are clios•:n Crom l'ar­
li:.m1.:nt, <lo not It,;;,, th ..  ir 1111111.fato: . 
;\Ilnii:tc1·s 1w m1· the subortllnatc State ocrlcl:tli; 
r.ccording to the provisions oC the luw. 
;\Iinistcrs bc:Core entering upon their dutr tak•· 
oath to support the Constitution and b., folthful 
to the King. 
SJ-:CTJOX !11-'.\linlsler:i arc re�ponslhl•: to tl1•' 
King and lo the National Skupshtin,t. 
The King · and the National Skup:<lllin'I c·.11 
king charges against ;\linisters for lnfrini; .. 1111:nt 
of the Constitution and of the laws or the la11.i 
committc:d In tlH:lr official capacity. For " 1 c,n;:� 
which �llntst.:rs do by an Illegal [itct In) Culfill­
m<:nt ot duty the Slate ls responsible. 
Sl:CTJOX !12-Charges can bll brought ag:dnst 
Mlnlste:rs both during the lime or thc:ir s.::n·icc 
and tor th·e years after retirement. 
A proposal that charges be brought a:;alnst a 
Minister must b.:: made In writing and must con­
tain the charges. 
J! the National Skupshllna brings charg.:s 
a&alnst a ;\Ilnlsti:r a dccl!<IOn to bring the :\Iln· 
lst1:r be!ot·C' the court shall b.: br'>ught by a 
majori-ty of two-thirds or th.:: votes or the 
mt-mbcrs pr.:scnt. 
SECTIO:S !13-The State Court shall try '.\lin· 
lstc:rs. The State Court Is formed of six Cotm· 
cilors or State and i;.lx Court or Cnssation 
Judges, whom each o! theso bodies shull choos..­
bY lot in their plenary sittings. The President 
cf the Court of. Cassation Is the Presilltlnt ot 
the Stale Court. 
:For tho!!e acts which arc not forcseC'n In the 
said lnw punishment shnll be !lxe.1 by the law 
aboul ;\Ilnlstcrral Nspe>1i.�lbility. 
Further clctall'S about '.\Cl11lstt'1°ial respon..ilblllty 
.s!•all be so?l forth In a spedul law. 
SECTIO:S �-Admlnlstrntlve autho1·lt)· can 
make the neccs:ml') r.-:;ul:1tions tor the appll­
ce.tlon of laws. 
By regulations ·with legal force aclministratlvi! 
authority c-an regulate relations onl)· on the 
basis o! kgnl nuthorizntion which shall .Qe given 
ea>ecially t•'r euch ens,•. 
The National Skupshtlna 1•an b>· 1·csoh1th.m di)· 
clan• 'vithout force in whoh• or in part n•i;ula­
tions s.·t forth on the .b:tl'i<' or 1..-i;al authoriza­
tion. 
Hesutations nm)· be 1.nl'hlishe•l. an,\ in them 
mu:.<t be cited ca<'h tinw tin• law 011 tlw b:isi� 
or which th,')' arc 111a.t.•. 
!'l·:CTIO:S 9.>-Ad111i11i:<trntlC111 111 tlw kln):',l•.)ll\ 
shall .b,• <"•'t1tluctl•tl b)" •k1>an11h·11l::, l'in·uit<. 
\liSlrkt'5 >tilt! <'Ollllll\111\'S. 
'l'lh' dlvislc>n Into tkpa1·111wntio shnll ·i.,, 111:1.t • 
l•y law <'II natural: '-''"'ial a11<I economi.· t>.1s.'"· 
OnC' p1-.,vin<'•' Nin ha,.,, 111 tnost l'lll•.l'l'll 111-
ohnhitants. 
i'w"' ''r llh.)r\) stn:tlh"r ct .. 'l':trltt\\'nt::t ..... ,n b .... ' 
Join,,.t lnh' •'lh' lari:,•r •h-1>art111,·11t. Th,• 1kp.1rt­
nh'ntal a�:oc .. ·1nbtl,•s o[ tlh" ,h·1•artnh.'nt� , ... ,,n,•,•rth" .. t 
shall mat..,• th•• final .t.-C'l:tl•'ll nbout thij. Hi1t 
M'\'11 :;u\'11 11 <h-11arlni.•11t l'alltll't ha\°l' ll\••1·,• th!\11 
f.Oll.t1()tl inhabit:\\\IS. 
At tlw lw:11I or each 1l.•part11i.•nt sl1:11l b•• a 
Gr,•at 6upan. \\'lhHn tlH• '''"� shall app,,htt ;tthl 
who shall .:cm1luct th,• ·bush"'"" vt ::':t:1h• n,hnln· 
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i · i 1 ,. l it•f1 lh \ill• •l••J\,l l ll l i •  I l l  \ ; 1 1 1 •;:;.!h !-'l:ll• uf .. 
, .. i:o ,,_ 
io. l;("TIO:-< !lG-FOI' h11,,jn. ·'" 11( a cit�-. COl1l· 
11·.u1lf', tli�ll'i<"l a nil d,·p:lrtln.-11lal ( h:\J'.H"l•·t th�:r"' 
!'l.:111 11, • "tabli:sht!,l local dvil :1111<'11•1111""·' ..,,._ 
r:iniz:tti'"'"' fol' the dty, commune. di:<trkt a111l 
•'• partnwnt on an elective b;isis. 
A special law shall be passed l'C&ardini; the 
i:('n•rnment and autonomy or cllks. 
,\UtOllfllllOUS \m;:l11C:<:< l'hall bt• can•tl !01· b)' 
>'P•·t'i:'I. autonomous o!fici:ils, nccoi:<lini to tho 
1>1«Wil'ion or the law. 
In tlw rang-,• of :ictivlty o( the :H1tonomoui< 
d··J•n1·tnl<:ntal 1Hlminl;<tration shall Call the fol­
l<-win� sons or buslnes:s : 
1 . Dcp�1rtmcnlal flnancci<: (a) )Inking up the 
1h·p:u tmcnt:u budi;\'l: tbl 1ll.,.1>o:<itio:1 01 1lt·i;an­
nwntal public taxc!', which a1·c fixed on tlw 
ba�ls of the law b�· th.: cl,·pal'lm•:nl to cover 
·de-pa rtmt:?ntal l'XJ>Cnclitur""· 
2. Depnnmcntal public work:s, as al."o buihlin� 
Pl'c:Sc:riptlons. · 
a. Care for th•! !ul'th,.rlni; of de11a .. tmcntal 
economic interc,:ts.: Agdcultt11· ... stoC'k rnlsini;. 
Yint' culture, fruit culture, fOl'C!'ll'Y, lak.: and 
river fll'h<:riN:, hunting, as also !or technical 
im1n·o,·cnwnt or the l:Jnd. 
4. ·Admlnlstrnllon of puulic rrop'?1·t�-. 
5. Care for the public health In the <lcpart­
mcnts, as wo:ll as for all institution�. through 
which the hea llh status of tho: deJJa rt111e11t may 
bt' !urthtr<'I!. 
6. Ca1·e about so<:lttl problems in the dcparl-
nh'nt. 
7. Depn1·tmeontnl humane in .. tltutior.s. 
8. Dep:irtnwntal means of t:omm�nication. 
!l. Co-op<:rntlon in the furtherance or 1:nllght­
enm<:nt In the departm<:nt. 
10. Co-operation In industr·ial cclucution In the 
clepa rtmc:nt. 
l l .  l::stablishm<:nt and maintenance of seed 
institutions. tourist club.$, mutual lonn and in­
sm·anec al'soc!>J ti on.<. 
J2. The cxpr.?ssion of cplnion at the request 
of the Go,·ernmcnt about projc<'t1< In conformity 
with the: law, which concern the department. 
as also In general about all other i.ubject� tor 
which th<: Go\'ernmcnt :ii:;ks their ;iplnion. 
. Also other bul'incs!< can by 111.w be entrusted 
to the departmc·ntal, autonomou� aclmlni,:tmtion. 
If the 1lc1 ... rtme11t with Hs ml':tn>< shoultl not 
bi". ab!<: to carry out th<: scYeral matters enumc·­
rtttcd, the Stat .. shall on clcmancl ot the depart­
mental Skupshtlna :rnd by decision ot the Na­
tional Skupshtlna gh·c th·� 11i::.:-<·ssary mc-Hns or 
shall its,.IC tak•" ov1:r the carrying out of tht:ll<' 
matter!;. 
Rt:('TlO:-< in-Autonomous [local] unit$ .!'hall 
l1ave th1·lr y1:i,irl)· buili;1;ti<. Tiit" a1lmlnll'trallon 
of 11utonomuus unit11 shall be under the .s11pcr­
.. 1 .... 1on of th1; :llinlslc·r ot Finance antl thP. chJC>f 
elJnt1·ol shall be rt:i;ulateu by special laws . . 
Fll·:<"'rJON OR - The departmental ori:;ani; of 
administration ar<! the departmental Skup:-htina 
a 1111 tli<" 1ll:r>:a rtm•:ntal c111nmlttl'c-. 
Th<- d"part11u·11tal and dlRtric't Skupi<htin;a :<luill 
d1<1nH for th•·m�<-lv<'s a l 'ro·:-l•l"nt, wl10 :-l1all 
,.,.,.�it••: <J\'l'I' tl1r-i1· "lltir11::<. TJ1,.y :<liall d10<1:<•· 
" ' "'' a cl"1>ar11n .. ntal a11ol 1lbt1 id 1·,,11111111 1 •  •·. J:y 1.xr-1·11ti<,11, Joh1t <-cm1p"t"nl:•; c::1n IJ• a:i-
Cont . 
�iJ:Ut .. l,1) I:•\\ h•I' 1h1 :i-Hfll·' 1t1:• JH·h··� �·( !'t;.· 
�ntl aut1•!.,•11:(\U:' "v1 k in lla.; tft·pat tn1ent. 
Th·· I ;  I"·::\ %11p:i II i.< t 111· <"11h l orfki:d or ti 
i:'<'n»ral �ta:" :Hlminl:::u·all�� 111 tl1t' tl<.:µanniu.: 
ill "<> far a:< �l"'dal <.�tencc fur one: ,,1 
111or'' il•·pal'tm"111"' Ill not gl\'l•n b)' law for ,1.,. 
clal bu:<ln•.-«l' ,,( �talc aclminl:<tra��· 
The: law �h:tll decide what ::-it:\tl �inc�s lh· 
Great Zu)'a:i !'hall handl.: In cunt'ultation wiu, 
the d• 1n1rtm··ntal committee. 
Furth<·r •l..tails about authority .Hl comv• . 
t.•nc:c or a11t"1w111ou" boilic>< - city, commun. 
dl�trkt an•l d .. 11art111c·ntal-shall be fix'"' h» ,, 
�pc..•cial la"'· 
SJ::<.:TIO:S 9!>-The departmental Skupshtin:· 
ha,,: thl! rii;ht tu n,1ak·" •ki>a1·tmt-nlnl rcgulatiuu 
about those math·rs of its competence. Tit., 
Ct'eat Zupan of the department shall proclaim 
dcpa rtmvntal regulations. 
The Gr..-nt Zupan or the department shall st;w 
from 111·<•<-l:urrnlion regulation>< which h" fitul� 
a: c not baso:'d on the Constitution and the law. 
Jn thi,; o.:n·nt h,• >'hall bl'in;; i;uch n•i;ulations 
wllh hi>< Oi'iniN1 to the Cou11cil of State for 
<!<"clsion, and shali Inform the competent Minis· 
tel' about thlll. JC the eounl'il of Stat<: shall 
Ciml that lh·· l'nid rvi;-ulation,,; � .. ._. not ba<ied 011 
th1: Constitution or on any law. they sho.ll not 
be proC'iaim<:d o r  publl:<h.�ll. The Council of 
Stutc is obll&cd to b1 Ing In t1w:1· d�cll'ion within 
two month;o. H the Council of Stale shall nc.t 
bl'lng in tlv:lr ch·C'ii:lon in thal lime, the decision 
of the Gr.:at Zu11nn 1<h;all :-tan\l, 
SEC'TIO:S 100-The departmental committee 
1<loall prl'sC'rih.: provil'ion1< anll •lin•ctlons for th" 
ft.lfillm.:nt of d('purtmt·ntal regulations. 
SEC'.l'IO:S 101-The Stu�e administrative au· 
thority excrdses i;upervlsion O\'t:I' nutonomou< 
business authorities through the Great Zupun 
and ln<lh·i·Jual expert otticlals. The Great 
Zupnn has th<: right to stay from execution 1111 
dccl;;ions of u utonomous officio.ls which 11houlcl 
not be based on the Constitution, the laws or 
departmental rcgulrHlons. Against u ruling of 
the Great Zupan a complaint can be lodged 
with tht' Council o! State within the time limit 
ot the lttw. lC th!' Council of Stal<: should not 
b1 Ing a ruling within a. month at furthest from 
th<: dut<· of Its r<-C'<'lpt, th:l 1lcc:l><l<m of the 
Zu1>an shall stan1l. 
s1-:c·T10� 10:?-For matt1;r.; ot :11hnini>'trali\•• 
nntur,• :idm!nl •t rnth.,! courts sha II be csta b· 
lil'hcd. Th,, law �hall !Ix thc!r scat, cornpctenc" 
:1n1l ori;anlzativn. 
f\t-:c1·10:-; 1o:�Thc Council or Stah' Is lh" 
highest nd1!1ir.i,:tr:.th-.i court. The Kini:: shall 
appoint 111 .. 1111>.-r.- o! the Council ot State on th•· 
:Hh'lc1: or th" l'•t·!>hl<:nt ot the Co1111c:ll o! Min· 
i:<lf'I'"'· anti In tl�e followln1' mann1•1· : The 1'i11� 
slonll n:im•· h:.tf the membe1·s from twl<'•' th" 
numb1·1· whi< h th•· �atlon11l Rku1lsl•tina pro· 
lJOl't':<, :inol lb' Xatlonal Skup:<hlina :-hall \'110M<' 
lh<' ol111 r h:ilf fr1Jm twk1· thE: numb'..'I' whic·h 
th" Ki11;.: l""'l•<>-<·s. Th" tillln.; of lhl' n1l111inl�· 
t1 all\'c PO-<itions ot the Councllo•·l> or State 
l'h:ill lw fix, .1 lJ)· :t. �1JN'lal law which can al�O 
1h·\'ia1 .. from tb .. :.bo\' .. i;tlpulutlonR. 
Fol' 11wrnho·1 :< <of t Ii•· 1�oun<'ll of Stn le onh' 
tho:•«: ltl)!lu·r <•!fi<·ial1< 01· public workrr:i "·ho 
huvt; Faculty (urilv• nilly) prcpurutlon or kll 
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y•'a1·i;· i->tal•; S• 1·,·ic1; o r  1rnhlic:- work t:an br: ap­
pointe<I. 
,\ l least two-lilirc1:- of th<: Co11ncllors of Sta IC 
n1ust ha\·c ,liploma,; after coroJ)lctini; { llo•; wurk 
of) a lei;al Faculty. 
Members of the Council of State can be re­
rncwed from th1.:ir places, trunsfon<"d to another 
br:rneh of State service and plac1.:cl on pension 
only on ki;al action. Rut when th<'y reach 
IO years of age or become Ill, so that they 
l':innot fulfill their duly, they must bE: placed 
on pension. 
The Couucil of Slate hns the tollowlng duties: 
1. As the highest administrative court it cle­
dcles on matters or admlnlst:utl\'e nnture. Mat­
te-rs pertaining to a com1,lalnt ai;ainst a uka.s 
and Ministerial decrees shall be -tlccidcd by the 
Council of State In tlrst an<1. l:ist instance. 
2. As un admlnlstrati\'e ori;11 n It heads State 
A1lm.i.J1istration and dccltlC!< about acts of ad­
mlnlslratl\'e naluri.: for whl<'h Its appro,·al is not 
nec<:ssary according to spc-cial laws. 
3. ll exercises supervli<ory authorill· ov1;r au­
tonomus units accordlns- to the pro\'isions ot 
the law. 
4. It clccidcs contllcts nb�ut compct<-nce be­
tween State adminlstrath·1.: authol'lties as well 
as conflicts about competence between State and 
autonomous authorltlc11. 
5. It decides also about 01hcr questions which 
shall be placed within Its compC'lcnce by law. 
}'urthcr details about the constitution or com­
petence and Its han•llin&' under the Council of 
State shall be prcscrib<'<l by i<Pcclal law. 
SJ:o;CTION 104-State competence shall be es­
tablished according to the presC'riplions of the 
law. 
SECTIOK 105-lt shall be· prc:scrlbetl by law 
how officials shall be named. 
SECTION 106-The names or State officials. 
rights ancl dutie!'. pay and pen10lons ot State ot­
ticlals accordins- to their or!ice shall - be tixerl 
by the law about otflclals. 
SECTION 107-Statc officials arc officials ot 
tlw whole State an<l shnll work tor the general 
Interest. · 
The ui;c oC thei r  authority ant! position by 
State o!Cicials !or partli<an alms, as al"o the In­
fluence ot a chief (In State officials. shall be 
punished according lo the lnw. 
Sl·:CTf01" tOR-An official to whom a pcrm:i.­
nl'nt place shall be a1<s111·Nl by law cannot bt' 
r!'movctl against his will without procel's ot a 
regular criminal or dlsc-ipllnary court. 
PART IX. 
Judici11l Authority 
SJ: CTlON 109-Jutli;es arc lndc1>C'mlcnt. Jn the 
r«ntlering of j11:<tiCt' they shn ll not stnn1l un(lcr 
tht? ln!lucn<'e or 11ny autho1·1ty, but shall Judge 
acconllni; to the law. 
Jud�cs and Ju.llcJal C'Clllll'!'tt·nc)· can be t'!'tab­
ll><hc1l only by law. Hut In no "'"''nt can cx­
traorcllnary Jutl�<'S or comml:<!'lt>ns bt• f'><tab­
li11hrd for Invest ii;a lions. 
In fnmlly anti Sll1't'rvls1>ry \lu:<lnt•!:s of the l\lus-
1111h1uwi< �tat .. i->h�·rlat J 1Hl.: .. s l'ha II aC't. 
10-:('TION IJ0-1-'or tit,• WhOlt! klni;tlom. th<'l'e 
Fliall b" uroly 1;11 .. C!Jurt 1.f <·:0:·1-":.tl•1n. with its 
t-:M) l ll l �:t �l't�t,. 
Tiie; Cou1 t (1( C'<t!<l'Htion il' <'(•lllJ1•·t1on1 :i!Heo r•1r 
the sctth:m,.nt of <·onflicto: lwl"-'""" 1HlmlnlAr:1-
tl\'C! clvit or milit11 ry autho1·1ty a�I Judicial :111-
thorlty. Llkcwli<e it Is com,•;t<:n�•&l!<-0 rr,,. tt." 
scltl(·m•·nt or conflicts ·betw•:•;n nclmJni:>tratin� 
ancl rc�ul:1 r court!'. 
s•:CTIOX llt-'fhe appointm(·nt ot Cass:ili(Jn 
and Af'IJ<·llntc J u•li;es nnt.l ot thr J•rcsldj!nt (Jf 
courts of thl' flr:<t rank shall b,. made by th•· 
Klni;'s ukaii (clccrt!c) on the ;ulvl<'" <•f th•; .\tin· 
lstcr or J111<tlcc from among tht· number of cun-
1lidatcs which "thc original bocly i<l1all i:1.:lc·cl. th<: 
ccnstltution ot which shall b� fixl•cl moni cxacll» 
by lnw. 
�1':CTl()N 112-The Judl;'Ci< or all courts ar'? 
JH:rman<:nt. Judges cannot t," <l•·11rl\'<:d of th<:ir 
o!Clc<, nor from any cau>'e bc r1.:lit-vcd Crom 1luty 
ai;aln!!t their will. without procc:ss of rci;ular 
C<•urtl' or 11lsci1>linary proc<:FI' or th1.: Court of 
Cassation. Judi;es cannot bc hf<l<? to :ic..-ounl Cor 
their Judicial work without a11i;r·o,·a1 oe· a com­
µ1.:tcnt App<:llatc Court. For mtember.> of the 
higher 1.:ourts the Court of Cal<�ation shall &i"e 
this appro\'al. 
A Judge cannot, c\·cn pro\i:<ionally. be a"­
sii;ned lo unoth<:r pai<l or un1,1aic.J public i<ervicc 
without his own consent and the appro,·al or 
th<.' Court ot Cassation. 
A Judi;c can be tran!'ferred only at his own 
ccni<cnt. 
A Ju\l&'e can be In scr\'ice only until rcn.C'hlni; 
t1·.1: sixty-firth year of his lit .. nn<l the f>re!!i­
clcnts ot the Casl'atlon and Al>PCll:>,tc Courts till 
the ai;c of 10 years. Rcforl' thnt time Jml&teS 
can be placerl on pension only on written re­
quest or If they ha ,.c so tailed physlc:tll)· or . 
mentally that they cannot fulfill th,•ir duh·. 
The Court oC Cas�ation shalt brini; In the r�i­
lni;s about 1.>ensioning in this last event. 
PART X. 
State Economy 
SEC'TIOX US-Each year the Nation11.l 
Sl1111>shtina shall rlraw up a State bml{:'et, which 
It shall fix only tor a year. 
The bu<li:et must be sprea1l before tlw Xntlonnl 
Skupshli11:\ at furthest a month aftt>1· Its CClmln� 
tO(:ether. At the �amc time with th,• b1111i:-..t 
!<hnll bl' sprC'1Hl befor,• the XatlClnal �kupshtin:1 
tor i;un·•'Y an1l apprO\'aJ al:«> a <'•'mJll•·lt' :w­
count (If thl' ex1•t'ntlih11·,•;;: oC thl' l:i.i-1 fj,;,•al �-.. :n. 
The N'atiClnal Skup!'htina cannC>t h11•r•'"'"' th<' 
f'lll'Wflli; Of thl.' part,:. but (':111 11.'('l'to;ll<t' Hill) C>mit 
th rm. 
Thf' b11<l�d shall be :tl'I'"'""'''' by pal"l,.! 
Thr m:inri.•r of C'Cln><trudi<'n and t'<'nll'll'li!'n 0C 
thi· bu.ti;l't shall b.;• pr,•sC'rlbt•d by tnw. 
The l'a\·lni;" ot C1nt• part ,,c tlw 1:>111li:d 11r 
b111l�l't �·('ar t•nnnol h,• .-x1wndt•1l In "atl,;f�·in� 
the ll<'C'll" t•f 11noth,•r pa1·t or y.-:u-. wlthNtl th•• 
n11rr1w:il <•t th•• Nntlnn:tl l'>k111•shtlna. 
�1·:CTIOX t 1 1 - t  •11t11 tlh' h111li.:t•t lahl bctort• .It 
:<hal l  ht• a11111-.w,.,1. tit,• )\ath>nal l':k11p,.htl11a \-:tn 
Hl'l" .  ""' on,•-twl'lfth f<•r ''"'' ''r llltWt' nwuths. 
1 !  tht• ?l:atlt>nal Skt11»•hti11a i>< ,\i,.1<1>l\'•••l l"'fN··· 
tlH" b111ti:..i 1-< fixt•,J. th.- l•1i.li;..t t•f th·· 1•rt'•'•'<lin1� 
fi><1•al Y•'llr shnll h.· pr••lt'lll:•"•l l•r ul.ns (,•r at 
lllCl>'t t<1ur 111<•11th". 
122 
Item V Cont . 
:O:l:l T I O X  1 1:\�<:tat,• ·,,:.p,•111llt1!c·,•s :111tl i;'<'ll· 
,·rnl �\:\\•' •'11 lla�· iohall b1• flX<'•l b�· l:lw. 
1'lw :>: • .ti"1111l !'k111•:<hll11:1 shall •h•l'l<lc all\'ltt 
�t:1t.• h>:lll:< . .  The (1,n:,r1·11mrt1t I:< 1•hlli;-,•1I tu lay 
h,•f,n·c tlic Xntion�1l :::kupi;htln:1. th1·1mi;h th(! 
l'hh•! l'•'"'"'I, a pun<'tu:tl "tt<'"t,•.1 1·1•p1•rt. 
wh, th1 r :1rran&'l?nwnts nbo11t 10:111,; ar <'<Hlch11kcl 
:Hhl flllfill.'J in the S1'nl'c of thc law, 
:-E('TIO:S llG-T:tx obllg:itlon Ii; i;,•m•ral, :inJ 
"II :-'t:I k pnbllc expenditures a re t;"cncrnl for 
th1· "'�"le �tate. 
I.\ J tax shall be paid accor.llns to t:\xablc 
\\,11 th, an•i proi;rcssl\'cly: 
'l'h,• Kin:; :mu h<'lr to the throne shall pay 
�tak t:lX«>< on pt'i\':\le J>l'Opcrty. 
-:-.;,, h .. lp whnte\'er, permanent or tc111purarr :  
"'' �irt <•r loan can b.i gl\'l!n from the :::tate 
'J'1 1a•111·y i( it shall not be based on the law. 
:-l:( TIOX 117-Thc· .:lllnl.ster of Fln:rnce shall 
h:I\'•' , ••nu·,,l of State propc1·ty, so Car ·as the 
law::' •i.:i n1•t establish otherwise. · 
A ��···cial law shall be passed about the man­
n<'r M ,Ji�p.:i:!'al ot State goods. 
lTh.,J right OC m\lnopoly sh:ill Cnll to the State. 
Or ... $, medicinal waters amt sprlnss and forces 
ot nature are State property. · 
A �Pt<'ial Jaw shall .be passed about the i;h·ing Cl\'tr of mining, industrial or, lndced, any othe1· 
J>l'hih:gE-.S. 
:'l,C'TIOX ll�A Chief Control shnll be estab· 
li;:h(:cl f1•1· the o\·ernight o( State R<:counts and 
s11pc:1·,·i�ion of the completion of State an•I pro­
\'lncial bu<lge:ts and Al,! head of the Co111·t ot 
• \('('('llllll�. . 
Th(' President ancl members ot the Chief Con­
trol :<hail be chos<:n br the National Skupsh­
lln:t f1 om a list of candldatcit, which the Coun­
<'il oI !:'ta.le ·shall prepare anJ In which shall 
be: nomln:itEc-d twice as man)· canJidates as 
th.-re urEc- 1>laees ,·acant. 
The PrEc-sident :ind hat( the members ot the 
('hid Cc•ntrol must be jurists (I. 'e . •  members or 
the. ba1·l. The other members must have been 
'.:llini�tt•'!' of Finance or must ha,·c had ten 
Y• ;I I'S <'! pro\'ed st:n·lce In Cl na ncial <'lllPIOY· 
Ol'"'llt. 
Th� Prc;:idf-nt an1l �nembei·s oC the Chief Con­
trol �hall <·njoy the l'ame l'li;ht of tenure as the 
m<·ntb': I  s of the .council of State. 
i-·twth�r J<:tails about the composition,· author­
It�· •t11'l proc<:dure ot the ,Chief . c·onta·ot :<hall be 
!<<·t fol'lh in a !'i>t:c•hd law. 
I t  ;:hall b� fixc•l by law In what �vents there 
i-hail h·· �1·ouncls for <:omplalnt against the rul­
in;; (J( lh<: ('hie:t Control to the Court of Cassa· 
ti-Jn. 
Tio<· f'hi•·f Cont1·ol i:hall survey, jui-lify and 
Ji1g1i•l:;tt• a<.:cO\tnts Of >;<:ncn1l l\tl111inist1·ntion ancl 
n:; IJlll:< r.,n<ltred against the Stute Treasury. I t · 
1<lla 11 wa t<.:h that no i:xpendlture o,·ersl<:p the 
b11° Ii;· t. ati•l that no i;um !'!hall be ca nice\ from 
pn•· 1,n1 t ,,f the hu1lgct Into anotl1cr. It shall 
cl<i>'•· llJJ th•: ac<.:ounti< <Jf all State acJministra­
tic,n :111•1 I" ohlli;•:tl to bring tog<:thcr all evl­
ch·tv·•· !"1l:d inf1,r1n:c.tfon. 
A "'ill•l•I• t<· !'tat'! ·uc<:ounting 1<h:dl he l:ol·I b<'· 
fcire ti.•> .":atl1111HI 8kUJ>�l1l1na i11 C'•mjuru-tann 
with t-Xl•J:.n;di<,ns ,,f the: ('hi• r c . . ntr<•I an•I 
that. at lon:;l':::l, f•.r •;J,•· , · .. ;.,., ,., 1·1\••hi11� lPJlll 




�n:c,T ION 119-]llllltar�· ob�atlon 111 G'"nrrnl, 
a<'c01·dl11g lo the ordinances of the law. 'l'hl? 
01·1::111lzal1011 aml size ot the army and fh:-i·t 
shall be prcscl"lb.:d by law. The King, 1ll.'1wntJ­
lnt;" on the ad\'lce of the Minister or \\Tar an•l 
:.tnrlnc. slmll prescribe the formation ot unltJ 
for both within the prescrlp(lons oC the law. 
How mu<'h or the an11y shall be hehl uqll1•r 
the flni; shall be dcchlcd c;1ch )'ear by the 
imdgct. 
:-;1.;('TION 120-The military courts arc ln<le­
.iwmlrnt. In rendering Justlc.:, the JucJge shall 
not be under any authorlt)·, but shall ju1lge nc­
cordlni; to the la.w. 
The Julli;cs of the l\Illltar�· Appcflatc Court 
l'lrnll be permanent, but th.: p.:rniancnc)· ot the 
Judges ot mllltary courts o! Jirst lnstauce shall 
be rei;11lated by the ·law. 
.1'td&'C'S of a. military com·t of !h·st illstance 
cnnnot be held to account· for their Judicial work 
without the appro\'al of the .:ll lltary .\ppetlate 
<'011rt, nnd Appellate Judges without the aP· 
p:·o,·al of the Court of Cns,,atlon. JuJges of a. 
l\lilltnry Appellate Court can be transferreJ 
only by their owrl consent, anJ In the event of 
promotion to a higher positi<•n, an cl J udgcs of a 
military cou1·t of fh·st Instance In accordance 
"''Ith the ordinances oC the law. 
$1·:<.'TION 121-"rhe ci\'ll courts shall judge 
crlln<'s which' a <;ivllian as,.:ociatcd with the :inn�· 
•'ommlti<, but during time ot war milltaa·�· courts . 
SJ-:CTION 122-No one, on r.:achlni; the age 
or :?O years, can enter State service 01· . re­
main In It IC he has not scr,·ed his yea1• accord· 
log to the ordinances oC the law or been ex­
cused Crom mllitar)" ser,,lce. 
s l•:CTION 123-l�or the maintenance of lnt£r­
r.al onl<>r. the military can be useJ only on the 
request o' comp.:tent ci vii authorltl�s. 
SJ·:CTION 12-1-A foreisn a rmy cannot be 
tal<<.:n Into the ser\'ice of our Stnte, us also the 
arn1�· of our ::itate cannot be ptacc<l In the 
s1·rvlcc oC any foreign St:ite without the pi-evl-
0111i approval of the Nationa-1 Sku1>shtlna. 
PART XII. 
Changes in the Co11stit11tion 
SJ-;('1'10:"° 12.>-The National Sk1111i<htlna, with 
the l�lni;. shall dC'C'i1l<! about changes In thll 
Constitution. 
!-1·:(,'TIO:"' l:?G-A propos::tl that i;omcthlng bl' 
('l.uni;cJ or supplemented In the Constitution 
can be made by the I<ing or the National 
Sk\tpshtlna. 
ln .such proposal must be namecl exr>rcs:;ly all 
the pointll of the Coni;titutlon which shoulJ be 
ch:uti;•·d •>r supplemente<t. 
If the King has made ti1e pro11oi:al, . he shall 
l111p:i1·t this to the National !-;ku11shllna, but the 
l'::itlon:il Slrnpshtlna. cun be prorogued at once 
aft«rwanl, and shall be COn\'cllC<l an.:w aftN' 
four months a t  loni;est. 
IC lrn<'h prQposul oa·iginate.t from the Na tion:tl 
�:10111"' 'Ina, 1kclslon shall be m:tclr. al1011t it on 
1111· ha"i,; fcor1:>'•'•'ll for ch•<.:1,.:lom; nf lt:�al (con· 
»t!t11tlun:d) p1·11pus:il,.: with a majurill' oC thn:·:· 
f:rtt.� v( lhe whole lllllllllct• l•f llll0l1lb•·I":<. 
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Ji :tho pro11c1snl Rh;1ll b<> n'1<>pt1·cl In this man­
JlOr. the Natlonnl Skup�htin:i iohall b<· proroi;o"<·d 
and con,·•·n\·d nn�w :..t lakst In a Pl0rlo1l ot four 
ponths from the day wh1 n the proposal was 
:vlo1>tod.• 
,\ntl In one and the othUI" ev<:nt' the National 
�i;upshtlnl\ can oeclde only n bout those chani;es 
:.ntl supplements or the Constitution which the 
proposal on the �nsls or which It was called 
t•·scther contnlns. 
Thto National SkupshUnn shall make decisions 
"ith a muJorlty or hair plus one ot the total 
numb<'r or Its membf:rs. 
:-J-:<.'TJON 1Z7-In the en•nt ot war or gen<:rnl 
11•obill;:atlon the National Skupshtlna can 1>US­
prnd for the whole territory or the State, <!.n•l 
for· the 1:vent ot an arme1\ ' uprl11lng for <tnY 
�·ini;lc part or It, by law. t<:mporarlly .these rli;hts 
of citi.:ens: The right or assembly, coming 
t<1i;ether and taking coun!:'d, freedom ot move­
n.\·nt, nonlnCrlngem<:nt ot dwelling, cor-
1 •;rpomlcnce and telegraphic communication. �or 
thto same reason the fr�dom or the press can 
1:,., limited In .the event ot an armed uprising tor 
th<· part ot the State concc-rncd" 
PART XIII . . 
71'1·ansf e,. o; 'Authority 
Sl.;("TION 1211-In the fin•t !'Csslon o! the 
�J;upshlina nflcr the prodamntlon of the Con­
stitution the Heir to the Throne Alexander as 
the Reb'cnt or King Pctt-r I .  In the !:'ense oC Sec­
tion :>S oC lhe Con:<tituti')n ';;hnll take the on t h :  
" Jn ihe no.me ot his )laje:>O' King Peter ] . . l 
i;wear with the help of God tha.t I will. ·hold 
the Con,,.tltutlon im;olablc, thu t l will r·ule ac­
cording to It :o nd the la"'"· that 1 will prcscl'\'C 
tbe unity oC the nation, th� in•lcpen<lC:ncc or the 
State ancl the Integrity ol tlfc tenitory of the 
!:>tale, and -that in all my efforts nnd work I 
will ha ,.e the gooll of the nation before m�· e�·.:s. 
So help me, God. Amt-n: " 
Sl-�C'l'ION J:?9-After thli' the n1\llonal reprc­
�<'ntalivcs In t'he sitting of the Skupshtina. be­
fore the Prc:<i<Jent of the Sku11.shtlna shall take 
thi!:' oath: 
·· I (nnme] swear that with the help ot Go\I 
nn<l by all that Is moH holy to me under the 
law and llcurcst to me on c<1 rth, t will hold true 
to U1c Coni<tltutlon i n  m�· work ns a reµrcsenla­
ti\·e, and that I will ha,·-: e\'er the i;oo<l of the 
ICing and the nation before my eyes and the 
unity or the State in m�· heart and mind." 
�Jo:('TION lSO-The prO\'lslons and Pl'O\'J>;!Onal 
lawi.. with the sigm\tures' ot lhe Pr·o,·isional 
Government, published in the Ofrlcial X"wi<, 
Si,·en out for the time from Dec. l, l!llS, until 
the cnt<>rlng Into Corce ot this Constitution. 
shall r.:maln further in force as laws so !a1· as 
t!\ey ar·c not rciocintlcd or chani;ed by oth<'r lawio. 
\\'ithin the period ot thrN� months from the 
c.nt.·rini; Into life of this Cr1n�titution the GO\'­
c·r111nc•nt i:hull l11y b.:forc the C'onst itulfonal 
Con1mit l<'<' a II those pro\'lslons �<'l forlh for tlh" 
tinw bt·lni:;- In .the fir�t sit tins: whkh :on· t<> h" 
ann11ll1·1l, 1l111l the ·C'onstitmir,nal C"on1n1iltl"e "'hall 
l":ll•l•:r itii \h·clslon as ·l() what :<hall be ;u1· 
nuuuc.:PtL 
!'<l·:('TJ{)� 131-t•11til 11\·; 11;0 �ini.: of law:< I'•" 
�<H'<liui; i.h•; vri;auii:ati ... a .,( 11•" .\lini:;trh:s. r·c-
i.::11 dlni.: 1111: c·oundl of Stnt<', r•·i::anllni; th•· 
<•t1lo·C t'ontn•I, r•·i.:a r•llni; th<· nrcl<:r or b111<111c·�>1 
In the <'ounl'il or State and r<:i;nrdlni; �llnlR· 
t• l'ial n·i.11.,11:<ibility, there shn.11 be <:xtc·n•lccl pro­
\'islonnlly O\•sr tho whole Sta� . force or the 
cvrn•spondlng laws of the IC . of S<·rbla, 
with changes amt alldltlon11 w .. l!h:t ll be 
carrlctl out ln the monn<:r foreseen'\, ::;ectlon 
l:J3. 
!\JO:C'TH>X 132-The i;tatutc signed by the King '
Aug. :m .• HJO(), and published in ·th<: S<·rb N<:ws 
F ... b. !!fi, l!ll 1, shall 1·emaJn In force until u nt:w 
i;1at11tc ioh"ll be pnssed In the s<:nse ot Sc;ctlon 
:ii or this Con:<tltutlon. 
�J-:(;TJO:S 1:!3-For the correlation ot l<>i;lsla· 
t ion anti a<lmlnl:«trutlon In the [newly) founded 
land u. short course or procedure shall be c1ita b· 
11.,:hed. 
All lei;al proposals which ha\'e for their ob­
ject the correlation ot legislation and aclmlnls­
u·ation, orii;inatlni; <:lther from the G<>\·crnment 
<•r from individual representatives, shall be rc­
f•·ned through tho President ot the Skuinlhtlna 
to a lc:glslative committee. 
The .report or the il:glslatl\·e committee with 
tl1t proposal wh!<:h the committee has adopteo 
shall be reterrco to the National Skupshtlna 
f')r, action. Regarding these legal proposals the 
Skupshtlna shall occlde by roll-call vote once 
11nd Cor all whether It shall accerJt 01· reject 
l!icm: Before the vote «i>ach Pal'llarm:ntnry i;roup 
m:i.y gi\·c short <:xplanatlon through one r<>pre­
s .. nlt<tlve. . 
Such l'nthcr ·brief procconrc tor correlation or 
lo:glslotlon ancl uclmlnlstrutlon in the loncJ can 
!'\· <IJ>J)Jic1l Within fl\'C years from the lhly o! 
cnl\o1·lng Into fo1·ce or the Constitution, but this 
time c11n also be extendccl .by law. 
As long as the Constitutional Sk\lpsht!nn shall 
lust as a leglslatl\'C Skupshtina the Const1tu-
1!onal Committee shall !ulflll the duty oC the 
lci;ii:latlve committee. 
" 
�lo:C'TION 134-A!ter the entering Into rorce 
11C this Constitution there shall remiiln to1· tl1e 
lime being the J>ro\'lslonnl provincial .odmlnls­
tnltlons. A provlnclal Hege.mt shall excrcli:c ad­
ministration through a chief of dcl):ll'lmcnt 
1·mlcr the dii·cct supervision or the :\linlster or 
Jr.t<>rnal Affairs, but as the organ or com­
Pl·h·nt Ministers. on th� b!lsls ot Jaws and onU-
1.ancc·s hithc1·to prc\'alling. 
Laws 11assccl nctcr· the cnt.•rini; Into tor·cc of 
thl,; Constitution cnnnnt ns>'ign to vrovlm:lal 
:: dminl:<t rntioni< new duties. 
lt1·;;a nl ini; the progrc.t<sln' tmnsfcr of the husl­
''' :<s of the pro,·inclal iHl111inlstrntl<>ns to the 
lr.11i\'hl11al �linlstrlt•!t anti lo the lndl\'l<l11:1l •l•:­
p:ortnu·nti<, :H·<'t'l'lllni; to prodsions set tor·th in 
tl.c mannt·r forc><een In �··•·tiun 13:i, the t•oun­
dl or .\lini><ter,; i<hall mak" 1h-clsion11 In 11;;1·•·<!­
n1t•nt with lhc p1·0,·inclal H.·::;<>nt 1'tlll\'t'l'll•·1I. 
.\:< Ions: as lht:' Pl'l'\'hwl:d :1.hnlnist1·a1h•ns ::h:oll 
UI' rnilong('ti lhc t<llb(>l'olill:ol.·:; ti( th·· ,.,,.,.,.,·al 
:'\linlstriC:< in the p1°(1\'l11c,•s arc "hlii,;1·.t lv t'llll­
:<111 t the opinion of I ht• ;:rv\ ind:i I Xt•;.:t•nl (ll't'· 
\'l11\1s to :t :\lini>'t .. 1·i:ol ,J,•l'lsiCln Cur a )'l'<'J•·•·t .. c 
tl.t>il'S l•f ,.:; .. 1wr:d 1 h.t 1·:u:l1·1· t.'1" \\ htdt b1·:u � 1Ut 
tlw ufrit'i.d ""'""''"' I. 
r':11·t i •:-: ha\•' the· t i1•h\ u( ·1 1 _•,·:d t,• tl1�· <'•ttHHil 
<.t�· :'lal•: as a (i: '' �lthl },,,.t o•1>J11 •• 1 :t1x-iat aJ·· 
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111!nl:-trallve conflict.a I n  which the provlalonal 
i·i·o, lnclnl administration decides. ·with respect 
lei thb d\at)', ,,....tever la neceSl!ary Is prepared 
In the CoUftW of �a4e. An administrative con­
Cllct 11 only �twe .. n a private or 1.,gal person 
011 the one ahle anJ an admlnlatraUve aulhorlt7 
un th" otht•r : nnol th�)· arl"e there where b>" 
na:ulatlon or decision of an admlDlatraUve au• 
thorlt)' the right of a private or lecal pereon 
II' lnJunol ''"ntmn· to leiial provision•. Ac-0 
cortllng tn this there Is no conntot theni where 
It Is .. 11tnblh1lwd by law for the provlslonul pro­
vlnt'lul Ext·cullve or admlnlstrnth·e authority 
hc.w he t<hull handle, Judge or decide a matter. 
1-EC'TfOS 183-The project of a law about th<' 
dh·lttlon ot the country Into departments aml 
tor the establlshml'nt ot departments (Sectlonn 
9:i and 9tl), 11s 111110 about the transfer ot the 
l>Tt:\'loua provincial authority to the Ministerial 
and D1:purtmcntal Ooven1munts (Section 134), 
the Oov1:rnm1int must present to the National 
Skupshtlna tor adoption within a. period ot 
tour month1. It the Nationttl Skupshtlna should 
not act on these laws within a. pcrlotl of three 
month11, the anme shnll b\l carried out under the 
proYlslona oC Section 133 regarding the corre­
lation of ll!glslatlon and administration In tbe 
countr)' ; and In so far as these laws shall not 
be pu1�c:d I n  accordance with this rather short 
method of procedure In thu further time of two 
month11. there ahall be mtldu by a decree of the 
Kina; within one month a division ot the coun­
try tortther with the apµortlonmt:nt of the pro­
,·lnclal a•lmlnl1tratlon In tho l!tmse ot Sections 05 
and !HJ Of the Con11lltutlon. This decree can be 
chana;c:d only In a legal manner. If this dl\'lalon 
ot the country 11hould be made, not In accor­
danc-e with the flr11� nor the second sentence or 
thll' Hctlon, but In. nt'rordance with the thlrtl, 
tl;�n thc·ro· ahull be e11tnbllshe1l In Chorvatla and 
�l11vo11lu four• departments. 
Llko wlH, nl110, If llrn country be divided by 
hl,:h�r •lo·t:n:c, 1u·cortllng to this section, Tzrna 
Goru I \lorrtencgro), oC 1111:1, with the region of 
Duka Koto1·11k11, but without the circuits ot Ph.:\ IJt- 111111 UIJ«lopolJ1• 11hnll con11tltule a de­
parto1t-nt und 1<h11 ll fulfill tho functions ot 11. d1•­
J1artrm nt ntt•unllllr,r to 1111� C1nh11llt Ullon. 
fll RC'C'Ot•hlnr«' with llw lnw nboul lire> rtppor­
tlonm1 nt or d1ilmrlnw11h1, Hu1mlt1 nnJ 1Icl':&cgo­
,.lna �hull b·· dhhlcd lhlo dt•1mrlntettl11 within 
lhelr 111· ·�c11l bo111 1l11, until this 11h11ll be enacted 
by law, 1111 dn:11ll11 In llu1111ln aml He1·zcaovlna 
11!11&11 <:C1o•tltut1• 1l•·11artmchlll. tJnlllnir ut these 
1le11urtm1·11lH 11hnll bt• <"1trrh•1I out b)· 1lt•1·l::;h111 ot 
the h1·1>11tlH11·11t1 I Sku1>shtlnoll ot lhc de1mrl-
1t11•nl11 l'Oll<'l!nll!d b)' ll lll•IJnrll)• or two-thlr<lll ot lh!! vult'M C'.llat \\ llhln thu llh11lulion11 flxud 
by llw l11lr•I 1111tui:r1111h or 8l'cllon ll:l ot lhe Con-
11llt11t11m. Slni;lu c111mnu11 .. 11 or dl11trh-t11 can be 
••·1>1<11111 ol !tom tho·lr 1lo-11urtnwntH and nnm•xetl 
to nnotlu·r ' 1lr1111rtnw11t within tlw pr.,scnt 
boun1l11 ut Bo1111l:l aml Jl.-n1•ico,·1na or oitt>1ldu 
ot tho·m, It tht·lr autonomo1111 r.,11rl!scntnUVt'S 
cons .. nt to thl11 by 11 1to,·l11l<m or th1-.�e-tltths ot 
tht \"Oh-If lln<I the National Sku111:1htlna ap11rov•'ll 
thlll olt·Cl:>1L••• 
Thi' clt'CUh• ("UPunntcs) shall remain as units 
ot St11tt: a11m111lst1•ntlu11 u11 tn r us they are not 
nboUshed by law. The la"' ahall regulate their 
circuit work. 
Llcauldatlon Of tho autono�lrcults shall 
be carrll'd throu1h In fa\·�· dl'pllrtmcnts 
... dlstrlcta u aoon u l9l ents t>hall 
be orsanlud. • 
BK<'TION IM-Untll the now la wt •bout ottl­
clai. torcaeen I n  8<.>etlon 106 of the COnslllutlon, 
the pr1•scnt luw abuut tlw rl,.;htto and duties ut 
otflclu.111 11hnll huh.I. Tho lll'W luw ahall contain 
the trumlft•r• ot authority In the whuh• com­
pass a ml 11ehedult1 of tho oftlclale ol allmlnl�trn­
t.on und ehull be paNtld at turthoat within thrc<' 
)'<'ars !rum thu t•ntelins Into tot'Cu or this Con­
stitution, unlit which time tho list of utclclols 
shnll bu t•xtended und revised. 
SECTION 13'1-Tho Presidents or the COUt'tM 
and all Judgus to whom pea·mancncy Is guar­
anteed by the Constitution or tho law shall be 
maintained further In thulr positions and duties 
In court. In other regions than the former 
Kingdom of Serbia, 1>crm11nency tor the sewral 
Judgea can be Instituted within a period of one 
year trom tho ndo11tlon ot this Constitution. ln 
this time the 1\tlnlstt'r Of Justice will form a 
commlaslon of tho Judgea of the higher courts 
tor these reiilo11a, with whom he shall rormulah• 
a decision, for what Judgea by name this per­
mum:ncy shall not hul<I, 
The neceuary filling of administrative Prei.1-
dencle.a and Judlt:l:it positions 11hall be done nc­
<'ordlnir to the laws which urtt nov" being tor­
mulatud. 
Judiri:a, who 1trll a11polntctJ or ahall be ap­
pointed I n  accordanco with the law about the 
provisional tllllna; ot otClclul positions durln� 
lime of wl\r or according to any other provi­
sional luw or decree, mu11t pn11s their Judlch1l 
l!xamlnatlon within 11. )"1•111• l\nrl a hnlt otter tlw 
entering Into torco of thl11 Con11tltullon. \Vho­
cvl!r of them does not do this within the lime 
1lecre<!d, 11hnll be at once n•llevc1l from Judlclnl 
<lut)'. 
Thu Court of Catumllon In Belgmtlo', the Hu11-
drt·d Seven In Zagreb, the High Court In Scl'll­
Je\'o, the Oreut Cou1·t In l'otli;ol'lts11 uod tht' 
dh·lslon or the Courl of Cns11ullon In Novy Snot 
shttll <>ontlnue 1111 hltlll'l·tu lllllll tho 111.1w w1t11b­ltHl111tl!ht or Ono CUUt•t or C'lll41<11tlt>n fut• lho WhOIO 
luml 11nd l:jhnll bu 1't•1Jar1h•1I 1111 (1arl of the Court 
ut Cu1uiatlo1t. 
REtTJO!'r 188-The publl>thln�-1. '"· tlw drcu­
lathm-ur n1•ws1.1apera nml 11i-lnto•J mut11•r 1•a11 lw 
turbhl«lt!ll Ir th1'y atlmulrito hutretl g11hu1t tho 
tHalt• 1111 11 whnll', n·lh;luus or n1\'<' tll.".-Ul'ol: llk1•­
Wl:<u It th•·� ll1dlr1·1·ll>' lndtc cltl;i:1•n11 to chuni::.: 
lhl' C'on>1llt.1tlort 01· the luws oC tht' land by 
fore .. , mcrd>· If It Is '"'''" dearl>' fl'om tht' title 
that they llwrt'bJ' nlm ''t lll<'h ln<'lh'nwnt of 
the citizens. Tho provisions or Ncctlon 13, P11ra­
i;m11h 3, about the t•nfo1«· .. 111<int ut 111111pr.:11:1lon. 
uppl)' ah•o ht.>I'<'. If exl'rt•NO 111l("1•s.�lty url:ies 
t11<·::;1• 1>ro\ lslons ••nn be 11nnulfo1l by luw, 
S.t:CTION ISt-Untll n luw almll bl! 111\,.Be•I 
nbuut prh·llo•i;••& In ti"' 11t.'nat? of �.-ctlon 117 or 
the Con11tlt11llun, ull J•rlvllt•1tt'" n1111li;m•1l until 
the tlay ot lht• 1worlnnmtlon ot the t'un11tlt11tlon 
11hnll b•• n•vll•w1•1I In thu manner for1•1<1•1•11 In 
S••cllon 1:1:1 or tht• C'nnslltutlun. In tilt.' 11rh·­
llegt) for thu cuttlnir ot !'!tu.tu forests llrn tt•rn"1 
Item v cont .  
nsed In the review !Jhall have retroactive tore4? 
rrom Dec. 1. 1918. 
flEC'TJOS ll�Whf'n this Constitution llhnll 
enter Into torcc the ConstJtuUonal SkUP8hlJn& 
colled Nov. 28. 10!!0. shall be transformed Into 
an ordinary legislative Skupahtln& with the time 
ot duration provided by the electoral law ror 
tbc Constitutional Skupshtlna. 
SEC'TIOS 111-l"ntll a new Jaw la paued re­
pnllng the elccUon ot rep�ntatlvea on the 
basls of the Constitution. that law shall con­
Unue In force on the basis of ,.·hlch the elections 
were held on �o,·. !!R, l!l!!O, with whatever 
changes 8hall be marle In contormlty wtth this 
Con11tltutlon. These changes ahall be made I n  
the manner pro�1ded I n  Section 133 o f  thla Con­
stitution anti shall have force aa soon aa they 
receive the sanction of the King. 
The committee can make the necessary 
changes In tJme also, which that law prescribes. 
but besides that It Is empowered to pre.'lcrfbe 
the manner, too, In which shaJI be made the 
apportJonml'nt of thP. mandat� 




COKCluMi&fl Onlina11ct11 SJ!:C'J'ION 141-Thf11 Con.Utu.,on :Jph the 
tran.fer of aathorlt7 shall come Into fo".!9 when the King slcna It, but ahall tak" � '91nrllni; 
force when It la publlahed In the bfflclaltWcwl!. 
From that day all l<'gal pro�ialons 'Whlda mf�ht be contrary to It ahaJI ce&M to ha .. �-
The Pr�ldent of the <'ouncU of llJnlaten nn1l 
all the l\llnlaters aliall care for the enforcement 
of this Con11tltutlon. 
We recommend to our Provl81ona1 Jlllalstry 
for the Constitutional SkupabtJ- and Ud1flca­
tlon or the Lawa that this Conatt utton 'Ill pub­
llithed, an<l to all the lllnlaten that ua.,, care 
tor Its enforcement; we enjoin die Udborltlea 
then that th .. y act accordlnc to It. aDd one and 
all that they submit to It. 
source : Howard We
bste� 
constitution ,  
•The Irving And.rews t Wolfe and Arthur ( Februe.ry, 19221 , current History 
Jugoslav 
83J-847 .  
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Item VI 
LAW FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE STATE , 
1921 
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ARTICLE I .  The following activities will be considered crimes 
within the meaning of this law : ( 1 )  Writing, printing , publishing, 
or distributing books , papers , notices which are of such a nature 
as to excite hatred of the state or to cause violent demonstrations 
against the institutions of state prescribed in the Constitution, 
or to menace the public peace and order ; also all anarchist propaganda 
by the spoken word, or any attempt to convince others that the 
crime of violence or any form of terrorism is the best means of 
changing the political or economic structure ; ( 2 )  the organization, 
or support of , or membership in� a society which has as its purpose 
propaganda for communism, anarchism, terro�ism, or any of the 
activities mentioned above ; ( J )  the renting or transfer in any 
form of buildings or rooms for meetings or persons concerned in 
preparation or work for any of the purposes ·mentioned above , if 
the owner knows the purpose of the renter , or i f ,  after discovery 
of the purpose he does not report it to the authorities ; ( 4 )  all 
propaganda intended to cause mutiny , unres t ,  or discontent among 
the soldiers , or to keep citizens or soldiers from their military 
duties ,  or to sabotage , hinder , or lesson the manufacture , repair, 
or transport of military material or provis ions , and in general 
all antimilitarist propaganda; ( 5 )  all relations with persons or 
groups abroad who purpose aid or support of the preparation of a 
revolution 1n this country or of any of the activities named above ; 
and all support by persons in the territory of our kingdom of persons 
or groups abroad which work against public order in our state ; 
( 6 )  all manufacture or assemblage of arms , tool s ,  machines ,  and 
explosives for the execution of the purposes mentioned above , and 
their concealment . 
ARTICLE 2 .  Such activities shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment in the Houae of Correction up to twenty years , and 
in lighter cases by short imprisonment and loss of civil rights .  
in such eases the court may set f inea of from one to ten thousand 
dinar s .  The corpora delicti will be conf iscated. In urgent cases 
house searches may be made at night. 
ARTICLE 3 . ( 1 )  In order to safeguard and assure the extirpation 
of those prosecuted. by the courts ,  the demolition of peasant houses 
standing alone may be ordered in regions or commun1t1ea in which 
such individuals appear , or conceal , or maintain themselves . Before 
such measures are taken , however, the political or judioial office 
concerned is required to give the population of the village fifteen 
day s •  notioe . If within this period the person sought by the court 
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has not been arrested, or has not surrendered himself or been 
killed. The demolition may follow. ( 2 )  Relatives of the 
individual sought by the court , to the fourth degree of direct or 
collateral lineage , will be deported to other district s ,  as will 
inhabitants of hou•ea against whom there is reasonable suspicion 
that they have concealed arms , munitions , or an armed person 
sought by justice, or any criminal. ( 3 )  If deportation of such 
relatives or of inhabitants of suspicious house• does not prove 
suffieient to obtain delivery or destruction of those sought by 
justice , and if it appears that the entire v i l lage or a sett lement 
supports the person sought by justice the inhabitants of the 
entire v i l lage or settlement will be driven from their home s .  Such 
a decision should be brought to the attention of the Minister of 
the Interior by the local commander within three days , and the 
decision become• Y&lid upon obtaining his approval. Other loyal 
citizens may be settled in the houses and possessions of those thus 
deported after other places have been found , in agreement with 
the Minister of the Interior , for those deported . Persons thus 
removed from their homes may return only after permission has been 
granted them by the Minister or the Interior , and then only if there 
i s  no danger to publio law and order. Whoever shall return to his 
home without such permission shall be punished by one year imprison­
ment and shall be returned to the place assigned him. 
ARTICLE 4. Concealment of armed persona and of persons sought 
by justice shall be punished by not mo�e than ten years • imprisonment 
and by a fine of not more than 1 0 , 000 dinars . 
ARTICLE 5 .  In regions where the inadmiasable custom of blood 
revenge persist s ,  and where murder is done or attempted by a child 
or minor , if it 1• impoaaible to prove the joint guilt of others , 
the child ' s  or mlaor • s  rather or hi• male relatiTe to the fourth 
degree of direct or collateral lineage may be punished by from one 
to ten year s •  imprisonment if there i1 reason to believe that the 
minor committed the deed because of improper attention of the 
afo�ementioned relat ive . 
ARTICLE 6 .  The state police authoritiea may aak military forces 
of the nearest military commandant if their own foroes are inadequate 
to maintain order .  
ARTICLE ?.  The population of v i l lages or districts to which 
mil itary foroes are sent for the maintenance of order are obl igated 
to receive &nd feed the soldiers in their house• and at their cost 
to the limit of their re•ource s .  
ARTICLE 8 .  A l l  other expense s  aris ing out of the disposal of 
the military force are to be borne · by the population; but if order 
is rapidly restored they will be freed from the p&J'Dlent or these 
expenses ,  which will be borne by the state treasury, and those 
articles whioh had already been given to the military forces will 
be restored to them. Persons eonvioted for actions which caused 
the use of military force are . liable for the e.xpenae caused to the 
state and the population by the calling in of the army. Upon the 
request of the Minister of Home Affairs , the Mlniater of the Army 
and Navy will allow a euffic1ent number of soldiers to enter the 
gendarmer1e and to serve their terms in that body. 
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A.1:iTICLE 9 .  Drunkards and others who cannot prove that they 
have an honorable means of subsistence ma.y be punished with not. 
more than three months ' imprisonment ; if vagabonds prove to be 
morally inferior th•y may , after serving their term or imprisonment , 
be transferred to a oompulsery labor 1nat1tution. Vagabonds or 
lli:nor age thus seized ma1 be sent to i�•titutions up to their 
twenty-fourth year without legal punishment. 
(ARTICLES 10 to 13 treat or the illegal use of explosive material , 
involving imprisonment or at least five years , and if many persons 
a�e thereby endangered, of at least ten years . )  
ARTICLE 14 . Whoever carries firearms without offical permi ss ion 
or conceals them in his house shall be imprisoned for not more 
than one year. 
ARTICLE 15. Whoever violates the regulations regarding the 
manufacture , importation, and sale of powder shall be further 
punished by a fine of from 10, 000 to 100 , 000 dinars . The court 
may also impose this fine in cases under Article 14. 
ARTICLE 16 . Civil or military officials of the state of 
autonomous administrations in so far as they exercise state functions , 
who individually or collectively interrupt their work for the 
purpose of a strike shall be punished by impri sonment, and their 
immediate chief• shall also be punished by a f ine of not more than 
15, 000 dinars . 
ARTICLE 17. If persons who are not forbidden to strike seek 
to disturb other peP8ons in their work, they shall be punished by 
not more than six months '  imprisonment and also with the penalties 
prescribed for the maintenance of the public order. If such 
persons do not immediately obey offioal order to leave places where 
they have improperly assembled , they shall be punished by not mQre 
than one years • imprisonment and by a fine not to exceed J , 000 
dinars . 
ARTICLE 18. No member of the Communist Party or of any 
organization rorbidden by this lax, Jllal' rulf ill a public post or 
funct ion; he ma1 not become a deputy or representative of any 
autonomous body. Thia applies also to officials of private 
institution• 11111eh enjoy special privileges from the state . Persons 
now occupying &uch pos itions will when this law comes into effect 
be removed from such positions . Officials thus removed may protest 
to the State Council but the protest does not delay their removal. 
ARTICLE 19. Whoever shall in any public meeting in an open 
or closed hall ,  or anywhere else , wear or d11play any sign, flag, 
or inscription as a protest agains..t. the organized state power or 
as a sign of chall81'ge la:. erd�r te infl�nc.e. .public opinion to 
believe that the present system i s  bad &Di . .ahaUld be replaced by 
another by means of revolution, by aboljticm ,of private property, 
or by disturbance of the public peace shall be punished by imprison­
ment or by ·fine not to exceed 50, 000 dinars or both. 
ARTICLE 20. Participation in manifestations such as described 
in the preceding paragraph ahall be puniahed by imprisonment not 
to exceed one year , and a fine not to exceed J , 000 dinai-s , or both. 
ARTICLE 21. If the proper authorities have forbidden a 
manifestation contrary to the interest of the s tate , all who 
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participate in such a manifestation or who do not obey on order to 
disperse , shall be punished by imprisonment ; leaders and unruly 
persons shall further suffer a fine not to exceed 5 , 000 dinars . 
ARTICLE 22. If the administrative authorities determine 
that an organization or a trade un�on has altered its legally 
permiss ible purposes and is beginning secretly or publicly to 
concern itself with impermissible or legal activities . such 
organization shall be dissolved by the authorities . Within three 
days the legal representatives of the organization may protest the 
decree of dissoultion to the lower court ; the authorities may appeal 
the decision of that court to the Court of Appeals . The legal 
representative of a dissolved organization shall be punished for 
their improper activities by arrest and by fine not to exceed 
5 , 000 dinars in so far as no more serious action impends . 
ARTICLE 23. ( repeals the provincial laws conflicting with 
the present law . )  
ARTICLE 24. If a person pursued in connection with the Press 
Law is asked to a hearing, and neverthe less hides or flees or 
remains three days out of his dwelling, and if this be officially 
confirmed, then the decisions of the court shall be posted upon 
the door of his house and shall thereupon become legally valid. 
ARTICLE 25.  ( Repeals those provisions of the Serbian Press 
Law which conflict with the preceding article . )  
ARTICLE 26 . The courts shall decide according to their judicial 
judgment all questions concerning the penalties inflicted in 
proceedings in connection with this law. If the court shall find 
grounds. for moderating the punishment , imprisonment in the 
House or Correction may be modified to mere imprisonment . 
ARTICLE 27 . All provis i ons of the general criminal code and 
all other criminal laws , including the Press Law and the Coalition 
Law , which conflict with this law , are abrogated for the period 
of validity of this law . 
Source : •Repression in the Jugosl&v State , •  Nation, CXIII 
( October 12 , 1921 ) ,  403-404. Originally translated from the 





STJEPAN RADIC ' S  STATEMENT TO THE PRAGUE PRESS , APRIL 1921 
The following interview which appeared in the Cas , of Prague 
/ serves to i llustrate a definite s tatement of Radic ' s  policy : 
We recognize the union of Yugo-S lavia and herein we differ 
from the Frankovatzi Party. This union is our definite goal , and 
we do not wish to destroy i t .  Our di spute with Serbia is an 
internal affair, and is not of an international character. The 
Serbs and Croats are indeed a racial uni t ,  but they are not one 
people . In the future we may become one people , but we are not 
at present. We shall not act against Serbia, but we do not wish 
to be amalgamated with Serbia; we wish to stand beside Serbia. 
The que •tion is whether or not Serbia will subjugate Croatia. We 
do not fear this struggle , for we are the stronger . 
The Croats want a Republi c ,  and in this matter we wish to come 
to an understanding with Serbia. Serbia could continue as � monarchy ; 
the Prince Regent Alexander can remain King of Serbia , but he 
might at the same time , be head of a Yugo-Slav Federation. We 
have nothing against him, and we shall not settle our dispute with 
Serbia by means of a revolution. Revolution is war , and we are 
opposed to wars . For this reason I am equally opposed to a peasant 
revolution. If a revolution broke out in Croatia it would be 
against my will , and the respons ibility would rest with the people 
and not with me . I am also opposed to revolution because we have 
no arms . If foreigners were to supply arms i t  would involve 
obligations on our part , and in that case we should be fighting 
for foreign interests . All reports , therefore , about revolution 
are incorrect.  
We shall probably not go to the Constituent Assembly. I 
propose that the const i tution be voted by a qualified majority 
composed of separate majori ties : Serb, Croatian, and Slovene . 
But i t  seems that Belgrade does not accept my proposal . If the 
Constituent As sembly passes M. Pashich ' s  draft constitution, we 
shall not, of course , recognize i.t ,  bu.t we shall. . make use of i t  
and shall submit to it . We shall wait t i l l  the next elections , 
and then it will be seen whether we have on our side a majority 
not only of Croats , but also of S lovenes and Serbs . And then we 
shall alter the constitution in accordance with our wishes . 
Granted that we are carrying on a struggle against Serbia, it is 
by deliberate intention that we do not pay taxe s .  I always say 
to my peasants : ' Only pay up when the authorities compe l you by 
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selling your goods ; do not give a farthing of your own free will . ' 
The result has been. that in Croatia only one-twentieth of the 
taxes have been paid. I am the instrument of the people ' s  will , 
I do nothing to alienate the sympathies of the people . We have 
left it to the people to decide for themselves in internal affairs ; 
only the foreign policy of my party has been confided to me . In 
this connection my programme is to advocate the alliance of all 
Slavs with the Germans in place of the Franco-British all iance . 
Source : • The Croats and Yugo-Slav1a , •  American Review of Reviews , 
LXV, No . 165 ( June , 1921 ) ,  837-838. 
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CROAT UNION PROTESTS 
The protest of the Croat Union was published in the Fre ies 
Heim, Zagreb on November 27 , 1924. Originally composed in a 
tabulated form , i t  reads as follows in translation: 
1 .  Since its establishment the Croat Union has stood upon 
the principle of the sovereignty of the people. This republican 
principle is the basis of modern democracy, which declares that 
the people create the state and that the power of the state is 
the product of the people ' s  will that the people are the sources 
of all politieal authority, and that the powet- of the state i s  
fully justif ied only when i t  i s  established by the people ; the 
people alone have the right to make the supreme decisions in the 
state , and no one can exercise the power of the state without a 
mandate from the people . 
This principle of the sovere ignty of the people has been ex­
pressed by the Croat Union in all its dec larations and manifes­
tat ions , in accordance with the general will or the Croat people , 
even in the decis ion of the Croatian parliament of October 2 9 ,  
1918,  which authorized the constituent as sembly t o  make the 
sovereign decision upon the compos it ion and form of the stat e .  
2 .  Maintaining this principle but taking account of the form 
of the kingdom of Serbia with which Croatia was establishing a new 
re lationship, the Croat Union was ready to adopt the following 
position : Without touching the principle of the people ' s  sover­
eignty, to create a democratic (which really means a republican) 
federated state in the form of a monarchy under the dynasty of 
the kingdom of Serbia. 
Upon the assumption that this could be realized as soon as the 
functions which the people intrusted to the king had been defined 
and limited by the constitution, and inspired by the example of 
the democratic spirit of many other progress ive European constit­
utional monarchies ,  the Croat Union was inclined to accept such 
a state with an hereditary king as the form of expre ssion of the 
people ' s  will. 
3. Yet the experiences of the last six years , especially 
recent experiences ,  convincingly demonstrate that the present­
day monarchy does not give the people ' s  will effective expre a­
sion. If one desires such express ion compromises must be aband­
oned and the democratic principle must be given its formal 
expression in a republican form of government . That is the 
conviction today of the Croat Union , which has therefore decided 
formally to declare for a republican form or government. A 
short factual summary of past events will justify this conviction .  
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4 .  Even the first so-called parliament, the provi sional 
•People ' s  Assembly , • which was artificially formed wi thout an 
election, demonstrated the possibility of imposing a centralized 
state system and showed that a democratic regime was still far 
removed . Through use of the administrative power new types of 
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law were imposed upon the people , the exist ing laws were changed , 
and international treaties were ratified in such manner that 
national territories and national property were di sposed of in the 
name of the people and assumed international importance without 
the consultation or knowledge of the people . Even in the pretenses 
of the necessities and difficulties of creating a new state ; the 
true intention to subordinate the people made itself obvious . 
5 .  With the creation of the present constitution, commonly 
known as the Vidovdan constitution, came an energi tic attempt to 
impose upon the people a definite constitutional s ituation which 
took no account of the people as the bearer of the law and the 
power in the state . Sovereign power was in fact taken from the 
constituent assembly and a situation was created which made i t  
dangerously easy t o  force the consent of the assembly. In thi s 
fashion the so-called Constitut ion-Parliament was established which 
was to vote only upon the constitution which expre ssed the will 
of those then in power. Against such an attack upon the sovereignty 
of the people the elected representatives of the Croats protested 
vigorously , 
6 .  When even these .. chinations proved insufficient the most 
extreme terroristic means were for six months utilized against the 
representatives of the people , and enough votes were brought to 
assure an absolute majority. On June 28, 1921,  on the day of the 
V1dovdan catastrophe of the Serbian people , the present constitution 
was imposed upon the Croat and Slovene peoples despite authoritative 
promises by the Kingdom of Serbia that the constitution would be 
adopted only by a qualified majority and without compulsion or 
oppression. 
7 .  The experience of this constitution has demonstrated to us 
that this fundamental law waa not created with the intention of 
giving the state a constitutional regime under the protection of a 
ruler who would be the first to honor and preaerve i t .  Rather i t  was 
the intention thus to make i t  possible to centralize the entire 
power of the state in Be lgrade and secretly to give the trustees of 
the state power over the �e , their property, their life , and their 
fate . 
8.  I t  i s  therefore no wonder that such a constitution has had 
desolating results, progress ively destroying national achievements 
in the field of law, poli tics , culture , and economic s ,  and that it 
has created the conT iction abroad that a state so ruled deserves 
neither confidence nor reapect . In such e ircumatancea it i s  difficult 
to speak without irony or parliamentarism, constitutionality, or 
civic freedom � and the ad.miniatration, rotten with corruption, i s  
destroying itself by i t s  own lawlessne s s ,  stupidity, and anarchy. 
Furthermore , personal freedom is so threatened that there have been 
repeated cases of political attacks upon the life and freedom of 
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individuals ;  there have even been massacres ( for instance , in 
B jelopol j e .  Mitrovica, and Pristina ) .  Recently an attempt was 
made at night upon the life of a deputy while he was in the hands 
of the police , who were escorting him to prison despite his 
parliamentary immunity upon the pretense that they could not read 
his parliamentar7 papers .  This was the engineer August Kosutich, 
who was attacked at Kastel in Dalmatia. 
9 .  Despite certain passages in the Vidovdan con�titution 
according to which thia is a constitutional parliamentary state . 
other prov isions of the same document largely revoke its legi s lative 
powers and make its control over the state i llusory. So the 
parliament becomes a fict ion and an illusion. And s ince this 
parliament was insufficiently subordinate and showed a desire to 
resume its legal attributes and control the activity or the s tate , 
it was thus treated. 
10.  The Serbian Radical Party (lihich, despite the fact that 
it masks itself under the name of the Party of the Serbs , Croats , and S lovene s ,  i s  an eminently pan-Slavic Serbian socialist party } 
des ired in December, 1922 , to strengthen its position by new 
elections because i t  was in a minority in parliament . These 
elect ions it wiahed to carry out in its own fashion using its 
familiar method. At the election of March 1 8 ,  1923 , the Government 
did succeed in increasing the number of deputies of the Radical 
Party, but the total was only 107 in a parliament of 312. Even 
this result, which was large ly due to reckless utilization of the 
power or the state for party ends , and to distortion of electoral 
arithme t i c ,  fails to corres pond to the number of votes which this 
party, rightly or wrongly , received. Upon a proportional bas i s ,  
the party would have had only 82 instead of 107 deputies . 
1 1 .  Thus the people expressed their lack of confidence in 
this party which fought the election-and fai led to receive a majority­
under the slogan • preservation and execution of the Vidovdan 
constitution . •  Yet by using its power through all sorts of intrigues 
and pres sure it succeeded in retaining the reins of government , 
treating parliament as an unauthoritative institution which was 
nevertheless unavoidable in the present democratic atmos phere . 
12 . In the spring of 1924 an important change occurred in 
parliament. A few thinking and just Serbian patriots headed by 
Ljuba Davidovich began to see that this destruction of the people ' s  
life would finally lead to reaction and ruin even of the Serbian 
people in their own territory, and so they decided to begin the 
task or saving the pee.le . They therefore turned to the idea of 
an honorable entente oordiale . 
lJ. The representatives ot the Croatian people , supported by 
those of the Slovene s ,  had alwa7s expressed this idea but got no 
respons e .  When this appeal came from Serbia, despite the fact that 
it did not ye' go tar enough , tne Croatian Peasant Republican Party 
(which in the e lections or 1923, h&d carried not only Croatia but 
also Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina) abandoned it• previous 
policy of staying away from the Be lgrade parliament (which i t  had 
followed so long as there was no offer from the Serbs of an entente 
cordiale ) and for the first t ime entered parliament to cooperate 
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in its work. 
The inevitable result of this step was that the Radical 
Government under the leadership of Nicola PachiQh_ , was put in the 
minority and had to resign. 
14. Then the Pachich Government with the help of irre­
sponsible elements whioh seems to have gained a decisive influ­
ence in the monarchy, sought by underground machinations and 
intrigues to frustrate the verif 1cat1on of the mandates of the 
Croatian deputies.  
15.  When this failed, Nicola Pachich, as leader ·Of the 
Radical . Party, 4emanded that he be given a mandate to. form a 
coalition GoTeP.ftment with Svetozar P.!!.ibieeY..1.eh . Since .thi.s . 
demand .eould mlt� .. ba . . mat .. at. onca. . .  on account . .  or publl.c .. opinion 
Nicola P.achi.ch announced at a meeting in Bjieljina .tha.t . .  he was 
determined to cax-ry through his policy by any means , even by 
bloodshed. Referring to the solution of the cri s i s ,  he said : 
'We then asked the king to permit us to ask the people whether 
they wi shed this state preserved as it was or changed. Only the 
people have t�e right to decide that . The king took oath that he 
would rule according to the will of the people , not according to 
the will of individual parties • • •  We do not know what the king 
will decide but the Radical Party will not give up its intention 
to keep this state as it is and I hope that it will be albe to 
force those who oppose the people ' s  will into obedience . •  
Nicola Pachich ' •  hint and threat, in posing as the protector 
of the state as it i s ,  is plain. 
16 . Nicola Pachich .did not immediately receive a mandate to 
call an e lection ; he was asked to form a new Gove�nment which, even 
with the support of Svetozar Pr1b1cevich ' s  group, did not have a 
majority in parliament. 
This Government was able to keep parliament closed, knowing 
that parliament would vote a laok of confidence . Parliament ' s  
regular activity was suspended until October 2 0  when, according 
to the precise instruction of the Vidovdan constitution, it was to 
resume its regular activity. This was a violation of the const­
itution and a eoup d ' etat ; it aroused bitter resentment even - in all 
parts of Serbia. Thlaa an · absolutist Government opposed to 
parliament , ruling unsupervised and without responsibility, was 
inaugurated. 
17.  The opposition, whioh had a strong and compact majority, 
did not submit . It p�oposed, upon the bas i s  of the constitution, 
that parliament be called into an extraordinary session, especially 
s ince certain urgent questions of a social and humanitarian nature 
for the benefit of the suffering poor needed attention. 
18. It was diff ieult simply to refuse such a proposal based 
upon the constitution, so a different temporary escape was found . 
The composition of a working Government was intrusted to the leader 
of the opposition, Ljuba DaYidovich, and this was formed on July 27 
with the program of freeing the administrat.ion of corruption and 
preparing the way for an entente cordiale of Serbs , Croat s ,  and 
Slovene s .  Those are the two most important questions for the 
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settlement and consolidation of conditions in the state . 
19. The new Government called parliament together in 
extraordinary session, worked out a few urgent laws , especially 
the invalid law and the law against corruption, and won a vote 
of confidence . A few concrete complaints were brought before 
parliament with the request that some of the ministers of the 
Pasaich Cabinet should be indicted for dishonorable acts , to 
prove which concrete data was submitted. 
The Croat deputies who expressed their confidence in the 
Government were prepared to enter it and to accept direct 
responsibility even under the king although they belonged to a 
strict republican party. 
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20.  The people breathed more freely, for it seemed that 
with this political change times would become more endurable . 
When October 20 drew near , howewer, the Davidovich Government , 
although i t  had the unlimited confidence of the majority, was 
asked to resign in a manner which is clear in the published text 
of the resignation : 
' Since Your Majesty has expressed the necessity of my resigning 
in the interest of a continuation of our policy of peace , order , law , 
attack on corruption, an an entente cordiale of Serbs , Croats ,  and 
Slovene s ,  I take the liberty of submitting my resignation. • 
Ljuba Davidovich himself recently told a gathering that his 
Government was systematically hindered in its activity, and that 
government decrees were held up for weeks . Since the public had 
no suspicion what was happening an attempt was made ·to compromise 
the Davidovich Government which had the people ' s  confidence . 
Davidovich has openly stated that his Government , which was formed 
on July 27 , felt as early as July 28 that i t  would be forced to 
resign. The intrigue was carried by means of false reports which 
some of the general were asked to submit .  
21.  This proceeding brought Nicola Pashich back to power for 
the period of the elections in a Government composed of the 
Radical Pa�ty and the friends of Svetozar Pribicevich. This 
Government is the embodiment of reaction, ready to use any means to 
achieve its goals. It is characteristic of the constitutionality 
and parliamentarism of the period that in the entire six years not 
one government has been changed because of an insufficient parlia­
mentary majority. Every government has been formed in extra­
parliamentary ways . 
New elections are set for February 8 ,  1925, in order to create 
an artificial parliamentary majority that will blindly follow the 
present holders of power. 
The first attempt to establish a government on the basis of 
an entente cordiale between the national groups was brutally defeated. 
Those ministers who were accused if corruption and dishonor have 
been freed froa indictment and they may now cry jubilantly that 
'evil spreads over the earth . ' 
2 2 .  A regime of violence and corruption which has proven its 
complete administrative incapacity is  now oppressing all parts of 
the country, but it is especially hostile to the Croatian people . 
Our cultural ,  social, and economic institutions are deliberately 
destroyed . Civ i l  officials are mercilessly persecuted. The 
existence of autonomous administrative units has almost been 
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a.estroyed and government commissars are admini stering rural 
communes .  Business has become the prey of crooks and conscience­
less exploiters . The development and exis tence of the Croat i.an 
people , in their domestic and foreign re lations , are threatened ; 
they haven no influence over their own fate . 
Thus the Croatian people are forced to work with might and main 
to become master in their own land . They have proved that they are 
ready to work peacefully with the true sons of Serbia for the free­
dom of all and the common good. 
Conscious of its duty to the Croatian people , aware of the 
meaning of public events of the last six years , and standing upon 
the democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people the 
Croat Union regards i t  as an absolute political necessity to accept 
the republican ideas as expressed by the Croat ian deput ies and in 
the above resolution. 
Source : •The Croat Union Protests , "  Nation, CXX , No . 3108 
( January 28 ,  1925 ) ,  102-104. 
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SPEECH OF PAUL RADIC, MARCH 27 , 1925 
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/ On March 27 , 1925,  Paul Radie del ivered a formal dec laration 
� 
of policy before the Skupstina at Be lgrade that marked an important 
turning point in the Serbo-Croat dispute . The more important 
passages of this historic statement have been translated and para­
phrased by H .  F .  Armstrong below : 
It is neces sary to recall what we Croats were under the old 
Aus tro-Hungarian monarchy. We were often more or less submerged . 
We had continually to fight for our own laws , our customs , 
institutions , and autonomy , but we were never simply slaves . For 
one thousand years our Croatian juridic system has been maintained. 
Then we aimed at independence :  now we aim at equality with our 
brethren in this same independence which . has been gained. Belgrade 
of today does not stand to us in the same relation as Vienna of 
yesterday . Here we feel ourselves in our own houses • • •  our 
republicanism does not force us to demand any particular form of 
government . We want the substance rather than the shadow . The 
oppos ition bloc took form at a moment when we realized that the 
idea of a national accord was unders tood in Serbia • • •  However , 
at this moment the constitution of Vidovdan rule s .  We recognize 
this fact as we recognize the dynasty of Karageorgevich . We 
simply desire that our system evolve little by little along 
normal ways toward certain adjustments of differences due to the 
exis tence of the Croat and Slovene minorities . Our ethnic unity 
is incontestable , but our past his tory with its consequences has 
created three national consciences with three different names 
for the three divisions of our people • . We are forced by natural 
circums tances to join our forces .  We must so work that out of 
this material unity a spiritual one will be evolved which will 
make us solid and substantial on the basis of our present state . 
Nothing is eternal in this world and nothing is perfect.  
We must have a constitution, and no one will affJIZlr� that the 
constitution of V1dovdan is an eternal and last ing one , and not 
subject to change . Reference has been made to our long abstent­
ion from partic1patton in the government . Gentlemen , if i t  took 
two years to get us into this predicament it will surely take 
time to get us out or it and to a proper under•tanding . We 
are beginning to be understood in Serbia. We earnestly desire 
a fraternal accord • • •  It must be remembered that at that time 
the authorities practically put no restraint on communist 
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propaganda , which continued to strike with violence on our political 
activity • • •  we have always had a f ight on two fronts- on the 
one hand , against the centralist force s ;  on the other , against the 
extremists • • • •  
Concerning our relations with the Peasant International , Mr . 
Maximovich has read innumerable documents which I will not analyze 
judicially because I am not a lawyer , but ·1Which I will s imply 
comment on from the point of view of common sense . This mass of 
evidence consists almost exclusively of letters addressed to Mr. 
Stephen Radich and to our party, but there is practically nothing 
from us whatever they wish , but that they do so- does not involve 
our approval or consent . Two capital factors must be accentuated. 
The first one is that we did not designate an official representative 
to the Peasant International,  as we had been invited to do. The 
second i s  that our Central Committee has made no definite decision 
as to the adhesion to the Peasant International. When our Central 
Committee can meet it will take the necessary steps to establish 
positively that we have no relations with the Peasant International. 
We recognize integrally the s ituation created by the constitution 
of Vidovdan, with the dynasty of the Karageorgevich • • • •  We 
recognize that any modifications in the existing condition of things 
must be made by a revision of the constitution, effected in 
fratePnal accord by Serbs , Croats ,  and Slovene s .  We have never 
fought against the state as such or against its interest.  The 
res istance of the population to certain conditions to which I shall 
make allusion has been unjustly qualified as being anti -state . The 
conditions which existed on the eve during and after the elections 
can only create discord and ultimately be fatal to our state . As 
earnest believers in: its future we will contribute all in our power 
to insure the collaboration of the Croat population in honest good 
faith for the consolidation of the state- a collaboration which can 
only be realized on a basis of absolute equality. If this consolid­
ation cannot come after we enter into Parliament , and after we have 
adhered without reserve to the program read by Mr. Davidovich, the 
general policy of the Croat people will be forced to change and we 
shall be powerless to help i t ;  we shall lose direction of the 
political situation. 
As our political organization has existed for twenty years we 
have experience , power , and moral authority sufficient to guarantee 
the integral cortsent of our electorate to any accord which will 
demonstrate respect for the law and for the will of the people . We 
do not fear that we shall be reproached with having surrendered. 
Bad faith may perhaps be charged against us by such journals as the 
Balkan , but during the last electoral campaign we showed under the 
most difficult conditions that we will not be broken and that we 
cannot be made to flinch. More than that , we are willing that i t  be 
said that we have given way , because i f  we do so it is a concession 
to our own Serbi�n brothe�s and for the good of our common future . 
With regard to the Peasant International of Moscow, all 
information coming from foreign sources , English , American , and 
French , can only confirm our point of view, which is that it has 
nothing in common with the Comintern, that is to say, with the 
Communist International . Still less i s  it an organization belonging 
to the latter .  Independently of this fact , and of the fact that 
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the Croat Peasant Party has not yet adhered definitely to the 
Peasant International, I declare now that we have taken no engage­
ment and that we have no relations with this Peasant International, 
and our Central Committee will officially establish this fact at 
its first meeting. On August J ,  1924, our parliamentary group 
took up the report of its president , in which he stated that the 
Croat Peasant Party should join the Peasant International on the 
condition that it  would maintain integrally its own program and 
tactics. He stressed the fact that he only saw in this the 
establishment of relations between the Russian people and the 
Croat people , and that this Peasant International is  nothing more 
than the continuation of the Peasant Pan-Russ ian Federation 
founded in 1899 8Jld which in 1904 had thirty million members . 
The acceptance of this motion to join was s imply the expression of 
the confidence of the group in� its president , on whom it absolutely 
relied. 
According to our program the obligation to defend the country 
ceases only with death . For that reason we consider a good army 
a national necessity. We do, however, desire to attain in a 
constitutional manner a reduction of military service and a 
diminution in the number of military organizations . We believe that 
military service should include the execution of useful public 
works , with a view to relieving the people of unnecessary expense . 
Source : Hamilton Fish Armstrong , " The Serbo-Croat Dispute , •  Nation, 
CXXI , No . 3132 (July 1 5 ,  1926 ) ,  101-102. 
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COMPARATIVE STUDY : GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
DIVIS IONS OF 1922 AND 1929 
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MAP 2 .  Kingdom of Yugoslavia : Administrative Divis ions of 1929 
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AUP GRUND DER REFOR:>.1 VOM 3. 10. 1n9 
tS t1 1 n d :  3 1 .  3. 1 9 3 1) 
Die ... utonomc B ... nsd:talt Kroatlc:i n11d1 dem ,Spornun1 • vo:n ZG. 6. l!ll9 
n.o Vo:wAltuni;srclorrn vom 3. Ok.I. 1929 (in Kr.lit gctrclcn 1931) sotltc Im Zus.;mmanhong m1t den Pt A KJ::f!i 
Alcxnnde:-s. e!r.o straf!ero zcntral!stlschc Stuat:vcrwrutung zu erreld1cn, dlo Fcb:cr cicr Ncughc<l"rung ,. 02:?, die 
Wt c:i rler vlelen klo!nen Be.zirke unlibcrslchtlich und kostsp:clis wc.r und ri;an!Jc!s gee!crneter Fochkr!ftc nlcht !unktio­
n. :te, durch Zuurmmcn!dSS�J in gr!!Dere :::inh<:!lcn ilbcn..-.ndcn. Es wurdcn 9 Bc:r..::chaftcn und etno PrllfdctuT 
Croft-Bi!:grad !)'cblld1:t, cilc de: Zcntrelrcg1crung unmlttclbor un!crstcl!t wucn. 
D _ m1ucn Bnnschartcn '''urden untcr M I n a c h t u n IJ g c s c h I c h. t l l c h c r G r c n : c n und vo !khth·nttlonal<ir 
U"ld s•amml,dlcr Vcrhllllnlssa nbgcgr<:nzt. Durch Zcrro.nung el\cr Zu£ammcnhlng.i und nl' 7. u s  11 m m  c H f  a '  & u n g 
In ., 11 r. h 1 s l o  r I s c h  c .. slroff icntrnlisi�rte V o  r w n I t u  n g s  c l  n h o l t a n  soi. c IU<lcr.illstlsctcn Dcst:e· 
li�nucn und Kr&ftc, lnsb.,sondcrc <lie der Kroatcn, ycbonnl we: Jen. H1crvon mnchlc hczclL. �ndc:wC!Se nur Sio cn:cn 
c.ne Aus:...ahruc, dns In de: Drnu-Bansdinrt vcrcin!gt bhcb. \'J .rts�ii!tllchc Cegcbcnhc!tcn b!lcbcn ur.bcrilo.;;1 -'a'· Oic 
Ec:u.Jid en wD.rcn so gcsdtnitltm, d�& !n 7 von 10 cine Mchrhc.! serbisct.on Volk•tums bcs:en:1. S;> wurd :i. n. d:e 
Vojv�.no und Syrmlon m�t "'."c!lcn dcr scrblL:hl:!n SwnAdlja zar Donau-Bnnstha!t vcrcln!gt. 
Vie Im .,Sporciz.11u'" vom :a. Aug. 1939 ous den 'llansdtaflcn Sawe und KJ&ten!and und clnlgcn Bc-<:rl:er. dcr N;id!bar· 
Loruchaftcn geb!ldoto .,Aulonome Bansch11h Kroallcn'" ver<:lnlgte kotncswco• atlc Kro;stcn In lhr"n Gronz,•n und s61o3 
cndo.crselts serbl�dlos l:Hcdlungsgcbict ctn. II. s. 
ff 
Source : RWerner Markert , OsteuroPB-Handbuch : 
Graz : Bohlau-Verlag, i954), pp . 6-87. 




THE CONSTITUTION OF 1931 IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM 
The following text of the constitution • found in the Slu�ben1 
List, is in cyri llic . 




11<1 �1ll:1on11 l.>0;1\joj 11 110:1>11 Hapo.1J.110.i 
l<Pt\Jb J�'rOCJlt\BUJF: 
11ponm:y jeMo 11 nporJiawy jcMo 
Y C T  A B  
KPAJbEBHHE JYfOCJIABHJE 
KO j II r.1taCI I ;  
Ol EJbAK I 
Onwre OJI.pe�6e 
l.JJtaH 1 .  
Kp<w.cn1111a Jyroc�ia1rnja j c  11�CJICJJ.Ha n yet auna 
M011apx11ja. 
1..JJJaH 2. 
J'p6 je KpaJhCBHHe JlBor JJaBH 5eJJH Opao y no­
Jlely, tta npac110M WTHTy. Bpx o6c rnase ,llBOrJJanor 
6e.11or .OpJJa CTOjH KpyHa Kpa.1 >eDHHe. Ha npcHMa 
Opna je mTHT, Ha t<OMe cy: 6eo t<pcT Ha upeeHOM 
lllTHTY ca no je)lHHM onbl1JJOM y cuaKOM t<pat<y, 
nopc1l tLcra wrnT ca 25 noJI>a up13c1111x 11 cpc6pHa­
·c1'HX 11aH3MCHUe a 11cn0Jl tMIX n.i1ae11 WTHT ca TPH 
3.'laTllC lllCCTOKpat<e 3BC3,!.lC H 6eJJH noJJyMeceu. 
/lp.>t<atrna 3acTaRa je nJJaso-6cJJ0·1tpneHa TPO· 
6ojr<a y tto1.1.opanHoM noJ10>1<ajy npeMa ycnpaDHOM 
f(On.r1>y. 
l.JJ1a11 3. 
CJ1y;l\oeH11 .ie3Ht\ Kpa.r1>en1111e JC cpncrw .xpnaT· 
Cl<O·CJIOll(' 11a•1 Kii. 
OJlEJhAK II 
Oc11oww rpai)aHC1<a 11pc.i11a If JO· .>1moo 11 
qMlH 4. 
• 
Jlp>1rn0Jt.a11n110 jc y •111rn11oj Kpa.11>e1111HH jc.11110. 
�011 cy rpa!,a11H npe.Ll 3a1,0HOM je/lWU<H. CuH y)f,1majy 
.IC�HaKy 331U1'HTY BJHICTH. 
He npH3Ha.ie cc 11.nC'MCT110 llH 11 1TyJJc, llHTH 
1 1 1;;11rn:i l lPl'lfM\'11Cl'fl;f "" p11l,c·11.y. 
Y jcwr:rna cc JJH<ma cJJo6u�a. , 
H11Ko He �to>Kc 6HTH y3eT ua O.Llrosop, llHTH 61n11 · 
np111uope11, HHTH HH3<JC Ma OJI Kora 6wrn JJHWeH 
CJIOUOJle, OCHM y CJJy•rajenuMa Koje je 3at<OH npep_­
llll,llCO. 
He3ar<oHHTO JJHrne1bc cJJo6oJJ.c je 1<a>K1t>11so. 
l.f mrn 6. 
HHKOMe He MO.>t<e cy .u.11111 11cua,!.lJJC/:\aH cy JI.. 
l.fJiaH 7. 
lfot<o He MOiKc 611T11 ocyl)eH JlOh: 11e 6y11e Han­
JJe11mo cacJJymaH u.1111 3a1<0H11M na'IHHOM no3saH ,I.la 
ce 6pa1m. 
l.fJiaH 8. 
J<a3Ha ce MO.>t<e ycTaHOBHTll caMo 331<0HOM H 
np1tMCHlfTH jeJlHHO rm llCJJa, 33 J<Oja je 381\0H y Ha· 
npe){ pe1<ao .11.a fie ce TOM t<a3HOM K83HHTH. 
l.J.naH 9. 
H11jeJiaH rpaljaHHH ue �10>1\e 6HTH 113rnan H3 
Jlp.>t<ase. OH ce ne MO.>t<e np0Tepan1 y 3CMJbH H3 
jel{HOr MeCTa y .npyro, HHTH 33T04HTH y .ieJlHOMe 
MCCTy, OCHM y CJiy<iajeBHMa J<Oje je 3aKOH 113petIHC 
llpCJlBH.l{CO. 
' 
. HHKO ce He MO)l<C, HH y KOM CJJy4ajy, npoTepaTH 
Ha ceor 3as11t1ajuor MeCTa, 6e3 cy.urnc npecy;le. 
l.JJJaH 10. 
CTaH je Henoepe.11aH. 
B;racT He Mo.>t<e npe.11y3eT11 um<a1.:eo npeTpecaH.>c 
HH HCTpa.>t<HBaJbe y CTaHy rpal,aita, OCHM y CJ1)''ta.ie­
BHM8 t<Oje je 38t<OH npe,llBH.IJ,CO II H3tIHHOM Kat<o je 
33KOH nponHcao. 
HeaaKOHHTa noapel!a CTaHa r<a>KH.>11Ba jc. 
l.fJian I J . 
YjeM11asa ce cJJooo.11.a oepe 11 canecTJt. :Vt"nojeHc 
DC'flOllCnonecTH pan11onpaHHC cy llPCJl :-iat<OllOM II 
Mory CBOj scpo:�a1<011 jaRllO HcnOUt',ll<lTll. 
y)l(�IOatbC rpal,aHCKHX H 110.llllTll'll<IIX 11pana HC· 
3ao11c110 je O/l 11cnone1u111>a ncpc. l l111w cc 11c MO>t<L' 
OC' JIOOO.llHTH cnoj !IX rpa!iat1l'l\fl x I I  noj f l  II x )l)'>t<HOCTll 
H 0Gaae3a no31majyh11 ce till 11po111Kc niu.i�' Bl'pc. 
Bepc Mory 6JtTtt npH3Han· c;wo aah·1111<1M. Yrnn· 
jcHe H rtpll3113Te llt'jlC C:l�11 l1'T;J,llJHl nwl>Y.iY cnoje 
yHyTpa1111bc ncpct<c 11ocJ1011r 11 � 11pa11;1>;1jy .-rn1j11�1 
3aKJiaJtaMa u <l>OllJl.Olll·tMa y I"fl<lllllU,UMa �1;11\(lft;l. 
1-IHt<o HHje nymaH Jla cnojc 11epc1w pcm·;1o•�c11.>c 
jaeHo Hcnonc;la. H111<0 m1ie JW>K<nt Jl:1 cy1lcJ1y,1c Y 
iicpo3at\01111M 3!CTl l �ta, CDC•taHi ;t"TllM3, o(ipe:111Ma 11 
Ul')l{OaMa, OCllM KO}l Jlp>t<aUlt f lX npa311Hl<a II cuc•1a· 
Item II Cont . 145 
llOCTll II y l<0.11111<0 TO OJtP<' 1111 :l:ll\011 33 oco6e, l<Oj e 
cy nO/l' IO)f{HC 0'111111.'.l\Oj, T)l'COpCl\Oj It uoj11oj BJJ:lCTlf. 
Y rno.kuc 11 np11:m:nc ncpr �tory OJij»K<HtUTH ue3e 
ca cnojm1 opxou11m1 11epc1<11M nor.nauap11Ma 11 nan 
rj'3Hl1Lla llP>l'<lOC, y KO.'ll h:O TO Tpa>l<C Jtyxomrn 11po­
m1c11 nojem11111x uepo11cnouccT11. I ln•11111, 1<a1<0 lie ce 
re nc3c onp>1<:111:rrn, peryJ111cal1c ce :1aim110M. 
Y i-:0JJ111<0 cy y np}f(aouoM Gy1.1c ry npcnnutjCHH 
3a uep03aKOllC cepxc 11:-l;l:lllll, HM:l iy cc JtCJlllTll MCl1Y 
nojcmme ycuoje11c 11 npHJH_qTe UC'po11cno11ccr11 cpa:J· 
Mrp110 qpojy ILllXOllHX nep1111x II crnap110 .ll01<33aUOj 
n0rpc611. 
Bepc1<11 npeTcraam1u11 He c:.1ejy ynorpe6JI.anaTH 
CBojy JlYXOBHY BJ13CT npeKO eepCKHX 6orOMOJba HJ!lt 
npeKO Han11ca nepcKor KapaKrepa HJJH Htta•1e npH 
epwett>y cnoje 3BaHH4He .llY>KHOCTll y napTHCKC 
cspxe. 
Hero raKo HllKOM HHje 11onywreHo 11a y 6oro­
t.fOJbaMa HJIH np11JIHKOM oepCKHX Cl\ynoaa H M3Hlt<f>e· 
CT3l.lllja y onwTe epum Ma Ka1rny OOJIHTH<IKY am· 
rau11jy. 
t.JnaH 12. 
CeaKoMe je CJ!0601rno, y rpnmmaMa 38Kona, 
H3p83HtH csoje m1w.1,etbc nyteM pet111, )!{Hee HnH . nHCaHe, CJ!HK8Ma II JlPYfHM CXOJlHIU.t C(>e,llCTBllM3. 
lfnaH 13. 
rpalj°aHH HMajy 11p3BO yllpVil\llRalba, 3(5opa H 110• 
roeopa y rpaH11uaMa 3aKotta. He MO}f(e 6HTH y.apy· 
)f<HBalba H a  eepcKOj HJIH nJJeMeHCKOj HJIH pernoHaJIHOj 
OCHOBH y napTHCKO·nOJIJ1TH'lt<e cnpxe Kao HH y cepxe 
�rn3111rnor nacn11TaH>a. 
Ha 36opose ce He MO>Ke .nona3HTH noJl opy)!{jer.i. 
lJJJaH 14. 
rpal}aHH HMajy npaeo MOJI6e. Mon6y MO>Ke 110T· 
IlHC3TH jeium HJIH IJHUJe lbHX, K80 H csa ;npaeHa JIHUa. 
Mon6e ce Mory 110.!l.HOCHTH ce11Ma e'naCTHMa· 6e3 
pa3n111<e. 
4naH 15. 
Hayi<a 11 yMeTHOCT cy cJm6o.nHe. 
4naH 16. 
nope11 .llPiK3BHHX jaBHHX WICOJia t.t0ry OOCTO· 
ja111 H npuaaTHe y rpamn.taMa ea1<0Ha. 
0CHOBHO WKOJlOBalhe je o6aee3HO. OHO je y 
.11P>K38HHM OCHOBHHM WKOJlaMa 6ecn.i1aTHO. 
Cee w1<0ne MOpajy .naaarn MopanHo eacnHraH>e 
H pa3BHjaTH .up>1<ao.1La11cKy CBeCT y l .YXY Hapo.a.Hor 
jl'Jl.HHCTBa H sepcKe TpneJbHBOCTH. 
Cae ycraHoae Ja o6pa3ooaH>e no.n .np>KaeHHM cy 
H�)l30P0�1. 
'-lnaH 17. 
Henoepe.nna je rajHa nHCaMa, renerpa�1cK11x 11 
renecp0Hc1mx caonwTett>a, OCHM y cnyqajy 1<pHBH4He 
HCTpare, M06Hn11ua311je un11 para. 
C1m om1 1<0j11 nonpe.lle TajHy n11caMa, renerpa<f>'· 
CKHX H TeJ1e<poHcK11x caonwreH>a, Ka3H11he ce no 
3aKOHy. 
lJJJaH 18. 
Cna1<11 rpafj°amtH HMa 11pauo HenocpeJIHO H 6e3 · 
w111j er OJI06pe1t>a TYi«I rm cy llY Jlp>1.:anHe H ca�10y­
npao11e opraue 3a 1<pH1HP1Ha 1 ena, Koja 611 OBH y•111-
HHJJH npcMa u,eMy y cnyn<6CHOM paJJy. 
3a M111111crpe, cy.llHje 11 eoj1111Kc no.n aacrano�1 
83)f(C Hapo•11nc 011peJt6e. 
3a WTCTC Kojc y111111e rpai)allHMa llP>l<aBHH HJllf 
CaMOy11pamrn opram1 HC�:llWHHTHM HJIH HenpaeHJJHHM 
spweH>eM cJJy>K6e, OJlrmrnpa iy npeJt pellOBliHM cy110M 
cny;!<6eHHf( Kao H3BpWHJl:Jll If JJ.pi!<aBa, 0)1.HOCHO 
CaMoy11paaHO TCJIO. 
lf11a11 I 9. 
Cna 3µa11.a y cnmrn c q '.' i- l\ta nrrn<anne CJtVll<oe 
no,1.k;u1uf\11 cy :we ry1111t1, lltJJl 1<11'w:,1 : 1 1M 11<in1 ·11ia�ia, 
CBllM3 Jlp>K8UJ1,QIUl�ta. 
l.IJ1:111  20. 
C11a1m . Jlp>1<:111Ji.am111 y11rn11a :ln111n1ry Jtp;1rn11c Y. 
ctpaHHM np>1<i111aM�. C11:11m�1 jc 11p;1rn11;1.n111111y CJ1c.,. 
UllJlllO HCTy1111TH u,.1 ;1p;1<:111J1,:111c rua nowTo 11c11y1111 
CIHJjc oii:lflt·:1c llPl'Ma llPilWHH. • 
:·tiopa11.yj c cc 11:i;t:111a11ic cuo j HX .npman,11,aua. 
O/lEJf,J\l( Ill 
COLlll}llAHe H e1<011om:1<c OJtPCA6e 
l!Jl:lH 2 1 .  
6paK, · nopo;,uua 11 1,cua croje 110.1t 3a11rr11roM 
JJ.plt<aee. 
4JtaH 22. 
Cnoj1111a je 3ajCM'lt'11a. 
Ca11pm1ma H 0611M npa1ta ceojHne o.apvl,yjy ce 
3rlh'.OllOM. 
E1<C11ponp11Jau1tja npmiarnc cnoj 1111c y 01111rre&1 
1111Tepecy 11ony111Teua je Ha oCHouy 3a1w11a, y:� npa­
uw111y 11a1<11a;ly. 
4.11an 23. 
Cnolio;rn paJta H yrosapa11,a y np11epc1w m1 OJt• 
HOCllMa npH3Haje ce. 
llp>Kaua HMa, y Htrrcpecy UCJIHHC, a 11:1 OCHOBY. 
33KOIJa, npauo H Jiy>+rnnc r Jta H11Tc1H1c 1111111c y np11· 
apeLUntM O!lHOCHMa rpal,a11:l, y nyxy up3ll.il.C 11 011<.1a­
lbatba JlPYWTBCHllX . cynpOTllOCTH. 
Y.l!aH 24. 
Kao caeero.naeHo TCJio y mna11.11�1a np110rc.lHHH 
H COl.(HjaJIHHM ycTaHOBJbasa ce npuapellHO Bl:lll.', l\Oje 
. he Ha Tpa>1<etbe I<paJLc11c1<c £3J1a:1c HJIH Hapo.zrnor. 
npcTCTaOHHWTB3 .113Rant CUOjC C rPV11HO MHtrl 'helbl!. 
flp11apen110 Belie ca•11tH..aa3.i y nr•:1 c1au1111tt11 npH· 
epe.llHHX pe11ona 11 CTPY'ifoau11 y 11p1rnpcJlHiot 11 COUH· 
jn.IJHllM n11ra11.>eMa. 
. Ha•11111 cacraaa H 110CJIOB311·rl np11epe.a11or Beh'a 




Jlp•aaHa enacT epmH ce no O.llPCA6awi osora 
YcTaea. 
t.JJtaH 26. 
3a1<ouo.11aeHy e.11ac1 epwe KpaA:> H t-lapo11eo 
npc·rCTaltHHWTIJO 3aje.11.HlltlKH. 
HapOJlHO npnCT8BHHWT80 caCT88.lbajy (i?Ha'f H 
HApOJlH& CKynlll1'HHa. 
4naH 27. 
Y npaeny BJiacr ep1u11 KpaJb 11pe1<0 O..lroaopHHX 
MHHHCTapa no o.npc)J.6aMa oeora YcTasa. 
YJl:lH 28. 
Cy.nc1.;y onacT epwc cy.noa11. l-b11x0Re nl'rt·r.1e 11 





h.pan, je 33T0t{HHK H3fl0."lll1r jl'·t111h'iT : II , p: 
)JcanHe iteJ1HHe; OH jc •1yBap 11>1t.'\\11111x cu:11 \:1it1t-!I'." 
HHrepcca. ,. 
Item II Cont . 146 
KpaJb noTapf)yje H npornawyje. sa1<0He, no· CTaa.ba .apma1rne \fHHOUHHl<e H ,Aaje BOJHe \fHHOBe no 
oµpc.l6aMa aa1<otta. 
KpaJb je spxosHH sanoaeJIHHl< cse aojHe CHJie. 
011 Aaje op,AeHe H Apyra OJI.lJHKOBaH>a. 
4naH 30. 
KpaJb 11Ma npaso aMHeCTHje. AMHeCTHjOM ce 
HllWTe npantte nocne.11Hue Ka>Kli>HBOr JieJia, anH ce 
t.bO�te 11e r.tory noeijaTH npaua npHBaTHHX n11ua Ha 
HaKHa.ny wTeTe. AMHeCTHja ce MO>Ke p.aTH npe no· 
•1eT1<a KpHBH\fHor nocTyn1<a, y T01<y nocTyn1<a H noc.ne H3Bpwtte npecyp.e. A�rneCTHja je onrnTa HJIH noje· 
AHH3\fH3. 
KpaJb 11Ma npaso no�mnoaa.ua. OH MO>Ke 11.ocy· 
ljeHy K33HY onpOCTHTH, CM3H>HTH HJIH y6.na>KHTH. 
npaBO ROMHJIOB3H>3 no p.eJIHM3 1<3>KH>HBHM C3MO 
no np11earnoj Ty>K6H OJlpCl}yje 3al<OHHK 0 cy,l\Cl<OM 
1<pHBH4HOM nocTyn�y. 
lfnaH 31. 
KpaJb npeTCT38Jb3 Ap>Kaey y CBHMa H>eHHM OJl.· 
HOCHM:t ca TyijHM Ap>KasaMa. Ott ornawyje paT H �a: 
J<Jby4yje MHp. AKO 3CMJb3 HHje HanaJIHyTa, HJIH JOJ 
paT HHjc orAaweH OJI 1<oje Apyre .np>1<ase, 3a ornac 
p3Ta noTpe6aH je nperxoAHH npHCTaHaK Hapo11.ttor 
npeTCT3BHHWTS3. 
A1<0 aeMJt.H 6y.11e ornaweH paT llJIH oHa 6yAe 
H3TI3AHYT3, HMa ce O;l.M3X C3383Tll HapOJlHO npeT· 
CT3BHHUJTBO. 
tf.llaH 32. 
Kpa.lb C33HB3 HapOllHO npercraBHHWTSO y pe­
A0B3H HJIH sattpe.11aH C33HB. 
KpaJb oTsapa H 33KJby4yje ce.ztHHUe JIH4HO, npe· 
CTOHOM 6eceJIOM HJIH npeKO MHHHCTapcKor caeera, 
nocnaHHUOM HJIH yKa3oM. 
Y cny1.1ajy KaJI KpaJb oreapa HJIH 3aKJby'lyje 
ceAHHue npecroHOM 6eceAOM CeHar H Hapo.ntta CKyn­
WTHHa yjeJIHO 3ace.11aeajy. 
l1 npeCToHy 6eceJiy H nocJ1attHUe H yKa3 nper.ta· 
nornHcyjy CSH MHHHCTpH. 
KpaJb Mo>Ke y csaKo .ll06a, no AP:>f<aBHoj no­
Tpe6H, n0383TH HapOJIHO npercrasHHUJTBO. 
KpaJb HMa npaso pacnycrHTH Hapo.ztHY C1<yn­
. WTHHY H HapeJIHTH HOBe H36ope. Y1<a3 o pacny�raH>y 
Kao H yKa3 0 HOBHM H36opHMa npeM,;mornHCYJY_ CBH 
MHHHCTpH. 
tfJiaH 33. 
Kpalb He MO>Ke 611rH y Hero epeMe nornasap 




Csa1<H nHcMeHH 'tHH KpaJbescKe snacrH npeMa· 
noTnHcyje H3.ll.Jle>KHH MHHHCTap O)l.HOCHO MHHHCT3p· 
c1m caReT. 
3a cae iume Kpan,ceCKe anacrH o.nroeapa MH· 
HHCTap OJIHOCHO MHliHCTapCl<H easer, KOjH je npe­
ManoTnHC30. 
3a llHHe Kpa;nese Kao spxoeHor 3anoae.nHHKa 
eojcKe, o)lroeapa MHHHcrnp sojcKe H MOpHapHL(e. 
lfJJaH 35. 
KpaJb H npeCTOJIOHacJie,llHHK nyHOJieTHH cy Ka)l 
nanpme 18 roirn11a. 
KpaJbeea JIH4HOCT je HenpHKOCHoseHa. KpaJby ce 
He MO>Ke HHWT3 v 011roaop110CT CT3RHTH HHTH KpaJb 
MO>Ke 6HTH Ty>KeH. Oso He ope)J.H 3a J<paJbeeo npH· 
S8THO HM81be. 
lfJiaH 36. 
Y Kp11bee1rnH JyrocnaeH.i H ena.na Kpa.11> AneK· 
caHJ1.ap I H3 AHH&CTHje Kapaljopljeee. Kp8.1ba AneK· 
caH.11pa H3CJiet;yje 1-beroso MYWICO noTOMCTBO no 
pe,lly npsopoljeH>a. 
lJJiaH 37. 
KaJl KpaJb HeMa MyrnKor nOTOMCTsa OH he o.ape­
AHTH ce6H H3CJICJIHHKa H3 no604He JIHHHje. y CJ1y<1ajy 
KaJJ. KpaJb JIO csoje cMpTH HHje o.npeJlHO ce6H Ha· 
CJieJ{HHKa, H11poJIHO npeTCT3BHHWTSO, y 3ajeJJ.HH4· 
KOj CC)J.HHUH, 6Hpahe KpaJba H3 HCTe )1.HHaCTHJe. 
l.JJlaH 38. 
I<paJbeec1m .lloM cacTaSJbajy :  KpaJbHUa cynpyra, 
)f<HBH npeTUH KpaJI>enH y npaeoj JIHHHjH, H3 HCTe 
Jll1H3CTHje, ca csojHM cynpyraMa, >KHSH nOTOML(H 
KpaJbeBH y npasoj JIHllHjH ca caojHM cynpyraMa H 
noTOMUHMa, pol)eHa 6paha KpaJbena H H>HXOBH no­
TOMUH ca ceojHM cynpyraMa, cecTpe KpaJba sna.aaoua, 
H csH >KeHCKH noroMUH 11.0 y)J.aje, crpuu KpaJba 
AneKcaH.npa I KHe3 ApceH, l<He3 nasne ca cynpyroM 
H OOTOMUHMa, H TO meHCKHM noTOMUHMa JJ.O y,llaje. 
0JIHOCH 11 nono>Kaj 4Jianosa y KpaJI>eBCKOM 
Jlo�1y ypeljeHH cy CTaTYTOM, KOjH nponHcyje KpaJb. 
'-lnaH 39. 
CTynajyhH Ha npecTo, KpaJb nona}f(e npe.11. Ha· 
POAHHM npeTCT3BHHWTSOM 331CJleTBy Koja rJiaCH: ,,Ja 
(HMe) crynajylrn Ha npecro Kpa11>esHHe JyrocnasHje 
H npHMajyhH KpaJ1>escKy anacT, 3aKJIHH>eM ce cae­
MoryhHM 6oroM, .na hy 4ysaTH H3Ha.n csera jeJJ.HH· 
CTBO Hapo.na, He3aBllCHOCT JJ.p>Kaee H ueJIHHY JIP>KaB­
He o6nacrH H .na hy no YcTasy H 3aKOHHMa sJiaJtaTH, 
H .na hy y CSHMa csojHM Te>l<H>aMa .ll06po Hapo,lla 
npe.n 04HMa HMarH. TaKo MH rocno11. Sor noMorao. 
AMHHI" 
lJJlaH 40. 
KpaJ1J 6opasH cTaJIHO y 3eMJIJH. AKO ce n0Ka>1ce 
norpe6a .11.a KpaJb H.lle H3 3eMJbe Ha Kpahe speMe, 
33CTyna ra no npasy Hacne.a.HHK npecTOJia. AKO Ha­
CJie.llHHK npeCTOJla HHje nyHOJieTaH, HJIH aKO je 
cnpe4eH, KpaJba he 3acrynaTH MHHHCTapcKH easer. 
3acrynHHWTBO ce sprnH no ynycrBHMa Koja KpaJb 
. Jlaje. Oso speJIH H 3a cny,1aj Kpan,eae 6onecTH, Koja 
He CTBapa rpajtty Hecnoco61-1ocr. 
3a speMe OTCyCTBa KpaJba HJIH HacJie)lHHKa npe­
CTOJia, MHHHcrapcKH easer HeMa npasa pacnywraH>a 
HapOJlHe CKynrnTHHe . 
3acrynHHWTao MHHHcrapcKor casera MO>Ke rpa­
j arH Haj.ny>Ke WeCT MeCeUH. no HCTeKy Tora pOKa 
C1'ynajy y Ba:>f<HOCT ycraBHH nponHCH 0 HaMeCHHWTBy. 
01l,EJbAK VI 
HaMecH11wrso 
l.JnaH 41.  
· KpaJbescKy snacr spwH HaMeCHHwrso: 1) KaJl jc 
KpaJb ManoneraH, 2) Ka.zt je KpaJb s6or ityweeHe HJIH 
renecHe 6onecTH rpajao Hecnoco6aH Aa spwu Kpa­
Jbeac1<y BJiacr. 
Y cnyirnjy KaJl je KpaJb rpajHo Hecnoco6aH .1:t.a 
spwH KpaJbescKy nnacT, o MOMeHTY 06pa3onal-ba H 
npeCT3HKy HaMeCHHWTSa peUJaea HapOJJ.HO npeT· 
CT3SHHUJTBO y 3ajeJIHll4KOj ce)lHHUH. 
KaJt MHHHCTapCKH caecT Halje 11a je HacTynuo 
CJJyllaj KpaJbese ttecnoco6HocrH, OH TO caonwrnea 
Hapo.n.noM npeTCTaBHHWTBY 3aje,ll l0 ca MHWJl>CH>CM 
TPH neKapa y3era ca JIOMahHx Me11111tmtCKHx ct>aKyn­
Tera. Ha HCTH ce H34HH nocryna Ka.A je y nHTalby 
Hacne.nHHK npecTOJla. 
tfJiaH 42. 
HaMeCHHllKa BJI8CT np11naJla no npaay Hacne.n· 
HHl<y npeCTOJl31 &KO je nyHOJleTSH. 
A1co HacJICllHHK npeCTOJI8, HS yspoKa no6poja­
HHX y 'IJiaHy 41, He MO>Ke )18 eprnH H8MeCHHllKY 
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11.'1:1CT, on11a he naMeCHH'l"Y n.nacT uprnHTH TPH JJKua, 
1-:ojn jc 1<pa.1i. o:�pe;u10 11:ipo111n11M ainoM HJIH TecTa· 
l\tl'llT<nt. HCToupeMc110 KpaJb 011pehyje cea1<0M 11aMe· 
c1rn.-y no jemrnr 3aMcHtt1<a. Ha rny11aj na ce ynpa3nH 
MecTo mlMCCHHt<a 11 1-berooor 3aMeHu1<a, Hapo11Ho 
r JpcTCTaBHHWTBO 611pa 1':1jHllM rJiaCatbeM, y 3aje1l· 
llH'llWj CC.ll lHllll, HOBOr H3MCCHHl<a Oil .!lBOjlfl.lC npe· 
ocrnJ111x saMcmma. A1w jc y >1<WBOTY caMo je.uaH 
3<DICllJ11( 011.ua OH J(0.11a3;r 6c3 H300pa ll�i ynpa>l<ILCHO 
l\ICCTO H3l\!CCtnll<a. 
Ha c.nyirnj na KpaJt.. 1rnjc OJLPC.llHO HH a1<TOM Hll 
Tt'CTmteHTOM trnMeCllHl<C HJUI }la ycJJe,ll 60JICCTll HJlll 
CMPTll 011pel';eH11x HaMecmrKa 11 H>HXOBHX 3aMeH111<a 
HHje MOryhe o6pa30BaTU fiaMCCHHlllTBO 01l 6ap .11sa 
1rnMeCH1>11<a, Hapo.nHo Dpe'J:'CTasmmnso 611pa TajHHM 
rJiaCal-beM, y 3aje,llHH'lKOj Ce!!.HHUH, noTpe6aH 6poj 
KpaJbC'BC1rnx HaMecmma. HaMeCHHUH Mory 6HTH caMo 
rpat)aHH KpaJbea11·He JyroCJiaBHje. 
Ope Hero IDTO y3�1y KpaJbeBcKy BJ1acT y csoje 
pyKe, HaMCCHHUH he npe.u HapO.UHllM npeTCTaBHH· 
UJTBOM noJIOJKHTU 3a1<JJeTsy : .11a l:ie KpaJby fonu 
aepHH H ).(a he B,TiaJJ.ant no YcTasy H 3eMaJbc1rnM 
3al<OHHMa. 
Lf.naH 43. 
A1<0 j e  je.llaH on TpojHue HaMCCHHKa np11ape· 
MeHO OTCyTaH HJIH cnpelleH, Jtpyra ,l!Ba H8MCCHl1Ka 
Moh11 lie H 6e3 1-bera OTnpaeJbaTH 11p.>1<a0He nocJiose. 
4JJaH 44. 
0 eacrr11raH>y Ma.110.nerHor Kpa,n,a crnpahe ce 
H3MCOIHUH. 
0 n!1ra1i>y ManonerHor KpaJba 6p11Hyhe ce CTapa· 
TeJbH o.u.peljeuH KpaJbel3HM TeCTaMeHTOM. A1<0 npe­
MHHYJJH KpaJb HHje o.npemrn crapaTeJba, HMeHoaahe 
HX HaM&HHUH no CaCJiyUJal-by OpeTCe.llHHKa lJpllCaB· 
Hor caaeT�, Kacau11osor cy)la H fJiasae KOHTpOJJe. 
4JiaH 45. 
l o CTynal-ba Ha 1lY)f(HOCT HaMeCHl-tKa MHHHCTap­
Cl<H caBeT he npHBpeMeHO BpWHTH, no.n CllOjOM o.nro­
BOf>HOillhy, Kpa,lbearny B.'laCT. 
lJJlaH 46. 
Y cnytrnjy CMPTH HJIH ocTaBKe KpaJbese, HaueJt· 
IHI!( npeCTOJia, aKO j e  JJYltOJleTaH, npHMa 0.!lM8X Kpa­
JbCDCKy BJJaCT, o6jaBJbyje TO Hapo11y npOKJiaMaU.HjOM 
11 noJiame npmmcaHy 33KJJeTBY npeJt Hap01lHHM 
CT peTCTaDHHWTBOM. 
4JH!H 47. 
Al<o Kpa,'b no CMpnt CBOJOJ HHje OCTaBllO 
MYWKOr noTOMCTaa, amt 611 KpaJbHUa y ape111e cMpTH 
KpaJbeBe 611.11a Tpy.11Ha H Ha c.ny<1aj .na Kpa.11> Huje 
a1<TOM HJIH TecTaMeHTOM 01lpe1rno ttaMeCHm<e, Hapo.u.· 
HO flpeTCTaBHHWTBO 6upa npHBPCMCHO HaMCCHlme, 
1<0jH he spwHTH KpaJbeBcKy BJJacT caMo .no nopo· 
ljaja. BJia.ua je .llY>!<Ha no11HeTH HapO.U.HOM npeTCTaB· 
HHIUTBY npe H36opa HaMeCHHKa MHUJJbel-be TPH JJe· 
I<apa y3eTa � ca JJ.OMahHX MC.llHUHHCl<HX cf>aKyJJTeTa 0 
KpaJbH'!HROJ TPY.llHOlm. To HCTO spe.1111 H 3a cny1.Jaj 
1<8,lla 6H OpeCTO.'IOHaCJJe�HHK npeMHHYO a 1-beroaa 6ff 
iKetta 6HJJa TPYJIHa y TpettyTKY CMprn KpaJbeae. 
lJJJaH 48. 
Y cJJyl!ajy Ka.ll npecrn npeMa o.a.pe.116aMa osor 
YCTasa ocTatte 6e3 ttacJ1ellHH1<a, MHHHCTapcKH caee1· 
fie Y3CTH y caoje py1<e KpaJbeBcKy anacT 11 o.uMax 
003B8TH . HapO.'lHO npeTCT3BHHWTBO y HapOl!HTU 
C33HB, y I<OMe he ce peUJHTH 0 npecTOJiy. 
l.JJiaH 49. 
UHBHJIHa .nHcTa KpaJbeaa onpefjyje ce 3aKOHOM. 
Je,llHOM O,llpel)eHa UHBHJJHa JIHCTa He MO.>Ke ce nOBH· 
CHTH 6e3 npHCT8JtKa HaponHOr npeTCTaBHHUJTBa HH 
CMaH>HTH 6ea npHCT3HKa KpaJbesor. 
I<paJUeocr<u 11a111ec11n1l11 he aa apcMe epmclba 
caojc .uy>1<HOCTH rrpmrnrn 113 1Lpit\C1B11e 6J1araj1ru1(c 
OHOJllll\O I<OJIHKO HM, ua npCJlJIOI' MHHHCTapcKor 





CcHaT cacrnaJbajy cetrnTop11: o.u I<paJ1>a HMCHO· 
11a1111 11 611pa1111. CenaTop He MO)!CC 6HTH MJJal)H O.l.l qe. 
Tj>J(CCCT fO.UHIIa. 
O.upe.uGc o 6pojy fo1paHHX ce11aropa H lbHXOBOM 
1136opy npo1111cyjy ce saKOHOM. 
Kp:lJb MOJKe HMellOB:lTH TOJIHKH HC'fH 6poj ceua­
TO.pa KOJJHKO HX je tmpmmx. 
H111<0 ue M0>1<e 611TH y HCTO epeMe ceHaTOp H 
uapOJJ.HH nocnaHH� 
4JtaH 5 1 .  
MaH.1taT 6HpaHHX ceHaTopa rpaje weer ro.n1111a. 
Cs�U<e TpH rOAPIHe CeHaT ce o6HaBJba HS�p.HMa HO· 
DHX 11JlaHORa 3a jell.HY nOJJOBHHY 6Hp&HHX CCHaTOpa. 
l-IJiaH 52. 
MaHJJ.aT ceHaTOpa OJI. Kpan..a HMettoli�uu1x ·rpaje 
wecT ro.11.ttHa. 0HH ce awry Ha npe.llnor npeTce.a.HHKa 
MHHHCTapc1<0r caaeTa pa3pemHTW ose .14y.ncuocrn 
yc.ne.u ¢11311111<e Hecnoco611ocT11 HJJH a1Co cy cy.1tOM 
ocyl)enH 3a 1<p1m11tma .nc.na. 
11MeuoaaHH CeHaTOpu, aKo cy UKTHOllH JlPJI<a.BHH 
11HHOBHHI.(H, He Mory 3a.np.>KaTH l!HHOBHH•rKH no,10.>1<aj. 
l.JJJaH 53. 
CeaaT ce cacTaje Ka.ll H Hapo.ztHa C1<ynwrnHa a 
npecrnje paJlHTH Kall H oHa. 
CeHaT caM ncmnyje ype.llHOCT ttaHAarn 611paHHX 
ceHaTopa 11 OJl,1Jyt1yje o H>HMa. 
Hapo,a11a CKynwTHHa 
lJJiau 54. 
Hapo.u.uy C1<ynmnrny cacraa.lbajy nocJ1:.11111u11 
ltOje m1pon. C.'1060.llHO 6HRa onmTHM, je).lH3KHM Ir llC· 
nocpe.11 111M r nacaH>cM. 
Hapoirna C1<ynwT11Ha t:>Hpa ce ua 4 rO.llHllC. MaH· 
J.(aT uapO.llHOr noc.IJaHHKa MOil<C npeCTaTH H paH11je y 
CJJy•iajeBIHtta KOje npe.llBlll)a 113CiOpllH 331<0H. 
0Jlpc.n6e o 6pojy H H36op1rna HapOJl.HHX noc.rn· 
trnKa npon11cy je ce sa1<0HoM. 
l.J.'!aH 55. 
npaRO UHpa1J1\0 llM:I CBal.:H Jlp)KaDJL><HU::l no pO· 
l}e1-t.y 11.1111 npHpof)c1uy, mw je HaBpIU110 ABa)(eceT H 
jC..!lHY fOJlHHY CTapocrn. 
0¢HUHPH aJ<THBHli Kao H RO,U><pHQHpM H BOjHH­
UH 00.ll 3aCT3BOM He Mory BpWllTH 6Hpa•JKO npaeo 
mt 6HTH 6HpaHH. 
3aKOH he peWHTH 0 .lKeHCKOM npaey rJJaca. 
4.IJaH 56. 
np11apeMeHO ry6e 6Hpa1IKO npaeo: J )  KOjH cy 
ocy�eHH Ha po611jy TaMHHUy), HJJll 38TBOp �iKH O.ll 
ro.11 1uy .D.:rna, .llOI< cc He nosoare y npasa, 2) 1<oj11 cy 
ocyl)eHu Ha ry6HTa1< l!UCHHX npasa 3a epeMc .llOI< 
Tpaje Ta Ka3Ha, 3) KOjH cy 00.!I CTCl.lHUJTeM, 4) IW i l l  
Cy IlO.ll CTi:lpaTCJbCTBOM H 5) KOjH cy npecy.110�1 H3i }"· 
6HJIH 611pat.tKO npano 36or H360pHHX KpHBHU,:J. 
lJJJ8H 57. 
3a ceHaTopa on.nocHo Hapo.nuor nocJiaH111w , t<.,.•\e 
6HTH H3a6paH ca�IO OHaj, KOjH HMa 611pa•1Ko npano, 
6es 06311pa je JJH yeelleH y fotpat.t1<H cnKCaK. OJ. LBa· 
KOr ce ceHaTopa 0,llHOCHO llOCJ13llHKa Tpa.>Ke 0311 yc.•10· 
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a11: I )  .!la je Jlp>KaB.'t.:lHHH no po}jeH>y HJIH np11po1Je­
H>Y !�pa.'beB!me Jyroc.11:is11je. I lpupol1cHH JlP>K<lB.'baHHH 
MOpa OHTH ttacTatt>eH HajMalbe )leceT rOJlHtta, paqy. 
H::i,iyl11t O.il )laHa np11po�e1ba, 2) .11a je HaBpillHO 40 
O.!UIOCHO 30 fOJlHHa CT:lpOCTH H 3) ,IJ,a roeopH H nHWC 
nap0.1HHM je3HKOM. 
fy61na1< G11pa•11cor npasa np11snatm H ry611rm< 
Ma1n:na ce11aropa o.11Horno ttapo.1ttor noc.1Jam1Ka. 
l'ettaTop11 11 11apo!lHH noc:1am1 1111 11e Mory GnrH 
y llC iQ Bpe�IC .llPiK3:Jllll ,'Jll(jlepallTll HJIH .llp>KaBlll l  
11pc;.ty31nrn•111. 
4.1:m 58 
AKTHBHH Jlp>KaBHH lJilHOBIIHUJ'I He Mory ce l<aH· 
l�H;IOBaTH 3a CCHaTope JI HG.pO}lHe noc.lJa!IHKC. 
00.'lHUHCl<H, cf>l'IH:lHCHCKH H lll)'MapCKH 'JHHOBHH· 
1{11 1\:10 JI 'IHHOOHHUH arpapHe pc<�OpMe, HC Mory ce 
1<8H.l11Jl0Baru, OCllM :lKO cy TO npecraJIH 6HTH ro,11my 
.u.a11a npe pacn11ca 1 136op;:i. 
1v\111111n p11 a1<n1ou11 11 11a pacnoJio>f<eH.>y Mory ce 
1.:aH,'.Ul-'lOB<IT11. 
YnaH 59. 
CnaK11 ce11arop 11 ttapO.!lHH nornattHK npercrae­
:i,a nco 11apo.11. 
Cs11 •1JJaHOoH I Iapo.u.1wr flpercrnemm1rsa no:1a­
;Ky Ja1'.1CTBy, .11a lie Kpa.'by 6HTH sep1rn, .na he •1ysa­
rn ll3Hll}l cnera jC.'tJIHCTOO Hapo.lla, HC33BHCHOCT .llP· 
)t<nnc 11 uc.111i1y np;1rnnHe 06.11acrH, .aa he Ycras qyea­
TH H Jl06po trapo.aa npe.n o•mMa HMarH. 
4JJa11 60. 
Hapo.mo npercraBHHlllTBO ca3HBa ce KpaJbeOHM 
yKci..>oM y npecroHnun BeorpaJly y pe.D.OBaH ca3HB 
cea1cc rO]llme JlB:l.!lCCeror OICT06pa. 
Arw ie y c.i1y4ajy para npectOHHUa H3MewreHa, 
�fapo;i.110 £Jpcn:TaP.11111urao :ncraje ce y uecry, 1<oje 
Je Kpn.'beBHM y1<a30M o ca3Hny o.zrpel}etto. 
Pell.OBaH ca3HB 11c MO»<e ce 3aKJby•1 11rH iJ.OI< 11e 
6y.ac pewe11 .llpi:«11:1HH 6y1.1eT. 
l.JJiaH 61. 
I lnpo.1Ha CKynmnma nperJie)la ca�ta nyHOMOh· 
CTHa CBOjHX •1.'!aHoea H 0.llJl)"Jyje 0 H>HMa. 
llJiaH 62. 
Hapo.11Ha C1<ynwTHHa 6Hpa aa csnrrn ca3HB H3 
CBO je cpe.n.HHe cnoje \laCHHW1 BO. 
l.JJJ:lH 63. 
3a1;011rne npc1More nOJlHOce, no oanawhe1t.y 
Kp11.1.e110111, noje;mnH MHllHCTpH. 
ripaeo no;1J1owe11>a 3a1wHc1rnx rrpe.zv1ora np11-
na�a csa1wM 11nany Hapo.llHOr flpetcTaBHHIDTBa, 
'IHJl1 npe,ll.JIOr 1111CMCHO HOMOrHe Haj�1afbe je]lHa ne· 
THHa •1.1a11oa;1 CC'1 1ara OJlHOCHO l lapo.1J.11e Ct<ynwTHHe. 
4J1a11 64. 
�ai.:cmc1rn npc!wor 1cojH Hapo.nua C1<ynmrnHa 
ycuo.111 rnn.•1,e cc C eHaTy na pa.11 11 o6patHO. AKO je 
aa1<0Hc1rn 11pe.n.J1or ycsojcH y llc.1rn1111 11 01.t HapO]lHe 
CKym.unme 11 OJl Cc1rn1·a cMaTpa ce Jla jc 1-hlpo.n.Ho 
ripetcTaenwwrno npCJlJJOr np11M11.110. l\1co cy yt.JHlbC· 
ne 1<a1<ae R3Me11c 11J111 .am1y11e OJl CcnaTa O.llHOCHO 
O.ll. HapOJlHe C1<ynwr1111c, 011.'l.a ce aa1<ouc1<11 npeJl.'IOf 
epaha Hapo;11Hoj C1cynumrn11 O/lHOCllO Cem:1Ty Ha 
pewanaH.c. Ka.aa cc oee 113MCnc 11 Jto11y11c np11Me O.ll. 
HapoJlne CKynmTHHe OJlllOCHO Cc11arn, CMaTpa ce 
.n.a je Hapo;mo flpe1·cra1H1111urno 11pc.aJt0r np11M11o1 0. 
Ha cny•iaj, .11a ce Cem1T 11 Hapo:ma C1{y111urnHa y 
npft,jeMy je.111tor 3aKouawr npe.ll.rtora y u.e.rtHHl1 HJJH 
y noje.ztHHOCTIU.ta lfe Caf.'laCe, CMUpa Ce ,lla je npe]l­
JIOC o.l!6Hne11 It y HCTOM ca31rny ce 0 lbCMY He MOlf<C 
n11111r 11n11onn 1w111:111arn. A1<0 cc c.11y1.1aj noHOBlt " y 
HJ.lyh°eM ca311ey, 0 TOMe 3al<OHCKOM npe;:v10ry 0.ll.llY: 
lJ11he KpaJb. 
l.JJJaH GS. 
Kpa.I? 3a1<J1Jyl1yje yrooope ca crpaHHM npxcaea­
Ma, am1 Je 3a nOTBPJ.lY THX yronopa norpe6tto npcr­
xo.JHO o.u.06pe1i,e Hapo.aHor npeTCTaBHHlUTBa. 3a 
llOTDPJ.lY lJHCTO llOJlllTfllJl(HX cnopa3yMa HHje norpe6-
HO npeTXO.lllfO 0.ll.06petue HapO.ll.HOr npeTCTaBHH· 
WTBa. 
3a yrosop, .na Tyl)a aojc1<a noceJtHe 3eMJbHWTe 
KpaJUem1He H.'IH .D.a npel)e npcKO H>cra, norpe6Ho je 
O.D.o6peH.>e HapOJlHOr IlpeTcTamrnrnTea. 
. Hapo.1rno npeTCTaBHHlllTBO MO>Ke, Ka)l TO H3HC· 
"YJe .11pJKairna norpe6a, OJ.lJJy1<ou y Hanpe.n osnacTH· 
TH MnttHcrapc1<1-1 easer, .na lf3.Zla Mepe aa tteO.ll.JIO>KHY 
npHMeuy npe.aJ10>1<eHor yrouopa. 
l p»<anHa repHTOpHja HC MO)f(e ce O'fYqHTH HJJH 
pa3MeHllTH 6e3 OJJ.06peH..a Hapo.a.Hor npeTCTDBHH. 
WTBa. 
l.JJiaH 66. 
3a1<0He nporJJalllyje KpaJb y1<a30M, 1cojw ca,np. 
)f(H caM aa1<0H peweH on Hapo.zuwr flpeTcrasHH· 
WTBa. Y,Ka3 npcManorn11cyjy CBH MHHHCTpH. MHRH­
CTap npaBJ.tC craaJba Ha yKa3 .llp>KaBHH ne1.1aT H CTapa 
ce 0 06HapottOBaH>y y ,,Cny>t<6eHHM HOBHHaMa". 
3mcoa .no611ja o6ase3tty cttary 15 .aaHa no o6Ha· 
POJIOBatby y .,C.Jiy:>K6eHH M  HOBHHaMa", 31<0 caM 33J<OH 
.ll.PYK"IHje He o.11pe.11 1 . .Uatt o6Hapo,nosaH>a y ,.Cny­
>t<6eHHM HOBHHaMa" pa'lyHa ce. 
YnaH 67. 
HapO.llHO npeTCT3BHHwroo HMa npaao aHKe-re 
Kao H HCTpare y H360pHHM H lJHCTO 3.ll.MHHHCTpatHB· 
HHM llHTalbHMa. 
4naH 68. 
Cnairn lJJWH Cem1Ta 11 Hapo.11He C1<ynwTHHe HMa 
npaeo ynpaeJJ.>ai:11 MHHHCTpHMa nHT3fba " HHTepne­
naunje. M11H11cTpH cy .ll.Y>KHH .u.aTH Ha lbHX O.ll.roeop 
y HCTOM ca3uey. 
l.JnaH 69. 
CettaT H Hapo.naa C1<ynwT11Ha ottwte Renocpe­
.ll.HO caMO ca MHijHCTpHMa. 
l.JJJaH 70. 
Y Cenary H y Hapo)lHOj C1cynwr11H11 nMajy npa­
eo .na roaope C3MO H>eHH 'IJl3HOBH, lJJlUHOBH BJ!a.lle 
H BJJ3.llHHH noaepeHHUH aa ro KpaJbeBHM y1<aao�f O.ll.· 
pel;eHH. 
lJJJaH 71.  
Ce1-rnT. H H<ipOJlHa C1<ynwrnHn Mory ny
.
Hosam­
uo pcwaean1 aKo je Ha CCJlliHUH np11cyn1a je,nHa 
·1·peh1111a cs11x ceHaropa O.llH'OCHO nocnatt111<a. · 
3a ny11oa:rn<Ho pcllleH>c noTpe6Ha je aelrntta 
rJiacoea np11cynmx. Y cJ1y1.111jy pasHe noJJ,eJJe rJJaco­
sa npc.'f.;1or, o 1<0Me je r.11acaHo, cMarpn ce, A<l je 
11pllM.'JiC'll. 
4JlaH 72. , 
0 cnaKoM 3a1<011CKOM npe)l.nory Mapa ce rnacarn 
.u..ea llYTa y HC10M C<l311BY npe Hero wro ce l<OH<l\1110 
ycaojH. 
4naH iJ. 
PcmaeaH>c CeHaTa 11 Hapo.nac C1cymuT1rne y aa­
je.nHH'lKOM 33CC,ztatby 6HBa caMo 3H qy•rnjeae 33 
1cojc je 113pwrno pe•1eno. 
3aje.11u11t.JK1tM 3ace.11aoa1i..11Ma opeTce.llanajy npeT­
CCJlHHU.H CcuaTa 11 HapoAHe C1<ynillTHH� 
11aH3Me-
1111•1110. 
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l..Jmm 74. 
CcuaTop O.llHOCHo Hapo1..1.m1 nocJJ3HHK He 011ro­
a3p3 aa mac KOjH je .ll.30 1<ao •1JrnH CeHarn OJJ.HOCHO 
Hapo.nHe C1<ynwnme. 
. 3a cae Hajaee H nocTyn1<e npH apwefby MaH.nara . 
6HJIO y ce.nHHUaMa CeHaTa HJIH HapoJtHe CKynwnrne 
HJIH y o.u.6opHMa, HJIH y OC0611TOM H3aCJJaHCTBy HJIH 
· y oco6Hrnj ll.Y)!{HOcrn no o.npe.n6H CeHara HJIH CKyn­
WTHHe, ceH3TOpH O.llHOCHO TIOCJlaHHUH o.nroeapajy 
CeHary o.n11octto Hap0.!.1.Hoj C1<ynwTHHH, no OJJ.peJJ.-
6aMa nOCJIOBHHKa. 3a OHC H3jaae H noctyn1<e, KOjH 
C3.llp>1ce KpHBH'IHO JJ.CJIO, . CeHarop OllHOCHO Hapo)lHH 
OOCJiaHHK o.nroaapa H npe.l( pe.nOBHHM cyllOBHMa aKO 
Cetta:r O.llHOctto Hapo.naa C1<ynrnt11Ha ,l(aJie 3a 10 
O.ll06peH>e. Ho aa -yapeJte, Kneaere HJIH 3JJO<tHHe ce­
Hatop O.ll.HOCHO HapOAHH nocJiaHHK OJJ.roaapa npe.l( 
pe.noBHHM cyJIOBHMa 11 6e3 nperxo)lHOr OJJ.o6pefba 
CenaTa O.llHOCHo Hapo.ntte CKynrnTHHe. 
l..JJiaH 75. ·i 
oe3 OBJiawfiefba Cenata 0,l(HOCHO HapO,AHe CKyn­
WTHHe, fbHXOBH 'IJiaHOBH He Mory ce 3a KpHBHUC 
y<tHH>eHe aaa aprnefba MaHnata Y3HMaTH Ha OJ .roaop 
HHTH JlHWHTH CJI06om� .llOK tp3je fbHXOB MaHnar, 
OCHM Ka,D; ce 3aTeKy Ha CaMOM ,l(CJIY 3JIOJ.IHHa HJIH 
npecryna. AJIH ce H y TOMe nocJieJJ.fbCM cny<tajy 
Cenat o.nnocno Hapo.l(na C1<ynwtHHa, a1<0 je Ha 
OKyny 0,l(Max H3BCWTaaa, H OHa .D;aje HJIH 0.l(pH<te 
oaJiawheH>e .na ce HaJJ.JIC)!{HH noc1yna1< npo.ny.>KH 3a 
apeMe caaHaa . 
. l1MyHHtetc1<0 npaao cenatopa H nocJJaHHKa Ha· CTaJe .llaHOM H36opa 0.llHOCHO HaHMCHOBafba. 
AKo K? nocrane ceHarop HJJH nocnaHHK npe 
Hero WTO JC HaJJ. fbHM no KaKBOj KPHBHUH H3pel!eHa 
11aapwna npecy.na, enact Koja apw11 H3BHijaH>e H 
Hctpary H3aecrnhe o toMe Cenat HJIH Haponny 
C1<ynwnrny, 1<oja Jiaje HJJH onp111.Jc oaJiawfiefbe 3a 
npo,ny)!{Cfbe noc1yn1<a. 
4Jiau CeHata H Hapo.nne CKYJIWTHHe MO.>Ke ce 
.Y3HMatu Ha O.D;roaop caMo pa,nH oHor .D;ena, 3a KOjH 
JC H3,l(3H. 
lJJiaH 76. 
Cenaty H H3po.D;noj C1<ynwtHHH npHna.D;a HC· 
1cJby1.Juao npaeo .D;a y ceojoj cpe.11HHH o,np.>Kaaa pe.zt 
npe1<0 ceor npe1ce.nHH1<a. HH1<a1<aa opy}f(aH3 CHJia ne 
MO}f(e ce nOCT3BHTH y 3rpam1 HHTH y fbC3HHOM .llBO· 
PHWTy 6e3 O.ll.06pelb3 npetCe,llHHKa. Hero TaKo 6e3 
lhCrOltQr o.no6peH>a He Mory HHK3KBH Jip.>KaBHH op­
raHH lJHHHTH y Ceuaty H Hapo.l(HOj C1<ynwTHHH a1<1 
BJl3CTH. 
H!'f 1<0 opy}f(aH He CMe yfiH y arpa.ny CeH3Ta H 
HapO)l.He C�ynwrnHe, ocHM JJHUa Koja no nponucy 
noce opy>1<Je H uana3e ce ua cnym6H KO.It Ceuarn 




KpaJb HMCHyje H pa3pewaea nperce,D;HHKa MH­
HHCTapc1<or caaeTa H MHHHCTpe. DpetCe.!lHHK MHHH· 
CTapcr<�r caa�Ta H MHHHCTPH lJHHe MHHHCTapCKH ca­
BCT, KOJH CTOJH Henocpenuo TIO.!l KpaJbeM. MHHHCTpH 
ce HaJia3e ua •1eJiy noje.l(HHHX rpatta .n.p>1<aane ynpaae. 
MHHHCtap MO)f{e 6HTH H 6e3 nOpT<peJba. 
MHHHCTpH HMCHyjy HH)!<e .!lP)f(aBHe lJHHOBHHKe 
no o.n.pe.l(6aMa aa1<0Ha. 
MHHHCTpH noJia)f(y npe crynafba Ha .!lY>KHOCT 3a· 
KJieTBy .!la he KpaJby 6HTH eepttH H .n.a lie paJJ.HTH no 
YcTaey u no aaKOHHMa. 
llJiaH 78. 
KpaJb H Haponua CKynwTHHa Mory onty>KHTH 
MHHHc-rpe aa noapeJJ.y Ycraea H aeMa.lbCKHX 3aKOHa 
y<tHH>eHy y CJiy>K6ettoj .llY>KHOCTH. 3a WTCTC, KOje 
MHHHCTap Y'IHHH rpaljaHHMa He3aKOHHTH .. epweH>eM 
CJiym6e o.n.roeapa .!lP)f(UBa a MHHHCTap .ll.P>l<UBH. 
l..JJiaH 79. 
MHHHcrnp MO>Ke 6u-ru onty>1<eH KaKo 33 epeMe 
Tp3jaH>a caoje cny>K6e 1a1<0 H 3a ncT ro.llHHa nocne 
oncrynaH>a. · 
Ope.D;nor, .n.a ce MHHHcrap onry>KH, M.opa ce y'IH· 
HHTH nHCMeHO H MOpa ca.np>KaTH TattKe onTy)!CCH>a. 
Ka.ll MHHHCTpa onrymH HapoJlHa C1<ynwrntta, 
0.!lJiyKa 0 CTaBJbafby MHHHCTpa no.LI. CYJ.l HMa ce .ll.0• 
HeTH BefiHHOM 0.ll JI.BC TpelrnHe OJ.I y1<ynHOr 6poja Ha· 
po.llHHX nocnaHHKa. 
l..JJiaH 80. 
SnmKe OJ.lpe)l6e o MHHHctapcrcoj OJJ.roeopttocTH 
ca.llp>KH noce6au 3aKoH. 
lJJiaH 81. 
YnpaaHa eJiact •10me Ha)l.aaarn ype;�Ge norp�6-
He :fa npHMeny 3a1<0Ha. 
lJJiaH 82. 
Ynpaaa y KpaJbeBHHH apw11 ce no 6mt0BHt1ar.ta, 
cpe30BHMa H onWTHHaMa. 
lJJJaH 83. 
KpaJbeBHHa JyrocnaeHja HMa ,AeeeT 6aHOBH· 
Ha H ro: 
1. .[lpaecKa ca ce.ztHWTCM y Jby6Jb.aHH; 
2. CaecKa ca cen11wreM y 3arp�6y; 
3. Bp6ac1<a ca CC.llHWTCM y oafba Jlyu11; 
4. npHMOpCKa ca CC.!lHWTCM y CnJIHty.; 
5. JlpHHCKa ca ce.nHwteM y Capajeey; 
6. 3etcK.a ca CC.AHWTeM ua Uerntby ; 
7 . .llynaecKa ca cenHwteM y HoeoM Ca,1iy; 
8. Mopaacrca ca ce.nHwTeM y HHwy; 
9. Bap.llapcKa ca ce.n.uwteM y C1<onJby . 
P.paBcKa EaHOBHHa: o6yxeara neo tepHropuje 
orpattHlJeH, 011. MeCTa r.ne ceaepaa rpauuua cpe3a 
lfa6ap Celle .!lP>KUOHY rpaHHUY, JJ.p}l(aBHOM rpaHHIJ.OM 
npeMa 11TaJIHjH, Aycrp11jH H Matjapci.oj Jl.O MeCTa, 
rJJ.e JipmaeHa rpaHHUa npeMa Mat;apc1<oj H36Hja Ha 
pe1<y Mypy (c. H. o.n 4a1<oeua). 0.n. pe1<e Mype rpa. 
HHUa H.!le HCTOlJHOM OJJ.HOCHO jy>KHOM rpaHHUOM cpe- . 
30Ba: JICH.llaBa, JbytoMep, nryj, lliMapje, BpemHl�e. 
Kpw1<0, Hoeo Mecto, MetJbHKa, YpHoMeJb, Ko11eeje 
H Jlorareu, o6yxearajyliH cee noMenyre · cpe3oee. 
CaucKa EaHOBHHa: orpaHHlJena je ca ceaeptte 
crpaue �o pe1<e Mype rope noMeHyTOM rpaHHUOM 
.llpaecKe oaHOBHHe. 3aTHM rpaHHua. HJJ.e peKOM My. 
poM H .D;aJbe JJ.p}f{aBHOM rpaHHUOM npeMa Mat;apc1<oj 
.no Mecra r.z:te oea Hanywra pe1<y .llpaay, 0JJ.a1<ne HJI.e 
.llpaaoM H .llyttaaoM no ceaepue rpaHHUC cpe3a l1JJO·· 
1<a. O.n pe1<e Jlyuaaa JJ.O pe1<e Case rpanHua H,ne 
HC'l'OlJHOM rpaHHUOM cpe3oea: By1<oeap, BHHKOBUH H 
}f{ynafba, o6yxaatajyliH H oee cpeaoae. Jla.lbe Hae 
peKOM CaeoM no yroKa Yue, a no TOM YHoM. no cc· 
aepOHCTOlJHe rpaHHUC cpeaa naop (j. 3. 0.!l Kocra.i· 
HHUe). 0.ll oaora Mecra .no JaJlpanc1<or Mopa (Mopa· 
JIHlJKH KaHaJI) rpaHHua Hlle jy>1<HOM rpaHHUOM cpc-
30Ba: KocrajHHUa, nerpHH>a, fJJHHa, BprHH MoCT. 
jyroHCT04HOM rpaHHUOM cpeaa BojHHli, HCTO'lflO)t 
rpaHHUOM cpe30B3: CJiyH>, KopeHHUa H .ll. Jlanau. 
·.llaJbe rpaHHUa HJJ.e jy>KHOM rpaHHUOM cpeaoea fp::i· 
1.Jau H focnHh o6yxeatajyfrn H oae cpeaoae. On o6a­
ne rpaHHIJ.a HJJ.e TCCHal.{OM Jby6aWKHM, Ka1w lOM 
Hosa noJbaHa, H3Meijy OCTpea MaOH H .n.11aHlll\ II 
ceeepHo OJ( OCTpBa 0JIH6 H (JIHBa .AO .np}f{aBHe rpa· 
ffHUe Ha Ja.z:tpaHCKO MOpe. 
. 
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Bp6£icKa Sa110B11Ha: rpaHH'IH ce 0.11. ceeepo11cTott­
He rpa11Hue cp;.!33 Jl.nop (J. 3. Oil KocrnjHHUe) pei\OM 
�·no�t .'.lO H>ettor yToJ<a y Caey, 3aTHM peKOM CaBOM, 
HCTO•IH<>�t rpaHHU.OM CpC308a : JlepBCHT3 11 fp343Htt­
Ua :to peKe ooCHc KO.ll ce.11a }loJ1u,a. 0.11.aTJfe 14.lle 
jyro.::a11a.!lHOM rpa1-111uoM cpe3a Mar:1aj .no TpoMet)e 
cpc3u11a: Tewa lb, MarJJaj H )f{en•1e. 0.n oee ra1.11<e 
r.paHlllta 1111e ccnepttoM r�aHHUOM cpeaosa: }f{cn11e, 
3CHll1ta II Tpaeum; .ll.0 n.'ICIHHHC 8J1aw11k (JbyTa rpe­
.na "· 1 740); o.aaTJ1e rpaH11ua 11.CJ.e npeKo KOTe 1446 
11c 1 v•1110M 11:1.111110�1 Jlcc�me (K. 1433), 1<. I 057, JcJ111h 
K. I l!I�, K. 1 0 1 8, K. 1 139, 06peuonau 1<. I 157, na npe-
1<0 P::;taP .. c n.'laHHHe (K. 136\5) 11 Hrpa.nHutTa (h:. 1085) 
H3."la�11 1-1a PaKouue (1<. 1 2 1  /). 0.11.ae.ne rpa1mua HJ.lC 
H3�1cl,y cc.1a floJ1p11nuH 11 Cy.nauoeHhH, 3ar1m H3-
r.tci,y ce.11a fMHlrn H fysHa Ha Ocoj (1c 888) H ,llaJ1>C 
rpe6cHor.t npe1<0 llJy.Thare (K. 1533), JleMHpoeua (t<. 
1724) 11 Upuor Bpxa (K. 1403) ua M. B11Topor (K. 
1748). O.il M. BuTopora rpa1rnua HJ.le HCTO•IHOM H 
jyr03<111:1.ll.HOM rpaHHUO�f f.13Mp4KOf cpe3a Jl.O cnpaM 
K. l 15ti tta n.'!aHHHH CrnpeTHHH; 0.11.aTJJe rpaHHtta npe­
ceu<I y 3ana}lHOM ne.1y JlH!latVCl<O no.'bC H Ha Tpo­
r.naey (K. 1913) H36Hja Ha jyroaana.nHy rpa1rnny cpc-
3a JIHBHO H H.!le IVOMe AO Ha Be.ilHKH 6aT (K. 1851). 
)laA>e rpaHHU.U H,!le jy)f(HOM H 3ana)1HOM rpaHHU.OM 
Cpe3a f30C. 0eTpOBaU )10 TpOMei)e Cpe.3083 Jl. J1anau,, 
l<HHH H Boe. r lnpoeau. 0AaB,!lC .no ceeepOHCTO'-IHC 
rpaHHU.e cpc3a .lluop (j. 3. O.A KocTajHHue) rpaHHU.a 
HJJ.e OJHa4eHow rpaHHU.OM Casc1<e 6auoe1me. 
npuwopcKa 6a110Bu11a: ca cesepHe crpaue rpa­
HK'fH cc oatta4el!HM jy)fUIHM rpaHHU.aMa Casc1<e H 
Bp6a<:Ke 6attoBHHe cee .11.0 TpOMel>e 113Mel)y cpeaoea: 
Jaju.e, oyrojHO H TpaBHHK (PaKoeu.e I<. 1217). 0.11. 
oeora MecTa rpaHHUa H}le HCTO\JHOM rpaHHUOM cpe3a 
6yrojHa H ceeepHOM rpaHHU.OM cpeaa KOH>HU.; 3a ntM 
HCTOttHOM rpattHU.OM cpeaosa I<oH>HU If MocTap no 
'I'pOMef)c cpe3osa: Mocrap, CTo.uu u Henecmbe. 
,Ua.it.e H.ll.e rpam1uoM cpe3a CTOJtau, o6yxearajyhk H 
OBaj cpea. Ha Ja.ll.p8HCKOM MOPY rpaHHUa npc.1a3H 
HepeTB�aHCKIO.f H 0eJLCW<l4Kl1M K3Ka.llOM 11..0 JlP­
}1(3BllC rpatmue Ha Ja.npaHCKOM Mopy. 
,apuuc«a 6auoBuHa: orpaHH'-leHa je ca 3ana.11Jte 
CTpa11e JJ.O pct<e Caee 03H3lfCHHM rpal-IHU.aMa npH­
MOpCKe H Bp6acKe 6aHOBHHe H naJbe ca ceeepa peKOM 
CaeoM .ll.O yToKa JleKC l<oJ1y6ape. 0.11 y.ToKa KoJ1y6ape 
.11.0 3ana1me rpaHHU.e flpHMopcKe 6aHOBHHe K. 2058 
Ha n.r1. TpecKaeHuH (HCTOlfHa rpaHHUa cpeaa KoH>HU) 
- · HJ.J.C HCT0'4HOM rp3HHUOM cpe30Ba: nocaBCI<Of 
(06peHoeau), TaMHaecKor, l<ony6apcKor, (MHOHH­
ua) H 00>1<ewKor, o6yxeaTa cpea Jby6Hh1<H, naJbe 
H)l.e HCTOtJHOM rpattHU.OM cpe3a TpHaBcKor H Jlpara· 
.'IeBCKOf, na HCTO\JHOM, jy.>KHOM H' 3808.!1,HOM. rpaHH· 
LtOM Mopae1tq1<or cpe3a H .naJbe jylf<HOM rpaHH· 
qoM cpe3.osa: ApHJbCKor, 3J1aT116opc1<or, BHwerpa.n­c1<or, lfaJHHqKor, Poranl'n<or H Capajeec1cor. 
3eTcl(a 5aHODHlta: orpaHH4eHa je ca ceeepHe 
CTp3HC 03Ha11eHOM jyX<HOM rpattHUOM np1rnopc1<e · 
H )lpHHCKe 6aUOBHHe me )lO TpOMet;e H3�1el)y cpe. 
soea: llpara'leucKor, )HH111cor H CTyJtellH4t<or. 0Jt 
one TpoMef)e .ll'? np;1ca0Hc rpaHHUe npeMu A;16aHHjH 
rpaml'tHa JIHHUJa 114e 11cT04HOM rpa1111uoM cpc3ona : 
CTY.11.CHH'IKOr, Jle»\CDCKOr, MHTPO.DHtJKOr, JlpcHu•1-
1Wr H no.upHMCl<Of', 06yxoarnjyhH CBC OBe CpC30Be. 
JlaJb� rpa1rnua HJie llp;1rnc110M rpaHHIWM npc�rn An-
6aHHJH JIO Ja.upm1C1<or Mopa. 
/lyHaBC«a. 6a11om1Ha: ca jyro3ana;u1e cTpane .orpa1u111eHa JC o:maYeHHM rpaHHUaMa .llp1111c1<c H 
CaacKc 6aHOBHHe, a ca cenepne H ceecpoHCT01.111e 
CTpaHe . .11p»<aBHOM rpaH H1toM npeMa Mat)apcKoj H 
PywyHHJH .110 MCCTa r .ne ona nocJJe.n,H>a H3611 ia Ha 
peKy Jlymm. H11c· )l,•1i::moM JlO HCTo•mc rpaHtruc cpe­
sa P:-.Mrrcor, c1<pchc Ha jyr t.fCTO•mo111 H jymuoM rpa-
HllUOM cpe3a PaMcKor a 3ornM jyroncT01mo:11 rpa­
HHU:OM cpc3a flO)t<apetla'!Kor. Opo,uylKyje HCT04110M 
rpaHHU.OM cpe3osa: Mopaec1<or, JleneHH41<0r, Kpary­
jt·Ba'tKOr H fpy>KaHc1Cor .11.0 Jly.11e11c1cor Upttor Bpxa 
�I<. 919) - Ha fJie.UHhCKHM llJl8HHH<IM8, 0,1.{31<,11:! 11pt:!CO 
Kpeqa11a (K. 760) H op3aKa (K. 822) H36Hja Ha rpa­
HHU.Y .UpHHCKe 6aH08Hl!C Ha flJ13HHHH f{OTJICHHK l<O}l 
Upnor Bpxa (K. 768). · . 
MopaBc1<a 6auomrna: orpa11111.1e11a je ca ceuepue 
H 11CT04He cTpaHc np;icauHoM rpa1111uoM npe?.ta Py1o1y­
m1j11 H 6yraprnoj .11.0 jyil<HC rpa11HI.(e cpe3a J!y.r1<ml'1-
Kor (t<O.ll .llemYaHor I<Jia.11.eHua). 0.a.an.ll.e rpaHHUa 
H.lle 3ym110M rpa11m.1,0M q)'e3oea: Jly)l<HH'-IKOr, HHw­
KOr, Jlo6pHttCKor, llpo1<ynaq1mr, KocaHH4KGr, Jlan­
c1<or H By1.111TpHc1<or o6yxeaTajytm H oee cpeaoae 
H Ha TpOMet)H cpe3oea ByqHTpHc1cor, fpatiaHH•IKOr H 
JlpeHHttKor H36Hja Ha 03Hatteay rpaHHt.ty 3eTcKe 6a­
HOBHRC. Jl.3,71,e rpaHHUa HJlC Ha ceaep 03HatteHHM 
rpaHHU:lMa 3eTCKe, .llpHHCKC H LJ.y1-1aDCKe 6anoem1e. 
BapJtapc1<a 5a11ou11ua: orpaHH4ena je ca ceeepa 
03HatteHHM rpaHHUaMa 3eTcKe H MopascKe 6aHOBH-
11e, a ca Hc'ro1<a, jyra 11 aana}la .11pmaaHOM rpattHUOM 
npcMa 6yrapcKoj, fpl!KOj H A.116anHjH. 
CnopHa nHTatha o .a.eTaJbHHM rpaHHl.WMa noje­
.!(HHHX 6aHOBHHa pewaeahe MHHHCTap yttyTpawH>HX 
OOCJIOBa. 
4JlaH 84. 
6aHoe1111e cy ynpaeHe H caMoynpaeHe je.nmrnue. 
Hapot1HT� aaKOH OJl.Pel}yje noneJJy 6aHOBHHa Ha 
cpeaoae H onwTm1e. 
OpraHH331.(Hja OOWTHHCKHX ynpaaa H .11.CJIOKpyr 
H>Hxoeor pa.11.a ypeljyje ce oco6eHHM 3aKOHOM no ua­
'-ICJJY caMoynpaee. 
lloje)lKHe rpa}lCKe OOWTHHe Mory 6HTH 3aKOHOM. 
H Ha .npyroj OCHOBH ypel)eHe. 
' 
Ynau '85. 
rp:lJl DCOrpa)l Ca 3eMyHOM H naH'lellOM 4HHe 
nocc6Ho ynpaeHo no11py1.1je. no.11 oeo ynpaano no.!l· 
pyttje cna.nahe H cea 0Ko.11Ha t.tecTa, Koja 6yny H3 
6aHOBHHe H3.!lBOjeua H 6y.!ly ywna y cacTaB OllWTH­
H8 6eorpa.11.cKe, 3eMyHcKe HJIH nantteeatt1<e. 
Ynau 86. · 
Ha 11eJ1y 6aHOBHHe CTOjH 6aH. OH je npeTctaBHHK 
apxOBHe �·JlaCTH y 6aHOBHHH. 
oaHa nOCT3BJba KpaJb Ha npe.n.11or npeTCC,!lHHK3 
MHHHCTapcKor caeeTa. 
lJJJaH 87. 
Bau nocTaBJba, npeMewTa, neH3HOHHwe H OTny­
WTa ynpasue �IHHOBHHKe y 6aHOBHHH y rpaHHt.taMa 
lfa.11.JIC>KHOCTH o.n.pet)eHe 3aKOHOM 0 6aHCKOj ynpaen. 
Ca.uoynpaaa 
lJJiaH 88. 
y cnaKOj 6a110BHHH, l\aO caMoynpaBHOM TeJ y, 
nOCTOjH 6aHOBHIICKO uche H 6aHOBHHCKH o.n.6op. 
4JJaH 89. 
BanonHHCKo nehe ce 6npa n a  ttCTHpH rOJl.HHC 
onwntM, je).lHaKnM, nenocpe/l.HHM r JJacaH>eM, npeMa 
o.n.pe.ll6a�rn 3a1<0Ha. 
Bche 6Hpa H3 ceoje cpe.nHHe 6a11oeHnc1m oJt6op. 
KOjH je car.10yapaBHH H38pWHH oprau y ()aHOBllflH. 
l>aH noc:TauJha H pa3peurnua G:�J101J11nc1<e •rn· 
HOBHHI<� Ha npC){JIOt Cia11001111CKOr o.noopn. 
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1..JJJaH 90. 
6aHOBUHCKa Beha Mory ypef)HB3TH noje.nHHe 
rpatte 6aHOllHHCKe ynpaee H }l(HBOTa 6aHOBHHCKHM 
ype.11.6aMa Ha OCHOBY OBJJawhefba 33KOHa 0 ypef)elby_ 
6aHOSHHa HJIH .npyrnM 3aKOHHMa. . 
6aHOSHHCKe ype.l(6e HMajy y .l(OTffllHOj 6aHOBHHH 
cuny aa1<0Ha. Otte He CMejy npOTHBypettHTH HH YcTa­
BY. HH OOCTOjelmM 3aKOHHMa, HHatre ce y TOM cny­
ttajy He Mory npHMefbHS3TH. 
4natt 91. 
6anOBHHCKH O.ll.60p cnpeMa npe.zv10re 6aHOBHH· 
c1rnx YP!!JJ.a6a, � o fbHMa pewaea 6aHOBHHCKO eehe. 
6attoBHHCKe ype.u.6e nporJiawyje H o6Hapo.zcyj� 
6aH, KOjH npeTXO.l HO TP3)KH carJiaCHOCT npmaBHOr, 
CaBeTa DO lbHXOBOj 33KOHHTOCTH. Y CJiyttajy JJ.3 np. 
>KaBHH caBeT carnacttocT O.L(6Hje ype.n,6a ce He MO>Ke 
06m1pO.llOBanr. 
.llp}f{aBHH caeeT je .ll.y>KaH .naTH HJIH o.n.6HTH ca­
r nacHOCT HajJJ.aJbe y poKy o.n Me Ce I.\ .naHa. AKO ce 
.llp}f{aBHH caeeT y ToMe poKy He H3jacHH· CMaTpa ce 
.na je carnacHOCT .n,aTa. 
4JiaH 92. 
. np}f{3BH3 l.leHTpaJIHa BJI3CT CTapa Ce .n,a C3MOY· 
npastte BJiaCTH Bpwe CBOje· ,3aKOHCKe .ll.Y>KHOCTH y 
o.npet)eHHM rpaHHl_\aMa H ,11.a He noBpe,11.e KOjH OOWTH 
.np)f{3BHH HHTepec. 
1.JnaH 93." 
6att O.llHOCHO aaKOHOM o.npel}eHH ,11.p>KaBHH op­
raH, HMajy npaaa o6ycTaBHTH cea peweH>a 6aHOBHH· 
CKOr Belia H 6aHOBHHCKOr o,11.6opa HJIH ODWTHHCKOr 
36opa H Oll6opa, 1<oja cy npOTHBHa YcTaey, aaKOHH· 
Ma H ypell6aMa. Oportte ·pewelba 6atta HMa Mecra 
iK3JI6H .llp.lK3BHOM caeery y 38KOHOM po1<y. 
Mory ce Ta1<ol)e o6ydaoHTH H otta pemeH>a H 
H3jaee, Koje cy wTeTHe no onwTe .np>Kaau�. HHTepece . •  
Y TOM c.11yttajy .lKaJI6a c e  no.nuocH MHHKCTP)' YHY· 
rpamH>HX nocnoaa y saKOHOM poKy. 
oaHOBHHCKO Belie MO.>Ke ce KpaJbeBHM YK830M 
pacnyctHTH H npe HCTeKa tteTeoporo.nHwfher nepuo­
.n.a Ha npe.llJJOr MHHHCTpa yHyrpaUilbHX nocnoaa H 
Hape.L(HTH HOBH H360pH 38 .llOTH'IHY 6aHOBHHy. 
• .. 4nau 94 . 
6aHOBHHCKO Belie pewasa cea1<e rO.ZlHHe y CBOM 
npeoM caa110y 6aHOSHHCKH 6y1,1er aa uape,11.uy ro­
JJ.HHy no npe,D.nory 6auoBHHCKHX o,11.6opa. 
llJiaH 95. 
. 6aHOBHHCKH 6y1,1eT 0.ll06paea 1!1HHHCTap {l>HH3H· CHJa, a rnaeHa KOHTpona HcnttTyje fberoeo H3Bp· 
wel!>e nyreM nperne;w aaepUIHOr pattyHa. . 
4JiaH 96. 
1 OnUJTHHe cy caMoynpaBHa TeJJa. li>m.rn ce oco-
6ettHM 3aKOHHMa Mory CTaBHTH y .llY*HOCT H aKTa 
ynpaette BJiaCTH H otte HX sprue rIO..ll ua.naopoM OJI· 
peryeHHX ynpaeHHX opratta. 
l.JJiaH 97. 
0.n.pell6e 0 opraHH381.(HjH H Ha,llJJe.>KHOCTH 6a­
HOBHHCl<HX H OrIUlTHHCKHX caMoynpaBHHX BJI3CTH 
nponHcyje aa1<ott. 
4natt 98. 
3a cnopose ynpastte npHpO.ll.e ycraHOBJbasajy 
ce yr1paBHH cy)lOlHI. 3aKOH 0..llpet)yje lbHXOBa Ce.,llH· 
WTa, HaJ.(JJe.lKHOCT H opraHlf331.(Hjy. 
1..JJiaH 99. 
np)f(3BHH easer je SpXOOliH ynpaBHH CY.ll· 
noce6HHM aaKOHOM 0.llpel)yJe ce HS'IHH DO• 
ctaBJbaH>a tt.Jiattosa Jlp>KaBHOr casern Kao H cactae, 




CyftOliH cy HC3aBHCHH. Y H3PHl..lafby npaB.lle OHH 
He CTOJC HH no.LI. Kal<BOM BJiamhy HO CY.llC no 38KO· 
HHMS. 
Cy.n.oeH H cy.ncKe HaJJ.neH<ttocru Mory ce ycra .. 
HOBHTH CaMO 38KOHOM. 
3aKOHOM ce npon11cyje Ha KOjH ce H8'1HH 6H• 
pajy, nOCTaBJbajy npeTce.nHHUH Cy.llOBa H cym-tje. 
Y nopo.llH'IHHM H HacJJe.llHHM nocnoenMa MYCJIH· 
Matta cy)J.e .npHCastte wepnjarcKe cy.nHje. 
· 
4JiaH 101. 
Cy.lluje ceHx cy.noea cy craJIHH. Cy.nuja He MO)l(C 
6HTH JJHUJeH ceora asaH>a HHTH Ma H3 Kora yapoKa 
y1<noH>eH ca .llY}l(HOCTH, nporns ceoje eoJbe 6ea npe. 
cy,lle pe.llOSHHX cy.lloBa HJIH .nHCl..lHnJIHHaptte npecyAe 
Kacal.lHOHOr cy,11.a. Cy.llttja He MO)f(e 6HTH Ty>KeH 38 
ceoj cy.llCKH pa..ll 6es O.ll06peH>a Ha.llJiemuor cy..lla • 
Cy.llHja He MO>Ke, Ma H npttspeMeao, 6ttTH yny. 
hen ua ..llpyry nnaketty HJIH Hennahetty jastty cny>1<6y, 
6es ceora npHcTaHKa H O.llo6peH>a KacauuoHor cy.11a·. 
Cy.llttja MO>Ke 6HTH npeMewreH cawo no csoMe 
npHCT8HKy. 
Cy.llnja MO}l(e 6HTH y cny>K6H .llO uaepwetKa ce-' 
.ll3Y.!leceT rO.llHHa CBOra >KHSOTa. npe TOra pOKa CJ•· 
.llY�jl ce MO>Ke CTaSH:_I'H : Y  neH3Hjy CSMO no nHCMeHOf 
MCJI6H HJIH Ka.ll renecHo HJIH .llYWeBHO T3KO ocna6H 
J18 He M�.lKe BpUIHTH CBOjy .llY>KHOCT. 0.nnyKy 0 neH· 
3HOHHCal-by y OBOM nocne.z:tH>eM cnyttajy .llOHOCH Ka._ 
ca1.tHOH11 cy .ll .. 
onEJbAK x 
Jlp>KaBHO ra3JtHHCTBO 
l.JJiaH 102 . 
CBaKe r0,11.HHe HapO.,llHO npeTCTaBHHWTBO O,llO• 
6paBa .llP.>KaBHH 6y1,1eT KOjH epemr sa ro.ztHHY JllHS. 
6y1,1eT ce Mopa no.nHetH Hapo.11Hoj CKynwTHHH 
Haj.11aJbe sa Meceu • .llaHa 0.11 .natta fheHor cacraHKa Y. 
pe.noBHOM C83HBy. Je..llHOBpeMeHO ca 6y1,1eTOM no.-· 
HOCH ce Hapo.11Hoj C1<ynrnTHHH Ha yettfjaj H o.n6pett.e 
H aaepUIHH pattyH nocne.11H>e ucte1<.11e pattyucKe 
ro.nuue. 
HapO,llHa C1<ynUJTHHa He MO>Ke npe,11.JJo>KeHe nap· 
THje yeeliaBaTH a MO.lKe HX CM31bHBaTH H H30CT8BHTH. 
6y1,1eT ce O.llo6paBa no napTHjaMa. 
HattHH cacraea H H3BpweH>a 6y1,1ern nponucyje 
Ct' 3aKOHOM. 
Ywre,lla je.lltte 6y1,1etc1<e naprnje HJIH �y1,1erc1<e 
ro.nuue He MO>Ke . ce yTpoUJHTH ua nO..llMttpeH>e no· 
tpe6a .11pyre naprnje HJIH rO..llHHe 6ea o.no6petba 
Hapo.nHor n percrasHHUJTSa. 
4JiaH 103. 
.lloK He Ol o6ptt no.llHeceHH joj 6y1,1eT HapoJJ.llO 
npeTCTaSHHUJTSO . MO>Ke 0.ll06pasaTH ,llBaHaeCTHH� 33 
je.u.att HJIH sHrue: Mecel.(H. A1<0 je Hapo.llHa CKyn· 
WTHHa pacnyrnTeirn npe Hero WTO je 6y1,.1eT pcrneH, 
6y1,1eT HCTe1<J1e pattyHcKe ro.L1.11He np·o.ny>Kyje ce yKa· 
Item I I  Cont . 152 
30M Haj;cy>Ke aa tteTHPH Meceua. AKO ce H y TOM 
poKy 6yuu He pewH Mo>Ke ce KpaJbeBHM yKa3oM 
npo)ly>KHTH 6yueT 11.0 Kpaja HOBe 6yueTCKe rO.llHHe. 
1.JJiaH 104. 
Ilp>K3BHH nope3H H ODWTe .llP>KaBHe )l3>K6HHe 
ycT3HOBJbaeajy ce C3MO 3aKOHOM. 
B.11a.aa no.auocH Hapo.aHoj CKynwTHHH O.ll fJiae­
ue KoHTpoJie oeepeHH H3BewTaj o H3epweH>y 3aKJbY· 
'ICHHX yroaopa 0 .llP>K38HHM 33jMOBHMa H H>HXOBOM 
yTpowr<y_ y CMHCJJY 3aKOHa. 
1.JJiaH 105. 
flopecKa o6aee3a je onwTa H cee cy .n.p>Kaeue 
J\3>K6Hue je.auaKe 3a ueJiy 3eMJby. 
KpaJb H Hacne.aHHK npeCTOJJa OJJ3hajy .llP>K3BHH 
nope3 Ha npueaTHO HMaH>e. 
HHKaKea OOMOh CTaJIHa HH npHepeMeHa, HHKaKae 
OOKJIOH HH Harpa11a He Mory ce .llaTH H3 Jlp>KaBHe 
6narajHHL\e, aKo HHCY OCHOBaHH Ha 33KOHy. 
l.fJiaH I 06. 
Ilp>KaBHOM HMOBHHOM ynp38Jba MHHHCTap <f>H· 
H3HCHja y KOJIHKO TO 33KOHH .llPYK'IHje He Hape.Ile. 
0 HattHHY oTyf)eH>a .llP>KaBHHX .no6apa .noHehe ce 
H8p04HTH 33KOH. 
npaeo MOHOOOJJa npHnana .llP>K3BH. 
Py.ae, ner<OBHTe eo.ne H apena H npHpO.llHe CHare 
CBOjHHa cy .llP)f(3BHa. 
Ha'IHH .llaBaH>a py.napcr<HX, HHJiycTpHCKHX HJIH 
Ma KOjHX JtPYrHX noanaCTHUa o.n.pef)yje ce 33KOHOM. 
lJJJaH 107. 
3a nper.ne11 np>KaBHHx pattyHa H H3.ll3HpaeaH>e 
H3.ll H3BpWeH>eM .llP>KaBHOr H ca&fOynpaeHHX 6yueT8 
UOCTOjH fnaeHa KOHTpona Kao BpXOBHH pattyH­
CKH cyn . 
. . npe11ce)lHH�a H 'IJJaHOBe rn��He KOHTpOJie 6HP,3 
HapoLtHa C1<ynwnma 113 KaH.llH.ll3UHOHe JIHC1'e, KOJY 
cacTaBJba Jl.p>KaBHH caeeT H Ha Kojoj je npe.zino>KeHO 
.llB3 nyTa OHOJIHKO K3H)lHJt3T3, KOJIHKO j e  npa3HHX 
I MCCT3. 
O.npe.a6e o cacTaey, H3.llJie>KHOCTH H nocTynKy 
f JlaBHe KOHTpOJie nponHcyje 38KOH. 
3aKOHOM ce OJIP.e�yje y KOjHM he cnytrnjeBHM3 
npOTHB 0.llJJyKe fJiaBHe KOHTpOJie HM3TH MeCT3 .>KaJI6H 
KacauuonoM cy.ay. 
fnaeHa KOHTpona nperne.aa, ucnp3aJba H JJHKBH· 
JlHpa paqyHe OOWTe 3.llMHHHCTpauuje H CBHX paqy­
Hononaraqa npeMa n.p>KaeHoj 6narajHHUH. Oua MOTPH 
.na ce He npeKopaq11 HHje.nau H3.llaTaK no 6y1,1eTy u 
.na ce uer<a cyMa He npeuoc11 H3 jenue 6yveTcr<e nap· 
THje y 11pyry. Oua 3aapwyje pat1yue ceHx .ap>KaBHHX 
ynpaaa H .ay>KHa je np111<ynJbaTH cee noTpe6He )lO· 
Kaae H o6aeewTelba. · 
3aepwu11 .np>KaBHH pattyu no.1tHOCH ce HapO.!lHOM 
npeTCTaBHHWTBY Ha peweH>e Ca · DPHMe.ll6aMa f JJaBHe 
KoHTpOJie H TO HajJlaJbe 3a jeJlHY ro.llHHy, pattytta· 




Bo,iua je 06aee33 onWT3 no O.llpe.l(oaMa 33KOll3. 
YcTpojcTBo H eenH'IHHa eojcr<e H MOpHapuue nponH­
cyje ce 3aKOHOM. <l>opMHpatbe jen.HHHU3 y 3aKOHOM 
onpel)eHow o6HMY nponHcyje KpaJb ype1160M ua npe· 
)lnor MrrnHcTpa eojcKe H MopuapHue. KonHKO he ce 
BOjCKe .llP>KSTH DO.It aacta&OM, o.ni>el,yje ce CBaKe 
rO,llHHe 6y�eTOM. . • . 
. . 
1..JnaH 109. 
BojHH cyJlOBH cy HeaaaHCHH. Y H3pHuaH>y npae.ne 
OHH He CTOje HH no.n KaKBOM Bnawfiy HO Cy/l..e no 
3aKOHHM3. 
Cyirnja npeocTeneuor eojHor cy113 He MO>Ke 6HTH 
Ty>KeH 3a ceoj cy.ncKH paJl 6e3 01106pefba eojHO· 
anenauHonor cyJla, a anenauHOHH CY.llHj3 6ea O.llO· 
6pett>a Kacau110Hor cy.Lta. 
npecy)le BOjHHX CYLtOBa pacMaTpa y nocne.nfbeM 
CTeneHy KacauHoHH Cy.ll. 
1.JJJaH 110. 
• Kp11a11ue Koje Y'IHHe rpalJaAH y .npywTBy ca 
eojHHKOM cy.llHfie rpa�aHCKH cy.llOBH a aa epeMe paTa 
BOjHH CY/l..OBH. 
• 
1.JJJaH 1 1 1 .  
HHKO no HaBpWeTKY )lBa.aeceTe rO.!lHHe H e  MO>Ke 
.llOOHTH .llp>KaBHY cny>K6y HJJH y H>Oj OCT3TH, 31<0 no 
0.llpeJl6aMa BOjHOr 3aKOH3 HHje ceoj POK OTCJJY>KHO 
HJJH 0.ll BO�He cny>K6e OCJJ06ofjeH. 
1.JJJaH 112. 
3a OLtp>KaBatbe yHyTpawtt>er peJla eojcKa ce 
MO>Ke ynoTpe6HTH cat.to Ha 3aXTeB H3.D.JJe>KHe. rpa­
f;aHCKe BJI3CTH. 
1.JJI3H 113. 
CTpaua eojcKa He MO>Ke ce y3eTH y CJiy>1<6y 
Hawe Ltp>Kaee, a HH eojcr<a Hawe .np>Kaee He MO>Ke 
ce cTaBHTH y cny>K6y HeKe CTpaHe Jlp>Kaae, 6e3 npeT" 
XO.llHOr 0.ll06petba HapO.llHOr npercTaBHHWTBa. 
:.J'·· 
, ,  . . .  " 
OD,EJbAK XII 
H3Mene y YcraBy 
1.Jnau � 14. 
0 H3MeHaMa y YcTaay pewaaa KpaJb ca HapoA­
HHM npeTCT38HHWTBOM. 
1.JJiaH 1 15. 
npe.nnor, .ll3 ce y YcTaey WTO H3MeHH HJIH .llO· 
nyHH, MO>Ke yqHHHTH Kp3Jb H HapO.llHO npeTCTaB.;. 
HHWTBO. 
y TaKBOM npe)lJJOry MOpajy Ce H3peKOM HMeHO·· 
eaTH cee Ta'lr<e YcTaea, Koje 6u ce HMane H3MeHHTH 
HJJH J(OnyHHTH. 
AKO je npe.llJJOr yq11HHO KpaJb, OH he ce caon .. 
WTHTH CeHary H Hapo.LiHoj Cr<ynwTHHH, na he ce 
3aTHM HapOJIHa CKynwTHHa OJlM3X pacnycTHTH H ca-· 3BaTH HOBa Haj.aaJbe sa 'leTHPH Meceu3. 
AKO je T3Kae npe.llnor noTeKao on CeHara O.D.· 
HOCHo HapollHe CKynwTHHe, o H>eMy ce pewae3 Ha 
HattHH npene11ljeu 3a pewaealbe 3aKOHCKHX npeJinora 
BeflHHOM OJl 315 O.ll yKynHOr 6poja OOCJJaHHKa. npe· 
.llJIOr H.lle 3arnM npen CeHaT 011uocuo 1-Iapo.aHy CKyn­
WTHHY 1<oj3 no H>eMy pewaaa eehHHOM on 3/5 O.ll 
yKynuor 6poja ceHaTopa 011ttoctto nocna11111<a. 
Ka.ll npe11nor Ha Taj Ha'IHH 6y11e ycsojeu, Ha­
POJlHa C1<ynwTHHa he ce pacnycrnni a Hooa ca3eahe 
ce Haj.llaJbe y poKy O.ll 4 Mecel{a 01� .1.1.aua Ka.na je 
npeJinor yceojeu. 
H y jeJlHOM 1:1 y .llpyroM cnytiajy CeHaT 011.uocHo 
HapOJlHa CKynWTHH3 MO>Ke pewaaaTH caMO o OHHM 
H3MeHaM3 H .llOnyHaMa YcTaea, Koje ca.np>KH npe�nor. 
HS OCHoey KOjer je OHa Ca38alla. 
CeHaT O.llHOCHO · HapoJIHa CKynwruua 11ouoc.t 
0.llJIYKY oehHHOM O.ll OOJIOBHHe BHWC jell.aH Oil. yKyn: Hor 6poja CBOjHx 'IJJIHOBI. 
Item II  Cont . 153 
Ha cJJytJaj JH\ cc (('m\T 11 Hapo;ma CKynwTlrna 
y np1·1je�1y npc;1.•11 >;1\e1111x 11�1Mc1-1n tt.1111 JJ.OllyHa Ynana 
y UCJlllHll HJltl 110.ieJLHllOCT11Ma He carnace OH.Ua je 
)(aJuc nocTyn:.m llCTH Kao 11  3a 331\0llCKC npeAJtore 
{tlJl:lll 64 ). 
l-IJiaH 1 16. 
Y cJJy•rnjy paTa, 1110611J1113auujc, 11cpc.ua 11 no­
Gyue, KOjH 611 JJ.OUCJm y m1Ta1bc jae1111 nopeaai< H 
CHrypHOCT llP>KaBe JIJJl1 1<3.ll cy /lO TC ML'pe y OOlllTC 
yrpo>KCHH jasm1 11uTcpcc11, Kpa.11, Mame, y TOM 11:1y-
3eTHOM c.ny•iajy, y1rn30M ttape;urrn JHl cc 11p1111pCMCllO 
npe)ly3MY CBC H3Battpe.uHe, HCOOXOJlllO mrrpc611c 
Mepe y ue.noj Kpa,n,es111-111 11.1111 y jc)lHOM 1t.e110M Jll'JJY_ 
ne3aBHCHO o.u yCT?RHHX 11 aaKouc1<11x 11po1111cu. 
Cse 113yaeTHO npe.uy3eTe m'pc 11o;u1ehc re 11a· 
KHaAHO HapOAHOM DpeTcTaDHHUJTny 11a car.•1ar11oc'I'. 
n pe;783Ha Uapel)c11,a 
'-l.riaH I ] 7. 
JJ.o .nairn cacTaHKa HapoJJ.HOr llpeTCTan11HwTOa 
KpaJb H3JJ.aje H npornawyje 3aK011e y1<aJOM. 
YKaa npeMa110Tm1cyje DpeTcc.11 1111< MHHHCTap· 
Cl<OI' caeeTa, pecopHH MHHHCTap H M1rnHCTap npaBAe. 
· 4naa 1 18. 
CeH nocTojetrn 3aKOHH, cea.t aa1<0na o KpaJbeB· 
CKOj BJ13CTH. H Bpxo1rnoj JJ.p>KaBHOj ynpaBH 0,11 6 ja­
Hyapa 1929 rO)ll1He, ocrnjy H a  CH33H AOI< Ce peAOB· 
HHM nyTeM He H3MeHe HJIH y1rntty. 
4JiaH 1 19. 
OJJ.pe.uoe qJiaHa 101 onor YcTaea Hehe ce npH· 
1rtefb11eaTH aa epeMe O.ll neT rOJJ.HHa OA )latta CTY· 
na.1-1>a y )KHBOT oeor Y CTaea. 
<· 3aK.!bY'fHe o)lpe)l6e 
4.naH 1 20. 
Osaj Yens CTyna y )KHBOT H .ll06Hja o6ane3HY 
cHary 1<a.u ce o6ttapo.Ayje y ,,Cnym6ett11M HOBHHaMa". 
0 H3BpUJeH>y oBor YCTaea CTapahe ce .npeTceA· 
HHK �fHHHCTapcKor caaeTa H CBH MHHHCTpH. 
DpenopyqyjeMo HarneM MHHHCTPY npaeJJ.e .na. 
osaj YcTaB o6Hapo.llyje a CBHMa MHHHCTp11Ma JJ.a ce 
o H3BpUJelby iberosoM cTapajy, snacT11Ma 3anose­
JJ.aMo, JJ.a no lbeMy noCTynajy, a CBHMa 11 caaKOMe 
JJ.a MY ce noKopasajy. 
3 cenreM6pa 1931 ro;urne 
y 6eorpa,lly 
AJIEKCAH,llAP c. p. 
(Oeaj Ycrae o6jaoJbeH je y 6pojy 200, 0.11. 3 cenreM6pa 
o. r., 0.11. Kora .11.a11a H ean<H). 
MH 
. AJIEKCAH,llAP I 
428. 
no MHJIOCTH oo)Kjoj H BOJbH HapOAHOj 
l<PAJb JYfOCJIABIUE 
Ha npe)lJIOr Hamer MHHHCTpa yHyTpaUJH>HX no· 
cnoaa, JipeTce)lHHKa Hamer MHHHCTapCKor caeeTa, 
npon11cyjeMo H npornawyjeMo 
3 A K O H  
0 6HPA4Kl1M cnHCKOBHMA 
§ 1 .  
6Hpaq1<11 cnHCKOBH no KOjHMa c e  epwe H360pH 
33 Hapo;rny cKynwrnHy cTaJIHH cy. 
Ka.A onaj 3aKOH CTynH Ha rnary, onmTHHCKH cy· 
JJ.OBH ( onwnrnc1<a nornaeapcTBa) JJ.Y>l<HH cy y poKy 
o� AeCeT AaHa cacTaBHTH npBH CT3JJHH 611paqKH COH· 
CaK y:imiajyl111 3[1 OCHor:y Cmllal\, no l<OMC cy 113· 
llpW\!1111 11360pll 11:.lj)G!l.l l l lX 1 1 < : 1  ... ·1.1:1111,a Ila Jl:llf I r  
CenTeMupa ]!):27 f(•JVlllC I I  llll'!UM y pc.ll<y UJl )laJt.HX 
21 cam 110JlHCT11 ta y ,1.1.na op rm ::1am1a npH111cp1<a 
H:l)lJIC>ICllOM cpec1w�t C)'J!Y Jla 111;nqi,\y. 3a OHC l<pa· 
jcuc r;w ue�rn cpernrn· cy;w ony he uornp11y CTaB• 
J1.aT11 11a,1u1e>1mH 01qJy;Km1 cy;i.. 3a H;1po111 5t•orpnJt 
11ornp11.y 011pa11KHX rnuc1w11a ap11111tie 01�py;1rn11 cy.Jt 
3a rpnJL I�eorpair. 
Y CTa.1111c Ol!pa'IKC rn11cKone ymrcyjy ce no cny­
>11iic11oj wn1<JIOL'Tll CllM, 1<0.i !I IHJajy G1tpa11J<O npaeo, 
:11(0 cy 1J;tj Mai1>e lllCCT ;\1CCCU11 llUCTCllhCHH y 1oj on­
lllTllllll. < >110 11m-.11t'il!i>C He 11:rnm :1il /l!Jit<anne cJ1y­
>K(>l't1111<t·. 
Jlp;1w111111 11 ja111m ra�.1oy11p;iom1 cJty:n<6cmntH 3a· 
ll!JJlC Cl' y 611pa11Kc Clll1CICOllC OHC OnWTllHC, y KOjoj 
llM jl' C)lyll<fo'llO CC JUllU'IC. 
y ()JllJITllllilMil, y •<oj ut.ta HMa Blfllle rJtaCa4KHX 
Ml'CTa 611pu111<H he cc l"llHCaJ� c11peMHTH y noce6HHM 
CllCl'l«IM:l :w cuaKO r./Jaca•JKO MC'.CTO. 
I lpll 1q1ajy C"lllffl<a 11a:ma1111J.c CC CJIOOHMa opoj 
yn11c:11111x II Cipo.i JlHCT<llla CJIHCl<a. 3aTHM Ile ce CTa· 
IH1TH 11y�cpa H 11a·1 y•1 ua J,e ra 011U11'UHCKH cy.zt ca 
)(l'JlOHOl1<>M (ucJJCil(JIHl\CJM) ll<J'l'JIHCaTH H CT3BHTH 
neqar. 
CpecK11 0;111orno <>1<py>t<1111 cy;c, y poKy O)l .nea 
JJ.aHa, nornp)(Hhc c1111ca1< 11 jc;1aH npHMcpaK· 3a.llp­
*aTH 33 cnojy apx11ay a JlpyrH apaTHTll CJllWTHHCKOAf 
cy)ly. A1<0 6Hpatt1<11 cn11rnK 111: G11 6110 cacrnBJbeH y 
3a1<ouc1-;0M 06J111Ky, cpccKH OJlHOCHo 01<pyll(HH cyJJ. 
he ra npCTXOJJ.HO HpaTHTH O;WTHHH, J,la ra OHa y 
poKy OA )lBa JJ.aHa ca0Gpaa11 31WHCl<HM nponHCHMa. 
§ 2. 
. 6Hp34KO npaeo HMa CBal<H 1r1yw1rn J.lP;f(38Jb3HHH 
no pol}elby HJIH npHpot)eH>y, 3KO je HaBpWHO )lBa• 
AeCeT H jeAHY fOJI.HHY CTapOCTH. 
§ 3. 
Oq>HU.Hpll 31<THBHH K30 H no.11.04JH1.UipH H BOj­
H11Ult .n0.l1 3aCTaBOM He Mory BpWH'HI 611paq1<0 npaeo 
HH 611TH 611pmm. 
§ 4. 
flpH!1peMeHo ry6e 6HpaqKo npano: 1 )  KOjH cy 
ocyt,et111 Ha po611jy H.llH aarnop JlYJKH O.ll ro,llHHe 
JJ.aua, JlOK ce He noepaTe y npaea, 2) KOjH cy ocy· 
t;eHH Ha ry6HTaK 1.1ac1111x npaea aa opeMe .1101< rpaje 
Ta J<a3Ha, 3) 1<oj11 cy no;1 CTC'll11UITeM, 4) KOjll cy 
nOJJ. crnpaTe.'bCTDOM H 5) KOjH cy npecy110•1 H3ry-
611Jill G11pa4KO npano 36or H36opH11x KPHBHU.a. 
§ 5. 
OnwTHHCKH cy.nosH (nornaepcTBa) HMajy no 
cny>1<6ettoj AY>KHOCTH ca:ll<e ro.llHHe O.ll npeor JlO TPH· 
.11eceT npeor jaHyapa aaKJbY'IHO 113epwHTH ucnpaeKe · 
THX COHCKOBa yeo.nelrn y tbl1X CBOjHM pewefbeM cea 
JIHUa KOja HMajy H360pHO npaso, a HHCY JJ.OTJie yae­
)leHa, a H30CTaBJbajyl111 Ha HCTH HaqHH OHa, !<Oja 
cy TO npaeo 113ry6Hna. 
QnwTHHCKH cy.n he BOjHHKe, KOjH cy OTCJIY/KHJIH 
caoj poK, no cny>K6eHoj .llY.lKHOCTH ynHcaTH y 6H· 
pattKH cn11ca1< no OTCJiy>Kelby poKa. HcTo TaKo yn11· 




HajJJ.aJbe JlO 5 cpeopyapa OOWTHHCKH CY.ll he no­
CJ13Tl1 TaKo HCnpaBJbeHH 6HpaqKH CDHC3K H3JJ.Jle.lKHOM 
cpec1<0M O.ll.HOCHO OKPYiKHOM cy.uy Ha noTBpJJ.y. Y 
HCTO npeMe no.11ttehe MY y npenHcy cae H3MeHe 611-
pattKor COHCKa, Koje je H3BpWHO y TOKY Meceu.a 
JaHyapa. 
Ka.u. CY.ll np11MH 6Hpatn<H cnHCaK yeepHhe ce, ..!la 
JJH O.llroeapa op11rHHany KOjH ce y fberoeoj apxHBH 
HanaaH H noTOM ra y poKy O.ll neTHaecT mrna oae-
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punt II opaTHTH OOWTHHCKOM cyn.y YHOCeliH y csoj 
op11; : 1 11a.rn11 cn11cnK H3MeHe H3BpweHe O.ll. cTpaHe 
onw n111CKor cyn.a y .TOKY Meceua jaHyapa. 
l lornp!ly nornucyje npeTCCD..HHK H ceKpeTap cpe­
CKOi' O.ll.HOCHO OKPY*H�r cy.D.a HJJH H>HXOBH 3acTyn-
11111.1.11. 
� 7. 
,\1:0 onwTHHCKH cyn. He non.Hece y rope 03Ha•1e­
ttm1 po)t-;y 6Hpal1Ke cnHCl<OIJe Han. .. 1en<HOM cpeCJ<OM 0.11.­
HOCHO OKPY*HOM cy.11.y, oeaj cy11 he r3 no3eaTH .11.a 
TO mtKHa..'lHO y111111H y poKy O!l neT D.3Ha, 3 y HCTO 
1:1peMe no 3B3Hll'lllOj .llY)f(HOCTH npcD..y3ehe WTO no 
3ai.;011�' Tpe6a 33 KU3HY onroeopHHX JJHU3. AKo H 
noc:1..: oeor3 pOK3 onu1T1111CKH cyn. He no!lHece cpe­
cKmt O.lHOCHO 01<py>1<HOM cy !lY CT3JIHH 6Hp84KH cnH­
caK, oeaj cy!l lie O!lpenHTH jen.uor •JHHOBHHKa CY.ll.3, 
.na y poKy O.l �fcceu D..3H3, y c�rncny 011pcn.a6a oeor 
33KOHa, C3CT3Bll CT3JlllH 611pa'lh'.ll cnHC3K 33 TY on­
WTHllV. 
Lio KOHa4lle nOTBpD..e ODHX COHCl<OB3 ea>K11he no­
c10ielrn cnHcaK. 
· 4:moBHHKY KOjH 6y:le on.pche11 Jla oa3j noc30 
capwH H3.!lahe ce OD..M3X H3 OOWTHHCf\e J<ace nyTHH 
rpowaK H .llHeBHHua no nocTojehHM nponHCHM3 o 
nytHHM :pOWKOOllM3 .ll.Pif<3BHHX CJJ)'>K6e11HKa 33 c.11y­
>K6CHO nyTOB3tbC, 3 Taj H OCT3JIH H3.ll.3UH n3whe Ha 
Teper o.11roeapajyhHx •iacHHKa. 
§ 8. 
OaaKo noTBpheH cnHcaK cTajahc cTaJJHO H3JIO­
)f(eH y onwrnHCKOM H cpec1<0�1 OAHOCHO OKPY>KHOM 
cy.11y. 
CeaKH HMa npauo .na 6Hpa4KH cnHcaK npernena, 
npenHwe, o6anaHH H wraMna H D..3, 6Hno 3a ce6e, 
6H.110 aa .llPyrora, Tpa)f(H H>erosy Hcnpae1<y. 
§ 9. 
fla je 6Hp3llKH COHC3K CTaBJbCH Ha yrne.n rpa­
ljaHCTRy, r.10pa OnlUTHHCKH cy.n 063HaHHTH HCTOr 
.naHa, KaD.. ce oeo y4HHH. 06aHaHa osa y eapowHMa 
H eapomHUaMa (rpro1rnwtHMa) epwH ce nHcMem1M 
o6jaaaMa, npHnenJbeHHM Ha OOWTHHCl<HM CY.llHHU3M3 
H 110 ymtU3M3 a no ceOCKHM OOWTHHaM3 jow H Ha 
Hal!HH KOjH je y TOj OOWTHHH yo6wtajeH. 
y 063H3HH MOpa H3pe•IHO 6HTH 1<a3aHo, D..a he Ha 
H36opy MOhH rJJaCaTH C3MO OHH, KOjH cy y COHCaK 
yuc,AeHH. 
§ 10. 
Hcnpae1<a 6HpaltKor cnHCKa Tpa>KH ce Henocp�­
.n110 llHCMeHo HJJH ycMeHO 0.ll OOLUTHHCKOr HJJH cpe­
CKOr 0.llHOCHO 01<py>l<HOr cyD..a, a aKO je KOll OI<py)f(­
llOr cy D..a ca Mo llHCMeHo. CpecKH OD..HOCHO OKPY>KHH 
cyn. he aKT Tpa>KeHe wcnp3eKe y poKy OD.. 24 caTa 
ynynnH onLUTHHCK0�1 CYJJ.Y Ha nocTynaK. YcMeHo 
Tpa>Kc1r..c cTanHhe cyD.. y 3anHCHHK. Ya Tpa>KeH>e 
HCnpaBKe MOpajy ce OOD.Hen1 Jl0Ka3H. 
3a .ll.OKa3c Mory cny>KHTH CaMO nyHOBa>KHe jaBHC 
Hcnpnae. A1<0 JJHue, KOje jc Tpa>rrnno Hcnpaa1<y, aa­
XTeRa, .ua MY ce o TOMe H3.U.a yaepcH>e, cyn. je .ll.Y'Kau 
To OJlMnx ytfHHHTH. Ceat<O Tpan<e�be 11cnpaaKc yeo.nH 
Ce HCTOr .uaHa K3KO y JlCJIOBOJIHY l<H>Hry (ypy1,16CHH 
aanHCllHK), T31<0 H y Hap011HTH CllHCaK pa.nH JJaKwer 
npcrne.ua. Al<O OOLUTHllCKH cy.n 11HHH HCnpaRKY y 
611pa•1KOM cnHcKy 110 CJ1y>K6c110.i Jly>:rnocn1 Mopa 
csoje pemeu .. c, KOjHM Hcnpae1<y unpcl,yje, o6paano­
�HTH nyHoBa>KHHM Jl01<a3HMa. 
§ 1 1 . 
flo C88KOM Tpa>t<eu,y HCnpau1<e 6Hp3'1KOr CDHCKa, 
onUJTHllCKH CY.I\ Mopa .noneTH ceoje peweH>e y poKy 
on ncT .naHa 6HJIO Jl8 Tpa>t<en.c yceaja HJJH He. Csoje 
pel lll'll.C nf1<' ;tnj c 0110Mt', JCoj 11 jc  11r11pas1<y Tpa>KHO, 
onMax 4HM ce jasH, y poKy o.u neT llaHa. AKO ce 
peweH>e THlle H i-:ora .npyrora, cy.n ra npe.o.aje H 
OBOMe CJ1y>1<6euo y HCTOM po1<y. 
Ope.naja peweH>a H3BpLUHlie Ce HHTepeCOBaHOM 
JJHUY ya nHCMeHy nOTBPllY npHjeMa a HenHCMeHOM 
npeD.. .neojHuoM cue.110Ka. Ha cJJy4aj, .na ce HHTepeco­
saHo nHue He npoHal)e, pewe1be he MY ce npnnenHTH 
Ha .llOM npeD.. .llBOjHUOM OHCMeliHX CBeJlOKa, KOjH he 
Ce noTnHCaTH Ha D..OCTaBHHUH 3ajeJlHO ca 3B3HHqHH· 
KOM, KOjH je pewelbe ua .llOM npHnem10. 
AKO ce ne 3H3 HH rJle je )IOM HHrepecoeaHor 
n11ua, Te MY ce npeJl3ja He 6H r.iorna H3eprnHTH HH 
Ha je.naH o.n H3JIO>KeHHX Ha'IHH3, OHlla he ce peweH>e 
npHnemlTH Ha OOWTHHCKH .llOM. 
0HH, KOjH cy o.n611jcHH LUTO y3 Tpa>Kelbe HHcy 
ncn.HeJJH .no1<a3e, Ka1<BH ce Tpa>Ke y § 10 oeor aa1<0Ha, 
Mory nOHOOO Tpa>KHTH HCnpaaKy H 00/IHCTH )lOKaae, 
aKo poK aa TPa*ClbC 11cnpaeKe He 6y.11.e yonwre 
HCTeKaO. 
Am1 aKo onwTHHCKH cy.n y ocrneJJ.>eHOM poKy no 
Tpa>Kelby Hcnpae1<e 6Hpa41Cor cm1c1<a He no1-1ece HH­
KaKeo pewe11.ie, cMaTpahe ce. D..a je n0Tpa>1rnoua 11c­
npae1<c OD..6Ho o.n Tpa>KC�ba H osaj he HMaTH npaeo 
.na ce >KaJJH Henocpe.nHO H3.llJJe»<HOM cpeCKOM 0)1,HO· 
CHO 01<py}!{HOM CyJly, 
y TOM CJlyttajy cpeCKH OD..HOCHO Ol<PY*HH cya he 
o;x OllWTHllCKOr cyD..a OJlMax Tpa>KHTH noTpe6Ha a1<Ta 
H npeMa .no1<a3HMa D..OHeTH pcweH>e, noCTynajylrn no 
c1 aey D..pyroM § 10 oeor 3aKOHa. A Ko ce HcnpaeKa 
TH4C H D..pyror JJHU3, cpec1<H o.nHocuo oKpy>KHH cy.n 
he 6HTH .n.y)f(aH y HCTO epcMe H oeora H3BeCTHTH. 
OnwTHHCKH cyD.. 11y>1<aH je y osoM cny4ajy ilo· 
cJJaTH cpecKOM O.llHOCHO OKPY>KHOM cyny norpe6Ha 
aKTa y poKy 011 24 caTa OD.. npHjeMa 3axTeea (ornHca) 
cpecKor O.l\HOCHO OKPY>KHOr CYJJ.3, KOjHM ce HCTa 
Tpa}!{e, 
§ 12. 
KaKo noTpa>KHB34 HcnpasKe, Ta1<0 H ottaj Kora 
ce HCnpaeKa TH4e, HMajy npaeo y poKy 011 rpH n.atta 
O.ll. npHjeMa peweH>a .>KaJJHTH ce tta.nJJe)f(HOM cpecKoM 
O.ll.HOCHO OKPY>KHOM cy.ny. 
AKo onwTHHCKH cy.n O.ll.6Hje MOJJ6y m;npa>t<HBa4a 
HCnpaeKe 6Hpa4l<Or CllHCKa, OHJJ.3 JIHUe, Kora ce TO 
Tpa>Ketbe THl.Je, aKO HMa UJTa D..a H3Hece HJJH H3jaBH 
y ceojy KOpHCT, MOpa TO YllHHHTH onWTHHCKOM cy;zy 
y poKy 0.11. TpH .nana O.ll npHjeMa peweH>a, o.nHOCHO 
cy.11C1<e .n.ocTaee (§ 1 1  aJJ. 7), jep noCJJe pemeH>a cpe­
c1<or OJlHOCHO OKPYiKHOr cy JJ.a He MO}!{e BHwe HHWta 
npeJly3eTH. 
)f{an6a no npeoM H H3jaea no .npyroM cTaey 
oaor naparpa<t:>a npe.n.aje ce ycMeno HJJH nHcMeH9 
onWTHHCKOM cy)J.y. >I<nn6e HJJH H3jaee CYll he CTaBH­
TH y aanHCHHK H CB:lKOMe, KO 33Tpa>KH, H3.Qahe yse­
petbe, 1.1.a je H Kora Jl3Hn )f{a.116a H.rm H3jaen 1.1.ara cy)J.y. 
§ 13. 
Csa1<0 cooje pewNr..e, J.1.011cce110 no § 1 1  oeor 
aa1<0Ha, onwTHllCK11 cyll MOpa 11oc.11:n11 no aeaHu4-
noj .!l.Y>l<llOCTH y po1<y 0.ll .noa l <IH<l 110 HCTeKy pOKa 
.»WJt6H, Ha1v1c)f(llOM cpeCl<OM o.u.uocHo 0Kpy>1<HOM 
c:ylly ua or(e11y, aajcJlHO ca c1mMa a1<THMa, 1<0j11 ce Ha 
oeo o.u.nocc. Oett.i cy.u. lie 11aj1laJhC aa ceJlllM aatta no 
11p11jcMy a1<aTa, .n.011cT11 ceojc peme1i,c KOjHM o.no-
6paea 11n11 tntLUTll pcwe�be on111T1111c1wr cy.u.a. Y cJ1y­
•1ajy >Kan6e, cpec1rn o.n.11oc110 01cpy>1m H cy Jl M0>1cc u 
npeHH<l'IHTH pcWCH.>C OlllUTllllCKOr cy;rn. \.Jmt JlOHCCC 
ceoje pewe11.>e, cpeCKH OJ(llOCHO Ol<py>KHH cy Ll HC1'0\' 
.11.aHa W3Jbe ra ca CBHMa 3K'rHMa OOUJTl111CKOM cy;zy. 
nOWTO npeTXOJlHO y 6Hpa•ll(H CllHCaK, KOjH cc KO.A 
H.>era HaJJa3H, yHece H3MCHY KOja ce H aKO cc y TOMC 
lberoeor.1 pewetby caAP*"· Pcwe11.ic cpecKor 01.1.11oct10 
01<py>1<11or cy,l\a H3npwno jc. 
Item I I  Cont . 155 
§ f4. 
no Tpa>t\elbY HCnpau1<e 6Hpa111<HX CnHCKOBa Hehc 
cc H;ll1.'1UhHB3TH 11111<a1rna Tal<Ca HH no 1<0jeM paJLY 
HJIH llKTy, HH1'H Ha 1tcnpase, Kao: H380JlC li3 UPl\OC• 
HHX 1m,Hra, yaepe1La, nornp.lle HTJl. KOje cy norpcGHe 
Kao JlOKa3u 3a ooa rpa>KcH>a, sch he ce Ha ll>Hl\la ua. 
3ua1111r1i: y 1<ojoj ce HaMepH u311ajy H J1a ce ttche 
MOhll ynorpe6HTH Kao 110Ka3H 6e3 TaKCe 3a Kal\DC 
.npyre nocJIOBe. Ha.nJ1e11<He enacTH .ny>KHc cy no-rpa­
>1rnoa'-ly 113,nan1 y po1<y Oil 24 cara cee Hcnpaec, JCoje 
ce Tpa>Ke pa.11.H HCnpaBl{C 6Hpa'-1KHX CnHCKOBa. 
§ 15. 
KaA 6y.11e o6ttapo.noaaH yKa3 o H360pHMa Ha· 
pOJlHHX nocnaHH!ia HcnpaoKe ce Mory rpa)f{HTH jow 
nerHaecT JlaHa no o6ttapo.u.ooaH>y yKa3a. CeaKo .llOl.l· 
HHje rpa>KeH>c HcnpaoKe He YTH'-le Ha cacrae 6Hpatt· 
Kor cnHc1<a, no KojeM lie ce 113apwwrn eeb pacm1-
cam1 H360p. 
§ 16. 1 
AKO .11aH H36opa naAa y epewe O.ll 1 jaHyapa AO 
25 ¢e6pyapa 33KJbyttHO, HCnpaeJbalbe cnHCKOBa no 
3BaHH'-IHOj JlY)i(HOCTH 0.llJIO>KHlie ce .no nocJie H36opa 
H poKOBH npeJlBHl)em1 y OBOM 3aKOHY 00'-IHH>Y retm . 
.neceT Aaua 0.11 )l.3Ha H36opa y Mecro 0,11 1 jattyapa. 
11cnpaaKe Ha saxTee noje,u.Haau.a wohn he ce H y TOM 
cJiytfajy apwHTH no OApc)l6aMa oeor aaKoHa. 
§ 17. 
Ko npHnHKOM HcnpaBKe cnHCKOB3, npe.llBHt;eHe 
y §. 1 oeor 33KOH3, yttece y cnHCaK KOje JIHU.e, HJIH 
HCKOr �3 CnHCKa H36pHwe Oe3 o6pa3JIO>KCHOr pewe· 
fha, K33HHhe ce 3areopoM O.ll TpH Meceu.a .no JlBC ro­
AHHc. AKo 6H 6poj_ raKo yn HcaHHX HJm H36pHcanHx 
.i!HU.a 6tto eetm O.ll .necer 3a jeAHO rnac3lfKO Mecro, 
Ka3HHhe ce .n.o ner rOJlHHa 3atnopa. 
§ 18. 
Ko npHJIHKOM HCnpaeKe cnHCKOBa XOTUMH4HO 
nponycrH y11er11 y cnHcaK nuua, Koja jc no 3Baunq. 
Hoj .ny>KHOCTH .n.y>KaH yHeTH, a ICoja JlOTJie Hncy 6nna 
y cnHCKy, J<3311Hhe ce JlO TPH MeCel{a 33TBOpa HJIH 
HOB'-13HO 110 3.000 JlJ1Hapa. 
. 
TaKO he ce HCTO J<a3HHTH H 33 c.11y4aj, 3KO TOM 
npHJIHl<OM HaMepHO nponyCTH H36pHC3TH OHC, KOjH 
cy yMp.m 11.1n Ji3ry6HnH 6HpaliKO npaeo. 
§ 19. 
AKO onwTHHCKH cy.ll Hc nO.llHece cTaJIHe 6HpaliKe 
cm1c1<0ee cpect<OM 0.llHOCHO OKpy>KHOM cy.ny ){ pOKY 
OJlpeljeHOM ODHM 33KOHOM, Ka3HHhe ce O)lrosop1rn 
JIHU.a .u.o wecT Meceu.H 3arnopa. 
§ 20. 
Cee one KpHBHU.e (§§ 17, 18, 19) CY.llHhe eehe 
· 01<py;1mor cy.na. 
§ 21.  
00CJIOBe IWjH CC O)lHOCe Ha pewasaH>e 0 HC· 
npanuH 6!-1pa1tKHX CTIHCKOBa y KpajeBHMa r .ne 11eMa 
onwTHHCJ<Or cy.n.a, npurnhe onwntHCKH npercrojm1K 
(Ha4eJJHHK, J<He3), llJIH lheroe 331\fCHHK aaje.IUIO ca 
.n.sa OnlllTl1HCKa BChllHKa, t<oje he H3a6paTH OnlllntH· 
Cl<O BChe. 
§ 22 
<l>opMyJJape 6Hpa1.JKHX cn11cKosa npon11cy jc MH· 
HHCTap yayrpawli>HX nocJJoea. 
§ 23. 
Y3 cra.!JHH 6upa•JKH cnHCaK onUJTHHCJ<H cy.n. 
Mopa cacranHTH " je.n.aH saje.nHHlJKH a3uylfHH (a6cu.e­
JlHH) Hr>feHHK (HH.lle1<c) CDHX UHpaqa y onwTHHH y 
1<0jcM he ce nope.n. HMeHa csa1cor 6ttpalfa osuatfHTH 
crpaHa H 6poj 6HpattKOr cn11cKa, no)! J<0j11M je osaj 
YBC,lJ,CH y 6Hpcl'Jl{H COHCal(. npH H3pa,llH npeor CTaJI. 
Hor 611p3•1Kor cn11ma onmrHHCKH cy.11 he uHTH .llY· 
>Kan, )la OHaj llMCllHK ll::ipa)111 y .ll83 npHMCpl<a, 0.ll 
KOjHX he jClHlll 33Jlf>;J\t!TH cpccr<H OJIHOCllO Ol<py»<Hl1 
cy.n 3a ceojy apxusy. 0Kpynmu cy.11 he noTOM CJIY· 
>t<ocno yno;mr11 cna1;or Honor 6Hpa•ia H y cnoj 33· 
UY'lflll 11MCHHI<. 
§ 24. 
OnwrH11c1m cy.n. he cu:me nerc roJ11me npcnu· 
cant op11 rn11anHH 611pa111rn cnuc<11< n::ocrann.ajylrn 
OHe 611pa11e l<OjH cy ll3CipHC:lllH, a yeOJtChH uaKH3.Zl.HO 
ynHcaue. Y 1<0J1H1<0 ce y echHM eapournMa yKa»<e 
norpe6a sGor HarOMHJl3110CTH aKara, cpeCKH O.llffOCHO 
OKpy>t<HH cy.n. MO>Ke uapCJlHTH .na ce Taj npenHe H 
paHHje H3DplllH H y .nn3 opHnrnanua np101ep1<a no· 
HOBO no.n.Hece cpeCKOM OJlHOCHO OKpyiKHOM cy.ny H 3  




3a npae Hape.nHe H36ope 11apoJUmX noCJtaHHKa 
no crynaH>y Ha cHary oeor saKoHa poK npe.naHl;eH y 
§ 7 KO.It npee pe'-leHHUe MCtba ce y poK O.ll Jl&a .aaua 
a POK npeJlBHt;eH y HCTOM naparp3<�Y KOJl Apyre 
peqeHHUe Melba ce y poK o.n. TpH .llaHa; poK npe.Zl· 
BHl)en §·OM 13 KO.It npee pet1ellHUC MC!ba ce y poK 
OJl 24 cara 3 POK npe.naHl)eH y HCTO naparp<lcf>Y KO.a 
.npyre pet1eHHUC Metba ce y pOK 0)1 .ZJ.83 Jl3Ha, ff pOK 
npe.zumt;eu y § 15 KO.It npee petJCHHU.e Meiba cc y pot< 
O/l TpH ,llaHa. 
§ 26. 
Oeaj 3aKOH cryna y >l<HBOT H 1106Hja o6aee3ffY · 
cnary 1<a.1t ce o6jaaH y ,,C.11y>1<oeHHM HOBHnaMa". 
6 ccnreM6pa 1931 rOJ\ . 
Beorpa.11 
npe1ce.11 1111c M1m11crapcKOr caocra, 
MHHHCTap YHYTpaWlbHX OOCJIOBa, 
AJJEKCAl-1.llAP c. p. 
no<tacuu al)yra11T J·b. B. l<pa.oa, 
ap,1HjcK11 l)c11epa.1, 
n. P. lf<ue1<oaHk c. p. 
BHACO ff crao110 Ilp>KanHll uc•rar, 
iiyeap ,llp;i;aouor nc•raT:t, 
M111111c1 ap npae.11c, 
.ll·p Llpar. C. KojHh c. p. 
npcTCt.llHHK M1tHHCTaPCKOr cucra 
MllHHCT:lp y11yrpamlbl1X nOC./IOBa, 
11o•r:ic1111 aljyrauT t-b. B. l<pa.'ba, 
ap>micrm i)eHep:m, 
n. P. mHeKosHh c. p. 
(Oeaj 3al\Oll Oojae.'l>Cll je }' 8311pc;l110M 6pojy 205, OA 7 




no MH.llOCTH OOiKjoj H ROJbH HapO,lHCJ.i 
KPAJb JYrOCJIABHJE 
Ha npeJlJIOr Hawer MMHHCTpa <)>HHaucuja, a no 
cac.1yma11.>y nperce]lHHKa H:iwer MHHHCTapctwr ca­
eera, nponncyjcMo H npor:rnwyjeMo 
3 A K O H  
o npoey>t<elhy paqy11c1<e l'O.ll me no 6yveTHMa Kpa· 
JbeBCMHX 6auc1rnx ynpaaa 33 1930/31 6y1,1errny 
l'OAHHY 
§ 1 
HayaeTHO O.ll Hapel)cH>a craea 2, q,:iaHa l fl YpeJ 
6e 0 YTBpl;HBathy HMOBHHe, Ha1111Hy ynpauc II 6) 
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1.1e rupa11.y u111101111Ha 11 o JJ 1 1 1rnmta1l11 i11 11Moo1111n'l1x 
0.J.110\'.il Jl\X.l:Wllil!>ll:\. cpeCl\IJX I I  Ol>.:1,\� il:IX l.:<11\IO)'llpa­
!la OJ.I. 23 ot.:Toupa 19:?9 �wry l\'pa.r1>cncKc Ga11rnc 
ynpase npWHTll llC flll<ITY 11a TCpeT 0.1.lOl)pCHllX llM npC­
JlllT;\ 110 6y�1cn1�1a 3a 1 930;31 rO.!l,llHY Jl.O :m CCllTl.:M­
Cipa 1931 3a1C:1>y•mo. 
§ :'! 
Onaj :i:11.:t)ll c ryua ua c11;.1ry ..'la110�1 ou11npoaona· 
1i..a y ,.C:1y>1.:6emn1 110!!1111:1�1:1" 1.;a:1a npccrnjc oa>1rn­
TH 3aKOH o npo11yw:e!hy paqyurne rom1He no 6yt1c­
T11�1a Kp a.oeaci-:11x 6anci.:11.x ynpana 3a 1930/3 1 6y-
1.reTc1<y romrny O.'l 18 jynn 1931. 
Ct!llTCMu;>o 19:31 rv.!lllllC 
y 6corpa.11y 
AJlEKCAH,D.AP c. p. 
;\\111111c rap cli11111111c11j a, 
JJ.-p o. oyptth c. p. 
I311,'1.eo II CT3BllO JlPlli3Ulllt fll''l3T, 
11yuap llpiliaCi1C11' nc•l:JT:J, 
MmmcTap npao.:ie, 
A·P llpar. Kojuli c. p. 
£1pcrcc.:i.1111K M1m11cTapcKor cacera, 
M•1!111cTap ytty1paw11>11x noc.�oaa, 
no'!acuu a�yra11r .th. i3. Kpa11>a, 
aplHtjCKH l;e11epa.11, 




no !1-HIJIOCTH oomjoj 11 J30JbH HapO).l.HOj 
l<PAJb JYfOCJJABHJE 
Ha npe.n;10r Harner M11HHCTpa Tpros1111e H HH· 
.nynp;ije, a no cacJJywaiby npeTceAHHl<a Hawer M11-
1111crnprnor caBern, npom1cyjeMO 11 npornawyjeMo : 
3 A K O H  
0 )lonyuu ::;a1w11a 0 H3B03Y H YB03Y tJWeHHU,C, palKH 
u nweHHt1Hor 6pawt1a 
l.JJJaH } .  
1--l::rn � 3 3m<0Ha o H3B03y Ii yao3y muett11u.e, 
pa;J(M H nWCl!l-l'll!Or 6paww1 OJ.l 27 jy1-ia 1931 I'OAH· 
tte, .ll.OJJ.aje ce HOB na pa rpac!), 1w jH r JI a CH :  
§ 3-a 
OnJiarnllyje ce npmmJJerosairn' arpaptta 6mma, 
.na npaBH sajMOBe y cspxy . Q)HH<lHCMpa�ba H3B03a_ H 
yso3a npe�rn onoM sa1rntty 11 ys .npnrnrmy rap attn1jy 
.zr.aje y TY copxy I<pe}l11Te np11a11JJeroBaHOM 3KU,HO­
Hapc1rnM .n:pywTBy sa H3B03 seMa.1bc1rnx npo113ao.n:a 
KpaJbeBHHe JyrocJJaBHje. rapaHUHje he y 11Me .u.p· 
)J<aBe 11saaaaTH 6aHI.li1 M11H11crnp cp11HaHc11ja no o).l.o-
6pct0y npeTCeJJ.mma M11H11crnpCKor · caaern. 
4J1.:11 '.?. 
Ouaj ::1;uw11 ny11a 1i.1 c1J;11 y 1rn:r ra I\pan, nOT· 
11111111..·, n o\iauc:.my rnary 1.wu�1ja 1rn ;�au oG1wpoAO· 
11:\Jba y ,.CJ1y}l{6C:llllM llOIJllH:l�la". 
4 C:CllTl'�IOJl3 J!J:ll l'O/�llllC 
5corpn;( 
M111111c:rap Tprun1111c 11 1111;(ycTp11je, 
Jl·P IC. I<y�ia11yJ1.11 c. p. 
I311;l�O II CT31lll0 Llp>K3Qllrl nc•HtT, 
11yoap Ll.pm:llluor nc'lnra, 
M111111cTap npaone, 
Jl-p JJ.par. C. l<ojuh c. p. 
AJJEl{CAHJJ.AP c. p. 
flpc1·ccJ111111< M111111cTapc1<0r caoc ra, 
l!!lllHCTOP YllYTPOW1bl1)C noc11oca, 
no•1oc111i_ al)yra11T .th. B. KpoJba, 
apMHjcKn t)e11epa.11, 
n. P. }ffamcom1h c. p. 
(Oo:ij 3&Ko11 06jae;i..c11 je y 6pojy 206, 011. 8 cente•1upa 
o. r., 011. Kora 11.a11a H oanm). 
431. 
CT P A B I1 JI H l1 K  
o HOHTponH Hll.ll H3npwen,eM nponuca 3a1<0ua o npo­
.llajn nmeHJu.1.e y 3eMJbU 
Y UHJbY 11snpU1e1ba 3a1<0Ha o npOJ.lajH nrneHHu,e 
y 3e�IJbH o.u 4 cem.eM6pa 1931, a Ha OCHOBY § 8 
,0BOra 3a1<0Ha, npon11cyjeM CJle)J.elrn OpaBHJIHHK: . 
lJJJaH 1 .  
KOFITpo.i:y Ha.u H3Bpwe1beM npomtca 3a1<0Ha o 
npo.naj11 nweH11ue y 3eMJbl1 o.u 4 cenTeM6pa 1931 
upme CJiy}l{oeHmJ.H qmuat1cHjcKe 1coHTpone 11 caeu11-
jam1H 1<0HTpoJJop11, KOje nocTaBJua CTpHBHnerosaHo 
31<UHOHapcKO JJ.PYWTBO 33 H3B03 3eMaJhCKl1X apo-
1'13BO,[l.a. 
1.lJJaH 2. 
Caarrn MJHIH je .u.y}l<aH na HajD.aJbe ,n.o IO cen­
TeM6pa 1931 caonrnrn npenopy4e1111M nHCMOM llPY· 
wrny, noMeHyTOM y npeTXOJlHOM 4JiaHy, Jta JIH he 
ce 6aBl1Tl1 MeJbaBOM I<aO Tproaa<Il{H 11Jlli !<aO ywyp­
Cl<l1 (Ha yjaM) M,llHH. 
lJJiaH 3. 
Csmrn MJ111H, 1<oj11 ce y CMHCJIY npCTXOllHOr 
4Jmna np11jas110 1cao Tprosa1nrn MJJHH, 11yn<aH je 11a 
Hajna.lhe n.o IO cemeM6pa 1931 noirnece n.pywTBy, 
noMeHyTOM y 4JlaHy 1 onora CTpaBHJJH111<a, npen11c 
.np11jase · no.m1eTe no ttape11611 M11H11CTpa cp11Ha11rnja 
5p. 6 1 9501111, oa 5 cemeM6pa . 1 931,  ,,CJJy>K6e11c 110-
s1rne" op. 203, 0)1. 5 CenTeM6pa 1931. 
l.JJJaH 4. 
CeH Tproaa4I<H MJJl1HOBl1 no11ne>1<e ttap61mTOM 
Hall30py 11 y TOM UHJbY MO}Ke M11HHCTapCTDO Cp11l!aH· 
rnja·O.zteJbe1-be nopc3a, Ha Tpa>Ke1be .zr.pywrna, no· 
MeHyTor y tfJiaHy I OBOra npaBl1JJHHl<a, noje.ll,HHH 
MJUJH CTaBHTH no.u. CTaJlHl1 Ha1l30p jeLlHOr CJ1y>K6e-
11111<a qrnH<:iHCHjCl<e l<OHTPOJle I<OjH he ce C�leCTHTl1 y 
caMOMe Mmrny. Ta1<aa MJJHH je 11y>1<aH cTaBHTH D.O· 
THYHOM rny11<6e1-1m<y npttcTojny npocT.op11jy ca Haj­
rt0Tpefa111j11M 1<m1ueJJapHjc1<11M np11GopoM 1<ao 11 
orpes 11 ocaeTJbeH,e Ha 6ecnmntto pacnoJ1araH>e. 
1'1HalJe MJIHHOBH HI-ICY .llY)l<Hli na CHOCe 6HJIO 1<a1rne 
11.pyre TepeTe pa,u.11 113BprneH>a,KOHTpOJJe H3.ll MJJHHOM. 
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YJJaH ;,. 
Ceatrn Tprosa•11<11 h!JlHll 111opa DOJU!TH KOHTpOJmy 
JffbHry y l<OjOj he ynHCHBan1: 
I )  cea1<y KOJll1'1HHY nwcHHU.e KynJbCHe 0)1. .ll.PY­
wrna n0Me11yror y 'IJiaHY 1 ooora npas1rnH11Ka; 
2) cna1<y npo;.1.ajy 6pamtta no t<OJ111•1HHH H 1rna­
m·ncry; 
3) npo.najHy ucny 3a csa1<y spcry 6parrrna; 
4) HlllC H npe3HMC l<aO H Mecro CTa1-10oa1-ba 
1<ynua 6pau111a 3aTHM 11 Mccro r.11.e ce 6pawtto HMa 
ucnopyYHTH. 
5) 6poj apeha H ynorpe6.r1>cHHX nJIOM611; 
6) lt3H y l<OjH je 6paw1w 113 MJIHlta H3alUJIO ; 
7) npcB03HO cpecrso t<oje je 3a npeoo3 OJI. MJIHHa 
11.0 Kynu.a ynorpe6JbeHo. 
YnaH 6. 
Caat<a apeha 6pawHa Kojy rprosa,11rn MJIHH 
nycrn y npOMCT MOpa 6HTH CHa6.uesena �JHJ)MOM 
MJll1H3 H nJJOM60M, Ha J<Ojoj ce 113Jl33H l(py>I<HH HaT­
m1c c je.nue crpa1-1e ,,flpHOHJieroeaHo a . .n. 3a H3B03" 
a Ha .upyroj CTpanH ,,6eorpa.ll.". Oae he nnoM6e MJIHH 
r<ynOB3TH l<O)l. .ll.PYWTBa, noMeHy'fOl' y 4Jl3HY 1 onor 
npao11nH111<a, H 0110 je je.zvmo oonawreno .11.a HX H3-
µaiJy je� 
0 cea1<0j KOJIH'IHHH na6asJbeHHX nJIOM6H Mopa 
rn111u 001111T11 Hapot111ry 6enerrrny y Kojoj he ce yn11-
c11oarH Ha6aBJbeHe I<OJIH4HHC, 6poj nJIOM611 CT3BJbe­
HHX Ha apehaMa KOje MJIHH nyCTH y npoMeT 1(30 11 
6poj no1<eapeHHX nnoM6H Koje ce Mopajy "llynaTH 
. �OK HX c11y>1<6eHH1< QlHH3HCHjCt<e KOHTpone He. no­
Dy'le, o 4eMy he OH y4HHHTH norpe611y Hano111euy y 
6eJICl1JKH 0 OJIOM6aMa. 
lJnaR 7. 
Cse pa;ube, r<0je ce 6ase npoJJ:ajoM HJll1 npepa­
�11aalbeM 6pawHa, .ll.Y){CHC cy .a.a 0011.e KoHrponay 
''1-bHry, y l<Ojy he ynHCHB3TH: 
1) MMC MJIHHa 0,AHOCHO npO)l.3B�a O.A KOjera cy 
6pawHo Ha6as1111e; 
2) Ha6aB.'bCHY r<OJIH4HHY 6pawHa no KB3JIHTeTy; 
3) tta6aaHy ueHy; 
4) npeoo3HO cpecreo KOjHM je 6pawHo ).{O fbHX 
r.1Hr.110; 
5) Geneurny o roMe .na JIH cy epe�e 6pawHa 
6HJTe CHa6.neaeHe <fll1PMOM �1.1111 11a H nJIOMOOM nponH­
caHOM y npeTXO.llHOM lJJTaHy. Hu je,nan npo.nasau. H 
npepal)HB3'1 6pawHa He CMC Cl<li)laTll TIJIOM6y .llOK He 
nOLJHe ynorpe6JbaBaTH 6paw110, a c1ornyre nJIOM6c 





CHjC1<e t<Oll'l'POJIC He O.llY3Me, 0 •1e��
y he 011 ) lllllH rll 
noTpe6Hy aanOMCHY y KOHTpOJIHOj l<lhHrH. 
4Jl3H 8. 
Co11 MJIHHODH (TpronallKH 11 ymypc1rn) 1<ao H CBH 
npo.11aau.11 11 npcpal)1113aYH 6pawtta 11y>1CHH cy A?J Y 
pa.nuo npeMe .nonycTe cny>1<6CHHUHMa QlHHa11CHJ Cl(e 
KOliTpOJJe H cneu.HjaJJHHM l<OtlTpOJIOpHMa (tlJlaH . 1 
OBOra CTpaBHJllll11<3) npHCTyn y lbHXOBe npOCTOpHje 
11 Aa HM erase Ha pacnoJ1ara11. ..e 1<011rpom:
1Y KtbHry 
l<aO H OCTaJie nOCJIOBHe l(Ji>Hre ca np1ma.aa.1ylt11M HC­
npaBaMa paAH yn11fjaja H 1<011crarona1ba npu11m10CTH 
y pa.11y. 
lJJiaH 9. 
v ' ' 
0 CB3KOM npOTl1033KOHHTOM pa}ly Kao H 0 cna­
l<OM pa11.y KOjli 611 cc npornn110 npon11cH�1a oaora 
fipaBHJIHHKa, a 1<0je CJJY)l{6CllHUH cl>HnaHrnJCl<C KOU· 
Tpone O.ll.HOCHO cneu.11jaJ11-1H 1<0HTpo11op11 (<1naH I 
OBOra flpaBHJlllHKa) npHMC'Te y MJlllH01311Ma HJIH r<OA 
npo.a.aoa.ou.a o,nHOCHO npepal}HBatia 6pawua, HMa ce 
cacraBHTH ypcAaH 3anuCHHK ca concrneHHI<OM MJJnHa 
O}lHOCHO ca npoJiaBaOU.HMa HJIH npepal)HB3'1HM3 6pa­
WHa H TaKaB 330HCH11K ,llOCTaBHTH ynpaBHOj BJl3CTH 
npoor creneHa 3a )l.a.rbH nocTyna1< y CMHCJ1y 11apclje­
H>a § 8 3aKoua o npo11.aj11 nwea11u.e y 3CM.11.>H . 
11380)1 113 oeora 33TIHCHl1Ka JlOCT3DHhe l<OHTPOJI· 
UH CJJync6emtUH H ,npywray nOMCllYTOM y tfJ13HY I 
OOOra npaBHJIHHK3. 
lJnaH 10. 
Oeaj npaBHJIHHK cryna 11a CHary l<a;J. cc oGua . 
po,'lyje y ,,Cny>1<6ettHM HODllll<l\la". 
op. 62707 /III 
8 CCllTCMGpn 1931 rOA· 
y 6corpaJiy 
M1mttcrap cjm11a11cttj:i, 
Jlp. 'B. oyp11h c. p. 
432. 
Ha ocHoay § 22 3a1<0Ha o 6Hpa4KHM cnHCl(OBHMa 
n p 0 n H c y J E M: 
A .  <PopMynap cra.rTHor 611pa11Kor cn1tcKa, KojH HMa cne11.ehe PY?PHKe: TeKyfiH 6poj, nopo· 
AH4HO H pol)C'HO HMe 6Hpa<ta, 3aH11M31bC, MCCTO CT3HOB3lb3 ()'JillU.3 H upOj 1<ylie - r<paj, Maxa.1Ja) ff 
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. u. </>Of>M)'.?afl 3aj1.'n11111J:;or :136\'l/llOr (aGe11c411or) 111t1c·1111u:1, 1.:n i 11 llM:t r..nr ·1cl.c• pyCipHr<c : TC· 
1<yl111 GpOJ.
_ 
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Mee rr> cT:111ona11.a 
(y11111tn 11 6poj 1cylic 
-Kpaj, Maxnnn) cn11c;.::1 
Ill iii'. 5104'; 




Onune ce,·umue Kacauuo1wr cyna o pa3yMeaaH>y H 
npm11em1 § 39 3m<011a o H311aoa1vy Tanaja ua no11-
py·1jy V.::1caum;)llor cyna y 6eorpaJly H Bemtt<or cy.n.a 
y noAropau.u Oll 30 11u.tla 1931 romme 
rocno.11111 Mnm1crap npaa.11e a1<TOM caoj m1 0.11. 
1 l aurycra '1931, 6p. 94370 Tpaxrno je )la l{acauHOHH 
cy.ll, ua ocHoay Tall. l § 40 3a1<0Ha o H3llaBaH>y Tam1ja 
.llOHece ·uaiiem1y o.LVIYKY onwre ce.n.t1�e no 0011M mt· 
T<:UbHMa: 
I) Lla .n1 1 lie 3a Tan11je 1<0je cy ce y apeMe cry­
na1ua Ha cHary HOBOr 3aKoHa o H3.l aDaH>y Tarn1ja 
3aTCK.ne Ila pa.'ly 1<0.ll onUITHllCKHX cy .LtOBa 11JHf l<Oll 
cpec1rnx 11a<1e.11cTana, aa>1<HTH npom1cH cTapor 3aKona 
0 H3Llaoa�bY TanHja HJIH HOBOr 38KOHa 0 H3)l.8831bY 
Tan11ja? 
2) .lla J111 he cyJJ. Tan11je �oje cy ce 3are1rne Ha 
p a1 y y ·apcMc cryna1ba Ha cHary uoaor 3aK011a o H3· 
)laaa1by rnn11ja a no Kojm.1a jorn H11je nocryn110 no 
§ 1 1  crapor 3a1<0Ha o 113.naaa!hy TanHja orJJamaaant 
no CTapOM HJJH no HOBOM 3aI<OHY 0 H3)l.aB8�bY ra­
n11ja? 
I<acauHOHH cy.ll y 11attaunboj caojoj onwroj CCJJ.­
m1u11 npoy<mo je oaa nHTalba na je Hau1ao: 
Do § 39 3a1<011a 0 H3.llaBaH>y Tan11ja 011 30 Maja 
193 1 r. 3a lta.'hH pa.n no ranHjaMa Koje cy cc 3are· 
1rne 1<0JI cyl!a, aa>1<c npon11c11 onora 3a1<011a. Met}yrHM 
oa1n1 3a1<0HOM m1jc HOpi\mpaHo 1rn1<0 he ce nocry· 
· n11r11 no Tam1jaMa 1<0je cy cc 3aTCr<.ne KOLl onwn1H­
c1rnx cyJ(OBa l'I noJIHUlljC l.:YIX n.�nCTH H no KOjHM3 cy 
Belt npe11.y3CTC H313CCl!e pan.1i..c OKO �bllXODC 110 rep:Le. 
3:ir<OH o 1131H1Barby Tan11ja mia 3a UM.'b 1w mncpe­
couaHa ,1111ua 11a w ro Gp;1m H JJarmrn tta•111H 11 ca WTO 
f.la!i>C TPOWf<OBa JlOl)y llO ram1je 011 CBOjMX �IM31b3. 
Oonj 611 u11.'b 6110 npo�rn:.uc11 ai<O 6n ce 0.1)'3CJJ3 
na;1moc-r crnrna OHtrn pa.n1ba�1a 1<0je cy onwnmc1rn 
cy l OBH, 00.'ll·ll(HjCl<e B.1!3CTH H npBOCT<.'neHH cy ltOBH 
611.IJH npe,'l)'3C.nH no npe/l�fCH!Ma Tpa>t<CHHX y6aWTH· 
npeTCeJlllHI< MHllHCTapcKor CllBCTfl, 
MHllHCTap y11yTpaw11 .. Hx OOCllOBll, 
no'lac1111 al)yrn11T 1-b. B. KpaJba, 
3pM11jc1rn l;e11epa.�, 
0. )i(llBKOBHfi C. p. 
11>c1t>a no 011pe,lloaMa pmrnjttx 3aKoHa a npe crynaH>a 
Ha cuary 11onor 3aKOHa o H311aaa1by rnm1ja, jep 6tt 
ca6Gpamaoa1be .noca.llaH>er pana no THM y6aruTHlbe· 
tb11r.ia can:a1beH 331<0HY o H3JlaBaH>y TanHja 61rno 
CKOD1taHO ca ryoHTKOM npeMeua H TpOWl<Ol311Ma a ua 
WTeTy KaKO l!HTepecosaHHX JIHU3, T3KO H 6p30r OT· 
npaBJb31ba TIOCJIODa KOJl 8Jl3CTH, Koje pane Ha y6a-
. 'lllT111be1i.1111ta. 3aTo KacaUHOHH cy 11 HaJJaaH .na y HHTe­
pecy 6p)l<el' paJta 01<0 H3llaBa1t>a TanHja Tpe6a ocTa­
BHTl1 y nanmocn1 cne pa111ue OnWTllHCKHX BJJaCTH II 
cy.nona Koje cy npe CTyna1ba Ha CHary HOBOr 3a1<011z · 
.1 o 11311aoaH>y Tarrnja on: 30 Maj a 19.31 ro.n. 6p. 64504 . 
npe)ly3cTe - H38pllleHe cao6pa3HO npOOHCHMa 3aJ<O· 
. ua o H3JJ.aBal-by TanHja o.n 1 4  11eueM6pa 1929 ro,ll. 11 
.npyrnx pa1mjHX 33KOHa pa.nH CaCTSBJbalba T30Hja. 
TaKo pattttje cacraaJbeHe TanHje no npomtCHMa §§ 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7 11 8 33KOHa o 113.nasalby ran11ja 011 14 .ne­
uer.-i6pa 1929 ro.z:t. 11Majy ocrarn y sa>«HOCTH H no 
HOBOM 33J<OHy 0 ll3.ll3B3!bY Tan11ja a He Mopajy ce 
one qiopMaJIHe pan:1be 06HasJbaT11 npeMa nponHrnr.ia 
§§ 5, 6 11 7 lioaor 3aK011a o H3.ll.aBalby ramtja O.ll. 30 
f..rnja 1931 ro..n. aKo cy J.(Orn.ne npe.u cyn nocne JS 
jyJia TeK. ro.D.. 1<a.n j e  11onH 33KOH o 113nasaH>y Tam1ja 
CTynHO Ha CHary. J\JJ11 no §§ 36, 37 H 38 HOBOr 3a­
l<oHa 0 H3Jl3B3t-hy TanHja 01  30 Maja Tt�K. fO.ll,HHe Ha 
r.o.upy1Jjy AneJJaUHouor cy11a y Ct<OnJby ceM HO.ilpy<1j a 
91<py)f(IU!X cy 11ona· y BpatbH, JleCI<OBUY H n11pOTY 
ynpowhe1111je jc 11 JJa1<1Ue .no1<a311aa1:,e caojH11c 11e­
no1<penwr 11Ma1ba 1-1a 1<0jc cc >1<cm1 y6awT11mJTn Hein 
wro je 611JJO no o.11.pc.11.6a�1a pam1jer 3at<OH3 o 113.'l.a· 
Ba1uy ran11ja H .npyrnx 3aKoHa, jep he cyll 113epw1 rn 1 
y6awTHli>CfbC H:1 11eKpCTHa HMalbU y O!HIM llO.Apyt:1ju:.rn 
1rno 11 y noil.py<1jy cpe3a AH.'lp11jena<11<or nollpy<1j:i 
DeJtH1<or cy .n.a y I lon.ropHu11 11 6e3 113ncwraja r11·pap­
HHX unacn1 ..na H�JaH>c 1:1c .no.11a311 no.'l. arpapHy pc· 
C�OpMy, a1<0 OHC 113 Tpa>1<e1be cy!La no TO:.le lie llOtiJ,ri,y 
r.1y H313CWTaj y po1<y Oll r.iect'L( na11a CeM 1 ora ua 
11cT0�1 nollpy•1jy 113y3cs Cpe3a a1rnr11.icoa<11<0r, cuo­
j 11na l!Cl(\)CTHOr 11Ma11>a MO>I'C ce Jl01<a3�113<:1Tll II Cl.l�­
JlOUmta no 11ouoM 3aK011y o H3.1.:iom1>y Ta1111ju oc:l 
o6311pa ua nponi1cc :::a1<011111rn o rpa1,m1c1<0M cy;trno�1 
rtOCTynKy. Ta1<0 HCl'O 011WTH11c1<.H cy.nooH no § :38 
HOBOr 3aKOHa o H3.n.aaaH>y TanMJa a Ha ornooy pe-
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we1na t<OjH:\1 Mm111crnpcTao noJbonpHspe!IC OllHOCHO 
Hajl.Jl(!)J{llC nrpapHC BJlaCTH npH3llaje liaCCJLCIU!l(Y 
npaao CBOjHHC Ha 1 0.lCJbCHOM 3e:\1Jbl1WTY H3!tajc Ha­
ceJbCHHl<Y Tamtje 6c3 Jl3JbHX <IWPM3JIHOCTH caMO ca 
orpaHH'ICl·MIMa H3Jl0il(Clllll\I y HCTOM pewCtbY 11 W3JbC 
jc cy JlY Ha JiaJbH pall. · 
na T<aKO CC npOn!ICHM3 §§ 36, 37 H 38 3a1<0Ha 
o 113JlaOaH>y TanHja OJI 30 Maja 1931 roJt. jow oHwe 
•111Hc on.naKw11ue 3a H3JlaBat-be TanHja Ha naoeJlCHOM 
11paa110M nonpyyjy, Hero UJTO je 'llH1>c110 pa1111j11M 
3a1<01111Ma, I<acau11om1 cy11 HaJ1a311 11a npe�ia § 39 Ho­
nor saKoHa o H3!laBaH>y Tan11ja cy110BH Tpe6a .un 11 
llCI Tatrnje <mje j.e 113l 3lbC TpameHO H OnLUTHHClrn cy­
JlOBH 113BpWHJIH npHnpc�rne pam-be 3:1 lbHXOBO ca­
CTaBJbalbe 11.nH cy ce 3aTeK.11e 11a pa.uy T<O.ll cpcc1rnx 
HalJCJTCTaBa Ha .ua11, Ka}l je HOBH 3at<Oll 0 113.'l3Bati>Y 
Tam1ja CTynHO Ha cHary, np11MCHH 1-1ape�etba pelfCHHX 
§§ 36, 37 H 38 HOROr 31<0Ha 0 l13/13B31bY Ta1111ja jcp 
H TO HJlC y np11JJor Jia ce conCTBCHllUH HCKpCTHHX 
HMaH>a ll!TO npe 11a 11CTO y6awnme WTO je H l.ll!Jb 
3m<OHY 0 H311aB31bY Tan11ja. 
Ca H3JJ0>1<e11or a Ha OCHOBY § 40 TaY. 1 3a1<0Ha o 
H311asa1by Tan11ja OJI 30 Maja 1931 ro11. 6p. 64504 11 
§ 16 Ta4. 2 3a1<011a 0 CBOMC yCTpojcTBy I<acauHOHll 
cy11 jc y nor.ne1 y Ha HCTa1<11yTa llHTalb3 AOHeo OBY 
cnoj y  
HAl/EJTHY OJlJTYKY 
flo CBJU.ta Tp<l)f(elbl!Ma y6aWTl11belba npe CTyna­
lba na cnary 3a1<011a o 113.aasa11>y ran11ja o.a 30 Maja 
1931 rop., cse· pa.a11>e onwn111cKHX cy.aosa· H nom1-
1'HjcK11x BJlaCTl1 113Bpwe11e no paHlfjlfM 3aKOHHMa y 
q11Jby cacranJbatba 11 113pasa1ba raruja npe 18 jyJTa 
1931 roJJ.. «ana je uoBH 3a1<011 o 113nasa1by TanHja OJ{ 
30 Maja 1931 ro.a. 6p. 64504 crynuo Ha c11ary, 111t1ajy 
oc.rarwy cua311, a .aaJbH pa.a no r11M y6awnt1belb11Ma 
11111a ce o6aBJITll KOP cy J{OBa no HOBOM 38KOllY. 
o 113.l{aBan.y ran11ja y cM11c11y § 39 11cror 3aHOHa. Ona· 
B:J)/{H 11 y noo1e�y or naUJaBafba ran11ja, «Oje je n11-
Ta11>e 11craK11yro y npe1111>e1t1 aKTy roconOJ1HHa M1t­
.1mcrpa npaspe no11 2. 
Amt 11 no ODHM ram1jaAta JJ.OKa3e 0 CBOjl1Hll 11-
0CHOBy np116asJI>alba 11Malba ueHHhe cy pos11 Ha no11-
pyqjy Ane11au1w11or cy 11a y CJ<onJby, 113y3es no.a­
py'lja OKPY»<Hl1X cy11osa y BpalbTI, JlecKOBUY II m1-
pory no npom1cu1tta §§ 36, 37 11 38 110Bor 3aK011a o 
113.QaBalby ran11ja o.a 30 Maja reJ<. roP.. a y nor 11e!ly 
arpap1111x 0){11oca np11Melb11Batie cy110D11 npon11ce § 36 
11cTor 3a«oHa If y no.apy'ljy Cpe3a a11.ap11je8al/KOr. 
flpeMa § 40 ra11. 1 3aK011a o 113.aasalby ranuja 
OJ{ 30 1.1aja 1931 ro11. osa 01111y«a o6a8e3Ha jc sa 
cy11one. 
op. 9297. - I-fa OnwTe CellHHUe Kaca�11011or 
cy11a, 24 aarycrn 1931 ro11., y oeorpa.ny. 
434. 
CrnnJbaH,e eau CHare Hape116e ,llHpe1<m1je nol'tlop­
cHor cao6paliaja 011 20 HoBeM6pa 1929 ro;l. 
Pl'lllelLeM rocnO}lHl!a MHllHCTpn cnot'lpalin_ia 
11.0.lloo.np. 1 18 011 7 jy.1Ja 1931 rnJt. crnnJ1>a Cl' aau 
C11:Jr<.' I Inpe;1\ln )lllf>t'l<llllje noMOJYl\Or caofipaliaja o.n 
'..10 11oaeh1upa 1 �l:.!!.> ro.n. I lou.up 332129 OTWT:lM11a11a 
y ,,C.ny>K6eHHM HOBHllaMa" 6p. 282-CXV, OJI 1 JlC­
l.lCM6pa ] 929, O!l!IOCHO orpallll'IClua nJIOllHJtik y 
w116eHc1<0M m.;pyry. 
n.o. noo.6p. l 18i3 I .  - J.13 MHHHCTapcrnn caoGpa ­
haja - Ynpaoe no�10pCTBa H pc11Hor caoGpal.ajn -
noMOpCl<O 0.11.C.:beH>e, 8 jyJJa ) 931 fO}l., y 15eorpa;ty. 
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H C CT P A B K A  
y· Ype.n.6H o ycTpojcmy 3acrnn1rnx l<lbHra Ha no}l­
pyqjy BemtKOr cyAa y no11ropHUH 
Y Ype,n6H o ycTpojcrny 3acrnsH11x 1<H>i:tr:1 Ha 
nonpy<1jy BeJIHJ<Or cyJJ.a y no11ropHUH OWTaMna11oj 
y Jl0Jl3Tl<Y ,,Cny>1<6em1x HOSHHa" OJI 12 a13ryCT:< 19:31 
noT1<pa;1e cy ce H3SeCHe rpem1<c 1cojc ce omrn 11c­
npaaJbajy: 
1) Y npsoj pettCHHl.lH ttJI. 10 ttcnpeTypaH jC f)�Jl 
pe•m Ha.  jeJJ.HOM MCCTy, TaJ<o .na llOTH'IHO MCCTO 
Tpe6a 11a rnacH: ,,011Jta lie ce ono6pena 3acrnna yse­
CTH y 3aCTaBHY 1<1-bttry H yje11110 he ce Ha HCnpaBH . . .. 
2) y 11pyroM cTasy 4.n. 22 MCCTO pc•111 ,.HM�;jy 
cc npen.11caTH Hose" Tpe6a JI.a rnarn ,,HMajy ce npe­
n1-1caTH y Hose". 
3) y o6pacl.ly cy.nc1<or JJ.Heo11m<a 3a 3acTaac py-
6p1ma ,.cyMa HCTpa>t<HBaH>a" Tpe6a .na r nac11 ,,cyMa 
noTpa>t<HBallia ". 
op. 1 07297. - vfa MmrncrnpcTea npaa11.e, 4 cen-
TeM6pa 1931 fO)l.HHe. • 
436. 
H C CT P A B K A  
y 33KOHY 0 H3,ll.aBaH>y TanHja 
Y §-y 30 3aKOHa· o H3.uaeaH>y Tan11ja, y .llpyroj 
pe'teHHl.lH 0Maw1<0M je Hcna.na pe4 .,y6wwTmbe�ba" 
Tat<o na Ta pe11eHuua Tpe6a 11a rnac11 :  ,,r11e cpect<H 
cyJtOBH jow HHcy yae.u.em1 y6awTmuCl-ba H npcHoce 
TanHja . . . .  ". 
op. 107297. - 113 MHHHCTapcTBa npaa)le, 4 cen­
TeM6pa 1931 roA1me. 
437. 
H C n P A B K A:  
y IlpaeHnHHKY o o6enemaaat&y nnoeHHX nyTeea 
Y 6pojy 182, o.n 1 2  aerycrn osc ro.11.., o6jaeJbeH 
je npaBHJIHHK 0 06e.ne>t<aBaH>y OJIOBHHX nyTCB3 H 
a.111111eja npsa tt.n. I I owTar.tnaHa je norpewHo, Te 11Mn 
11a r.11ac11: 
,,06amrn 3Ha1<01m y rnaaHOM cny}f\e 3a opH.it'11-
n1uuj_v 11 npnoau. n.iJOBHli no1<asy jy rpatt11nc n.10BHt)r 
n� Ta, JlOK 3a6pa11a nponn3a 1ma mmepaT1rn1111 i.:a-
pal\Tep " . 11 
· Y.11 . n P.C.6p. 9727. - 1'13 Ynpnec noMopcTD:i a 
pc•mor cao6pallaja, 31 aerycrn 1931 roJJ.., 5corpa,a. 
v 
Source : Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Sluzbeni List (Beograd : 
Printing Office , 1931 ) ,  pp. 1305-1320. 
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Item I I I  
RESOLUTION ADOPTED O N  MARCH 7 ,  1932,  AT THE MEETING OF THE LEADERS 
OF THE PEASANT-DEMOCRATIC COALITION 
l .  Standing firmly on the principles of democracy, we consider 
that the sovereignty of the people should form the basis of the 
organization of the State . The people are the sole source of 
political sovereignty and of all public authority. 
2 .  Since the peasants form the basis of culture , of the 
economic life , of the social structure and or the moral values 
of the nation and since they represent the vast majority of the 
population, they should also form the basis of the political 
organization of the nation. 
3 .  We must point out the fact that , from the very beginning , 
the Serbs from Serbia have imposed their hegemony in Croatia and in 
all other lands across the rivers Sava Drina and Danube ( that is 
in all formerly Austro-Hungarian l&nds � . This hegemony rests on 
immoral methods of violence and oppression. Having seized the 
monopoly of power ,  but incapable of wielding it intelligently, 
the Serbs from Serbia are using it for the purpose of destroying 
all moral values ,  all modern institutions and achievements ,  all 
material wealth and the spiritual peace of the people. These 
conditions have culminated in the dictatorship introduced on 
January 6 ,  1929, which not only strengthened this hegemony but 
abolished civil and political freedoms . 
4 . On the basis of this sad experience , we have come to the 
inevitable conclusion that we must revert to the year 1918 and take 
it as the starting point . I t  is a pressing need , therefore , to 
organize and conduct a relentless struggle against this hegemony 
with the intention of eliminating it from all our lands together 
with those who exert it and weild authority on its behalf . 
5 .  Only the elimination of this hegemony can form the basis 
for the new organization of the State. Without , at the moment , 
discussing in detail the plan of this reorganization, we have 
agreed to the principle that the new commonwealth must exclude the 
hegemony of one or more of its members and that it must be based on 
the identity of interest and on the free will of all its members . 
Thus every member of the commonwealth would have his particular 
interests safeguarded in his own unit ,  while all together would 
co-operate in the common affairs of the commonwealth which are to 
be determined. Thu s ,  and only thus , can the moral and material 
progress and prosperity of the Serb, Croat and Slovene peoples be 
assured. Particular interests of the minorities of foreign speech 
will be fully safeguarded and guaranteed. 
Item III  Cont . 
S igned : Dr . Valdko Macek, Sava N .  Kosanovic , 
Dr.  Hinko Krizman, Josip Predavic , Dr . Juraj 
Sute j ,  Dr. Ante Trumbic , Veceslav Vilder , Dr . 
Mile Budak, Dr . Dusan Boskovic and Reverend 
(Serbian Orthodox ) Dusan Kecmanovic 
,.,, 
DR . VLADIMIR MACEK 'S  INDICTMENT 
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v 
Of Dr . Vladimir Macek ,  etc . ,  that he collaborated in the month 
of November 1932 in drawing up the demands that the lands beyond 
the rivers Sava, Drina and Danube , which now form part of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia,  be legally returned to conditions as exist­
ing in those lands at the time of the dissolution of the Austro­
Hungarian Monarchy, in order that these lands might then open 
negotiations regarding the organization of the Yugoslav State-he 
is  therefore guilty of propaganda intended to convince others that 
these lands should be s�arated from Yugoslavia and formed into a separate State . Dr. Macek has therefore committeed the crime 
punishable under paragraph J of the Law for the Protection of Order 
and Security in the State to 5 years in the penitentiary . 
/ 
Source : P .  D .  Ostrovic , The Truth About Yugoslavia ( New York:  
Publishers , 1952 ) ,  pp. 286-288. 
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Item IV 
PREPARATION FOR MARSEILLE 
In a chapter of his book, under the title upreparations for 
Marse ille , "  Milichevitch has published the following unconfirmed 
data on the background of the crime and the persons implicated in 
the preparations : 
1. The attempt on the King ' s  life was prepared by the Central 
Committee of the Ustasha in Bologna , Italy , when the news of the 
impending visit by King Alexander to France was published . 
{Summer, 1934) 
2 .  "At the same time , Vlada Georgiyeff-Kerin, known also as 
Vlado Makedonsk i ,  chauffeur to Ivan Mihailoff , and terrorist 
instructor, made his appearance in the Ustashi Camp in Italy. Kerin 
was now in charge of firing practice in the camp, with the target 
used being a silhouette in perfect replica of King Alexander . "  
J .  About the end of August ,  1934, Ivan Mihailoff , head of the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization went to Rome • • • 
to arrange with Pavelitch the place , day , and hour of the 
assassination. He was staying at the Hotel Continental ,  in which 
most of the Balkan terrorist organizations had their meetings . 
Inspector General, Ercole Cont i ,  attended the talks between 
Pavelitch and Mihailoff . •count C iano twice received Mihailoff 
and Pavelitch together . •  
4 .  "Pavelitch and Mihailoff agreed to assemble several groups 
of terrorists for the actual assassination. The first group was to 
make its attempt immediately upon the King ' s  landing at Marsei lle . 
In the event of the first group ' s  failing, another was to make an 
attempt with a bomb at a prearranged time . A third group was 
assembled to operate in Paris .  In the event of all three groups 
in France failing, a fourth group was to operate in England . "  
5 . At Mihailoff ' s  suggestion, it was decided " that the first 
group be headed by his chauffeur , Vlada Georgiyeff-Kerin, who , "  he 
said , •had experienced such assassinations , and would take the first 
chance he saw . "  
6 .  Pave litch ordered Mijo Bzik , his secretary in the Ustasha 
camp in Italy , to assemble several groups of terrorists . Bz ik went 
to Vienna and then travelled with Lt.  Colonel von Perchevitch to 
Jamka Puszta in Hungary . Perchetch had just been executed and 
replaced by Vjekoslav Servatzi as the Leader of the Ustashis in 
Hun�ary. Bzik was •now charged with the task of selecting, with 
Servatz i ' s  help, the terrorists required, and fitting them out 
with false names and forged passports . •  
7 .  Milichevitch notes that "none of the members of the terrorist 
groups chosen knew either the place or the time of the attempt . 
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Those data were kept so secret that even his (Mi lichev i tch ' s )  
agents in Janka Puszta were unable to give any precise information . u  
The explanation of this ignorance was given by the Marsei lle 
Police , whose investigation established that while in Hungary , 
none of the terrorists had any idea of what their mission would be 
abroad nor that they were selected to murder the King of Yugoslavia. 
8 .  S imultaneously, the Ustashis sent their political emissaries 
to Western Europe to represent the Croat cause there . Andrea 
Artukovitch, a Zagreb lawyer , was sent to London, ( in 1941 , he 
became Minister of the Interior) while Stephan Peritch proceeded 
to Brussels ; he was later appointed Minister to Italy by Pavelitch . 
At the end of September, Kvaternik ( later Pavelitch ' s  Minister of 
Police ) left Italy for Switzerland where he was to instruct the 
arriving detachment of Ustashis sent from Janka Puszta. 
Source : Tibor Eckhardt , Regicide at Marseille ( New York : American 
Hungarian Library and Historical Society , 1964) , pp. 33-3 5 .  
APPENDIX IV 
Item I 
THE ZAGREB AND BELGRADE MEMORANDA 
ZAGREB 
At the moment when you. gentlemen Re�ents. are taking over 
the prerogatives of the Crown from the hands (If Him. who de­
voted the manifold qualities of His strong per�onality to His mis- � 
sion as So\'ereign and finally sacrificed His life in the fulfillment 
of His far-reaching plans-at this difficnlt moment we consider it 
our duty as citizens to inform you of the state of the country and 
of the temper of the people. All state anthoritics should be :iware 
of these conditions and should have due regard for the will of the 
people. "Were it not for the misrepresentations and dnwnri�ht un­
truths that are both freely published and SC'CTetly whispered about 
these conditions, there would be no need for the step which we 
are taking, but the very fact that such misinformation is broadcast 
makes this step particularly necessary as an act of civic duty. All 
honourable citizens ought to co-operate in eliminating the dan­
gers that arise from the naive or malevolent concealment of truth, 
and from flattery which, particularly in recent times, has taken 
forms bordering on bad taste and verging upon insinuations. 
Guided by this desire for truth, which is so necessary today and 
animated by the words of Louis XIV: "Truth is always welcome, 
if told with respect and submitted without partiality"-we take 
the liberty of approaching you, gentlemen Regents, with this state· 
ment of ·truth .and of the measures that, in our opinion, should 
follow it. 
It is an iniquitous fallacy and the source of much evil to believe 
that many Yugoslavs, particularly among the Croats, are enemies 
of the state. Even in the case of the rare individuals who might be 
IO regarded with validity, the causes and motives of these excep-
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tional instances should be examined. One of the principal causes 
is beyond doubt the fatal confusion between the terms "state .. and 
.. organization of the state." 
The truth which can be categorically stated is that the people 
are loyal to this state and that they want it. This is truth and the 
very fact that he wants this state should be the foundation of the 
rights and liberty of every citizen to express freely his opinions re­
garding the organization of the state and to act in accordance with 
his own lights. In the interest of the preservation of the state the 
form of its organization must be Aexible, in order to perpetuate 
the state under changing conditions. 
This moment is not an appropriate one to discuss the desired 
form of the organization of the state, but this is the extreme mo­
ment to declare openly that the vast majority of the people reject 
its present organization. This moment is inappropriate to discuss 
the organization of the state because the impartial administration 
of justice is a much more urgent problem. It is symptomatic of 
the present conditions that the citizens must claim and demand 
that which is the most elementary characteristic of any state, and 
on which ordinarily no words need be lost. Many, even the lowest, 
officials of the state consider themselves endowed with authority 
arbitrarily to interpret and apply the law in a manner which 
.amounts, very often, to its extreme prostitution and violation. 
Such violations are a daily occurrence throughout the country and 
thtte is hardly a citizen who has not been their victim. In the first 
place, therefore, an impartial administration of justice must be 
guaranteed through equitable application of even the severe laws 
at present in force until they are gradually replaced by milder 
legislation. Justice must be impartially administered and applied 
to all citizens alike. 
Censorship, which as it is now practiced has reached the peak of 
unreason, arbitrariness, harmfulness and illegality, is insuppona­
ble if truth is to be helped to victory. 
The laws governing aM<>Ciations and public meetings must be 
reformed to exclude the monopoly of only one political party and 
only one political principle. Loyalty to the state is a sufficient 
reason and condition for any state to permit freedom of allOCia­
tion and public meetings. 
Independence of the Law Court1 must be guaranteed if the 
Courts are to become true interpreters of justice. Legal sanctiom 
must be restored against illegal acts of an administration which 
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in practice does not stand on the solid ground of the law. In this 
connection all government officials should be specifically warned 
that the misery of a vast number of the population has reached 
such proportions that it is not only intolerable but directly dan­
gerous to augment this misery by police molestations which tend 
to increase the irritation and bitterness of the citizens. 
It is advisable, if not directly to aboli,sh, then at lea-st to suspend 
-by way of experiment-the activities of the Court for the De­
fence of the State, which through its numerous and severe sen­
tences creates an undoubtedly ham1ful and dangerous impression 
that the nation produces only enemies of the state, whereas condi­
tions contrary to law produce enemies of such conditions. 
In view of existing conditions it is much that the citizens claim 
and demand, but it is nothing in comparison to what ought to be 
a conditio sine qua non of every state. 
As a first visible and convincing manifestation that the policy 
of the state has entered the path of pure legality it would seem to 
be of utmost urgency: 
i)  To release from pri5on Dr. Vladimir Macek, or, to be more 
precise, to allow him to exert his legal right to obtain a condi­
tional release. An analogous treatment to be accorded to all other 
political prisoners as far as they satisfy the conditions required by 
law. 
2) Grant the largest possible amnesty. Amnesty has not been 
granted for years. 
3) Grant freedom of movement to all those who have been de­
prived of it or restricted for political reasons. 
4) The army, gendarmes and police are capable, in our view, of 
taking care of peace and order in the land, and we consider it not 
only unneccessary but extremely dangerous to permit other or­
ganizations to assume their task. 
5) Change the electoral law for rural and urban councils by in­
troducing secret instead of the public ballot as it is at present. 
Carry out the elections, already provided for by the law, in these 
communities. Such elections will confirm our contention regard­
ing the untruthful rumours and reports and show the true trend 
of public opinion. They would do this in a peaceful atmosphere 
and would be preparatory to national elections, which, we admit, 
would be premature and dangerous at the present moment. 
6) Appoint to the highest positions in the state, like those of 
Bani (governors), personalities whose past record and character 
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would afford a guarantee that the measures proposed and the 
good intentions of the Regency would be carried om. 
The following measures seem to us to constitute an imperati\·c 
necessity, in this first moment: to pacify the population, nom1alizc 
conditions, and inspire the people with faith that conditions will 
gradually improve. The ground must be prepared for the concen­
tration of all national energies which is so vitally important 
today.· The recent declaration of Mr. Baldwin : "I shudder at the 
thought of what a weak British government would mean in the 
present European situation" is equally applicable to our country. 
For purely technical reasons the number of signatures on this 
Memorandum is not very great. The necessity of quick action, in 
face of the security measures of the police, who hinder loyal citi­
zens from freely consulting about the common weal, that is to say, 
about the interests of their own country, did not permit us to 
collect more signatures. The undersigned, however, guarantee 
with their word of honour that each of them has consulted tens 
upon tens of loyal citizens of different professions, prominent 
public men of different political thought, who are all informed of 
the Memorandum and in agreement with its contents. If we had 
had the opportunity of deliberate and unhindered action there 
would have been thousands upon thousands who would have 
signed it and would have thus manifested the true feeling of the 
country. '.Ve are convinced that this Memorandum would have re­
ceived a plebiscitary endorsement as representing the minimum of 
measures that should be undertaken without delay in this critical 
moment in the interest of the State, of the King, and of the People. 
Dr. Ante Bauer Dr. lvo Krbek 
archbishop University Prof. and Mayor of 
Dr. Alojzij Stepinac Zagreb 
archbishop coadjutor Dr. Tomislav Tomljenovic 
Dr. Klement Bonilacic former Ban 
bishop of Split Vlado AndraSevic 
Dr. Svetozar Ritig Municip. Councillor, etc. 
parish priest Vladimir Pexidr-Sriea 
Dr. lvo Spevec President of the Commerc. Sec-
lawyer and Municipal Councillor tion of the Chamber for Com-
Dr. Ferdo Sisic merce arid Industry 
University Professor 
Dr. Zelimir Maiuranic 
Dr. M. Curcin 
Editor of 
Evropa" 
the review "'/llova 
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Milan Ramuseak 
President of the Chamber of 
Artisans 
Dr. Petar Knoll 
University Prof. 
Ivan Per8i6 
former M. P. and Municip. 
Councillor 
Dr. Antun Gottlieb 
surgeon 
Dr. Adolf Ursi6 
lawyer, Varaldin 
Dr. Albert Bazala 
University Professor and Presi· 
dent of the Yugoslav Academy 
Ing. Djuro Stipeti6 
University Professor and Rector 
Dr. Ivo Tartaglia 
former Ban 
Ivan Me8trovi6 
Milan M. Rojc 
former head of dept. of Croatian 
govt. for educational and reli­
gious a/Jain, etc. 
Dr. Milivoj Dezman 
Nikola Precca 
Dr. Stanko Svrl juga 
Dr. lvo Belin 
Secretary of the Stock Exchange 
Dr. Djuro Vraneiic 
President of the Medical Cham. 
ber 
Pavle Ostovic 
Secretary of the former Yugoslav 
Committee in London 
Viktor Fabris 




former Vire-Mayor of Zagreb 
Krdimir Brovet 
President of the Assoc. of Mer­
chants 
Dr. Rikard Lenac 
Dr. Ljudevit Sole 
lawyer, Varazdin 
Dr. Stanko Hajdukovic 
lawyer, Osijek 
Dr. Ante Kraljic 
law)'er, Susak 
Dr. August Petrovic 
lawyer, Osijek 
Note: It will be lttD that all professions were represented among the signatories, 
and although all 'Wel'e active in public life, practically none of them was active in 
daily party politics. The Memorandum was addressed to the Regents. It was actually 
drafted at the beginning of September, 1934 and would have been delivered to 
Alexander had he lived. As it is, it was submitted to Prince Paul, the chief Regent, 
about mid-November. In spite of its moderation. the Memorandum provoked a 
campaign of wild abute of the signatories by the government-controlled press in· 
spired by the Serbian oligarchy. However, a group of Belgrade intellectuals, with 
Slobodan Jov.a.oovit at the head of them, greeted the Zagreb Memorandum, and 
prcsenred a Memorandum of their own to the Regents at the beginning of Decem­
ber, 195'· 
Except that Dr. V. Mats and 10me other political prisoners were released from 
prieon some months later, the Memorandum had no effect. It should be noted that 
this Memorandum emphasizes the miJCry of the people and that most of the signers 
were capitaliall or members of the well-to-do class. 
The organizations mentioned in point 4 arc the chetniks and the Serb-dominated 
Yugoslav Nat.ioo.al Defence organization. Both claimed to be super-patriotic and as· 
168 
Item I Cont . 
BELGRADE 
(handed to the Regents in the first days of December, 1934) 
In the difficult situation that has arisen through the death of His late 
Majesty King Alexander, the undersigned group of Belgrade intellec­
tuals consider it their duty to address to the Regents the following 
statement: 
It becomes clearer every day that the murder at Marseilles was an act 
conceived by foreign enemies of our country with the intention of en­
dangering the integrity of our state. This makes it an obligation for 
the sons of this country to concentrate all their energies and, le.aving 
aside all particular political programs, to adopt a common program of 
national salvation as they have always done in the past when the coun­
try was i n  danger. 
We welcome the Memorandum of a group of Zagreb intellectuals who. 
while confirming that the vast majority of the Croats are loyal to this 
state although opposed to iu present political organization, have ar­
med at the same conclusion that the concentration of national ener­
gies represents a dire necessity at the present time. This fonifies us in 
our conviction that all parts of the nation are equally conscious that 
to-day more than ever salvation lies in unity. 
The Regenta have an honourable but serious responsibility to ensure a 
regime that will lead the country out of the aisis while relying on 
united energies and enjoying the confidence of the whole nation. We 
have, therefore, considered it our duty to interpret before the Regents 
thCIC feelings which, in om opinion, prevail in the ranks of the in­
telligentsia. 
J ovanovic5 Slobodm 
Markovic5 Bo�idar 
Mirkovic5 Vladimir 
(and about forty other signatures) 
Note: It ii intcrating that none of the Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy 
signed thia Memorandum. 
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